% M? 3.T.I A guide to the Tactical Appreciation 1987 J23-007 JAN 88 LAND WARFARE CENTRE JUNIOR STAFF WING 3.T.1 1988 A GUIDE TO THE TACTICAL APPRECIATION References: A. JSP(AS)102 (Second Edition) - Service Writing, 1984 B. MLW One 5.1 - Staff Duties in the Field, 1986 C. MLW One 5.2 - Aide-memoire, 1987 This manual replaces all previous handouts from the Junior Staff Wing on the subject of military appreciations. The manual does not replace References A, B and C. Rather it binds together the philosophy and directs the students' attention to interpretation applicable to the appreciation at unit level. The manual is published under the authority of the Chief Instructor of Junior Staff Wing for use by students attending the Junior Staff Course. .123-008 JAN 87 I AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE Proposals for amendment or additions to the manual should be referred to the Module Master for Operations. Such proposals should include a draft of the suggested amendment. Amendment List Amendment Made By Date No Date J I 9-001 JAN 88 LAND WARPARK CENTRE JUNIOR STAFF WING MILITARY APPRECIATIONS 'At the beginning of 1944, Lieut-General Scoones was commanding 4 Corps on the Assam front. He was an informed, thoughtful soldier with a clear mind of the analytical type. My staff sometimes complained that he produced lengthy appreciations in which all factors and courses of action were conscientiously considered. I always pointed out that these appreciations could be re-read after the event and found uncannily accurate. A General whose appreciations can stand this test is not perhaps as rare as a politician whose speeches can equally bear re-reading, but such far sightedness is one of the foundations of real Generalship and is not too common a gift. Scoones had, too, a steadiness in crisis that was, for the battle he was to fight, an invaluable quality.' Defeat into Victory Field Marshal Viscount Slim References: A. JSP (AS) 102, Service Writing (Second Edition), 1984, Chapter 16 B. MLW One.5.1 - Staff Duties in the Field, 1986 Chapter 5 C. MLW One.5.2, Aide-Memoire, 1987 Chapter 10 INTRODUCTION ' 1. An estimate or appreciation of a situation is the military term defined as a 'logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to the course of action to be taken in order to accomplish his mission' (Reference A, Chapter 16, paragraph 1601). -2- 2. The appreciation is essentially the process whereby operational information is collected and then used to produce outline plans. The references cover the appreciation as it relates to strategic, tactical, and administrative problems at formation level. While the basics remain the same ft»r all levels, there is a need for amplification of the unit level appreciation. 3. The purpose of this manual is to explain the steps inherent in an appreciation applicable to unit level tactical problems. 4. In considering this purpose students should be aware of the following: a. This manual does not replace the References in any way but rather binds together the philosophy. Students are encouraged to read the References to gain a broader viewpoint. b. There are no drills or simple keys to success. The appreciation is simply one person's thought process on paper. Each person's approach is going to vary particularly on points of detail and interpretation of what is of relative importance. This manual gives detailed explanation but DOES NOT encourage slavish adherance to every example* 5. This manual is set out in six parts as follows: a. Part 1. (White). Part 1 encompasses some background reading by giving: (1) some explanation of the logic inherent in the appreciation process, (2) a reading list with explanatory notes, and (3) some hints on the collection and layout of information. b. Parts 2 to 5. (Part 2 Yellow, Part 3 Blue, Part 4 and 5 White). Parts 2 to 5 consist of a step by step guide to the factor analysis appropriate to offensive and defensive operations. c* Part 6. (Green). Part 6 is a glossary of definitions and explanations of tactical terms. 6. Parts of this manual will appear repetitive. This is necessary because of the variation in needs among students. Some can understand the process from a logic diagram. Others prefer a general overview of each section of the process and what it does. Again others need a detailed factor guide. Most seem to gain from examples. One may therefore find the same information presented in four different ways. 7. The information given in this manual should be examined critically. The emphasis and many of the explanations are based on the author's viewpoint. The coverage is particularly geared to the JSC and is therefore not an exhaustive overview of the military appreciation process. The appreciation is a creative and a thinking exercise and student submissions should reflect this. \ J19-002 JAN 87 PART 1 BACKGROUND TO THE APPRECIATION PROCESS The Tactical Decision and Military Judgement 1. To make a tactical decision requires sound military judgement. Inherent in judgement is experience and analytical thought. These two aspects require perspective as both are clearly evident in every deduction in the appreciation process. 2. The analytical process is based on propositional thought (the logical connection of given truths or facts) and is the basis of the 'scientific' solution. It is characterized by a computer style binary operation where factors either fit a programme or blue print (of doctrine) or they do not. It is the process of logic which tends to lead to the 'black or white and no grey' solution. 3. The conceptual process is based on appositional thought (the placing of the complete problem next to solutions found in the past for similar problems) and operates on the basis of experience and is characterized by 'gut feeling'. It does not operate on the building blocks of data or propositions but rather on whole images drawn from what the brain has been exposed to or experienced. The expression of this thought process in any endeavour is often regarded as 'artistic'. Rommel called it 'fingerspitzenfuhl' (finger feeling). 4. Arms officers frequently operate in the conceptual mode more than the analytical and tend to arrive at a solution on first sight of the problem. This accords with unit training. The temptation is then to situate the appreciation. 5. Both the analytical and the conceptual process must be brought together. The conceptual provides inspiration or hypotheses for the analytical to test. Officers who do operate with a conceptual bias must exercise extreme self discipline to subject the 'gut feeling' to an objective analysis. Service officers frequently do not suffer from this distraction and therefore tend sometimes to produce better technical appreciations than their arms counter-parts. Their analysis, however, suffers from lack of detailed hypotheses and sound practical premises. 6. Both arms and service officers currently suffer from a lack of operational experience. It is only by the application of the discipline inherent in a sound appreciation that both the conceptual and analytical skills can be truly developed in peace-time. Complete the following reading in the sequence given: f a. Study the remainder of Part 1, less Annexes A, B and C. b. Scan the remainder of Part 1. c. Study the description of the following terms and ensure that you understand them thoroughly: (1) Aim. See Parts 2 and 3. See also Part 6 Glossary for the words: (a) aim, ) (b) clear, ) (c) defend, )\ (d) delay, ) These words are listed ) (e) deny, ) in the glossary under ) (f) destroy, )) 'Task Verbs'. j) Cg) contain, (h) secure, ) \) (i) support, and (j) limitation. Key Terrain. See Part 6 Glossary. As indicates, the identification of this terrain is the key to the appreciation. Key Terrain is often on approaches but may not always be so. Where a piece of Key Terrain outside an approach is used in an enemy defence and therefore becomes an objective, a preliminary operation may be required. (3) Objective. See Part 6 Glossary. (4) Vital Ground. See Part 6 Glossary. (5) Approach. See Part 6 Glossary. (6) Time and Space. See Parts 2 and 3. (7) Assessment of Tasks. See Parts 2 and 3. 6-11 (8) Courses Open to Own and Enemy. See Parts 2 and 3. Note that courses should be fully stated. Enemy courses should be kept broad but are not simply re- statements of doctrine. From these descriptions effect is derived (see Part 6 Glossary) which in turn leads to own courses. Own courses are described in detail and include support aspects. (9) Mission. When examining the statement of the mission in the outline plan be aware of the relationship between it, the original task and the aim. The limitations are not expressed in the mission because they are already included in courses and will be reflected in the outline plan. Often, but not always, the mission will be the fundamental task given by the superior commander. It may be that the fundamental task was to deny penetration in strength through an area and that the best method of achieving this (from courses open) is to attack the enemy. In such cases the wording of the mission may be quite different from the task or the aim even though it is achieving both. Thus the aim 'to def within bdry' becomes the mission 'to def HILL X', HILL X being the vital ground. Check the task verbs in the Glossary. (10) Outline Plan. It is here that you apply what was taught for operation orders including precedence, double entry book-keeping, use of Annex A to Chapter 6 of Reference B for command status and its wording, and the statement of tasks. If a platoon is to capture objective one in phase two then that becomes its task '(Phase 2 : capture Objective 1)'. See paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 of Annex B to Part 1. d. Now relate these terms to the flow diagram at Annex A, the 'Deductive Reasoning Process' explained below and the hints for appreciation writing. Relate this, in turn, to the example appreciations in Parts 2 and 3. e. Study Part 3. f. Read Part 6. \ The Deductive Reasoning Process 8. Level of Thinking. The level' of the reasoning process sets the scene. A battalion commander in giving a task to a company commander will have considered the problem to platoon level to ensure that the company commander has the necessary resources. In like manner the brigade^ commander considers down to company level and tasks battalions, and the company commander considers section level and tasks platoons. The frame work for this 'two down' level of consideration is set by the context of 'two up' both in terms of own forces and enemy. Thus a 6-11 battalion commander examining a defence problem will analyse his problem to platoon level while at the same time being mindful of the brigade and divisional commander's aim and approaches to the battalion and brigade vital ground. While considering that a battalion or regiment of enemy will attack his position he will consider that regiment in a divisional setting being mindful of the normal allocation of divisional resources to that regiment. 9. Fact. A fact is a thing assumed as a basis for inference. It is assumed, therefore, that the data given in the texts, manuals and narratives to problems are facts upon which we may infer information not given. 10. Factors. A factor is a useful fact from which deductions can be drawn. This means that a fact which pertains to the achievement of the aim of an appreciation is a factor. thus in a set of references, a narrative and a map, we find many facts and we select the relevant ones and list them under the heading 'FACTORS' and sub-headings 'Relative Strengths', 'Ground', 'Assessment of Tasks', 'Time and Space' and 'Enemy Courses' and others that may seem relevant. The relationship between Aim, Factors, Own Courses and Outline Plan is shown in the flow diagram at Annex A to Part 1. Note that Own Courses and Outline Plan are not factors. 11. Deduction. A deduction is inference from general to particular. Thus given the factors that there are two LMGs and one RPG identified on Hill X causing delay to our advance, one can use the general information in MLW Three 2.2 -The Musorian Armed Forces 1980 under doctrine, organisations, and order of battle, and a map to deduce such things as: a. it is possibly a platoon position; b. there is a third squad which, by doctrine, in this phase of war, would be located in the vicinity of area Y; c. there are two more RPG 7s; d. there are probably some other heavier weapons such as HMGs or AT3s (the general idea and narrative would give clues here); e. the platoon would be within range of at least the RAG; and f. most important, what does all this mean to you? This leads to such deductions as: (1) number of objectives, (2) size of targets and therefore size of fire unit required, (3) likely enemy DF tasks which you need then to avoid, 6-11 (4) the ratio of fire units to objectives and manoeuvre elements and therefore the requirements for the development of adequate combat power, and (5) the emphasis to be given to your own resources such as employment of support section to destroy a bunker or use of air burst to destroy enemy in open pits. Note that a deduction 'I must maintain momentum' is nonsense because it is a statement of principle. It is from this principle and its application to given facts that you deduce how you can achieve momentum in the particular scenario. For amplification of the 'so what' process see Part 6 Glossary. 12. Quantity of Deductions. What is needed from deductions is usable information. Thus at unit level you seek information which relates directly to how you deploy platoons, direct and indirect fire support, and any other assets under your command to achieve the aim. That is the reason for applying the 'so what' process; 'so what' relates to your level of reasoning and your aim. The deductions should be sufficiently developed so that they can be picked up in later sections of the appreciation (time and space, assessment of tasks, courses open). For example the air situation may lead to a general deduction that some precaution is needed. This is of little use unless adequate resources are identified (eg level of digging, air sentry per platoon or company area etc) so that these can in turn be listed under assessment of tasks. 13. Summary of Deductions. There are two ways of looking at summary of deductions: , a. At the end of a large unwieldly subject such as ground it is useful to summarize the main points as they inter- relate. It may also be useful to do the same between some major headings such as ground and enemy. b. A tabular layout of an analysis of approaches summarizes in note form all the deductions in a host of perspectives and then gives the assessment of the approach on the same . page. Either way it is a useful tool to condense information in the context of the aim and its limitations. Re-Appreciation 14. Note that on completion of the appreciation the situation could change. If you are involved in a long term task (eg defence or deliberate attack) it may be worthwhile to end the appreciation with either: a. 'Re-appreciate at ' (time/date); or b. 'Re-appreciate when '
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