Kent Political Almanac

64 Pages·2015·2.73 MB·English

Kent Political Almanac
‘Europe in the World’
Special issue
School of Politics and IR
2 Kent Political Almanac
Issue 2
Managing Editor Academic Advisors

Rebecca Walker Professor R Blakeley

Editorial Board
Professor Elena Korosteleva

Afroditi-Maria Koulaxi Dr Ben Seyd
April Yeung Dr Andrew Wroe
James Pepper Professor Richard Whitman
Liam Faulkner Dr Harmonie Toros
Layout & Design
Maëlle Poulin
About the Kent Political
Almanac
Mike Spaan Mehdi Abakarim
The Kent Political Almanac was created Moonira Mamoon Robert Small
to provide a platform for academic
debate and peer-reviewed publication Regis Verdier
opportunities for students in Politics and
International Relations. This journal’s
purpose is to showcase the School’s
best undergraduate and postgraduate
essays.
The initiative came from students of the
School of Politics and International
Relations, which led to the journal being
launched in November 2013.
All articles are peer-reviewed by both
students and members of the School’s About The Global Europe Centre
academic staff. We are proud to be an
entirely student-led publication,
The Global Europe Centre (GEC) is a new interdisciplinary research centre, focusing on
supported from our School of Politics
Europe, its member states, and its place in a changing world.
and IR at the University of Kent.
The Centre brings together leading international academics from politics and international
Get in touch relations, economics, law, business, and European culture in order to explore the
contemporary policy challenges to Europe and its nation states.
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Kent Political Almanac 3
Issue 2
‘Europe in the World’
Special issue
Welcome to this special issue
This edition marks the Kent Political Almanac’s second publication. We
are privileged to once again launch the journal in partnership with the
Global Europe Centre, University of Kent. The majority of the essays in
this edition therefore follow a theme of ‘Europe in the World’.
Following our call for papers, we received a great deal of excellent work
sent in from students of all ages and degree stages. We are extremely
proud to be presenting a selection of these in this edition. Work from
students from hugely diverse backgrounds all around the globe is
represented here, with an equally international array of editors.
We started this journal with an idea, and since then it has rapidly
evolved. In the future we hope to present more editions throughout
each academic year, and further increase the publication’s visibility.
None of this would be possible without a committed team of editors,
volunteering their time to help students show off the best of what they
can do. We would like to thank all of the authors who contributed to
this issue, and those who agreed to present their published work at this
year’s celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the University of Kent’ Contents
We are especially grateful to the members of staff from the School of Interest Group Representation in the
European Union 4
Politics and International Relations, who gave their time to be part of
the review process, and whom believe in this project as much as we do.
European Security after the
Our special thanks go to the Global Europe Centre, and to Professor Cold War 14
Elena Korosteleva, whose support has been pivotal from the journal’s
How Democratic is the United
launch.
States? 22
We hope that you will enjoy reading this issue of the Kent Political
The EU as a mediator in the
Almanac.
Georgia-Russia War 31
Rebecca Walker
The Impact of enlargement in
Managing Editor modern European Crisis 39
Normative Power? The role of the
EU in contemporary politics 48
The EU’s treatment of ACP
countries 56
4 Kent Political Almanac
Issue 2
Interest Group representation
By Julien Decre
in the European Union
Interest groups are at the heart of many
Euro-sceptic criticisms, especially with
respect to the democratic legitimacy of
the European institutions. Yet the
First and foremost, it is important to properly define the terms of our analysis and to
understanding we have of how the
understand the basic mechanisms of inter group representation in the EU.
representation of interest groups in the
European Union (EU) works is often To begin, one must be precise about what is meant by ‘interest group’. The term is vague
and general. Interest groups take many different forms, more or less organised, more or
quite blurred. The aim of this essay is to
less large, with different goals in different areas. They have varying designations: ‘pressure
attempt to understand the functioning of
groups’, ‘special interest groups’, ‘associations’, ‘lobbies’ ‘NGOs’, ‘civic groups’, ‘non profit
interest group representation in the EU.
organisations’, etc. Indeed, the more or less organised, more or less institutionalised or
More specifically, I will look at whether it informal, with more or less resources, and defending very diverse interests1. Nonetheless,
is more based on competition Eising recognises three key factors to identify when one wants to study an interest group:
(‘pluralism’) or negotiation (‘corporatism’) organisation, political inter and informality. Organisationrelates to the characteristics of the
between the different interests. At first group: It must be organised. This excludes, for example, movements of public opinion.
Political interest refers to the intrinsic vocation any interest group to influence public policy.
sight, the multiplicity of interests and of
Informalityis the f that interest groups are not meant to play a role in politics themselves:
their influence routes let appear a certain
They seek to influence politicians to make them act on their behalf2. Regarding the interest
degree of pluralism within the European
groups in the European Unionthere are three main types of interests that can be identified:
institutions. Yet a significant ‘commercial interests’, ‘diffuse interests’ – also called ‘public interests’, that is to say whose
institutionalisation of interest group purpose is the common good –, an ‘territorially defined interests3-4.
representation may suggest a modern
In addition, one may also take a look at the basic mechanisms that drive the representation
form of corporatism. To what extent is
of interests within the EU. On the demandside, in recent decades interest groups have
interest group representation in the EU
tended to organise themselves at the European level because the EU has acquired many
pluralist or corporatist? In an attempt to regulatory skills in various fields (eg economy) – skills that are no longer the monopoly of
answer this question, I have made use Member States. Furthermore, it can be much cheaper and efficient to act directly at the
of the analyses of numerous scholars European level, instead of taking action in each member country. On the supplyside, the
EU is open to the influence of interest groups because their expertise helps the rulers to
that have studied this issue, since the
implement more effective and consensual policies, which will be thus better enforced. It is
early days of European construction until
also a way for them to promote their power against that of Member States: This is why the
the present day. I will try to demonstrate
Commission and the European Parliament are the most open to European interest groups,
that it is a mix of various forms of interest in contrast to the Council of the European Union5. Therefore, European institutions
group representation – sometimes encourage interest groups to come together and speak at the European level. Thus, the
derived from pluralism and sometimes
from corporatism – that prevails within
the EU. One could distinguish in
“Eising recognises three key factors to
particular large variations depending on
identify when one wants to study an interest
the sectors represented.
group: organisation, political interest and
informality.”
1 See Jan Beyers, Rainer Eising, and William Maloney, “Researching interest group politics in Europe and
elsewhere: much we study, little we know?”, West European Politics31, no.6 (2008), p. 1106.
2 Rainer Eising, “Interest Groups in EU Policy-making”, Living Reviews in European Governance 3, no. 4 (2008),
<http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2008-4>, [accessed November 26, 2014].
3 This is principally Member States’ representatives that look after territorially defined interests. But not only:
Certain regions, for example, can mobilise to defend their interests directly at the European level.
4 Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union(2nd edn.), (Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac-millan, 2005), p.
211-213.
5 Hix, Political System of the EU, 227-229.
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tendency is towards an increasing number of interest groups that act directly at the
European level. This was especially the case after the Maastricht Treaty: The number of
interest groups with an office in Brussels then tripled compared to the previous decade,
reaching around 15006,7, and it is difficult to estimate the actual number of interest because
all are not so organised bureaucratically8.
“after the Maastricht Treaty: The number of
interest groups with an office in Brussels then
tripled compared to the previous decade”
The importance of interests groups is particularly evident with regard to business interests,
which represent the majority of interest groups operating at the European level – nearby two
thirds. Thus, given the large number of actors and the ease with which they can access the
Commission to defend their interests, one can think of a pluralist intermediation model9. For
that matter, I will begin my analysis by examining more in depth the pluralist aspects of
interest group representation in the EU. At first sight, the representation of interest groups in
the EU may recall a form of ‘primitive’ or ‘classical’ pluralism. Authors such as Truman, Dahl
and Lipset theorised this concept in the 1950s-1960s. The main principle is that free access
for all interest groups to political leaders allows reaching equilibrium in a check and
balances system that is beneficial to the democratic functioning – in addition to the
traditional electoral representation. Interest groups must have equal access to the leaders.
The role of political leaders is simply to remain neutral between the interests, not favouring
one at the expense of others10,11,12. This seems to happen at the EU level, both for business
and diffuse interests.
Along with European integration, the accumulation of market regulation competences at the
level of Brussels has created a new structure of opportunity for social and economic
interests13. Commercial interests have to be defended where trade is regulated: in Brussels,
increasingly. Moreover, in face of globalisation large corporations no longer seek the
protection of states but rather try to make gains in productivity on the international market:
This constitutes one more reason to act in Brussels rather than at the national level. Along
with Europeanisation, interest groups have therefore largely tended to organise themselves
at the EU level. In doing so, some large companies act alone, or pay professional lobbyists
to act on their behalves. Others participate in sectorial groups such as the European
Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC). Others participate in cross-sectorial organisations: eg
the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations (UNICE), the Association of
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (EUROCHAMBRES), the European Association of
Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (UEAPME), etc. Strategies vary depending on
the interests to protect and may be multiple14.
6 Hix, Political System of the EU, 211.
7 Justin Greenwood, Interest representation in the European Union(Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
8 Greenwood, Interest representation in the EU.
9 Hix,Political System of the EU, p. 215-216.
10 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Knopf, 1951).
11 Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man; the Social Bases of Politics(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960).
12 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City(New Haven: Yale University Press,
1961).
13 Hix,Political System of the EU, p. 226.
14 Ibid., p. 214.
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Regarding diffuse interests, instead of acting on a case-by-case basis in each member
state, public interest groups can coordinate and act directly in Brussels when their interests
converge. This allows them to save money and to be more efficient15. As for commercial
interests, in addition to individual actions, many large organisations have been created to
defend diffuse interests on a European scale: the European Trade Union Confederation
(ETUC), the ‘G8 environmental NGOs’ (EEB, WWF, FoEE, Greenpeace, T & E Birdlife
International, CNE, IFN), the European Consumers’ Organisation (BEUC), etc. Looking at
all these multiple interest groups operating at the EU level, it may be argued that at first
sight the representation of interests seems to follow a pluralist model, in which all interests
compete without a single one being able to sustainably prevail. Into the bargain, this seems
consistent with what was expected by the ‘neo-functionalist’ theorists of European
integration: They relied particularly on business interest groups to promote Europeanisation
among the Member States16. Indeed, their role has been far from negligible in the European
construction and the EU’s creation17.
However, since the 1960s the idea of European pluralism has been widely criticised. Olson
expected that because of problems of ‘collective action’, major groups with diffuse interests
would never be able to organise themselves in order to counterbalance the power of small
groups with ‘concentrated’ interests. Indeed, unlike for private interests, there are great
incentives to free ride with respect to public interests. The outcome is therefore an unequal
access to political power for diffuse interests that calls into question the idea of a pluralistic
system of interest group representation18. This seems consistent with what happens
currently: As Hix recalls, the representation of business interests is quite disproportionate in
the EU19.
15 Iid., p. 226.
16 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957(Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 162-213.
17 Hix,Political System of the EU, pp. 208-231.
18 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups(Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 127-128.
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As a consequence, this is maybe a form of ‘neo-pluralist’ interest group representation that
rather seems to prevail. According to neo-pluralists,20problems of pluralism can be avoided
if political leaders cease to act as neutral arbiters, and help underrepresented interests
groups by subsidising them. This is what currently happens: The European Commission
funds hundreds of public interest groups21in order to counterbalance the power of business
interests. However, in spite of all these funding and consultation of public interest groups
efforts, interest representation at the EU level is still quite unbalanced in favour of business
interests22.
“According to neo-pluralists, problems of
pluralism can be avoided if political leaders
cease to act as neutral arbiters, and help
underrepresented interests groups by
subsidising them.”
On the other hand, as I will now attempt to show, the sole (neo)pluralism cannot
characterise the interest group representation system in the EU. In some areas, a trend
towards the institutionalisation of interest group representation, to promote negotiation, may
also suggest a modern form of corporatism.
On the other hand, as I will now attempt to show, the sole (neo)pluralism cannot
characterise the interest group representation system in the EU. In some areas, a trend
towards the institutionalisation of interest group representation, to promote negotiation, may
also suggest a modern form of corporatism. A wave of institutionalisation has developed in
20 See Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O’Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1987).
21 See Christine Mahoney and Michael J. Beckstrand, “Following the money: European Union fun-ding of civil
society organizations”, Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no.6 (2011), pp. 1339-1361.
22 David Coen, “Empirical and Theoretical Studies and EU Lobbying”, Journal of European Public Policy14, no. 3
(2007), pp. 335.
8 Kent Political Almanac
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the EU since the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In response to the exponential increase in
the number of business interest groups operating at the European level, and given the
unequal representation of public interests (especially labour interests), the European
Commission has taken action. From the mid-1980s, it has sought to institutionalise ‘social
dialogue’ between ‘social partners’ that are considered legitimate and representative of
European citizens’ will. Thus, for instance, in 1984 the president of the Commission
Jacques Delors, stated that henceforth UNICE and the ETUC – representing the two main
types of interests that oppose at the industrial level – would be systematically consulted on
any new social policy23. Moreover, this institutionalisation of relations between the ‘social
partners’ was largely accelerated with the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the EU –
which therefore cannot be completely considered a ‘pluralist’ system. Now the Commission
is legally constrained to consult business and labour prior to any new proposal for legislation
in the social field. And if the representatives of these two types of interests manage to reach
an agreement on a specific policy, it can be directly used as a European legislation24.
In addition, the EU has tried to institutionalise dialogue between business interests
themselves through the establishment of ‘quasi-formal forums’ in order to avoid the
surcharge of the Commission. These forums are designed to pursue public good through
negotiation. In 1997, Coen mentioned in particular the Ravenstein group25, the Maritime
Forum, the Transport Network Round Table, the Automobile Workshop,the Steel Panel, and
IT and Telecommuniction superhighway groups26.
“In the EU, organisations are legitimate
partners of institutional stake-holders in
decision-making and the establishment of
new rules, and they even have in certain
cases a self-regulatory authority.”
23 Hix, Political System of the EU, 216.
24 Ibid., p. 217.
25 Coen explains what the ‘Ravenstein group’ is: ‘a cross-section of Brussels-based political affairs directors. It is
an informal industrial club which discusses broad issues.’
26 David Coen, “The Evolution of the Large Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union”, Journal of European
Public Policy4, no. 1 (1997), p. 96.
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Finally, this institutionalisation of relations between interest groups by the Commission has
also continued in recent years as part of the debate on the democratic deficit of the EU, in
response to the growing distrust of citizens towards Brussels’ institutions. Thus, in 2002, it
endorsed new minimum standards with regard to the consultation of interest groups; and in
2008 it set up a voluntary register and new guidelines to be followed by them27. This
institutionalisation of interest groups relations in the EU – the ‘social dialogue’ in particular –
calls into question the idea of a completely ‘neo-pluralist’ system, as it has been defined
previously. Besides neo-pluralist arrangements coexist arrangements that can be described
as ‘quasi-corporatist’28. Indeed, the institutionalisation of ‘social dialogue’ recalls Hix’s
definition of corporatism: ‘The state recognises, licenses and grants representational
monopolies to the two sides of the class divide: the “social partners”29. In the EU,
organisations are legitimate partners of institutional stakeholders in decision-making and the
establishment of new rules, and they even have in certain cases a self-regulatory authority:
Therefore, one could argue that they play a ‘quasi-public’ role30.
However, one could not assert that genuine ‘classical’ corporatism actually exists within the
EU. ‘Classical’ corporatism31, denotes the model applied in certain European nation states
(eg Germany) until the 1970s: a division of interests between capitalists and workers, with
an organisation representing each one and participating in tripartite negotiations with the
State in order to implement policies accepted by all.
Streeck and Schmitter have investigated the issue in depth at the time of the establishment
of the EU. They identified preconditions necessary for the emergence of corporatism and
concluded that nothing of the sort could emerge at European level. Indeed, the EU lacks
fiscal power, so it could not use it to exert pressure in tripartite negotiations. Moreover, the
multitudeof access points for interest groups prevents the formation of a complete
organisation encompassing on one side the interests of workers, and on the other those of
capital. In addition, there is an imbalance in favour of employers, because of the priority
given to market integration. Lastly, the multitude of different national systemswould make it
difficult to set up a European corporatist system32. This analysis appears to be still true
today.
In any event, authentic corporatism does not seem to be suitable for the current European
Union. The great interests opposing today cannot be reduced to the Labour-Capital division.
These are themselves divided between them, and above all many other diffuse interests
have grown in importance: environment, women’s rights, minority rights, consumer
associations, etc33.
At last, one can therefore argue that a mix of interest group representation styles –
sometimes including corporatist aspects, but in which pluralism is still dominant – prevails
within the EU. A particular form of pluralism seems to predominate: It is sometimes referred
to as ‘élite pluralism’ or even ‘chameleon pluralism’.
27 Rainer Eising, “Clientelism, Committees, Pluralism and Protests in the European Union: Matching Patterns?”,
West European Politics31, no. 6 (2008), p. 1179.
28 Eising, “Interest Groups in EU Policy-making”, p. 19.
29 Hix, Political System of the EU, p. 219.
30 Eising, “Clientelism, Committees, Pluralism and Protests in the EU”, p. 1170.
31 Corporatism as a complete model needs to be distinguished from certain corporatist arrange-ments that can be
found in a complex system such as the EU.
32 Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe C. Schmitter, “From National Corporatism to Transnational Plu-ralism: Organized
Interests in the Single European Market,” Politics and Society19 (1991), pp. 133-64.
33 See Hix,Political System of the EU, p. 210.
10 Kent Political Almanac
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As we have seen, a form of neo-pluralism combined with some arrangements inspired from
corporatism characterises the interest groups representation system in the EU. According to
several authors, this mixture of systems has led to the emergence of a particular form of
pluralism: ‘élite pluralism.’ Indeed, a consequence of the institutionalisation of pluralism is
the co-optation of interest groups that have access to representation. The Commission
chooses its partners, thus creating a distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’34. Access
to the forums where interests confront is not as easy for all. It tends to be reserved primarily
to major trans-European organisations with a relatively important political weight.
For instance, the ETUC, BEUC and EEB36have gained a first choice place within the
system, unlike many NGOs and many diffuse interests. One of the consequences of the
dismissal of some interests groups from this elitist framework is the growing use of other
forms of collective action aiming to impact at the European level, such as demonstrations
directly in Brussels, often with much anger against the EU institutions. One can think of
course to farmers, but also to numerous other groups, such as animal rights advocates or
even bikers37.
However, according to Eising one should nuance this idea of ‘élites pluralism’ because it is
not systematic: the gaps and imbalances in interest group representation vary depending on
sectors38. In this respect, Coen and Richardson evoke a form of ‘chameleon pluralism’
instead: ‘EU pluralism might be best characterised as a kind of chameleon pluralism,
capable of changing its appearance over time during the policy cycle for a given policy
problem or within a sub-sector over a longer period of time39. Indeed, the Commission
changes its approach to pluralism depending in particular on the type of legitimacy it wants
34 Hix, Political System of the EU, p. 219.
35 European Environmental Bureau
36 See Hix, Political System of the EU, pp. 219-220.
37 Rainer Eising, “The Access of Business Interests to EU Institutions: Towards élite Pluralism?” Journal of
European Public Policy14, no. 3 (2007), pp. 384-403.
38 David Coen and Jeremy Richardson, Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, Actors, and Issues(Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 348.
39 David Coen and Alexander Katsaitis, “Chameleon Pluralism in the EU: An Empirical Study of the European
Commission Interest Group Density and Diversity across Policy Domains”, Journal of European Public Policy20,
no. 8 (2013), pp. 1104-119.