Khrushchev's Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954-1959

398 Pages·2014·3.269 MB·English

by  Cəmil Hasanli

Khrushchev’s Thaw and National Identity in Soviet
Azerbaijan, 1954–1959
The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series
Series Editor: Mark Kramer, Harvard University
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Khrushchev’s Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954–1959
Jamil Hasanli
Khrushchev’s Thaw and National Identity in
Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954–1959
Jamil Hasanli
LEXINGTON BOOKS
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hasanli, Jamil.
Khrushchev’s thaw and national identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954–1959/Jamil Hasanli.
pages cm—(The Harvard Cold War studies book series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4985-0813-1 (cloth : alkaline paper)—ISBN 978-1-4985-0814-8 (electronic) 1. Azerbaijan—Politics and
government—20th century. 2. Nationalism—Azerbaijan—History—20th century. 3. Communism—Azerbaijan—History—20th
century. 4. Social change—Azerbaijan—History—20th century. 5. Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 1894–1971. 6. Azerbaijan—
Relations—Soviet Union. 7. Soviet Union—Relations—Azerbaijan. 8. Azerbaijan—Social policy. 9. Azerbaijan—Economic
policy. I. Title.
DK697.3.H3747 2014
947.5408’52—dc23
2014036925
™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information
Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.
Printed in the United States of America
For my grandchildren
Ayan, Emily, Sabina, Aytan, Sami, and Ibrahim.
Contents
Introduction
1 In a Tangle of Old Problems: First Steps of New Leaders of Azerbaijan
2 The 20th Congress of the CPSU and Soviet Republics of South Caucasus
3 Enactment of the Law on State Language of Azerbaijan
4 Deepening Political Crisis in the Leadership of Azerbaijan
5 1957: Growth of Contradictions between Soviet Leaders and Azerbaijan
6 Transformation of the National Policy into Key Vector of Society’s Development
7 Attempts of Party Bodies to Strengthen Control in Ideology
8 Summer 1959: Moscow’s Interference and Change of Leadership in Azerbaijan
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
About the Author
Introduction
The years 1954–1959 were of no great importance in the seventy-year history of Soviet
Azerbaijan. However, this brief period saw major developments in the life of the nation that
left their imprint in the annals of history and hearts of citizens. What changes took place in
Azerbaijan in 1954–1959? For some people the developments of the reviewed period
remained inexplicable and suspicious; for others—delightful reminiscence that gave birth to
national pride and bitter disappointment. However, principal questions remained unanswered:
what happened in the Republic from early 1954 to mid-1959? What events led to the
dissatisfaction of Moscow politicians and resultant tough measures? Why did these events
affect reappraisal of spiritual milestones and reanimation of political life and processes of
national rebirth? What were causes of Republican leaders’ great interest in the destinies of
their country and people? Was it a genuine growth of the national idea and self-consciousness?
What novelties were brought into the literature, historical science, and culture? Why, under the
pressures of the Kremlin, Party, and state apparatus, were statesmen and senior officials of
Azerbaijan removed from their posts? This book makes an attempt to answer these and other
questions that mattered most not only for the history of the USSR but for the subsequent
destinies of the Azerbaijani people as well.
Following the death of Joseph Stalin, the political life of the USSR was marked by certain
changes. First of all came the so-called “case of physicians,” those allegedly attempting upon
Stalin’s life and charged with close links to international Zionism. All those repressed in this
case were rehabilitated. The same is true of the case of the “Mingrel nationalistic group” that
brought great misfortunes to the Georgian people; in April 1953 illegally deported citizens
were allowed to return home. Against a background of relaxation of Soviet totalitarianism
there was a touch of liberalism in the national policy. Thus, the rights of Union Republics in
planning their own economies and running their cultural life were, to an extent, expanded.
Beginning in the mid-1950s the rural population was provided with passports. The Soviet
“servitude” came to an end, and the inflow of citizens into towns intensified. In the 20th
Congress, crimes of the Stalin period were made public; the rehabilitation process started; and
victims of Stalin deportations returned to ordinary living conditions, although with certain
restrictions. This process became known as the “Khrushchev thaw.” Despite gradual
weakening of the Stalin totalitarianism of the 1930–1940s, the “Khrushchev spring” in the mid-
1950s failed to put an end to it once and for all. The reforms of Nikita Khrushchev were
indeterminate and failed to affect the foundations of the Soviet system. For instance, some
repressed peoples were allowed to come back and restore their autonomy, while the rights of
Crimean Tatars, Meskheti Turks, and Povolzhye Germans were still infringed.
It was the “Khrushchev thaw” that revived the political life of Azerbaijan. A new leadership
of the Republic was formed in the beginning of 1954. Imam Mustafayev was elected the First
Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan at its 20th Congress; Sadykh Rahimov headed
the Council of Ministers; Mirza Ibrahimov was elected the Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR. This triumvirate assumed the responsibility for the
Party and economic and cultural life of the Republic. Note that the new leaders of the country
took no part in the Stalin repressions and were interested in deepening the political processes
going on in the Soviet Union. They managed to make these processes comply with the interests
of Azerbaijan and even contrived to hold out against pressures from the “non-native”
population of the Republic, representatives of the so-called Baku Party organization who
claimed themselves to be “victims of Bagirov’s terror,” which is how the era of Stalinism
began to be referred to after the arrest of Mir Jafar Bagirov, who was then the Party leader of
Azerbaijan.
An article on enforcing the Azerbaijani language’s status as a state language was added to the
constitution of the country in August 1956. It was the wide and universal application of the
Azerbaijani language in state institutions that gave impetus to the development of a national
self-consciousness. The Republic saw the growth of national sentiments. However, outliers
manifested themselves as well. Productive conferences in Baku to discuss language issues
sometimes turned into heated debates and even brawls. Sensing the government’s support, the
native population gradually expanded its legal rights and restored its positions in politics and
economics. The burden of staffing policy fell on the shoulders of Azerbaijanis. The driving
factor in the development of science, literature, and culture was to comply with national
values. All these fostered spiritual principles, in-depth study of the historical past, and a full
transfer of culture into the national track.
Fifty years have passed since then, and today’s readers may take the progress for granted.
However, account has to be taken of the fact that in the reviewed period other national
Republics faced problems of this sort as well. Except for Georgia and Armenia—which
managed to add articles on the state status of their national languages to their constitutions in
1937—all the other Republics, particularly Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, raised the
question of their language status as they marked their national rebirth. In 1953, First Secretary
of the Communist Party of Ukraine Leonid Melnikov, Russian by nationality, was replaced by
Ukrainian Aleksey Kirichenko. However, neither Ukraine nor the Baltic Republics succeeded
in adopting a law on state language. Azerbaijan was the single Republic that made this step
without the permission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CC CPSU) in 1956 and thus equalized itself in rights with its neighbors.
In spite of the fact that the rights of the Union Republics were expanded, and they were
provided with certain economic independence in the 1950s, hidden confrontation arose
between the Center and the provinces. Dissatisfaction of the Union Republics came from the
growing chauvinism of Moscow officials that was in fact predicted by Lenin toward the end of
his life. It was the consolidation of the Party apparatus in the course of Khrushchev’s reforms
that imparted the increasingly ugly nature of this process. Testifying to this was an undisguised
animosity between the heads of the Republics and CC CPSU apparatus officials. The matter
was that Muscovites looked down their noses at national minorities and treated them like a
lower order of creation. Travelers from Moscow behaved arrogantly in the Republics. Much
documentation referring to Azerbaijan, including numerous statements made by Party
bureaucrats, debriefings on inspections, and reports on Baku developments, was of a biased,
ill-intentioned nature. An eloquent testimony to this fact is a report made by a CC CPSU
special group who carried out inspections in Azerbaijan in the spring 1959. Results of the
work done were submitted to a meeting of the Presidium of the CC CPSU. Strained relations
between Mustafayev and the central authorities came as a result of low-grade apparatus
intrigues carried out by senior executives from the CC CPSU, and their overrated self-
appraisal was manifest in their relations with representatives of national regions. An attempt
was made in 1955 to remove Mustafayev. Thus, in April 1955, Moscow was going to approve
the candidacy of the First Secretary of the Baku City Party Committee, but in the course of
interlocution, Evgeniy Gromov, head of the department for Party organizations of the Union
Republics, made uncomplimentary comments about Mustafayev. In August 1955, CC CPSU
senior executives passed a decision on removing Mustafayev from his post, and they eventually
succeeded, although not in 1955 but in 1959.
On the one hand, Khrushchev’s reforms gave national Republics certain rights to solve local
problems, but on the other hand, beginning in the mid-1950s nearly all Second Secretaries of
the CPSCs from national Republics were sent from Moscow with the goal of strengthening
control over the Republics. As a rule, they were Russians by ethnicity, and they were meant to
fulfill the function of Moscow’s “eyes and ears” in the Republics. Vladimir Semichastny, who
would later lead the Soviet KGB for long years, was sent to Azerbaijan with precisely this
mission in 1959. In his memoir, he touched on the period of time when he served as the Second
Secretary of the Azerbaijan Party CC: “It probably merits explanation why the Second
Secretary of the CCs of the republics had to be Russian. The Second Secretaries almost
everywhere were sent from the Center, and as a rule, they were Russians . . . and this system
justified itself. I consider that this was what maintained a sustainable equilibrium in the
national republics.”1 A former KGB chief described the mission of the Second Secretaries of
the Republics as follows: “the person chosen as the Second needed to be not only a soldier, but
a leader who had authority, strength and management ability; he needed to be able to solve the
most complicated problems, be a good organizer and influence both the management of the
republic and the masses. . . . I set up this kind of system: no single decision of the Party CC [of
Azerbaijan—J. H.] was made without my approval.”2
It was no secret that the USSR saw national contradictions and dissatisfaction of national
minorities with their status. Proceeding from a bitter experience of the Soviet society, local
leaders were deathly afraid of any accusations of nationalism, so they had to handle the
national question with utmost care. The bitter lot of Nariman Narimanov, one of the First
Chairmen of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, may be cited as an example. As far
back as in the 1920s he was accused of nationalism. Attempts to dismiss charges of this sort
from his name were crowned with no success, even in the transitional 1950s or the stagnant