Knowledge as Acceptable Testimony

225 Pages·2017·2.32 MB·English

by  Steven L. Reynolds

Knowledge as Acceptable Testimony
Standard philosophical explanations of the concept of knowledge invoke a
personal goal of having true beliefs, and explain the other requirements for
knowledge as indicating the best way to achieve that goal. In this highly
originalbook,StevenL.Reynoldsarguesinsteadthattheconceptofknow-
ledge functions to express a naturally developing kind of social control, a
complexsocialnorm,andthatthemainpurposeofourpracticeofsayingand
thinkingthatpeople“know”istoimproveoursystemforexchanginginfor-
mation, which is testimony. He makes illuminating comparisons of the
knowledge norm of testimony with other complex social norms – such as
thoserequiringproperclothing,respectfulconversation,andthecomplemen-
taryvirtuesoftactandfrankness–andshowshowthisaccountfitswithour
concept of knowledge as studied in recent analytic epistemology. His book
willinterestarangeofreadersinepistemology,psychology,andsociology.
stevenl.reynoldsisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophyatArizonaState
University. His research, which has been published in a number of leading
philosophicaljournals,focusesonthetheoryofknowledgeandmetaphysical
issuesaboutrealism.

Knowledge as Acceptable
Testimony
Steven L. Reynolds
ArizonaStateUniversity
UniversityPrintingHouse,CambridgeCB28BS,UnitedKingdom
OneLibertyPlaza,20thFloor,NewYork,NY10006,USA
477WilliamstownRoad,PortMelbourne,VIC3207,Australia
4843/24,2ndFloor,AnsariRoad,Daryaganj,Delhi–110002,India
79AnsonRoad,#06–04/06,Singapore079906
CambridgeUniversityPressispartoftheUniversityofCambridge.
ItfurtherstheUniversity’smissionbydisseminatingknowledgeinthepursuitof
education,learning,andresearchatthehighestinternationallevelsofexcellence.
www.cambridge.org
Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781107197756
DOI:10.1017/9781108181815
©StevenL.Reynolds2017
Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception
andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements,
noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten
permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress.
Firstpublished2017
PrintedintheUnitedKingdombyClays,StIvesplc
AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Names:Reynolds,Steven(AssociateProfessorofPhilosophy),author.
Title:Knowledgeasacceptabletestimony/StevenReynolds,ArizonaStateUniversity.
Description:1[edition].|NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2017.|
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
Identifiers:LCCN2017007131|ISBN9781107197756(Hardback:alk.paper)
Subjects:LCSH:Testimony(Theoryofknowledge)|Knowledge,Theoryof.
Classification:LCCBD238.T47R492017|DDC121–dc23LCrecordavailableat
https://lccn.loc.gov/2017007131
ISBN978-1-107-19775-6Hardback
CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracy
ofURLsforexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhispublication
anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain,
accurateorappropriate.
Contents
Acknowledgments pagevii
1 Social Norms, Knowledge, and Philosophy 1
ASocialNormforTestimony 1
CouldThatBePhilosophy? 3
State-of-NatureThoughtExperiments 4
EmpiricalPhilosophy? 7
ExperimentalPhilosophy 9
PreviewoftheState-of-NatureArgument 12
PreviewofProblemsaboutKnowledge 16
2 What IsKnowledge? 19
AnAnswerThatGivesItsFunction 19
Craig’sState-of-NatureThoughtExperiment 21
ModificationstoCraig’sThoughtExperiment 28
WhatCouldBeAskedintheStateofNature? 31
AnswerstotheQuestions 37
ChoosingamongConflictingAnswers 39
3 Developing a Concept ofKnowledge 46
AnInquirer’sFirstStepstowardaConceptofKnowledge 46
LotsofWorkandTestimonialNorms 48
MotivationforSelf-Evaluation 50
Gnowledge 52
GnowledgeandFailedGnowledge 56
4 IsThatOur Concept of Knowledge? 62
Truth? 62
GettierExamplesandJustification 68
TestimonialNormsandGettierStories 70
WhyWeShouldSayOnlyWhatWeBelieve 74
SummaryoftheState-of-NatureArgument 78
IsKnowledgeaNaturalKind? 81
Non-PropositionalObjectsofKnowledge 83
5 What IsJustified Belief? 85
OtherComplexSocialNorms 85
JustifiedBelief 90
v
vi TableofContents
IsJustificationClearerthanAppearance? 94
ClarifyingAppearances 95
AppearanceofOneselfKnowing? 100
6 JustifiedBelief Isthe Appearance of Knowledge 104
IfItAppearstotheSubjecttoBeKnowledge... 104
IfItDoesNotAppeartotheSubjecttoBeKnowledge... 107
ProblemsfortheAppearance-of-KnowledgeAccount 110
InaccessibleJustification? 112
ThoughtsabouttheMeaningof“Know” 117
7 Testimonial Knowledge andSocial Norms 122
JustificationsforAcceptingTestimony 125
GeneralProblemsforKnowledgethroughSocialNorms 126
ProblemsfortheSocialNormViewofKnowledgebyTestimony 131
WhatAreSocialNorms? 134
MotivationbyApprovalandDisapproval 136
BurgeonNaturalNorms 140
8 Knowledge from Testimony 145
DoWeHaveaSocialNormofKnowledgeforTestimony? 145
EvidencefortheSocialNormofKnowledgeforTestimony 147
EvidenceAgainstaSocialNormofKnowledgeforTestimony 150
Burge’sRationalistViewofTestimonialJustification 157
ResponsestoBurge’sViewofTestimonialJustification 162
Moran’sAssuranceViewofTestimonialJustification 168
TheMainDifferencefromAssuranceViews 170
9 Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Evaluations 173
WhyEvaluationsofBelief? 173
OughttoBelieveandControloverBeliefs 176
Counterexamplesto“OughtImpliesCan?” 179
WeCanBelieveasWeOughttoBelieve 182
Epictetus’ProblemaboutExpressed“OughttoBelieve”Judgments 185
SolutionstotheProblem 187
MyPreferredSolution 190
10 Why We Should Prefer Knowledge 195
RecentAttemptedExplanationsWhyWeShouldPreferKnowledge 197
IndependentValueforSkills,Achievements,Virtues? 199
AnotherKindofValueExplained 201
ConsideringValueinSpecificCasesorinPractices 202
ChangingtheSubject? 203
CreatingValue? 205
References 207
Index 214
Acknowledgments
ThankstoCambridgeUniversityPress,referees,KristyBarker,andespecially
Hilary Gaskin.
ThankstoArizonaState Universityfor sabbatical leaves thatgavemetime
unencumbered by teaching duties to work on this project in Fall 2001, Fall
2008, and Spring 2016. Thanks also to my students at Arizona State Univer-
sity, especially Joseph Kimand Parker Crutchfield.
I have benefited over the years from able and generous colleagues and
friends at ASU who have commented on and discussed various parts of the
project with me, including Brad Armendt, Tom Blackson, Cindy Bolton,
Elizabeth Brake, Cheshire Calhoun, Stewart Cohen (now at the University of
Arizona), Richard Creath, the late Gregory Fitch, Peter French, Ted Guleser-
ian, Jane Maienschein, Joan McGregor, Peter de Marneffe, Jeffrie Murphy,
Nestor Pinillos, and Douglas Portmore. David McElhoes and Jeffrey Watson
have helped with much appreciated discussion of some recent parts of
thebook.
A special thanks to my colleagues and friends Michael White and Bernard
Kobes for many discussions, much fruitful reading of the manuscript in
variousstagesof preparation, and much (and much needed) encouragement.
SinanDogramacioftheUniversityofTexasatAustinreadandcommented
on the entire manuscript at a late stage. I am in his debt for generous, expert,
andastutecommentsandsuggestionswhichIthinkhavemateriallyimproved
thework.
Finally,forinspiration,support,andinstructionofmanysorts,Iwouldlike
to express my loving appreciation to my wife, Sharman, and to our sons,
Andrew, Ben, and Daniel.
vii

1 Social Norms, Knowledge, and Philosophy
ASocial Norm for Testimony
Weseemtohaveaninformalrulethatweshouldtellpeoplesomethingonlyif
we know it. For example, you should tell your friend that the orchestra is
playingthisSaturdayonlyifyouknowthatitis.Somephilosophersthinkthat
our having such a rule indicates something important about telling (or testi-
mony), or about assertions more generally. This book argues that our having
this rule indicates something importantabout what it isto know something.1
Ithinkwedohavearulethatyoushouldtellpeopleonlywhatyouknow,and
that in some ways it is rather like the rule that you should always dress
appropriately.Itisacomplexsocialnormwhosespecificcontent–whatcounts
asfollowingtherule–dependsonlocalcultureandwaysofdoingthings.What
counts as appropriate dress – more specific norms about how to dress – varies
not only with person, time of day, season, location, and activity, but also in
different societies and across the years. Men in the United States in the 1920s
were expected to wear hats outdoors in most public places, and were made to
feel out of place if they didn’t. Going hatless no longer counts as being
inappropriately clad for adult males in the United States, but going shirtless
does,onmanyoccasionsandinmanyplaces.Failuretobeappropriatelydressed
exposesustodisapprovinglooksandcommentsbut,exceptinafewcases,not
formal legal sanctions. Most of us comply with the social norm requiring
appropriate dress by complying with the more specific norms for our time,
place, role, and activity (e.g., relaxing at home, recreation in public places,
working in farming, education, a warehouse, a factory, medical services, tech
businesses,traditionalbusinesses)andourownculturalsub-classification(self-
employedcontractor,student,teacher,salesperson,engineer,lawyer,retiree,old,
young, owner, management, labor). But many of us occasionally violate the
1 SimilarrecentprojectsincludeEdwardCraig’sprojectinKnowledgeandtheStateofNature
(1990), which will be discussed below, and Sinan Dogramaci’s “reverse engineering” of
epistemicevaluations(Dogramaci2012,2015aand2015b),whichfocusesonthefunctionof
the concept of rationality, rather than the concept of knowledge. For more discussion of the
purposeofepistemicevaluations,seeHendersonandGreco(2015).
1