Kant’s theory of science PDF
Preview Kant’s theory of science
KANT'S THEORY OF SCIENCE KANT'S THEORY OF SCIENCE Gordon G. Brittan,Jr. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY Copyright © 1978 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book Publication of this book has been aided by a grant from The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation This book has been composed in V.I.P. Bembo Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey Vanessa ". . . to cognize anything a priori is to cognize it from its mere possibility. But the possibility of determinate na tural things cannot be cognized from their mere concepts; from these concepts the possibility of the thought (that it does not contradict itself) can indeed be cognized, but not the possibility of the object as a natural thing, which can be given (as existing) outside of the thought. Therefore, in order to cognize the possibility of determinate natural things, and hence to cognize them a priori, there is further required that the intuition corresponding to the concept be given a priori, i.e., that the concept be constructed. Now, rational cognition through the construction of concepts is mathematical. A pure philosophy of nature in general, i.e., one that only investi gates what constitutes the concept of a nature in general, may indeed be possible without mathematics; but a pure doctrine of nature concerning determinate natural things . . . is possible only by means of mathematics. And since in every doctrine of nature only so much science proper is to be found as there is a priori cognition in it, a doctrine of nature will contain only so much science proper as there is applied mathematics in it." METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL SCIENCE Preface It is not necessary to come from the West to be bound ines capably to one's own history. Philosophers, too, beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past. Inevitably they carry some of the present with them. There is at least this much truth to Croce's dictum that all history is contemporary history. In this study, I have tried to reconstruct rationally Kant's theory of science, drawing largely on the Critique of Pure Rea son and downplaying the fact that his position changed and developed over the years. If anything justifies my title, it is the attempt to give a general account of this "theory" and to show how, for Kant, it clarifies the relations between philos ophy and science. At the same time, the title "Kant's Theory of Science" is both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad because there are many features of Kant's theory of science, particularly having to do with methodological questions and the role of reason in its regulative aspect, about which I have said very little. There is already an excellent discussion of these questions and this role in Gerd Buchdahl's Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. The title is too narrow because the differences between Kant's theory of science and his more general metaphysics of experience are ones of detail and em phasis only. What I have to say about the former should il luminate the latter as well. The reconstruction has been guided by three criteria of adequacy formulated by Professor Wolfgang Stegmiiller.1 He asks that a reconstructed philosophical theory be presented (1) in such a way that it remains in accordance with the basic 1 In a pair of clarifying papers, "Towards a Rational Reconstruction of Kant's Metaphysics of Experience," Ratio, i, 1967, pp. 1-32, and n, 1968, pp. 1-37. Professor Stegmiiller has also directed my attention to some little- known but extremely interesting lectures on Kant given by Professor Hein- rich Scholz in the winter semester, 1943-1944, at the University of Miinster, very much in the same spirit as my study, if not always with the same results. viii PREFACE ideas of the philosopher; (2) as far as possible in precise terms; (3) if possible, as a consistent theory. I would supplement the first criterion, as does Stegmiiller, with the proviso that the original text be first analyzed carefully and respected throughout,2 and extend the third to read "as a consistent and unified theory." There are inconsistencies in Kant's theory; he never denied it. But a problem deeper than exposing or at tempting to resolve such inconsistencies is to see how the var ious themes he develops fit together. In the case of the theory of science, this comes down to trying to develop a unified ac count of Kant's philosophy of mathematics and his philoso phy of physics or, from a different point of view, to relate the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to the Critique of Pure Reason. It is also the case that to reconstruct a philosophical position is to make clear the structure of argument that supports it, and this involves as a natural consequence entering into ques tions of logical theory. A great deal of attention has been de voted to Leibniz's conception of logic, even to the extent of saying, as does Russell, that his metaphysics reflects certain deeply held beliefs about logical form. But comparatively lit tle attention has been devoted to Kant's logical doctrines, apart from routine derogatory remarks about the Table of Judgments in the first Critique and the notorious comment that logic had not advanced a step beyond Aristotle.3 In part, this neglect stems from the fact that Kant, unlike Leibniz, made no distinctive contribution to the history of logic. More important is the fact that some of Kant's most interesting log ical doctrines are no more than implicit in his work, and can 2 I have not hesitated to use contemporary ideas in the attempt to clarify Kant's position; but I have also tried to make clear which of these ideas are in the text and which are introduced from outside in the attempt to cast light on it. 3 A comment belied by Kant's efforts to break out of the traditional framework, in his essay "On the false subtlety of the four figures of the syl logism," for example, more importantly but less systematically when he finds the framework cramping, as in his discussion of the first two An timonies in the Critique of Pure Reason, where he proposes a distinction be tween "analytical" and "dialectical" contradictories. PREFACE IX be attributed to him only inferentially. Yet, as I hope to show, they provide important axes and motives of his posi tion. Understanding Kant's logical theory has been greatly facili tated by a number of recent technical developments. I have tried to make use of these developments, in an informal way, without presupposing any extensive technical background on the part of the reader. Indeed, my own interest in Kant's theory of science was in part prompted by these devel opments, and the light they shed on the positivist objections to that theory, just as the interest of the neo-Kantians of Mar burg was in part prompted by developments in physics around the turn of the century. Most books on Kant grow out of a more or less sustained at tempt to teach the Critique of Pure Reason. So did this one. I owe a debt of thanks especially to students in seminars at the University of California, Irvine, and the Claremont Graduate School for their help in what often proved to be a cooperative project. I owe a debt of thanks as well to former colleagues in the philosophy department at Irvine. In the preface to his book, Mind and Art, Guy Sircello has summarized eloquently what it meant to be a member of that department. A present col league, James W. Allard, has been kind enough to read through several chapters and has made some valuable com ments. A quartet of philosophers have, as teachers and friends, shaped my intellectual development. I would like to thank them while at the same time discharging them of any respon sibility for the ways in which their influences are embodied here. It is fair to say that the position of each is, in important respects, Kantian. Donald Davidson provided the general philosophical framework, particularly as concerns its anti- reductionist impulse. Jaakko Hintikka introduced me to Kant and to the possibilities of exploiting developments in logic to the better understanding of the history of philosophy. Bas van Fraassen supplied some of the developments here
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