Japan 1945: From Operation Downfall to Hiroshima and Nagasaki PDF
Preview Japan 1945: From Operation Downfall to Hiroshima and Nagasaki
JAPAN 1945 From Operation Downfall to Hiroshima and Nagasaki ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND ILLUSTRATOR CLAYTONKS CHUN, PH.D.,isonthe U.S.ArmyWarCollegefacultyat CarlisleBarracks,Pennsylvaniawhereheteachescourseson nationalsecurity, strategy,andeconomics. HecompletedamilitarycareerintheU.S.AirForce and haspublished inthefieldsofnational security,militaryhistory,and economics. JOHNWHITEisacommercial illustratorwith manyyears'experience ofworking withadvertisingagencies,designfirms,publishersand large corporateaccounts.Hehasreceived awardsfromTheBroadcastDesign Association andTheNational NavalAviation Museum,and hispaintingshave appeared inAviationArtmagazine,AviationHistorymagazine,andonthe HistoryChannel.Johnand hiswifeMargeryliveinCharlotte,NorthCarolina. CAMPAIGN • 200 JAPAN 1945 From Operation Downfall to Hiroshima and Nagasaki CLAYTON K S CHUN ILLUSTRATED BY JOHN WHITE SerieseditorsMarcusCowperand Nikolai Bogdanovic Firstpublishedin2008byOspreyPublishing ARTIST'S NOTE MidlandHouse,WestWay,Botley,OxfordOX2OPH,UK 443ParkAvenueSouth,NewYork,NY10016,USA Readersmaycaretonotethattheoriginalpaintingsfromwhichthecolor E-mail:[email protected] platesinthisbookwerepreparedareavailableforprivatesale.The Publishersretainallreproductioncopyrightwhatsoever.Allenquiries shouldbeaddressedto: ©2008OspreyPublishingLimited JohnWhite,5107CMonroeRoad,Charlotte,NC28205,USA Allrightsreserved.Apartfromanyfairdealingforthepurposeofprivate ThePublishersregretthattheycanenterintonocorrespondenceupon study,research,criticismorreview,aspermittedundertheCopyright, thismatter. DesignsandPatentsAct,1988,nopartofthispublicationmaybe reproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmittedinanyform LINEAR MEASUREMENTS orbyanymeans,electronic,electrical,chemical,mechanical,optical, photocopying,recordingorotherwise,withoutthepriorwrittenpermission Distances,rangesanddimensionsaremostlygiveninthecontemporary ofthecopyrightowner.EnquiriesshouldbeaddressedtothePublishers. USsystemofinches,feet,yardsandstatutemilesratherthanmetric: feettometers: multiplyfeetby0.3048 ACIPcatalogrecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. yardstometers: multiplyyardsby0.9144 milestokilometers: multiplymilesby1.6093 ISBN9781846032844 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS EditorialbylIiosPublishing,Oxford,UK(www.iliospublishing.com) PagelayoutbyTheBlackSpot Icouldnothavecompletedthisbookwithouttheoutstandingsupport TypesetinSabonandMyriadPro ofseveralindividualsandorganizations.Thefollowingpeoplewillingly IndexbyAlisonWorthington gavemuchhelpandadvicethroughouttheprocess.MyeditorsNikolai OriginatedbyPPSGrasmereLtd.,Leeds BogdanovicandMarcusCooperfromlIiosPublishingcontinuedtoprovide CartographybyTheMapStudio superbcoordinationandoversightoftheproject.Additionally,John Bird's-eyeviewartworksbyTheBlackSpot White'sexcellentartisticabilitiesbroughtlifetothestoryofJapan1945. PrintedinChinathroughWorldprintLtd. TheArmyHeritageandEducationCenterattheU.s.ArmyWarCollege, CarlisleBarracks,PAandtheAlbertF.SimpsonHistoricalResearchCenter, MaxwellAFB,ALgavemeinvaluablehelpansweringmanyquestions. 08 09 10 11 12 10 9 8 76 54 3 2 1 Finally,Iwanttothankmyfamilyfortheirpatienceduringthisproject. FORACATALOGOFALLBOOKSPUBLISHEDBYOSPREYMILITARY THEWOODLAND TRUST ANDAVIATIONPLEASECONTACT: OspreyPublishingaresupportingtheWoodlandTrust,theUK'sleading NORTHAMERICA woodlandconservationcharity,byfundingthededicationoftrees. OspreyDirect,c/oRandomHouseDistributionCenter,400HahnRoad, Westminster,MD21157 E-mail:[email protected] ALLOTHERREGIONS OspreyDirectUK,P.O.Box140Wellingborough,Northants,NN82FA,UK E-mail:[email protected] www.ospreypublishing.com Keytomilitarysymbols 0 0 0 0 0 DIII DII ArmyGroup Army Corps Division Brigade Regiment Battalion DI 0 0 0 ~ 8 ~ Company/Battery Platoon Section Squad Infantry Artillery Cavalry D p 0 B bd EJ ~ Airborne UnitHQ Airdefence AirForce Airmobile Airtransportable Amphibious [ZSJ § EJ §] G EJ EJ Anti-tank Airaviation Bridging Engineer Headquarters rn EE [ill] W IT] ~ [ill Medical Missile Mountain Navy ~~~~~:ibiological. Ordnance [2] ~ (d 00 []] ~ Signal Supply Transport Rocketartillery Airdefenceartillery Keytounitidentification identiufienritlZlParueninlt Commander (+)wlllladdedelements (-)lesselements CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 5 CHRONOLOGY 9 OPPOSING COMMANDERS 11 US commanders. Japanese commanders OPPOSING PLANS 17 The options for Japan • The Allied strategyfor victory Diplomacy or destruction OPERATION DOWNFALL: THE INVASION OFJAPAN 34 Phase one: Operation Olympic. Phase two: Operation Coronet Setting atimeframe • The Japanese response THE APPROACH TO ARMAGEDDON 45 The choice oftarget • Ademonstration ofpower S09th Composite Group. Readying the weapons HIROSHIMA 51 The plan ofattack. Red plugs for go NAGASAKI 67 The plan ofattack. Fat Man and the forecast AFTERMATH 79 The future ofwarfare THE SITES TODAY 90 BIBLIOGRAPHY 93 INDEX 95 J R BERING SEA SEA ~, OF OKHOTSK .J, NORTH PACIFIC / /~ AREA ,I;, . f·. Bonin Islahds CENTRAL PA'CIFIC IwoJim~; ~~~~~nso . Marcus AREA Hawaiian o Islands ~ake (NIMITZ) ," <lo~{.> :Marianas Saipan~Islands Guam,' 8th~ PACIFIC OCEAN Caroline1~lands· .' ...~LineIslands Equator /----------------------------- ~S..a...m...oa \1t'" New /.~~ji '";Hebrides ,.'Tahiti ... ·..·S.uva '''3.. New·'. INDIAN AU ALIA Caledonia SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN AREA Japanesecontrolledarea _ Alliedcontrolledarea USareaofresponsibility 1,000miles I I 2,000km INTRODUCTION Byearly 1945,theseniorAlliedleadershiphadrecognizedthat Germanywas on the verge of defeat, threatened with a combined American, British and Sovietdrive into Germanterritory. Theattentionwas nowswitchedtoJapan. American, British, Commonwealth, Chinese and other forces had fought bitter campaigns against the Japanese throughout Asia and the Pacific, and mademajoradvances againstTokyo'stroops. UnitedStatesArmyandMarine Corps units had island-hopped their way across the Southwest and Central Pacific, getting close to the Japanese home islands. This allowed American long-range bombers to attack targets inJapan on a regular basis. American submarines,whichhadfirststartedto blockadeJapaninDecember 1941,now began to tighten their death grip onJapan's economic capability, its military transportation system and its food supplies. However, unlike the situation facing Allied ground forces poised to advance deep into Germany, Japan posed a more difficultproblem. American forces could continue their march north through the Central Pacific, but to accomplish a similar capture of Tokyo, Allied forces would need to execute what would almost certainly be a series of extremely costly amphibious invasions. The key question facing Alliednationalandmilitaryleaderswas howto coercea determinedJapanese government, military and population to surrender unconditionally. Inanycontestforcontrol oftheJapanesehomeislands, theAllies'superiorityinarms andmaterielwouldbetelling. Japaneseheavyweapons,such asthisIJAmachinegun,were oftenlesseffectiveandfewer innumberthanAllied equivalents.(USArmy) 5 ABOVE,LEFT The United States had been at war for more than three years byjanuary USArmyAirForces(USAAF) 1945.Thenationhadsacrificeditsmilitary,populationandeconomyfighting officershopedtousestrategic anextensivetwo-frontwar. Althoughheavyattritionhadworndownjapanese bombingasapowerfultoolin military capability by 1945, a fresh round of Pacific amphibious invasions thePacificTheater.The8-29 wouldfindfameasaweapons from the Philippines and Central Pacific had demonstrated that imperial deliveryplatformthatwould japanese military units would not surrender easily. Allied leaders could see a helpendthewar.(USAirForce) rush to end the war would be costly. Britain and her Commonwealth allies had fought alongside America throughout the Pacific; these countries had ABOVE,RIGHT Americafoughtabrutalhand enduredwar sinceSeptember 1939, andtheirresourceswere depleted. China to-handcampaigntoliberate was stillunderoccupationwhileNationalistand Communistforces struggled thePacific,asdemonstrated among themselves and against the commonfoe ofthe japanese. How to end bythisscenefromLeyte's thewar becameadifficultchallenge. Politicalandmilitaryconferencesamong recapturein1944.(DOD) the Allies seemed to follow a singular approach: a methodical defeat of japaneseforces onthe home islands ofKyushu and Honshu, followed bythe occupationofTokyo. Still,japaneseforces maintainedmany, albeitweakened, units throughout Asia and the Pacific. Taking Tokyo might not guarantee the nation's defeat, as experience had taught the Allies that many japanese soldiers, sailors and airmenwouldfight to the death. TheAllies had to find a way to ensure theywould surrender. japanese political and military leaders seemed, in public, unified in their desire to fight to the death. However, mounting losses and the destruction of japanese cities by bombing were hard to hide and might mean the very destructionofjapanas anation.Therewasasmallbutgrowingmovementof Foreign Ministry officials and others who believed surrender was preferable to the type of end facing Germany, one that involved the destruction and occupation ofthe nation. These officials believedthat a negotiated surrender would leave some territory under Japanese sovereignty. To these "peace" advocates capitulationwas a goal, but notwith the unconditional terms that theAmericans, Britishand Chinesehadsought.Themostimportantaspectin their mind was keeping intactjapan's symbolic essence: the emperor and the imperial system. Opposing viewpoints recalled that japanese military forces had executed spectacular victories in 1941 and 1942. Although Tokyo had suffered horrendous losses since Midway, its ground and naval units had not beentotally broken. japan's survival was stillpossible. 6 PresidentHarryS. Truman'sdecisionto usethenewweaponoftheatomic bomb twice.against Japan continues to affect US national security policy and her international relations to this day, and the process itself provides a valuable insight into the way decisions were made under wartime pressures. Many US War Department officials viewed the atomic bomb as little more than a larger explosive device, with no wider significance; conventional strategic bombinghad alreadyleveledDresden, Tokyo and otherAxis cities, so what was so special about the atomic bomb? Many officials were also lookingto the future and the postwarera, and soughtmeans to demonstrate therelevance oftheirparticularbranches ofservice. Anamphibiousinvasion would demonstrate the need for the US Army and Marine Corps, to protect thenationandwinwars. BlockadingJapanand bombardingherwithsurface ship firepower andcarrieraircraftwouldprovethatnavalforces could bring decisive results. Likewise, the air forces could claim that the use of bombers had broken the will and ability of the Japanese to continue the struggle. However, Americanforces thattookthe Philippines, IwoJima and Okinawa wereshockedattheferocity ofthefanaticalJapanese defense. TheAmerican andBritishpoliticalandmilitaryleadershiphadfelt aninvasionwasthefaster andmostlikelywayto force aJapanese surrender. AlthoughotherAmerican AmericancasualtiesatIwoJima military leaders advocated alternative ways to defeat Japan, such as the andOkinawashockedUS opening of a second front by the Soviets (unlike Germany, the Japanese PresidentTruman.Theselosses werefighting ononlyonemajorfront againsttheAmericans, andso opening hadaprofoundeffectonhis decisionwhethertolaunch another might make Japan's defeat quicker and less costly) an invasion aninvasionoftheJapanese seemed imminent. However, numerous voices in the Allied command homeislands.(DOD) questioned this plan, fearing Allied casualties in the tens ofthousands. Itwaswiththeseconsiderationsin mind that the American president made one of the most difficult decisions ofthe entire war. The atomic bomb was but one of a long list of many innovative weapons to emerge during WorldWar II. Developedfrom experimentationwith nuclear power, it was considered, at one point, to be merely an expensive experiment, and one that some Americangovernmentofficialsthoughtwasteful.The US War Department gathered the greatest scientific andtechnicalexperts available and spentan unheard of$2 billionto design, develop andtestatheory. The effortwas basedonthe ideas andconcepts developed by a handful of highly influential scientists, who believedthatGermanywasdevelopingnuclearpower, which could give Adolf Hitler a weapon of great magnitude. European scientific immigrants, such as Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr and Enrico Fermi, had sufficient credibility to persuade President Franklin D. Roosevelt to establish a program to build an atomic bomb. Intendedfor use againstGermany, this scientificdeviceultimately becameaninstrumentthat helped end the war againstJapan. Inthecampaignsacrossthe The views and opinions of the political, organizational, strategic and Pacificin1944and1945,US militaryleaders allcontributedto theeventual, difficultdecisionto drop the soldiersandMarineshadto atomic bomb- onethathas beensubjectto debate eversince. The debate at evictJapanesedefendersfrom the time focused on the best way to demonstrate the Allies' determination strongdefensivepositions, suchasthiscave,which to get Japan to surrender quickly. At stake was the conduct of the largest resultedinhighcasualties. - amphibiousinvasionplannedfor WorldWarII, whichmightcostthousands Oneoptionforclearing of Allied, and particularly American, lives, not to mention those of the suchpositionswastouse Japanese defenders and civilians who might be killed or wounded. The flamethrowersandchemical enemy, fighting for its existence,couldcontinueresistancefor years, putting weapons.(DOD) at risk prisoners of war, civilians living in occupied territories and the AlliedpopulationsthroughoutAsia and the Pacific. Oncetheinitialdecision was made to land military forces in Japan and occupy sacred territory, it would be risky to switch the focus from invasion to reliance on an as yet unproven weapon. Although the atomic bomb was instrumental in demonstrating a new threat to the Japanese national existence, the use of nuclear weapons was not the only factor that forced Japan's surrender. MountingJapanese losses caused by increased and more intensive attacks on the home islands, the nation's dwindling economic capability, the threat of invasion and the fact thatJapanhadnowbecomethesolefocus ofAlliedmilitarypowerfollowing Germany's capitulation all influenced the nation's leaders in Tokyo. Japan's empire was shrinking at an increasing rate, and she could not hold back the relentlessadvanceofAlliedmilitarypower. Alliedseniorpoliticalandmilitary leadership agreed that theJapanese empire's rule was coming to an end, but came to the conclusion that a major shock to theJapanese might push them to surrender. The time for that shock would come on 6 August 1945. 8
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