"Jack of all trades" : the metamorphosis of armored cavalry in Vietnam.

189 Pages·2016·6.18 MB·English

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Electronic Theses and Dissertations
8-2005
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Robert Manson Peters 1966-
University of Louisville
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd
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Peters, Robert Manson 1966-, ""Jack of all trades" : the metamorphosis of armored cavalry in Vietnam."
(2005). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 1119.
https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/1119
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"JACK OF ALL TRADES:" THE METAMORPHOSIS OF ARMORED CAVALRY IN
VIETNAM
By
Robert Manson Peters
B.A., Randolph-Macon College, 1989
A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of the University of Louisville
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Arts
Depm1ment of History
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky
August 2005
“Jack of All Trades:” The Metamorphosis of Armored Cavalry in Vietnam

By

Robert Manson Peters
B.A., Randolph-Macon College, 1989

A Thesis Approved on

June 10, 2005

by the following Thesis Committee:

Thesis Director

ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would first like to thank Dr. Wayne Lee for all his help with this project. I could
not have done this without his guidance, patience, and professionalism. His ability to
quickly get to the essence of an issue amazes me. Thanks to Dr. Scott Levi and Dr.
Michael Cunningham as well. Thanks to Dr. Robert Cameron, Armor Center Historian
for his insights and time, and to the Armor School Library staff under Mr. William
Hansen, a special thanks for allowing me to make liberal use of your resources. To Mr.
Charles Lemons and the Patton Museum staff, thanks for your help. Thanks to my family
- my wife and children, who gave up a lot of time with me so that I could work on this
project, and who encouraged and motivated me. To my grandmother Charlotte Myers
whose recent 90th birthday celebration I missed because I was working on this, who
helped instill in me a love of history. Lastly, to the dedicated U.S. soldiers who served in
Vietnam, thank you again for your honorable service and sacrifice. As part of this, I'd
like to specially thank my father, a Marine Vietnam Veteran who always made me proud,
and Thorn Richason, the model of the cavalry trooper veteran.
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ABSTRACT
"JACK OF ALL TRADES:" THE METAMORPHOSIS OF ARMORED CAVALRY IN
VIETNAM
Robert Manson Peters
August, 2005
This thesis is a chronological historical examination of armored cavalry doctrine
and execution during the Vietnam War, with a focus on comparison of the armored
cavalry's doctrinal missions of reconnaissance, security, and economy of force with the
reality of execution on the ground. In Vietnam, a metamorphosis occurred between these
doctrinal missions and actual execution due to a series of factors, such as the nature of
area warfare and a relative lack of doctrinal preparedness, the latter largely due to the
doctrinal flux of the early 1960s, myths about warfare in Vietnam, and institutional
resistance. The metamorphosis also occurred because it had to, and could, because of the
many positive attributes of the cavalry, and because a series of other new enablers
supplanted and masked the loss of cavalry in performing their doctrinal missions. The
enablers ranged from new reconnaissance concepts and units, to the rise of technologies
and increased surveillance abilities. Despite all the changes in execution from doctrine
due to the demands of an extremely complex and multi-faceted war, cavalry and armor
doctrine returned to its conventional focus following the war, while most of the adapted
doctrine was relegated to peripheral manuals.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................... .iii
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................... .iv
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 1
II. THE ROAD TO VIETNAM ............................................................... 8
III. ARMORED CAVALRY DOCTRINE AND EXECUTION IN VIETNAM ...... 33
IV. THE METAMORPHOSIS EXAMINED ............................................... 143
V. THE POST-VIETNAM LEGACy ....................................................... 165
REFERENCES ................................................................................... 176
CURRICULUM VITAE ........................................................................ 183
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In accordance with Webster's dictionary, doctrine has several meanings, all
interrelated and applicable in the military sense. The definitions represent the entire
range of Army operations from the smallest unit levels up to national level policy. First,
doctrine is "something taught." Second, it is "a principle or body of principles presented
by a specific field, system, or organization for acceptance or belief." In the case of the
cavalry, it is part of the proponent of armor and cavalry, a branch of the combat arms.
Doctrine according to this second definition also serves as a common language with the
other combat arms, infantry and artillery. Third, doctrine can be a "rule or principle of
law, especially when established by precedent," which are universally applicable
concepts such as mass, speed, agility, tempo, surprise, etc, which can be used in the
application of more specific doctrine. Fourthly, it can be a "statement of government
policy, especially in foreign affairs." This is where doctrine connects military activities
with government policy objectives.
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Doctrine is at times prescriptive, outlining specific actions to take; at other times
it is a general guideline, not to be followed all the time to the letter, but to be adjusted on
the ground as needed, dependent on the factors of METT - mission accomplishment,
enemy factors, friendly troops capability, and the dictates of the terrain. So, while it can
1 Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary (1988), S.Y. "doctrine."
be specific, doctrine is also set of guidelines within which to operate. To add to this,
doctrine can, and must change if determined that something entirely different or some
variation of doctrine works better. If an army cannot adapt when necessary, it will fail.
Doctrinally, the history of the mission of the cavalry is lively and varied. From
the earliest times, cavalry (mounted warfare) contributed in many different ways to the
conduct of warfare, including providing greater speed, mass, and shock affect. Cavalry
has always been characterized by speed, but yet aspects of the cavalry have been
emphasized differently at different times. For example, shock affect was used by the
cuirassiers of Napoleon, while shock effect was not used by cavalry during the U.S. Civil
War in the same sense.
Perhaps cavalry's greatest and most significant doctrinal role, however, has been
reconnaissance. The ability to conduct reconnaissance was greatly improved by the
mobility of the horse, using it to transport the soldier in order to find the enemy more
quickly. The cavalry used its speed and mobility to gain and maintain contact with the
enemy, preferably with stealth, in order to gain intelligence for and protect the remainder
of maneuver forces. Typically the cavalry gained and maintained contact with the enemy
in order to allow the rest of the friendly maneuver forces to destroy the enemy at a critical
point on the battlefield. Cavalry also confirmed or denied the disposition of enemy
elements for planning purposes for friendly missions, and countered enemy
reconnaissance.
Reconnaissance was the primary mission of cavalry leading into World War II,
but by the end of the war, U.S. cavalry came to be associated with a more robust set of
2
"trinity" doctrinal missions: reconnaissance, security, and economy of force.2 The ability
and requirement doctrinally to conduct these missions set the cavalry apart from pure
tank forces. The goal of security is to keep the main force from being under observation
by the enemy, and to keep them safe from surprise. Security missions consisted of
screening, guarding, or covering the main body of forces from enemy reconnaissance and
enemy main forces, with each mission representing increasing levels of protection.
Economy of force is both a principle of war and an operation, and consists of offensive or
defensive missions that direct cavalry forces to find the enemy, and then conduct an array
of military operations once contact is made. The principle of economy of force is to
occupy as many of the enemy's forces as possible with a smaller, armed and mobile force
specially trained and equipped for the task (such as the cavalry), thus allowing and
facilitating the bulk of friendly force maneuver units' ability to achieve their objectives,
which mayor may not be the destruction of that particular enemy force. Thus, by the end
of World War II, regarding reconnaissance, it was an accepted concept that cavalry
needed to have the means to fight for information; stealth, while worthwhile, was not
always practical or achievable. However, by the end of World War II, the cavalry was
associated with all three "trinity" missions rather than just reconnaissance.
Cavalry doctrine of the mid-1960's, leading up to the introduction of ground
forces in South Vietnam, still centered on the "trinity." Cavalry doctrine was primarily
based, as was the larger Army doctrine, on a conventional conflict such as World War II,
or a future Cold War conflict with Warsaw Pact forces on a European battlefield, even
though President Kennedy's policy of "Flexible Response" of the early 1960's sought to
2 The term "trinity", for the doctrinal missions of reconnaissance, security, and economy of force was first
observed in the monograph by Major 1. Bryan Mullins, "The Core Competencies of U.S. Cavalry."
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prepare the Army to fight low-intensity conflicts such as insurgencies. Conventional
conflict was linear warfare with front lines whieh demarcated friendly from enemy, and
was based on the threat model of Warsaw Pact forces of the Cold War. The reality of the
situation in Vietnam, however, necessitated fighting differently, and thus challenged
cavalry doctrine, causing in-country changes and adjustments, some of which found their
way into doctrine after the fact.
In general, doctrine did not reflect, or predict the ultimate type of conflict that
U.S. forces faced in Vietnam. Doctrine lagged mainly because it did not anticipate the
nature of the war in Vietnam and what it would require of an Army with largely
conventional doctrine, although there were some warning signs. Further, there were
several large myths about the Vietnam War which arguably retarded doctrinal
preparation, including the idea that fighting guerillas was infantryman's work and that the
jungle was no place for armor. The prior defeat of the French in Vietnam created
wariness of meeting the same demise. In short, the myths helped delay doctrinal efforts
to prepare for what lay ahead. By the end of the Vietnam War, however, if not sooner,
the myths were dispelled, and armored cavalry more than proved themselves. The
resulting experiences were enough collectively to cause the Army to coin a new doctrinal
term for their collective operations in Vietnam: stability operations.
In the Vietnam War, the armored cavalry that participated varied: divisional
cavalry squadrons, an armored cavalry regiment, air cavalry troops and squadrons, and
separate cavalry troops. This study looks at the doctrine and execution of the division
cavalry squadrons and one armored cavalry regiment. The division cavalry squadron is
by doctrine the reconnaissance, security, and economy of force asset for the division - the
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