Knowledge, Language and Mind

205 Pages·2012·0.637 MB·

by  Antonio Marques, Nuno Venturinha

Knowledge, Language and Mind
On Wittgenstein
Edited on behalf of the
Internationale Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft e.V.
by James Conant, Wolfgang Kienzler,
Stefan Majetschak, Volker Munz, Josef G.F. Rothhaupt,
David Stern and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl
Volume 1
Knowledge,
Language and
Mind
Wittgenstein’s Thought in Progress
Edited by
António Marques and Nuno Venturinha
ISBN 978-3-11-028411-9
e-ISBN 978-3-11-028424-9
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Contents
Abbreviations   VI
Acknowledgments   VIII
Editors’ Introduction   1
P. M. S. Hacker
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction – a Wittgensteinian Critique   11
João Vergílio Gallerani Cuter
Five Red Apples   36
Jesús Padilla Gálvez
Are “Sentence” and “Language” Blurring Concepts?   52
Nikolay Milkov
Wittgenstein’s Method: The Third Phase of Its Development (1933–36)   65
Rui Sampaio da Silva
Meaning and Rules in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy   80
Nathan Hauthaler
Wittgenstein on Actions, Reasons and Causes   95
Alberto Arruda
Intention in the Investigations   114
Emiliano La Licata
Propagating Meaning. Kauffman Reads Wittgenstein: A New Interpretative
Paradigm?   126
Constantine Sandis
Understanding the Lion for Real   138
Maria Filomena Molder
The Difference between Drawing a Conclusion and Saying: It is like this!   162
Contributors   187
References   188
Index   194
Abbreviations
AWL Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1932–1935, ed. A. Ambrose, Oxford: Blackwell,
1979.
BBB The Blue and Brown Books, 2nd edn, ed. R. Rhees, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969.
BEE Wittgenstein’s Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000. (Numbers of manuscripts (MS), typescripts (TS) and dictations (D) are
according to G. H. von Wright’s catalogue.)
BT The Big Typescript, ed. and trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue, Oxford: Blackwell,
2005.
CE “Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness”, trans. P. Winch, in PO, pp.
368–426.
CV Culture and Value, rev. 2nd edn (A. Pichler), ed. G. H. von Wright, trans. P. Winch,
Oxford: Blackwell, 1998.
DB Denkbewegungen: Tagebücher 1930–1932, 1936–1937 (MS 183), ed. I. Somavilla,
Innsbruck: Haymon, 1997.
GB “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough”, trans. J. Beversluis, in PO, pp. 115–155.
LC Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief,
ed. C. Barrett, Oxford: Blackwell, 1966.
LFM Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics: Cambridge 1939, ed.
C. Diamond, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976.
LW II Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. II, ed. G. H. von Wright and
H. Nyman, trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
LWL Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1930–1932, ed. D. Lee, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
NB Notebooks 1914–1916, 2nd edn, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans.
G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979.
OC On Certainty, rev. edn, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe,
Oxford: Blackwell, 1974.
PG Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, trans. A. Kenny, Oxford: Blackwell, 1974.
PI Philosophical Investigations, 2nd edn, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans.
G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1958.
PIr Philosophical Investigations, rev. 4th edn, ed. P.  M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte, trans.
G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte, Oxford: Blackwell, 2009.
PO Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951, ed. J. C. Klagge and A. Nordmann, Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1993.
PPF “Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment”, in PIr, pp. 182–243.
PR Philosophical Remarks, ed. R. Rhees, trans. R. Hargreaves and R. White, Oxford:
Blackwell, 1975.
RFM Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 3rd edn, ed. G. H. Von Wright, R. Rhees
and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1978.
RPP II Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II, ed. G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman,
trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
TLP Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1922.
VW The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle, ed. G. Baker, trans. G. Baker, M. Mackert,
J. Connolly and V. Politis, London: Routledge, 2003.
Abbreviations   VII
WA Wiener Ausgabe, ed. M. Nedo, Vienna: Springer Verlag, 1993ff.
WC Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911–1951, ed. B. F. McGuinness,
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008.
WVC Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, ed. B. F. McGuinness, trans. B. F. McGuinness and
J. Schulte, Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.
Z Zettel, 2nd edn, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe,
Oxford: Blackwell, 1981.
Acknowledgments
This book was prepared within the framework of the research project Wittgen-
stein’s Philosophical Investigations: Re-Evaluating a Project, funded by the Por-
tuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) and hosted by the Institute
for Philosophy of Language (IFL) at the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences
(FCSH), New University of Lisbon (UNL). The editors would like to express their
gratitude to all these institutions as well as to the authors who have contributed
to this volume, the majority of whom have had the opportunity to discuss their
work in Lisbon during various activities carried out under the project. We also
would like to thank Carlos Pereira and Vanessa Boutefeu for their editorial assis-
tance as well as Alberto Arruda for organizing a meeting with the editors in 2011
and for his collaboration throughout the project.
Editors’ Introduction
The essays included in the present book present a multitude of topics and sug-
gestions all relating to Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Nonetheless, in most chapters
(if not in all of them) it is easy to identify the problem of method, indeed of a new
method for philosophy, as a transversal theme. It is true that the development
of his post-Tractatus thought, the identification of processes of discontinuity,
the characterization of the rupture brought about by Wittgenstein himself or
the exact timing of the establishment of a new philosophy have always occu-
pied a central place in Wittgenstein interpretation. Already the 1945 “Preface”
to the Philosophical Investigations is itself an important piece of self-criticism
and, to a certain extent, does not allow much doubt as to the moment when he
first recognized “grave mistakes” in his former philosophy: “For since I began to
occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I could not but recog-
nize grave mistakes in what I set out in that first book”.1 The invention of new
methods associated to different “Copernican revolutions” has, of course, been a
recurrent procedure of philosophers throughout the history of philosophy, and
always represents a kind of self-reception of their own former thought. In the
case of Wittgenstein interpretation, the evaluation of more or less dramatic dis-
continuities is by itself a chapter of commentary on his work, namely if the line
of discontinuity between a dogmatic and an undogmatic philosopher acquired a
new strength with the discussion promoted by the so-called “New Wittgenstein”
approach.2
If one takes a closer look at the different chapters, we find that Peter Hack-
er’s essay, although not primarily centred on the methodological issue, makes
an important contribution to helping clarify the “logico-grammatical” method
that Wittgenstein uses to criticize the traditional (empiricist as well as ratio-
nalist) account of self-knowledge and self-ascribed experience. He does this
by confronting it with Kant’s doctrine of transcendental apperception, where
the awareness of the subject’s ownership of his representations is the basis for
human experience or objective knowledge. In Wittgenstein no such requirement
is necessary in order to become master of the perceptual vocabulary and con-
cepts of perception. In Hacker’s view, Wittgenstein’s account of self-conscious-
ness breaks with the Cartesian/Lockean tradition which culminates in Kant: in
order to express feelings or perceptual experiences it is simply not necessary to
presuppose that there be a core of a priori conditions to produce such expres-
1 All quotes are from PIr.
2 See as the most relevant starting point for this discussion, Crary and Read 2000.