John locke - University of Massachusetts Amherst

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John locke
John Locke (1632-1704) isthe foremost liberal politicalphilosopherofthe modemera. His Two
Treatises onGovernmentpromote thevalues ofindividualrights, liberty, privacy, and tolerationin
arguingagainstaristocraticprivilegeandabsolutistforms ofgovernment. ForLocke, government
should be an instrument for securingthe life, liberty, andwell-beingofapeople, aset ofinstitu
tions that promoteastable societyinwhich citizens are free to choose their ownindividual pur
suits ofhappiness. Since human beingsshare a fundamental moral equality, governing powers
shouldbeseennotassovereignfathers butaspublicservantselectedto carryoutcollectivetasks.
When a government fails to uphold the trust ofits citizens-by tending toward tyranny and
oppression, invading the private property rights ofcitizens, or corrupting representatives-the
people can rightlyrebel and reclaim their original political authorityin revolution.
Locke was born in Somerset, England, and received an Oxford education in medicine and
philosophy. His interest in medicine and science continued throughout his life, and as an adult
he became a fellow ofthe Royal Society (the first scientific society ofEngland) and a friend to
several prominent scientific figures, including Sir Isaac Newton, Robert Boyle, and Thomas
Sydenham. He was also a close friend ofthe first earl ofShaftsbury, LordAshley, servingas his
physician, research associate, co-author, and politicalsecretary. As asupporterofAshley, Locke
wroteanonymouslypublished treatisesagainstexistingpoliticalpowersand participatedinrad
ical political movements intended to preventJames II, the Catholic duke ofYork, from suc
ceeding to the throne. In a climate ofgrowing political unrest in 1683, Locke fled England to
Holland, where he participated actively in an international community ofexiled revolutionar
ies. Several years later, he returned to England and published his major work in epistemology,
AnEssay ConcerningHuman Understanding(1689), in which he argued for an empiricalfounda
tion ofall knowledge. For his remaining active years, Locke enjoyed status as an intellectual
celebrity,held minorpoliticaloffices, andwrotewidelyonissues rangingfrom educationto reli
gion to finance. Fornearlyall ofhis life, it was not knownbyhis contemporaries that he wrote
theTwo Treatises on Government. The Treatises were published anonymouslyin 1689, and Locke
revealed his authorship ofthe texts in his will upon his death.
The first treatise ofthe Two Treatises on Government aims to refute the theory that kings pos
sess divinely ordained political rights. In the seventeenth century, Sir Robert Filmer and other
theological-political theoristshad argued that kinglypowerwas inheritedfromAdam, who pos"
sesseddivine natural rights overEve, theirchildren, and the entire created world. Locke spends
the majority ofthe First Treatise demonstrating that Filmer proves neither the original absohtlr
110 Part II Modern Philosophers
sovereigntyofAdam norany historical lineage betweenAdamand Englishkings. He also argues
in oppositionto Filmerthat theauthorityofkings is notakin to the authorityoffathers overtheir
children, for citizens are not like children and parental authority ceases when children reach
adulthood. The first chapter ofthe Second Treatise summarizes the arguments of the First Trea
tise against paternalistic and divinely ordained kingly power.
TheSecond Treatise onGovernmentputsforward Locke~ ownpositiveaccountoftheoriginand
purpose ofgovernment. Like Hobbes, Locke not only stands against theocratic political power
but also offers a social contract theory ofpolitical obligation, beginningwith an account ofthe
state of nature that human beings inhabit prior to living in civil societies backed by govern
ments. UnlikeHobbes, Lockeappeals to natural morallawsaccessible to humanityin the hypo
theticalstate ofnaturebythe useoftheirreason, arguingthatthestate ofnatureneednotbecome
a state ofwar. Without asovereign power, human beings could live peacefully, following their
naturaldutiesofself-preservationand respectfulness towardothers. However, asgreedand irra
tionality lead some individuals to violate natural moral laws, people living in a state ofnature
stillface theneed to punishand restrainwrongdoers. Ournatural rights to punishwrongdoers
along with our other natural rights-are best entrusted to a sovereign power in a state, which
can impartially enactjust punishments and secure rights to life, liberty, and property
A LetterConcerning Toleration, published anonymouslyby Locke in 1689, complements the
argumentsofTheSecond TreatiseofGovernment. In the latter,we find theargument thatthe proper
scope ofthe authorityofthe state extends onlytosecuringindividuals' natural rights to life, lib
erty, and property Although Locke does not mention religious toleration in the Second Treatise,
his arguments for limitations upon social and political power in the treatise are extended to
diverse religious practices in the Letter. Locke argues that societies and states must tolerate all
harmless religious practices, for controllingreligiOUS beliefisnot necessary to securingrights to
life, liberty, and property; moreover, individual salvation cannot be secured by means of the
-coercive force ofthe state. A LetterConcerning Toleration was radicalinits time. Its proposals for
religiOUS toleration and freedom of religious beliefwere attractive to only a small minority of
political liberals, and the Letterwas widely attacked as atheistic and heretical.
John Locke The SecondTreatise ofGovernment l:f
The Second Treatise of Gove-rn-ment:
An Essay concerning the True Original Extent and
End of Civil Government
I occasion to think that all government in the
world is the product only of force and vio
1. It having been shown in the foregoing lence, and that men live togetherby no other
discourse, rules but that of beasts, where the strongest
carriesit, andso layafoundation for perpetual
1. That Adam had not, either by natural
disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition, and
right of fatherhood, nor by positive
rebellion (things that the followers of that
donation from God, any such author
hypothesis so loudly cry out against), must of
ityoverhischildren, ordominion over
necessityfind outanotherrise ofgovernment,
the world, as is pretended.
another original of political power, and
2. That if he had, his heirs yet had no
another way of designing and knowing the
right to it.
persons that have it, than what Sir Robert
3. Thatifhisheirshad, there beingnolaw
Filmer hath taught us.
ofnature nor positive law of God that
2. To this purpose, I think it may not be
determines which is the right heir in
amiss, to set down what I take to be political
all cases that may arise, the right of
power; that the power of a magistrate over a
succession, and consequently ofbear
subject may be distinguished from that of a
ing rule, could not have been certainly
father overhis children, amasterover his ser
determined.
vant, ahusband overhis wife, and alord over
4. That ifeven that had been determined,
his slave. All which distinct powershappen
yet the knowledge ofwhichistheeldest
ingsometimes togetherin the same man, ifhe
line ofAdam's posterity being so long
be considered under these different relations,
since utterly lost, that in the races of
itmayhelp us to distinguish these powersone
mankind and families of the world,
from another, andshowthe difference betwixt
there remains not to oneaboveanother,
a ruler ofa commonwealth, a father ofa fam
theleastpretence tobe theeldesthouse,
ily, and acaptain ofa galley.
and to have the right ofinheritance.
3. Politicalpower, then, Itake to be aright
All these premises having, as Ithink, been of making laws with penalties of death, and
clearly made out, it is impossible that the consequentlyallless penalties, for the regulat
rulers now on earth should make any benefit, ingand preservingofproperty, and ofemploy
or derive any the least shadow of authority ing the force of the community, in the
from that, which is held to be the fountain of execution ofsuch laws, and in the defence of
s
all power,Adam privatedominion andpaternal the commonwealth from foreign injury; and
jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just all this only for the public good.
12 Part II Modern Pbilosoplwrs
II they are, made to last during his, not one
another's pleasure: and being furnished with
Ofthe State ofNature like faculties, sharing all in one community or
nature, there cannot be supposed any such
4. To understand political power aright, and subordination among us, that may authorize
derive it from its original, we must consider, us to destroy one another, as ifwe were made
whatstateall menare naturallyin, and thatis, for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of
a state of perfect freedom to order their creatures are for ours. Everyone, as he is
actions, and dispose of their possessions and bound to preservehimself, and not to quit his
persons, as theythinkfit, within the boundsof stationwilfully, sobythe likereason, whenhis
the law of nature, without asking leave, or own preservation comes not in competition,
dependingupon the will ofany other man. ought he as much as he can to preserve the
A state also of equality, wherein all the rest ofmankind, andnotunlessitbeto dojus·
power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one tice on an offender, take away, or impair the
havingmore thananother; therebeingnothing life, or what tends to the preservation of the
more evident, than that creatures ofthe same life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of
speciesandrank, promiscuouslybornto allthe another.
same advantages ofnature, and the use ofthe 7. And thatallmenmaybe restrainedfrom
same faculties, should also be equal one invadingothersrights, andfrom doinghurt to
amongstanotherwithoutsubordinationorsub one another, and the law of nature be
jection, unless the lord and master ofthem all observed, whichwilleth the peace and preser
should,byanymanifestdeclarationofhiswill, vationofall mankind, the executionofthelaw
setoneaboveanother,andconferonhim,byan ofnature is, in that state, put into every manS
evident and clear appointment, an undoubted hands, wherebyeveryonehas arightto punish
right to dominionand sovereignty . . . the transgressors ofthat law to such a degree,
6. But though this be a state ofliberty, yet as may hinder its violation. For the law of
it is not a state oflicence: though man in that nature would, as all other laws that concern
state have anuncontrollable libertyto dispose men in this world, be in vain, if there were
ofhispersonorpossessions, yethehasnotlib nobodythatinthe state ofnaturehadapower
erty to destroy himself, or so much as any to execute that law, and thereby·preserve the
creature in his possession, but where some innocentand restrainoffenders. Andifanyone
nobler use than its bare preservation calls for in thestate ofnature may punish another for
it. The state of nature has a law of nature to any evilhe has done, everyone may doso: for
governit, whichobliges everyone, and reason, inthatstate ofperfectequalitywhere naturally
which is that law, teachers all mankind, who there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one
will but consult it, that being all equal and over another, whatanymaydo in prosecution
independent, no one ought to harm another of that law, everyone must needs have a right
in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for to do.
men being all the workmanship of one 8. And thus, inthestate ofnature, oneman
omnipotent, andinfinitelywisemaker; alhhe comes by a power over another; but yet no
servants of-one sovereignmaster,sent·into the absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal,
world by his order; and about hishu:sitiess; :whenhehasgothiminhis hands, accordingto
they are his property; whose workmanship thepassionateheats, orboundlessextravagancy
John Locke The SecondTreatise ofGovernment IL
ofhis ownwill; butonlyto retribute to him, so 11. From these two distinct rights, the one
farascalmreasonandconsciencedictates, what of punishing the crime for restraint, and pre
is proportionate to his transgression, which is venting the like offence, which right of pun
so much as may serve for reparation and ishing is in everybody; the other of taking
restraint: forthese twoare theonlyreasonswhy reparation, which belongs only to the injured
one man may lawfully do harm to another, party, comesit to pass that the magistrate,who
which is that we call punishment. In trans bybeingmagistrate hath the common right of
gressingthelawofnature, theoffenderdeclares punishingputintohishands, canoften, where
himselfto live byanother rule than that ofrea the public good demands not the execution of
son andcommon equity, whichisthatmeasure the law, remit the punishment of criminal
God has set to the actions of men for their offences by his own authority, but yet cannot
mutual security, and so he becomesdangerous remit the satisfaction due to any private man
to mankind, the tie, which is to secure them for the damage he has received. That, he who
from injury and violence, being slighted and hassuffered the damage has aright to demand
broken by him, which being a trespass against in his own name, and he alone can remit: the
thewholespecies, and thepeaceandsafetyofit, damnified person has this power ofappropri
provided for by the law ofnature, every man ating to himself the goods or service of the
uponthisscore,bythe righthehathtopreserve offender, byright ofself-preservation, as every
mankindingeneral,mayrestrain,orwhereitis man has a power to punish the crime, to pre
necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and ventitsbeingcommittedagain, bythe right he
so may bring such evil on anyone, who hath has of preserving all mankind, and doing all
transgressed that law; as may make him repent reasonable things he can in order to that end:
the doing ofit, and thereby deter him, and, by and thus it is, that every man, in the state of
his example others, from doing the like mis nature, has a powerto kill amurderer, both to
chief. And in this case, and upon this ground, deter others from doing the like injury, which
every man hath a right to punish the offender, no reparationcancompensate, bythe example
and be executioner ofthe law ofnature.... of the punishment that attends it from every
10. Besides the crime which consists in body, andalso tosecuremen from theattempts
violating the law, and varying from the right of a criminal, who having renounced reason,
rule ofreason, whereby a man so far becomes thecommonrule andmeasure Godhathgiven
degenerate, and declares himself to quit the to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and
principles of human nature and to be a nox slaughter he hath committed upon one,
ious creature, there is commonlyinjurydone, declared war against all mankind, and there
and some person or other, some other man fore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one
receives damage byhis transgression; inwhich of those wild savage beasts, with whom men
case he who hath received any damage, has, canhave nosocietynorsecurity: andupon this
besides the right of punishment common to is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso
s
him with other men, a particular right to seek sheddeth man blood, by man shall his blood be
reparation from him that has done it: and any shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that
other person, who finds it just, may also join everyonehadaright to destroysuchacriminal,
with him that is injured, and assist him in that after the murder of his brother, he cries
recovering from the offender so much as may out, Everyone thatfindeth me shall slay me; so
makesatisfaction for the harmhe hassuffered. plain was it writ in the hearts ofall n1;H')kitlcL
114 Part II Modern Philosophers
12. By the same reason maya man in the so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will
state of nature punish the lesser breaches of scarce be sojust as to condemn himselffor it;
that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with but I shall desire those who make this objec
death? I answcr, each transgression may be tion, to remember, thatabsolute monarchsare
punished to that degree, and with so much but men; and ifgovernment is to be the rem
severity, as will suffice to make itanillbargain edy of those evils, which necessarily follow
to thE: offender, give him cause to repent, and from men's being judges in their own cases,
terrify others from doing the like. Every and the state of nature is therefore not to be
offence, that can be committed in the state of endured, I desire to know what kind of gov
nature, mayin the state ofnature be also pun ernment that is, and how much better it is
ished equally, and as far forth as it may; in a than the state ofnature, where one man com
commonwealth: for though it would be manding a multitude, has the liberty to be
besidesmypresentpurpose, to enterhereinto judge in his own case, and may do to all his
the particulars of the law of nature, or its subjectswhateverhe pleases, without theleast
measuresofpunishment; yet, itiscertainthere question or control of those who execute his
is such a law, and that too as intelligible and pleasure? andinwhatsoever he doth, whether
plain to a rational creature, and a studier of led by reason, mistake, or passion, must be
that law, as the positive laws of common submitted to? whichmeninthe state ofnature
wealths: nay, possiblyplainer; as much as rea are not bound to do one to another. And ifhe
soniseasierto be understood, than the fancies that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any
and intricate contrivances of men, following othercase, he isanswerable for it to the rest of
contrary and hidden interests put into words; mankind.
for so truly are a great part of the municipal 14. 'Tis often asked as a mighty objection,
laws ofcountries, which are only so far right, where are, or everwere there anymeninsuch
as they are founded on the law of nature, by astate ofnature? To whichitmaysuffice as an
which theyare to beregulatedandinterpreted. answer at present, that since all princes and
13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in rulers ofindependent governments all through
the state ofnature everyone has the executive the world, areinastateofnature, 'tisplain the
power ofthe law ofnature, I doubt not but it world never was, nor never will be, without
will be objected, that it is unreasonable for numbers ofmeninthatstate. Ihave namedall
men to bejudges in their'Own cases, thatself governors of independent communItIes,
love will make men partial to themselves and whether they are, or are not, in league with
their friends: and on the otherside, ill-nature, others: for 'tis not every compact that puts an
passion, and revenge willcarrythemtoo far in end to the state of nature between men, but
punishingothers; and hence nothingbutcon only this one ofagreeing together mutually to
fusion anddisorderwill follow; and that there enterinto onecommunity; and make onebody
fore Godhathcertainlyappointedgovernment politic; other promises, and compacts, men
to restrain the partiality and violence ofmen. maymake onewithanother, andyetstillbein
I easily grant that civil government is the thestate ofnature. The promisesandbargains
proper remedy for the inconveniences of the· for truck, etc. between the two men in the
state ofnature, which must certainly be great desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la
where men may bejudges in their:own case, .. Vega, inhis historyofPeru; orbetweenaSwiss
since 'tiseasyto beiniagined, thathe'whowas and an Indian, in the woods ofAmerica, are
John Locke The Second Treatise ofGovernment' 1'15 .
binding to them, though they are perfectly in it; for nobody can desire to have me in his
a state ofnature, in reference to one another: absolute power unless it·be to compel me by
for truth and keeping offaith belongs to men force to that which is against the right ofmy
as men, and not as members ofsociety. freedom-Le., make me a slave. To be free
from such force is the only security of my
preservation, and reason bidsme lookonhim
III
as an enemy to my preservation who would
take away that freedom which is the fence to
Ofthe State ofWar
it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave
16. The state of war is a state of enmity and me thereby puts himself into a state of war
destruction; and therefore declaring by word with me. He that in the state ofnature would
or action, not a passionate and hasty, but take away the freedom that belongs to anyone
sedate, settled design upon anotherman's life, in that state must necessarily be supposed to
puts him in a state of war with him against have a design to take away everything else,
whom he hasdeclared such an intention, and that freedom being the foundation of all the
so has exposed his life to the other's power to rest; as he that in the state of society would
be taken away by him, or anyone that joins take away the freedom belonging to those of
with him in his defence, and espouses his that society or commonwealth must be sup
quarrel, it being reasonable and just I should posed to design to take away from them
have a right to destroy that which threatens everything else, and so be looked on as in a
me with destruction; for by the fundamental state ofwar.
law ofnature, man being to be preserved, as IS. Thismakesit lawful for aman to kill a
much as possible, when all cannot be pre thief who has not in the least hurt him, nor
served, the safety ofthe innocent is to be pre declared any design upon his life, any farther
ferred; and onemaydestroyamanwho makes than by the use of force, so to get him in his
warupon him, orhas discovered anenmityto power as to take away his money, or what he
hisbeing, for the same reason that he may kill pleases, from him; because usingforce, where
a wolf or a lion, because such men are not he has no right to get me into his power, let
under the ties of the common law of reason, his pretence be what it will, I have no reason
have no other rule but that of force and vio to suppose that he who would take away my
lence, and so maybe treated as beasts ofprey, liberty would not, when he had me in his
those dangerous and noxious creatures that power, take away everything else. And there
will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls fore it is lawful for me to treat him as onewho
into their power. has put himselfinto a state ofwar with me
17. And hence it is that he who attempts i.e., kill himifI can; for to that hazard does he
to get another man into his absolute power justly expose himself whoever introduces a
does thereby put himself into a state of war state ofwar, and is aggressor in it.
with him; it being to be understood as a dec 19. And here we have the plain difference
laration of a design upon his life. For I have between the state of nature and the state of
reason to conclude that he who would get me war, which however some men have con
into his powerwithout myconsent would use founded, are as far distant as a state ofpeace,
me as he pleased when he had got me there, goodwill, mutual assistance, and preservation;
and destroy me too when he had a fancy to and a state of enmity, malice, violence, and
II(, 1)lnt II Modern Philosophers
mutual destruction are one from another. Men Heaven. The Lord thejudge (says he) bejudgt
living together according to reason without a this day between the Children ofIsrael, and Ihe
common superior on earth, with authority to Children of Ammon. Judges xi. 27, and then
judge between them, are properly in the state prosecutingand relyingonhisappeal, he leads
of nature. But force, or a declared design of out his army to battle. And therefore in such
force upon the person ofanother, where there controversies, where the question is put, Who
is no common superior on earth to appeal to shall bejudge? it cannot be meant, who shall
for relief, is the state ofwar; and 'tis the want decide thecontroversy; everyone knows what
ofsuch an appeal gives aman the right ofwar jephtha here tells us, that the Lord the judge
even against an aggressor, though he be in shalljudge. Where there is nojudge onearth,
society and a fellow-subject. Thus, a thief the appeal lies to God in Heaven. That ques
whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the tion then cannot mean, Who shall judge
law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I whether another hath put himselfin astate of
may kill when he sets on me to rob me but of war with me, and whether I may, as jephtha
my horse or coat, because the law, which was did, appeal to Heaven in it? Of that I myself
made for my preservation, where it cannot can onlybejudge in my own conscience, as 1
interpose to secure mylife from present force, will answer it at the one great day, to the
which iflost is capable ofno reparation, per supremejudge ofall men.
mits me myown defence and the right ofwar,
a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the
IV
aggressor allows not time to appeal to our
common judge, nor the decision of the law,
OfSlavery
for remedy in a case where the mischief may
be irreparable. Want ofa commonjudge with 22. The natural liberty of man is to be free
authority puts all men in a state of nature; from anysuperior power on earth, and not to
force without right upon a man's person be under the will or legislative authority of
makes a state ofwar both where there is, and man, butto have onlythelawofNature forhis
is not, a commonjudge. . . . rule. The liberty of man in society is to be
21. To avoid this state of war (wherein under no other legislative power but that
there is no appealbut to Heaven, and wherein establishedbyconsent in the commonwealth,
every the least difference is apt to end, where nor under the dominion of any will, or
there is no authority to decide between the restraint of any law, but what the legislative
contenders) is one great reason of men's put- shall enact according to the trust put in it.
ting themselves into society, and quitting the Freedom, then, is not what Sir Robert Filmer
state ofnature. For where there is an author- tellsus, D.A. 55. Alibertyforeveryonetodowhat
ity, a power onearth from which reliefcan be helists, to live as he pleases, and not tobe tied by
had by appeal, there the continuance of the any laws; but freedom ofmen under govern
state ofwarisexcluded, and thecontroversyis mentis to haveastandingrule to live by,com
decided by that power. Had there been any mon toeveryone ofthat society, and made by
such court, anysuperiorjurisdictiononearth, the legislative power erected in it. Aliberty to
·to determine the right between jephtha and followmyownwininall thingswhere therule
th.eAmmonites, theyhadney.ercome toastate prescribes not, not to besubject to the incon
: oEwar,but we see he wa-s.fofc:ed toaPP\?ill to ...stant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of
John Locke The Second Treatise ofGovernment· 11
another man, as freedom of nature is to be and the master of such a servant was so far
underno otherrestraintbut the lawofnature. from having an arbitrary power over his life
23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary thathecouldnotat pleasure somuchasmaim
power is so necessary to, and closely joined him, but the loss of an eye or tooth set him
with, aman'spreservation, thathe cannot part free, Exod. xxi.
with it but by what forfeits his preservation
and life together. For a man, not having the
v
power ofhis own life, cannot, by compact or
his own consent, enslave himself to anyone,
OfProperty
nor put himselfunder the absolute, arbitrary
powerofanotherto takeawayhislifewhenhe 25. Whether we consider natural reason,
pleases. Nobodycangivemore powerthan he which tells us thatmen, beingonceborn,have
hashimself, and he that cannot take away his aright to theirpreservation, andconsequently
own life cannot give another power over it. to meat and drink and such other things as
Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own Nature affords for their subsistence, or revela
life by some act that deserves death, he to tion, whichgivesusanaccountofthose grants
whom he has forfeited it may, when he has God made oftheworld toAdam, and to Noah
him in his power, delay to take it, and make and his sons, 'tis very clear that God, as King
useofhim to his ownservice; andhe doeshim Davidsays, Psalmcxv. 16, hasgiven the earthto
no injury by it. For, whenever he finds the thechildrenofmen, givenitto mankindincom
hardship ofhis slavery outweigh the value of mon. But, this being supposed; it seems to
hislife, 'tisinhispower, byresisting the willof some a very great difficulty how anyone
his master, to draw on himself the death he should ever come to have a property in any
desires. thing, Iwillnotcontentmyselfto answer, that,
24. Thisis the perfect condition ofslavery, if it be difficult to make out property upon a
whichis nothingelsebut the state ofwar con supposition that God gave the world to Adam
tinued between alawful conquerorand acap and his posterity in common, it is impossible
tive. For, ifonce compactenterbetweenthem, that any man but one universal monarch
andmakeanagreementfor alimitedpoweron should have any property upon a supposition
the one side, and obedience on the other, the that Godgave the world toAdamandhisheirs
state ofwar and slavery ceases as long as the in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his
compact endures; for, as has been said, no posterity; but I shall endeavour to show how
man can by agreement pass over to another men might come to have apropertyinseveral
that which he hath not in himself, a power parts of that which God gave to mankind in
overhis own life. common, and that without any express com
Iconfess, we find among theJews, as well pact ofall the commoners.
as othernations, that men didsell themselves; 26. God, who hathgiven theworld tomen
but 'tis plain this was only to drudgery, not to in common, hath also given them reason to
slavery; for it is evident the person sold was make use ofit to the bestadvantage oflife and
not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical convenience. The earth and all that is therein
power. Forthe mastercouldnothave powerto is givento men for the supportand comfort of
kill him at any time, whom at a certain time their being. And though all the fruits it mllU~
he was obliged to let go free out ofhis service; rally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to
118 Part II Modern Philosophers
mankindincommon, as theyare producedby could. That labour put a distinction between
the spontaneous hand ofnature, and nobody them and common. That added something to
has originally a private dominion exclusive of them more than Nature, the common mother
the rest ofmankindinanyofthem, as theyare ofall, had done, and so they became his pri
thus in their natural state, yet being given for vate right. Andwillanyone sayhe had no right
the use of men, there must of necessity be a to thoseacornsorapples he thusappropriated
means to appropriate them somewayorother becausehe hadnot the consent ofall mankind
before they can be ofany use, or at all benefi to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to
cial, to any particular man. The fruit or veni assume to himself what belonged to all in
son which nourishes the wild Indian, who common? Ifsuch a consent as that was neces
knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in sary, man had starved, notwithstanding the
common, must be his, and so his-i.e., a part plenty God had given him. We see in com
of him, that another can no longer have any mons, which remain so by compact, that 'tis
right to it before it can do him any good for the taking any part of what is common, and
the support ofhis life. removingit out ofthe state Nature leavesitin,
27. Though the earth and all inferiorcrea which begins the property, without which the
tures be common to all men, yet every man common is of no use. And the taking of this
has aproperty in his own person. This nobody or that part does not depend on the express
has any right to but himself. The labour ofhis consent ofall the commoners. Thus, the grass
body and the work of his hands, we may say, myhorse hasbit, the turfs myservanthascut,
are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he and the are I have digged in any place, where
removes out ofthe state that nature hath pro Ihavea right to themincommonwith others,
vided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour become my property without the assignation
with it, and joined to it something that is his or consent of anybody The labour that was
own, and thereby makes it his property It mine, removing them out of that common
beingbyhimremoved from thecommonstate state they were in, hath fixed my property in
nature placeditin, ithathbythis laboursome them....
thingannexedto it thatexcludes the common 31. Itwill perhapsbe objected to this, that
right of other men. For this labour being the if gathering the acorns or other fruits of the
unquestionable property of the labourer, no earth, etc., makes a right to them, then any
man but he can have a right to what that is one mayengrossas muchas he will. To which
oncejoined to, at leastwhere there is enough, Ianswer, Not so. The same law ofnature that
and as good left in common for others. does bythis means give us property, does also
28. He that is nourished by the acorns he bound that property too. God has given us all
pickedup underanoak, ortheappleshegath things richly, ITim. vi. 12. Is thevoice ofreason
ered from the trees in the wood, has certainly confirmed by inspiration? But how far has he
appropriated them to himself. Nobody can given it us, to enjoy? As much as anyone can
deny but the nourishment is his. I ask, then, make use ofto any advantage oflife before it
when did they begin to be his? when he spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a
digested? orwhen he ate? or when he boiled? pr-operty in. Whatever is beyond this is more
or when he broughuhem home? oLwhenhe. thanhisshare, and belongs to others. Nothing
picked them up? And'tis plain" if the first was made by God for man to spoil or destroy
gathering rnade them. not his, nothing else And thus considering the plenty of natural