Latin America 2020: Challenges to U.S. National Security Interests

2020·1 MB·English

by  NDU Press

Latin America 2020
Challenges to U.S. National Security
Interests
Craig A. Deare

Latin America 2020

Latin America 2020:
Challenges to U.S. National
Security Interests
Craig A. Deare
National Defense University Press
Washington, D.C.
June 2020
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within
are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of
the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared
for public release; distribution unlimited.
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vided that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate
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Cover: Protester launches tear gas fired by national guard during demonstra-
tion against government of Nicolás Maduro, Caracas, Venezuela, April 26, 2017
(Shutterstock/Reynaldo Riobueno)
First printing, June 2020
Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................1
Introduction .............................................................................................1
An Overview of the Threats ...................................................................5
Cultural Underpinnings .......................................................................18
The Confluence of Threats: Venezuela ................................................25
Conclusion .............................................................................................31
Notes .......................................................................................................34
About the Author ..................................................................................38

Latin America 2020
Executive Summary
U.S. national security interests in Latin America are undermined by three key
threats: transnational criminal organizations, which exploit weak levels of gover-
nance across the majority of countries in the region; extra-regional actors, which
fill the vacuum created by U.S. distraction and inattention to its neighborhood;
and finally, a number of regional political actors embracing ideological positions
opposed to open political systems and free markets, which undermine progress
toward democratic governance and stability. The United States must acknowledge
the deeply rooted causes of the weak levels of governance and engage with greater
attention and presence while recognizing its limitations for helping to resolve those
weaknesses in the short term. U.S. prestige is on the line within this hemisphere as
we confront the ambitions of revisionist powers undermining global order.
Introduction
Latin American specialists routinely draw attention to a range of factors that
merit the attention and concern of U.S. policymakers. Nonetheless, the panora-
ma in the spring of 2020 is particularly dire, with ongoing social, political, and
economic weakness across the region, now exacerbated by the 2019–2020 novel
coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. The geopolitical environment of the Western
Hemisphere during the 2016 U.S. election cycle represented a unique window of
opportunity to improve the quality of the security relationships that the United
States had with its counterparts throughout Latin America. Unfortunately, policy-
makers failed to take full advantage of that opportunity and now are confronted
with a more daunting landscape.
It is a matter of fact that U.S. foreign policy in general, and U.S. national
security strategy in particular, does not routinely focus on the nations of Latin
America, where threats are assumed to be less pressing than in other parts of the
world. Despite a traditional attitude of benign neglect, U.S. security interests there
are indeed consequential. Given a globalized world, and the fact that the United
States is no longer the only viable option available to the region’s nation-states
seeking external engagement and support, American policymakers will need to
work harder—and more importantly, smarter—to remain relevant and engaged
1
Deare
with our Latin American partners. Geopolitical realities at play in this part of the
world are serious and troublesome; they will not disappear in the short term and
will require dedicated time and attention by senior national security decisionmak-
ers sooner rather than later.
The dynamics of Latin America are quite complex, the cumulative effect a
combination of geography and exploration, led by the Spanish (and to a lesser
degree, Portuguese) conquest, domination, and eventual colonialization of in-
digenous populations beginning in the early 16th century. The evolution of these
societies over the years has been uneven, but the predominant trend has seen au-
thoritarian and non-inclusive political systems, economic systems characterized
by small groups of wealthy elites and large segments of economically marginal-
ized populations, and judicial systems developed to support the elites rather than
unbiased rule of law for the entire societies. The net effect is the most violent and
economically unequal region in the world.
Broad national security interests of the United States were captured succinctly
by a report from the Project on National Security Reform: “To maintain security
from aggression against the nation by means of a national capacity to shape the
strategic environment; to anticipate and prevent threats; to respond to attacks by
defeating enemies; to recover from the effects of attack; and to sustain the costs of
defense.”1 If these interests are at varying degrees of risk in other parts of the world,
they are also under assault in Latin America. Obviously, this part of the world is an
environment we should wish to shape; after all, we share the same neighborhood.
It seems clear that anticipating and preventing threats in Latin America are both
prudent and cost-effective. Consequence management after the fact will be far
more expensive, and these problems are manifesting themselves now.
In 2016, a number of indicators painted a positive picture for U.S. national
security interests in the region and a window of opportunity emerged. The late
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s Pink Tide was receding rapidly.2 The anti-
U.S. alliance known as ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de América,
or the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas), established by Chávez to reduce U.S.
influence, was imploding after Chávez’s death in March 2013 amid declining oil
prices.3 Leaders supportive of the goals of promoting democratic governance and
2