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Kant Yearbook 9/2017 Unauthenticated Download Date | 10/12/17 10:49 PM Unauthenticated Download Date | 10/12/17 10:49 PM Kant Yearbook 9/2017 Philosophy of Science Edited by Dietmar H. Heidemann (University of Luxembourg) Editorial Assistant: Oliver Motz (University of Luxembourg) Editorial Board: Henry E. Allison (University of California at Davis), Karl Ameriks (Notre Dame), Gordon Brittan (Montana State University), Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Boston University), Klaus Düsing (Universität zu Köln), Corey Dyck (University of Western Ontario), Kristina Engelhard (Universität zu Köln), Brigitte Falkenburg (Universität Dortmund), Hannah Ginsborg (University of California at Berkeley), Michelle Grier (University of San Diego), Thomas Grundmann (Universität zu Köln), Paul Guyer (Brown University), Robert Hanna (University of Colorado at Boulder), Lothar Kreimendahl (Universität Mannheim), Georg Mohr (Universität Bremen), Angelica Nuzzo (Brooklyn College/CUNY), Robert Stern (Sheffield University), Dieter Sturma (Universität Bonn), Robert Theis (University of Luxembourg), Jens Timmermann (University of St Andrews), Ken Westphal (Boğaziçi Üniversitesi), Marcus Willaschek (Universität Frankfurt/Main) Unauthenticated Download Date | 10/12/17 10:49 PM The Kant Yearbook is an international journal that publishes articles on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Each issue is dedicated to a specific topic. Each annual topic will be announced by way of a call for papers. The Editorial Board of the Kant Yearbook is com - posed of renowned international experts, and selects papers for publication through a double blind peer review process. Online access for subscribers: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb ISSN 1868-4599 (Print) ISSN 1868-4602 (Online) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliographic information published be the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at: http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover image: Martin Zech, Bremen Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck ♾ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com Unauthenticated Download Date | 10/12/17 10:49 PM Table of Contents Cord Friebe Kant’s Rejection of Leibniz’s Principle and the Individuality of Quantum Objects 1 Ido Geiger Kant on the Analytic-Synthetic or Mechanistic Model of Causal Explanation 19 Nathaniel Goldberg Kant on Demarcation and Discovery 43 Michela Massimi What is this Thing Called ‘Scientific Knowledge’? – Kant on Imaginary Standpoints And the Regulative Role of Reason 63 Michael Bennett McNulty What is Chemistry, for Kant? 85 J. Colin McQuillan Kant on the Science of Aesthetics and the Critique of Taste 113 Ansgar Seide How the Understanding Prescribes Form without Prescribing Content – Kant on Empirical Laws in the Second Analogy of Experience 133 Idan Shimony What Was Kant’s Contribution to the Understanding of Biology? 159 List of Contributors 179 Topics of the Kant Yearbook 2018, 2019 and 2020 181 Unauthenticated Download Date | 10/12/17 10:49 PM Unauthenticated Download Date | 10/12/17 10:49 PM Cord Friebe Kant’s Rejection of Leibniz’s Principle and the Individuality of Quantum Objects Abstract:KantrejectsLeibniz’sPrincipleoftheIdentityofIndiscernibles(PII).In quantum mechanics, Leibniz’s principle is also apparently violated. However, both ways of rejecting the PII differ significantly. In particular, Kant denies that spatiotemporal objects are unique individuals and establishes appearances asmerelysingularones.Thedistinctionbetween‘unique’and‘singular’individ- ualsiscrucialfortherolethatintuitionplaysincognition:itwillbeshownthat Kant’swayofrejectingthePIIgoesagainstthestandardversionsofconceptual- ismandnon-conceptualismwhich,inturn,pointsouttherelevanceofthisissue for the understanding of transcendental idealism. Finally, the systematic rele- vancewillbecheckedbydefendingaKantianinterpretationofquantumindivid- uality. 1 Introduction Kant rejects Leibniz’s Principle of the Identityof Indiscernibles (PII). According toLeibniz,spatiotemporalobjectsareuniqueindividuals:everything,suchasa drop of water, is qualitatively distinguishable from every other so that, in principle,therecannot be morethan one such thing.AccordingtoKant, spatiotemporal objects are merely singular individuals: such-and-such water drops, e.g., are“appearances”andsocanbepresentedtous,inintuition,severaltimes.Cor- respondingly, maximal comprehensive empirical concepts such as “such-and- such water drop” are complete, according to Leibniz. They are individual con- ceptsthatrefertoonesingle,uniqueobject.ForKant,eventhemostcomprehen- siveempiricalconcepts,inapplicationtointuition,aregeneral.Theyrefertoone, or more than one, singular object. This distinction between unique and singular individuals is crucial for the understanding of Kant’s transcendental idealism. For, it shows that, for Kant, distinguishing (conceptually) and individuating (via intuition) are two significantly distinctive aspects of cognition. This goes against (the standard version of)conceptualism.¹Ontheotherhand,intuitionsthatarenotdeterminedbycon-  Standardconceptualism(defendedbyMcDowell,andothers)deniesthatintuitionplaysasig- nificantlydistinctiveroleincognition.Standardnon-conceptualism(defendedbyHanna,and https://doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2017-0001 Brought to you by | University of Gothenburg Authenticated Download Date | 10/7/17 2:05 PM 2 CordFriebe cepts would present unique individuals; a merely singular object can only be presented if,counterfactually,there can be a second exemplarof the same con- cept.Thisgoesagainst(thestandardversionof)non-conceptualismaccordingto whichcognitionisamoredevelopedcapacitybasedonelementary,non-concep- tual perception. So, Kant’s way of rejecting the PII challenges the two extreme views and asks for further qualification. Quantum mechanics (QM) also rejects the PII, at least according to the so- called Received View. However, the way in which QM (allegedly) violates the PII differs significantly from Kant’s and leads to other, non-Kantian ontologies of quantum objects: or they are still unique individuals distinguishable by non-qualitative, haecceistic properties, or they are not individuals at all (see FrenchandKrause2006).Asitseems,Kant’sviewofspatiotemporalobjects(appearances)asbeingmerelysingular,asopposedtounique,individualshasbeen overlooked by philosophers of science.² I will check the prospects of a Kantian interpretation of quantum individuality. The paperisstructured asfollows.The firstSectionprovidesaclose-to-text interpretation of Kant’s peculiar view.Then, the second Section explicates the relevance of Kant’s rejection of the PII for the understandingof transcendental idealism, focussing on the debate about conceptualism vs. non-conceptualism. Finally, the third Section applies the foregoing results to the current debate in the philosophyof QM. 2 Kant’s Rejection of the PII Leibniz argues that numerically distinct, spatiotemporal objects such as two drops of water always differ in intrinsic, qualitative properties. Such objects areintrinsicallyandqualitativelydistinguishable,e.g.,thefirstisred,thesecond green.Accordingly,thereapparentlyaretwowaysofopposingtoLeibniz:(i)nu- mericallydistinctobjectsmaybedistinguishableonlyextrinsically,e.g.byrela- tionally spatiotemporal characteristics such as ‘being x meters apart from each other’,and(ii)theymaybedistinguishablenon-qualitatively,byso-calledhaec- ceities such as ‘being identical with the object called a’. others)holdsthatintuitionisevensodistinctivethatitcanpresentobjectswithoutbeingdeter- minedbyconcepts,namelyinperception.ArecentsummaryofthisdebatecanbefoundinAl- lais(2015,ch.7).  HermannWeylcallsauniqueindividual“Sonderwesen”(2000,21),butamerelysingularin- dividual“Einzelding”(2000,16).Unfortunately,MullerandSaunders(2008,501)suggestasif Weylistalkingaboutindividualsalwaysinthesamesense(namely,justinthefirst). Brought to you by | University of Gothenburg Authenticated Download Date | 10/7/17 2:05 PM Kant’sRejectionofLeibniz’sPrincipleandtheIndividualityofQuantumObjects 3 Intheindicatedways,onedoesnotreallyrejectthePII.Rather,inbothways onemerelymodifiestheprinciplebypointingtosomeotherwaysofdistinguish- ingnumericallydistinctobjects,namelyextrinsicallyornon-qualitatively.Conse- quently,inthecontemporaryanalyticmetaphysicsandinthephilosophyofsci- ence,thesewaysareconsideredtobestrategiesofsavingthePII.³Bycontrast,I will argue that Kant rejects the PII completely: considered as appearances, the two water drops are numerically distinct ‘although’ utterly indistinguishable. ForKant,spaceisaprincipleofindividuationsuigeneris,notaLeibnizianprin- cipleindisguise.Inparticular,Kantdoesnotoptforspatialdistinguishability,as itcouldbedone,say,onaNewtonianaccountofspace.Itiscrucialthatspatio- temporal objects are considered to be appearances and that things can be presented to us in intuition. Kant’s understanding of spatiotemporality matters forhiswayofrejectingthePII,whichisnotthecaseinthetwowaysmentioned above. Hereis,initsentirety,Kant’srelevanttextontheidentityandthedifference of spatiotemporal objects: Ifanobjectispresentedtousseveraltimes,butalwayswiththesameinnerdeterminations (qualitasetquantitas),thenitisalwaysexactlythesameifitcountsasanobjectofpure understanding,notmanybutonlyonething(numericaidentitas);butifitisappearance, thentheissueisnotthecomparisonofconcepts,butrather,howeveridenticaleverything maybewithregardtothat,thedifferenceoftheplacesoftheseappearancesatthesame timeisstillanadequategroundforthenumericaldifferenceoftheobject(ofthesenses) itself.Thus,inthecaseoftwodropsofwateronecancompletelyabstractfromallinner difference(ofqualityandquantity),anditisenoughthattheybeintuitedindifferentpla- cesatthesametimeinorderforthemtobeheldtobenumericallydifferent.Leibniztook theappearancesforthingsinthemselves,thusforintelligibilia,i.e.,objectsofthepureun- derstanding (although on account of the confusion of their representations he labelled themwiththenameofphenomena),andtherehisprincipleofnon-discernibility(prin- cipiumidentitatisindiscernibilium)couldsurelynotbedisputed,butsincetheyareobjects ofsensibility,andtheunderstandingwithregardtothemisnotofpurebutofempirical use,multiplicityandnumericaldifferencearealreadygivenbyspaceitselfasthecondition ofouterappearances.Forapartofspace,eventhoughitmightbecompletelysimilarand equaltoanother,isneverthelessoutsideofit,andisonthataccountadifferentpartfrom thatwhichisaddedtoitinordertoconstitutealargerspace;andthismustthereforehold ofeverythingthatexistssimultaneouslyinthevariouspositionsinspace,nomatterhow similarandequaltheymightotherwisebe.(CPRA263/B319ff.)  See,e.g.,Black(1952):disputantA,thedefenderofthePII,appliesthestrategyofweakening thehistoricalversion. Brought to you by | University of Gothenburg Authenticated Download Date | 10/7/17 2:05 PM 4 CordFriebe Firstly, it should be stressed that Kant is not concerned with the merely episte- mologicalproblemofcognizing/perceivingthenumericaldistinctnessofthings: thedifferenceofplaceisanadequategroundnotonlyfortherecognisabilityof thenumericaldifferenceoftheobjectbutforitsontological,numericaldistinct- ness itself. Further, spatial difference does not merely coincide with numerical distinctness, neither contingently nor necessarily, but is the ground for it. Kant holdsthatspatiotemporalobjectsarenumericallydistinctinvirtueoftheirdiffer- ence in places. Thisbeingsaid,thethesis,atfirstglance,seemstobethatinnerdifferenceis notneededbutspatialdifferenceissufficient.ItseemsasifKantinfactweakens Leibniz’sprinciplebyincludingspatial locations/relations intothescopeofthe potentially distinguishing properties. However, Kant never explicitly says that the difference of the places distinguishes the drops of water; he only points outthatspatialdifferencegroundstheirnumericaldistinctness.Kantapparently doesnotintroducespatialdifferenceasacriterionofdistinguishabilitybutasa principium individuationis. Kant stresses that numericallydifferent parts of spaceare “completely sim- ilar and equal to another”. So, even if spatial locations are considered to be properties(whichisnotobviouslythecase),theyarecompletelysimilarproper- ties,notabletodistinguishtheirobjects.Differentplaces,atbest,arelikediffer- ent property exemplifications which likewise do not distinguish their objects. Considertwoequallyredthingswithtwonumericallydifferentexemplifications of(Platonic)Redness:theywouldbeindistinguishablewithrespecttocolour,as the two waterdrops would be with regard to spatial ‘properties’. Be this as it may, the main point is that it makes dialectically no sense to assumethatspatialdifferenceisconsideredtobedistinguishing.For,dialectically, it is crucial to consider the drops of water, on the one hand, as “objects of pure understanding” and, on the other hand, as “appearances”.Considered as objects of pure understanding,they would be one and the same thing; consid- eredasappearances,they wouldbemany(two).However,with theassumption thattheyaredistinguishablebyspatialproperties,thesetwowaysofconsidering thespatiotemporalobjectsimpliesthatKantwouldfairlymisrepresenthisoppo- nents. Both the historical Leibniz aswellas defenders of a relational PIIwould hold rather absurdviews. Leibniz, in Kant’sview, must then somehow ignore the qualitative (spatial) difference of the concrete, empirical objects. Thus, it seems as if Leibniz (in Kant’sview)takesthewaterdropsasbeingnon-spatial,i.e.asbeinglocatedout- side space (and time). In contrast, an interpretation is needed according to which taking them as “objects of pure understanding” does not dislocate them.The adequate way for Kant interpreting Leibniz is, rather,to say that the Brought to you by | University of Gothenburg Authenticated Download Date | 10/7/17 2:05 PM