Joint Force Quarterly

134 Pages·2004·9.57 MB·English

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The Military
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Army SOF in
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The Military
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Army SOF in
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The essence of strategic leadership is the
process of examining events in their many
dimensions, testing immediate issues in the
context of broader long-term goals, establishing
priorities based on balance among importance,
urgency, and achievability—then pursuing
policies in the near term aimed at securing the
long-range objectives.
—Donald E. Rumsfeld
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JFQ
AWord from the
Soldiers preparing for
mission in Afghanistan.
Chairman H. Robinson)
Milton
my (
Ar
S.
U.
J
oint warfighting is constantly evolving in well as foreign nations and perhaps even non-
theory and practice. Military and defense governmental organizations.
professionals train for and expect opera- The global war on terrorism ushered in an
tions to be joint. To win, we must fight as a era of enhanced jointness in which coalition and
team. And combatant commanders plan on joint interagency participation is the norm. Profes-
operations as a matter of course. Recently, the sional military education promotes integration
term joint has begun to assume a broader com- among services, agencies, and allies, who are all
mon definition and an air of expectedness. routinely included in exercises and operations.
It is routine for more than one service to per- Within the Government, we find consider-
form together in experiments, exercises, or bat- ably more common, comprehensive, and impor-
tles. Joint operations are our baseline. Yet in dis- tant interagency cooperation. Warfighting com-
cussing jointness we tend to envision far more mands and various agencies must be aware of
than just two services working together. We see a
joint team functioning with other agencies as (continued on page 4)
Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 1
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CONTENTS
Q 1 A Word from the Chairman 16 Army SOF in Afghanistan:
by Richard B. Myers Learning the Right Lessons
by Frank L. Jones
F
9 A Quiet Revolution: Nuclear
J Strategy for the 21st Century 23 Millennium Challenge 2002—
by James J. Wirtz and James A. Russell Setting the Mark
by Grover E. Myers
JFQ FORUM
31 The Military Uses of Space
32 National Security Space—
Enabling Joint Warfighting
by Peter B. Teets
38 Forging Space Warriors
by Lance W. Lord
44 Architecting Space Programs
by Stephen J. Ferrell and
Hal E. Hagemeier
50 Space and Missile Defense
by Donald R. Baucom
56 Some Propositions on
Spacepower
by Michael V. Smith
65 Globalizing Space Security
by Simon P. Worden and
Joan Johnson-Freese
72 Finding a Path to Spacepower
by John M. Logsdon
PHOTO CREDITS
The cover shows lift off of Delta II rocket from Cape 78 Unity of Effort in Joint
Canaveral (Boeing). The front inside cover features
Information Operations
[clockwise] soldier, Enduring Freedom (55th Signal
Company/Leopold Medina, Jr.); sailor aboard USS Harry S. by Synthia S. Jones, Bernard Flowers, and
Truman, Iraqi Freedom (USS Harry S. Truman/Danny
Karlton D. Johnson
Ewing, Jr.); marine during live fire exercise (Fleet Combat
Camera, Pacific/Michael Sandberg); and airman
monitoring air traffic, Iraqi Freedom (U.S. Air Force/ 84 Deterring Attack: The Role of
Stefan Alford). The table of contents depicts universe
Information Operations
seen from Hubble Space Telescope (AP/Wide World
Photo/NASA); and Global Hawk UAV at air base in by Gregory Schulte
Australia (U.S. Air Force/Jeremy Lock). The back inside cover captures USS
Providencesailing home to New London (U.S. Navy/Nicole Hawley).
2 JFQ / Winter 2002–03
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WINTER 2002–03 / NUMBER 33
119 Educating Foreign Officers
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
90 Joint Doctrine—Engine of by Douglas M. Gibler and
Change? Tomislav Z. Ruby
by Stephen J. Cimbala and
James J. Tritten OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN
124 Creighton Williams Abrams, Jr.
96 Transforming Joint Exercises
and Readiness
THE JOINT WORLD
by Stephen J. Mariano
125 Doctrine
102 Intelligence Support for
Military Operations OFF THE SHELF
by Markus V. Garlauskas 126 War and the Human Psyche:
A Review Essay
109 Unmanned Combat Aerial by Ian Roxborough
Vehicles and Transformation
by John J. Klein 127 Great Power Struggles:
A Book Review
by George C. Herring
114 An Israeli Military
Innovation: UAVs 128 The Chiefs as Policymakers:
by Ralph Sanders A Book Review
by Samuel J. Newland
129 Soldiers as Governors:
A Book Review
by Audrey Kurth Cronin
Joint Force Quarterly
Stephen J.Flanagan Robert A.Silano Lieutenant Colonel Peter L.Hays,USAF
Director Director of Publications Executive Editor
Institute for National Strategic Studies Institute for National Strategic Studies
Editor-in-Chief Editor
Martin J.Peters,Jr. Calvin B.Kelley William A.Rawley
Production Coordinator Copy Editor U.S.Government Printing Office
Art Director
JFQis published for the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted topics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 132
by the Institute for National Strategic Studies,National De- without permission of copyright proprietors.An acknowledg- for details).Please direct all editorial communications to:
fense University,to promote understanding of the integrated ment toJoint Force Quarterlyshould be made whenever mate-
Editor,Joint Force Quarterly
employment of land,sea,air,space,and special operations rial is quoted from or based on its contents.
ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ
forces.The journal focuses on joint doctrine,coalition warfare, This publication has been approved by the Secretary of De-
300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg.62)
contingency planning,combat operations conducted by the fense.All previous issues have been published electronically
Fort Lesley J.McNair
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The opinions,conclusions,and recommendations ex- below.Paid subscriptions to JFQare offered through the U.S.
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http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm
ISSN 1070–0692 April 2003
Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 3
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Joint Force Quarterly A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN
Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF (continued from page 1)
Publisher each other’s plans and coordinate actively. Intelli-
gence sharing, homeland defense, and synchro-
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
nizing instruments of power are necessary to win
VADM Paul G. Gaffney II, USN (cid:2) National Defense University
the global war on terrorism.
Chairman
Moving from service competition to routine
BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) (cid:2) Office of the Chairman joint operations has been accompanied by a sig-
LTG George W. Casey, Jr., USA (cid:2) The Joint Staff nificant cultural change. We must continue this
evolution to embrace a new concept of enhanced
MG Reginal G. Clemmons, USA (cid:2) National War College
joint operations—changes in the Armed Forces,
A. Denis Clift (cid:2) Joint Military Intelligence College governmental agencies, and allied nations.
RADM David R. Ellison, USN (cid:2) Naval Postgraduate School History not only tells us where we have
been; it offers clues about where we need to go.
BG Mark P. Hertling, USA (cid:2) The Joint Staff
To illustrate the evolution of jointness, let me
BG James T. Hirai, USA (cid:2) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
touch on just a few examples, from tentative co-
Col Craig S. Huddleston, USMC (cid:2) Marine Corps Command and Staff College operation among services to the enhanced joint
warfighting required to combat terrorism.
MG Robert R. Ivany, USA (cid:2) U.S. Army War College
Col Ronald R. Ladnier, USAF (cid:2) Air Command and Staff College Experimenting in Wartime
Maj Gen Edward L. LaFountaine, USAF (cid:2) Joint Forces Staff College Interestingly, the tradition of joint warfight-
ing can be traced to the early days of the Nation.
MajGen Harold Mashburn, Jr., USMC (cid:2) Industrial College of the Armed Forces
For example, by April 1863, General Ulysses Grant
Maj Gen Bentley B. Rayburn, USAF (cid:2) Air War College
had been trying to take Vicksburg for months. But
RADM Rodney P. Rempt, USN (cid:2) Naval War College nature provided an obstacle, spring rains. Union
Col John H. Turner, USMC (cid:2) Marine Corps War College forces had to move quickly down the Mississippi
River past the deadly Vicksburg defensive batteries
EDITORIAL BOARD to attack from the east—Grant’s preferred ap-
proach. After seeking the counsel of Admiral
Stephen J. Flanagan (cid:2) National Defense University
Chairman David Porter, they elected to sail Union troops
and supplies down the Mississippi.
Richard K. Betts (cid:2) Columbia University
With cavalry raids as a distraction, the river-
Col John M. Calvert, USAF (cid:2) Joint Forces Staff College borne transport scheme worked. The Union lost
Stephen D. Chiabotti (cid:2) School of Advanced Air and Space Studies only one ship to the batteries. Grant was able to
isolate Vicksburg from the east. Confederate
Eliot A. Cohen (cid:2) The Johns Hopkins University
forces finally surrendered July 4. Experimenting
COL Robert A. Doughty, USA (cid:2) U.S. Military Academy with joint warfighting helped the Union turn the
LtCol Thomas J. Felts, USMC (cid:2) Marine Corps War College tide of the Civil War. This series of events fore-
shadowed the importance of jointness to later
Aaron L. Friedberg (cid:2) Princeton University
military successes.
Alan L. Gropman (cid:2) Industrial College of the Armed Forces
A Costly Lesson
COL Timothy S. Heinemann, USA (cid:2) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
The defeat at the Kasserine Pass exemplifies
CAPT Chester E. Helms, USN (cid:2) Naval War College
the poor integration and communication that led
Mark H. Jacobsen (cid:2) Marine Corps Command and Staff College to tragedy during Operation Torch in February
Daniel T. Kuehl (cid:2) Information Resources Management College 1943. The operation was designed to drive Axis
forces out of North Africa, but our troops were in-
Thomas L. McNaugher (cid:2) The RAND Corporation
experienced and untested. American leaders tried
Kathleen Mahoney-Norris (cid:2) Air Command and Staff College
to use airpower simultaneously as artillery and an
William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. (cid:2) Joint Military Intelligence College umbrella for ground units. Unfortunately, inade-
quate communications, planning, and synchro-
John J. Mearsheimer (cid:2) The University of Chicago
nization plagued the Allied forces.
LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) (cid:2) Hudson Institute
The Allies ceded air superiority, leading to in-
Col Thomas C. Skillman, USAF (cid:2) Air War College sufficient air support for ground operations in the
pass.Unable to achieve control of the air over the
COL Robert E. Smith, USA (cid:2) U.S. Army War College
battlefield, ineffective air support combined with
LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) (cid:2) Harvard University
inexperienced American troops and poor battle-
Col Gary West, USAF (cid:2) National War College field communications led to a costly defeat by
troops under General Erwin Rommel.
A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL
4 JFQ / Winter 2002–03
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Myers
F/A–18C taking off,
Iraqi Freedom.
Daniel)
Mc
A.
Philip
Navy (
S.
U.
However, the Allies learned from their mis- objectives, the war was often a segregated affair—
takes and issued new orders for Allied airpower to more deconflicted than integrated.
strike interdiction and rear echelon targets. This Desert Storm introduced new concepts of op-
allowed airpower to decimate Axis support logis- erations and innovations that previewed the mili-
tics in Tunisia and helped turn the balance in tary transformation of the 1990s. Perhaps the
favor of the Allies. greatest was effects-based operations. This con-
With a more focused and synchronized air cept promoted an attempt to control an enemy,
campaign, fortified Allied surface forces pushed as opposed to traditional warfighting strategies of
the Axis back. Adolf Hitler all but abandoned his attrition or annihilation.
African army. And in May The Coalition commander would restrict
1943, the Axis lost North enemy decisionmaking processes in order to take
Desert Storm highlighted
Africa and the Allies pre- away options. In Desert Storm, the Coalition was
the role of precision and ad pared for a push north able to accomplish this without entirely crushing
through Italy. Iraq’s infrastructure or annihilating its army.
hoc innovations in the area
The North African Precision, speed, and superior intelligence
of time-sensitive targeting campaign illustrated that allowed the Coalition to target the enemy by
Allied combined arms war- disrupting its command and control and deci-
fare could be inefficient sionmaking. Countrywide military pressure all
and dangerous when planned poorly. Allied com- but paralyzed the Iraqi leadership, and a crush-
manders quickly learned the importance of coor- ing ground assault pushed dug-in enemy troops
dinated and integrated planning between compo- from Kuwait.
nents and nations. Desert Storm highlighted the role of preci-
sion and ad hoc innovations in the area of time-
Jointness in the Storm
sensitive targeting. The Scud hunting operations
In 1991, Operation Desert Storm showed un- in western Iraq particularly reflected a new capa-
precedented jointness on a theater-wide scale. Yet bility, leading to a decade of experimentation
while successful in achieving U.S. and Coalition with joint time-sensitive targeting procedures
and technology.
Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 5
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A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN
The Scud hunt saw Special Operations Forces The importance of this new jointness be-
(SOF) closely collaborating with the air compo- came evident after 9/11 and was reinforced by
nent on near real-time strikes. In one case in American successes in Afghanistan. SOF and in-
1991, a team was bracing for assault by an enemy teragency assets were integrated and integral to
helicopter in western Iraq. The team radioed an the plan and the operation. And in preparing
airborne F–15E and passed their position and situ- lessons learned while the operation was unfold-
ation. The fighter launched and guided a 2,000- ing, the services, joint components, and combat-
pound laser guided precision bomb, destroying ant commands shared notes and experimented
the hovering helicopter. with improvements in strategy, technology, and
This type of SOF-airpower coordination was operational coordination.
desperate, unplanned, and impractical, but it
Millennium Challenge
worked. As a result, nascent collaboration between
Special Operations Forces and joint aerospace In summer 2002, U.S. Joint Forces Command
power became a preview of hugely effective tactics conducted Millennium Challenge, a large experi-
used in Afghanistan. However, despite some lim- ment that generated thousands of data points
ited successes in Desert Storm, the potential of and hundreds of ideas. Participants examined
special operations was largely unrealized. dozens of concepts, initiatives, and warfighting
issues. One highlight was the joint fires initiative
Enduring Freedom
for time-sensitive targets, a Web-based, collabora-
After the atrocities of 9/11, Operation En- tive tool that allowed land, maritime, and air
during Freedom showed the inherent flexibility commanders to share awareness and knowledge
of the U.S. joint force and the importance of a simultaneously. Allies also participated.
new style of coalition operations. Special opera- All components knew the priority targets se-
tors of all services, and lected by the joint force commander. They had
coordination with ele- access to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
during Millennium Challenge, ments of several U.S. sance assets of other components to find targets.
and allied governmental Once found, they chatted in real time on which
the decision and execution
agencies, were common- component could engage those targets. At the
process in time-sensitive place and critical. same time, they decided which assets could best
SOF teams collabo- conduct post-strike battle damage assessment.
targeting often took less
rated successfully with During Millennium Challenge, the decision
than an hour Coalition air compo- and execution process in time-sensitive targeting
nents and together deliv- often took less than an hour. By sharing informa-
ered bombs and shared tion and fostering trust, the joint team got the
satellite communications, navigation, and a host job done with considerably improved timelines.
of intelligence assets. The result reinforced the They had developed a faster decision cycle—and
importance of even more effective integration history shows that those who make better deci-
and new operational concepts. The services had sions faster usually win.
gone to school on Desert Storm experiences in
Iraq and the War on Terrorism
Scud hunting and integrating sea, air, space, and
SOF assets. The joint fires initiative and the time sensi-
Afghanistan demonstrated a new paradigm tive targeting tested and refined in Millennium
where select U.S. forces, supported by joint air- Challenge and in Afghanistan continued to
and spacepower, could act as force multipliers. In evolve during Iraqi Freedom. An attack against
Enduring Freedom, 21st century technology Saddam Hussein in a hotel took 45 minutes—
paired cavalry charges—right out of the 14th cen- from the time we received the intelligence to
tury—with the most advanced weapons to defeat bombs hitting the target. Our time to attack can
a larger army of well-equipped fighters. In fact, be under an hour, but we need to push for a
the force multiplication capability of air- and faster response.
spacepower teamed with Special Operations The common operating picture is also a
Forces was unprecedented. In December 2001, great example of the type of integration and in-
when the Taliban fell from power, only about formation sharing that speeds decisionmaking
1,500 American military personnel were on the and is truly transformational. In Desert Storm,
ground. However, their combat effectiveness sur- the air component commander had a reasonably
passed traditional views of their capabilities. good battlefield picture. During the battle in
Afghanistan, the air component commander had
a much better picture, with considerably more
real-time sensor information conveniently dis-
played in addition to the blue force positions.
6 JFQ / Winter 2002–03
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Myers
Marines refueling near
Az Zubayr,Iraq.
Quihuis, Jr.)
C.
Kevin
mera (
Ca
mbat
Co
Division
Marine
1st
But throughout the 1990s, and even in Afghan- (cid:2) months of focused and deliberate psychological
istan during Enduring Freedom, the ground com- operations against Iraqi military commanders, troops,
ponent had poorer connectivity and a less com- and regime supporters
plete picture. (cid:2) years of sanctions on the regime and terrorist
leaders
For Iraqi Freedom, however, U.S. Central
(cid:2) preparation for humanitarian and civil emer-
Command insisted that all the components share
gencies
a very similar picture of the battlefield and the-
(cid:2) maritime control of the Arabian Gulf
ater. Information sharing enabled the component
(cid:2) in due course, a closely coordinated and flexi-
commanders to provide reachback support to for- ble, 24/7, all-weather land-sea-air and SOF component
ward tactical units and to coordinate and inte- blitz that crushed the Iraqi military.
grate their plans. The ground command opera-
But what won the war was the ability of the
tions center in Doha, Qatar, was as sophisticated
Coalition to remove the enemy sanctuary in time
as the combined air operations center in Saudi
and space. This was done by integrating a range of
Arabia. And just as importantly, the corps com-
combat and other capabilities, as well as overcom-
mander and division commanders shared this
ing unique logistic challenges. Iraqi Freedom has
common operating picture as well.
illustrated the importance of enhanced joint-
Iraqi Freedom portended a crucial trend use-
ness—with shared intelligence and coordinated
ful for fighting the global war on terrorism: the
informational, diplomatic, economic, and military
increasing importance of multiple agencies and
actions contributing to an unprecedented success.
nations combining efforts over an extended pe-
The combatant commander achieved superi-
riod. It demonstrated the effectiveness of long-
ority in all areas of space and time, which led to
term, multifaceted relationships between organi-
Coalition success in the major combat phase. He
zations and allies geared toward achieving
was able to make better decisions faster than the
common goals. In the case of Iraq, this meant:
enemy. Well understood rules of engagement and
(cid:2) diplomatic efforts at coalition building exceptional red teaming and planning for what-
(cid:2) years of weapons and tactics improvements in ifs made the most of Coalition flexibility—and
all the components gave friendly forces a tighter decision cycle. He
(cid:2) reducing Iraqi air defense and command and
control capabilities through months of targeted
airstrikes
Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 7