Knowledge and Demonstration: Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

166 Pages·2004·0.99 MB·English

by  Orna Harari (auth.)

KNOWLEDGE AND DEMONSTRATION
The New Synthese Historical Library
Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy
VOLUME 56
Managing Editor:
SIMOKNUUTTILA, University of Helsinki
Associate Editors:
DANIELELLIOTGARBER, University of Chicago
RICHARDSORABJI, University of London
Editorial Consultants:
JANA. AERTSEN, Thomas-Institut, Universität zu Köln
ROGERARIEW, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
E. JENNIFERASHWORTH, University of Waterloo
MICHAELAYERS, Wadham College, Oxford
GAILFINE, Cornell University
R. J. HANKINSON, University of Texas
JAAKKOHINTIKKA, Boston University
PAULHOFFMAN, University of California, Riverside
DAVIDKONSTAN, Brown University
RICHARDH. KRAUT, Northwestern University, Evanston
ALAINDELIBERA, Université de Genève
JOHNE. MURDOCH, Harvard University
DAVIDFATENORTON, McGill University
LUCAOBERTELLO, Università degli Studi di Genova
ELEONORESTUMP, St. Louis University
ALLENWOOD, Stanford University
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
KNOWLEDGE AND
DEMONSTRATION
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics
By
ORNA HARARI
Tel-Aviv University,
Israel
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
ISBN 978-90-481-6722-7 ISBN 978-1-4020-2788-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-2788-8
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved
©2004Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2004
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2004
No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording
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and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.
To the memory of Edna Harari
(1963-1985)
Contents

Acknowledgements......................................................................................ix

Introduction...................................................................................................1

1. Intellect as a First Principle...................................................................13
1.1 The Ambiguity of the Term Archê...................................................13
1.2 Two Senses of Archê.......................................................................16
1.3 Induction and Intellect.....................................................................19
1.4 Induction..........................................................................................21
1.5 Induction in the Posterior Analytics I.1 and the
Prior Analytics II.21........................................................................25
1.6 Induction in the Posterior Analytics II.19........................................30
1.7 Epistemological Implications...........................................................35

2. The Immediate Premiss..........................................................................39
2.1 Immediate Premisses and Skepticism..............................................39
2.2 Definitions and Hypotheses.............................................................40
2.3 The Problem of the Modal Status of Hypotheses............................47
2.4 Hypotheses and the Principle of the Excluded Middle....................51
2.5 Demonstrative Necessity.................................................................56
2.6 Hypothetical Knowledge versus Knowledge Simpliciter................59

3. The Logic of Demonstration..................................................................63
3.1 The Modern Exegesis of the Theory of Syllogism..........................63
3.2 Syllogism and Hypothetical Deduction...........................................66
3.3 Syllogistic Consequence..................................................................73
3.4 The Cognitive Value of Syllogistic Reasoning................................81

4. Syllogism and the Object of Knowledge...............................................87
4.1 The Discrepancy between Aristotle’s Theory and
Scientific Practice............................................................................87
4.2 Syllogism and Greek Mathematical Reasoning...............................89
4.3 Syllogistic Logic and the Principles of Demonstration....................96
4.4 The Objects of Mathematics and Syllogistic Reasoning................100
4.5 Greek Mathematical Reasoning.....................................................109
vii
viii CONTENTS
5. Knowledge and Demonstration...........................................................117
5.1 Knowledge and Understanding......................................................117
5.2 Definition and Being......................................................................120
5.3 Being and Essence.........................................................................127
5.4 Demonstration and Essence...........................................................132
5.5 Aristotle’s Concept of Knowledge.................................................139
Conclusion.................................................................................................143
Select Bibliography...................................................................................149
General Index............................................................................................155
Acknowledgements

My study of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics began as a doctoral
dissertation, which I carried out under the supervision of Sabetai Unguru.
My deep gratitude for his encouragement, open mindedness, and thorough
criticism exceeds any verbal expression. Further, my understanding of
Aristotle’s logic has significantly changed as a result of my understanding of
Greek mathematical texts; I owe this to Sabetai Unguru. In writing this
book, I have benefited from Charles Kahn’s comments on several versions
of the manuscript. The book as a whole is much improved as a result of his
suggestions. I am also grateful to Geoffrey Lloyd for commenting on an
earlier version of the manuscript, and discussing with me points of
disagreement. His challenging criticism caused me to clarify my position.
John Glucker also has my warm thanks for his thoughtful suggestions and
corrections. In the spring of 2002, I participated in a seminar on the
Posterior Analytics, taught by John Murdoch at Harvard University. I am
deeply indebted to him for his comments and support.
This book was written, while I held a fellowship from the Dibner Institute
for the History of Science and Technology at MIT. I am grateful to the
Dibner Fund and the dedicated staff of the Dibner Institute for providing me
the means and assistance that made the completion of this book possible.
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my teacher Michael
Stauss, to whom I owe my general approach to Aristotle, to Menachem Luz,
who introduced me to Greek philosophy, and to Gilad Eshel, who stood by
me during crucial stages of this research.

ix
Introduction

This study explores the theoretical relationship between Aristotle’s theory
of syllogism and his conception of demonstrative knowledge. More
specifically, I consider why Aristotle’s theory of demonstration presupposes
his theory of syllogism. In reconsidering the relationship between Aristotle’s
two Analytics, I modify this widely discussed question. The problem of the
relationship between Aristotle’s logic and his theory of proof is commonly
approached from the standpoint of whether the theory of demonstration
presupposes the theory of syllogism. By contrast, I assume the theoretical
relationship between these two theories from the start. This assumption is
based on much explicit textual evidence indicating that Aristotle considers
the theory of demonstration a branch of the theory of syllogism. I see no
textual reasons for doubting the theoretical relationship between Aristotle’s
two Analytics so I attempt to uncover here the common theoretical
assumptions that relate the syllogistic form of reasoning to the cognitive
state (i.e., knowledge), which is attained through syllogistic inferences. This
modification of the traditional approach reflects the wider objective of this
essay. Unlike the traditional interpretation, which views the Posterior
Analytics in light of scientific practice, this study aims to lay the foundation
for a comprehensive interpretation of the Posterior Analytics, considering
this work from a metaphysical perspective. One of my major assertions is
that Aristotle’s conception of substance is essential for a grasp of his theory
of demonstration in general, and of the role of syllogistic logic in particular.
Traditionally, the Posterior Analytics is regarded as the first elaborate
theory of the structure of science. Aristotle’s discussions of epistêmê
therefore differ in their subject matter from his predecessors’. Plato, for
instance, was occupied with the notion of knowledge but Aristotle is
considered to have introduced a new subject for philosophical analysis: no
less than science itself. As a result, Aristotle’s theory of demonstration is
usually detached from its historical context. The philosophical problems that
he raises are assessed in light of modern philosophy of science rather than in
light of pre-Socratic and Platonic conceptions of knowledge.
This approach is reflected in modern discussions on the meaning that the
term epistêmê carries throughout the Posterior Analytics. In the past few
decades various commentators have questioned the traditional rendition of
epistêmê as “knowledge” or “science”, arguing that in fact Aristotle’s notion
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