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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/24/2017, SPi Kant and the Philosophy of Mind OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/24/2017, SPi OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/24/2017, SPi Kant and the Philosophy of Mind Perception, Reason, and the Self EDITED BY Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson 1 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/24/2017, SPi 3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © the several contributors 2017 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2017 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2017931028 ISBN 978–0–19–872495–7 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/24/2017, SPi For A. W. Moore OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/24/2017, SPi OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/24/2017, SPi Contents Acknowledgements ix Contributors xi Note on Sources and Translations xiii Introduction 1 1. Kant, the Philosophy of Mind, and Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy 5 Anil Gomes 2. Synthesis and Binding 25 Lucy Allais 3. Understanding Non-Conceptual Representation of Objects: Empirical Models of Sensibility’s Operation 46 Katherine Dunlop 4. Are Kantian Intuitions Object-Dependent? 67 Stefanie Grüne 5. Intuition and Presence 86 Colin McLear 6. Imagination and Inner Intuition 104 Andrew Stephenson 7. Inner Sense and Time 124 Ralf M. Bader 8. Can’t Kant Cognize Himself? Or, a Problem for (Almost) Every Interpretation of the Refutation of Idealism 138 Andrew Chignell 9. A Kantian Critique of Transparency 158 Patricia Kitcher 10. Judging for Reasons: On Kant and the Modalities of Judgment 173 Jessica Leech 11. Kant on Judging and the Will 189 Jill Vance Buroker 12. Self and Selves 204 Ralph C.S. Walker OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/24/2017, SPi viii Contents 13. Subjects of Kant’s First Paralogism 221 Tobias Rosefeldt 14. The Lessons of Kant’s Paralogisms 245 Paul F. Snowdon Bibliography 263 Index 277 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/24/2017, SPi Acknowledgements The production of this volume has been remarkably smooth sailing, a fact for which we owe many thanks. First, our thanks to the contributors to the volume, both for their excellent and thought-provoking essays and for the speed with which they responded to our numerous requests. A number of the papers were presented at a workshop in Oxford in January 2015, which was supported by funds from the John Fell Fund, the Mind Association, the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, and Trinity College, Oxford. The workshop was an incredibly stimulating occasion, and we are grateful to all involved, including Angela Breitenbach, Max Edwards, Robert Hanna, Katharina Kraus, Alexandra Newton, Robert Watt, and Kenneth R. Westphal. We later taught a graduate seminar organised around the contents of this book and our thanks to Kevin Busch, Neil Dewar, Carolina Flores Henrique, Pieter Fritschy, Matthew Husband, Amy Levine, and Alex Lupsaiu for their comments and discussion. Luke Davies helped with the copy-editing for the volume, saving us much time and effort. Alix Cohen and David Landy provided very useful advice. Finally, our thanks to Peter Momtchiloff for his encouragement and to Peter and the staff at Oxford University Press for their work in producing this volume and bringing it to press. Andrew Stephenson gratefully acknowledges the support of the Leverhulme Trust. This volume is dedicated to our colleague and teacher, Adrian Moore, as a small token of gratitude for his friendship and support. The sheer range and depth of his work would be inspiration enough, but when combined with the sensitivity and kindness he shows to all he encounters, he stands as a model for how to be a philosopher. Anyone who knows Adrian’s work will know the high regard he holds for Kant. We hope that he will find much to enjoy in the current volume.