Italian regionalism or ‘Padanian’ nationalism - the political project of the Lega Nord in Italian politics

15 Pages·0.69 MB·English

by  Giordano Benito.

PoliticalGeography19 (2000)445–471
www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo
Italian regionalism or ‘Padanian’ nationalism —
the political project of the Lega Nord in Italian
politics
Benito Giordano *
School ofGeography, UniversityofManchester,OxfordRoad,Manchester M139PL, UK
Abstract
The resurgence of regionalist political parties has had a considerable, though variable,
impactoncontemporaryEuropeanpoliticsinrecentdecadesandtherearenumerousexamples
of such parties across Europe. In Italy, there are several regionalist parties, however, it is the
emergenceinthelast15yearsorso,oftheNorthernLeague(LegaNord)(LN)politicalparty,
in the North of Italy, which has given a new impetus to debates about the significance of
regionalism in Italy as well as across Europe. This paper discusses the different approaches
to defining regionalism as well as the common features and driving forces of contemporary
political regionalist projects. It then focuses upon the political discourses of the LN in order
todiscussthewaysinwhichthepartyresemblesotherregionalistprojects,whilehavingcertain
key, distinct and rather unique differences. This is because the LN’s political project is not
basedinanareathathashistoricclaimstonationhood.Instead,theLNhasattemptedtoinvent
an ethnicity for the North of Italy (or ‘Padania’) in order to justify its political claims for the
protection of the economic interests of the region. ‘Padania’ (which is the Latin term which
refers to the basin of the River Po), has never ‘existed’ as an administrative or political unit
but the LN has attempted to construct (and invent) a geography and a history in order to
justify its territorial and political claims. (cid:211) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords:Italy;LegaNord; Regionalism;‘Padania’
Introduction
During 1990s, the debates about the resurgence of political regionalism in Europe
have become particularly prevalent. One reason for this has been the fact that in
* Tel.:[phone];fax: [phone].
E-mailaddress: [email protected] (B.Giordano).
0962-6298/00/$-seefrontmatter(cid:211) 2000ElsevierScienceLtd.Allrightsreserved.
PII:S0962-6298(99)00088-8
446 B.Giordano/PoliticalGeography19(2000)445–471
several European countries, regionalist political parties have made significant elec-
toral gains in recent years. This paper focuses upon Italy, which is one of the coun-
tries in which there has been a significant resurgence of regionalism over the last
10 years or so. Political regionalism is not a new phenomenon in Italy and there
have been a number of examples of regionalist political parties during the history
oftheItalianRepublic.However,itistherisetopoliticalprominenceoftheNorthern
League (Lega Nord) (LN) political party in Italian politics, which has brought to the
fore questions about Italian national unity and identity. The party has articulated a
new, and politically more contentious ‘Northern question’, which is superimposed
upon the long-standing ‘Southern question’ in Italy (Diamanti, 1996a).
TheLN’sdemandsforgreaterregionalautonomyarepartofawidertrendamongst
regionalist parties in Europe. However, it would be a mistake to assume that all
versionsofcontemporaryEuropeanregionalismhaveexactlythesamedrivingforces.
Clearly regionalist political parties and movements form a heterogeneous category
in terms of their structures and specificities of demands (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982, p.
426). On the other hand, there are certain features, components and driving forces,
which arecommon tothe majorityof contemporaryregionalistpolitical parties.This
paper firstly considers some of the different ways of defining contemporary
regionalism and then discusses the key components, which are relatively common
tothemajorityofregionalistpoliticalprojects.Secondly,thepaperanalysesthemain
political discourses of the LN in order to illustrate the ways in which the LN shares
some of the common features of contemporary political regionalist projects but yet
has certain distinct and unique differences. It is these differences that make the par-
ty’spoliticalproject importantinthecontextofdebatesaboutEuropeanregionalism.
The key difference between the LN’s political project and the majority of other
regionalist political parties is the fact that it is not based in an area that has historic
claims to nationhood. Instead, the LN has attempted to invent an ethnicity for the
NorthofItalyinordertojustifyitspoliticalclaimsfortheprotectionoftheeconomic
interests of the region. The LN rejects the concept of the Italian national-state and
wants to create a separate state called ‘Padania’1, which encompasses the regions of
North and Central Italy. However, ‘Padania’ has never existed geographically or
historically but the LN has attempted to construct (and invent) a geography and a
history in order to justify its territorial and political claims.
The rise of the LN in Italy, therefore, raises a number of questions not only about
the nature of contemporary regionalism but also about understanding contemporary
conceptions of regional (and national) political identities. Firstly, the LN has shown
that with the use of modern technology as well as its mix of cultural symbolism and
graphic political propaganda it is possible to deliberately invent the existence of a
new political identity (for ‘Padania’) complete with its own myths, symbols and
rendering of history for the North of Italy (Agnew & Brusa, 1999, p. 123). Indeed,
1 AccordingtotheLN,the14‘nations’whichconstitute‘Padania’areAlto-AdigeorSu¨dtirol,Emilia,
Friuli,Liguria,Lombardia,Marche,Piemonte,Romagna,Toscana,Trentino,Trieste,Umbria,Valled’Ao-
sta andVeneto.‘Padania’ istheLatinterm fortheregion surroundingtheRiver PoinNorthernItaly.
B.Giordano/PoliticalGeography19(2000)445–471 447
in the space of a couple of years the LN has created a sense of ‘Padanian’ identity
whereas attempts to create a sense of national Italian identity have taken 130 years
(and are still very much ongoing).
Secondly, the invention of ‘Padania’ shows that political identities are more mal-
leable or subject to revision than most social scientists and historians have tended
toacknowledge(Agnew&Brusa,1999,p.126).Indeed,asAgnewandBrusa(1999,
p. 126) point out “what is remarkable in the case of Northern Italy today is that we
can see before our eyes the attempted invention of an identity that has had no prior
existence”. However, the invention of a ‘Padanian’ identity does not mean that all
other identities are being replaced or superseded in Northern Italy. In fact, it illus-
trates the way that a ‘new’ political identity can appeal in a complementary rather
than competing way with other political identities at other scales. In Italy, both local
andnationalidentitieshaveco-existedfordecadesandthecreationofanew‘Padani-
an’politicalidentitydoesnotmeanthat‘old’affiliationsdisappear(Agnew&Brusa,
1999, p. 128).
In summary, the LN’s political regionalist project, which is premised upon its
attempt to invent a place called ‘Padania’ shows the extent to which things have
changed since the last round of nation-state building in the nineteenth century when
a number of European nation-states were created (Agnew & Brusa, 1999, p. 123).
As the next section discusses, there are certain common features and driving forces
behind the resurgence of contemporary regionalism, however, quite clearly the
example of ‘Padania’ ensures that the LN remains quite unique in comparison to
the majority of other regionalist political projects within Europe.
Understanding contemporary regionalism
It is important not to over-dramatise the importance and strength of regionalist or
nationalist movements in contemporary Europe; however, there has been an upsurge
of such parties striving for greater political autonomy in recent decades. The funda-
mental question is why is this resurgence occurring in contemporary European
nation-states at the end of the twentieth century when it was assumed that the
phenomenonwouldfadewiththeprocessesofmodernisation.Inthe1950sand1960s
there was general consensus amongst academics and policy makers alike that the
processes of industrialisation and urbanisation associated with post-war economic
growth would eradicate the potent force of regionalism and nationalism.
It was thought that the diffusion of industrialisation and technology from the cen-
tral core of states would encourage the spread of the centre’s universalist values,
erode regional languages and promote the development of central state bureaucratic
systems. In spite of inevitable opposition to these processes from certain sectors of
society, which Lipset (1975) calls ‘revolts against modernity’, the outcome would
bethedevelopmentofrelativelyhomogenousnation-states.Clearly,thishasnotbeen
thecasebecausemarkedregionaleconomicdifferencespersist—alongwithdistinct
languages,culturesandidentities—inthemajorityofnation-states,andinparticular
in those states which are the most industrially and economically advanced (Keating,
1996, p. 43–44).
448 B.Giordano/PoliticalGeography19(2000)445–471
The crucial question is what exactly does the term regionalism signify? Clearly,
regionalismcanbeunderstoodindifferentways,suchasathreatto,orprotestagainst
theState,carryingdangersofexclusion,fragmentation,and/orseparatism,oralterna-
tively as a mechanism for modifying State authority with the aim of gaining greater
autonomy(Jones&Keating,1995,p.9).Inaddition,akeyquestiontoaskiswhether
regionalism is a new political perspective, a temporary phenomenon, or a serious
and lasting consequence of and challenge to the deficiencies of the nation-state and
hence a new form of modernity (Hueglin, 1986, p. 440). In some cases, regionalism
can be understood as a socio-political project with aspirations to restore past ethnic
and cultural identities and autonomies. In other cases, regionalism can be seen as
an invention of the present, often being based upon distorted histories and contem-
porary claims to specific ethnic identities. On other occasions regionalism combines
both of these factors in order to gain legitimacy. Keating (1996, p. 53) argues that:
for the most part, the peripheral nationalisms [or regionalisms] of developed
western societies represent attempts to come to terms with the changing constel-
lation of power and to reconstitute politics on a territorial basis which is legit-
imised historically but which can be used to confront contemporary political and
economic realities.
It is not possible to construct a single model or theory explaining all the different
cases of regionalism (Jones & Keating, 1995, p. 9). In addition, regionalisms differ
in their character as well as their strength, depending on the conditions in particular
local societies and the impact on them of national and international forces (Keating,
1988). Furthermore, although it is the resurgence of regionalism in recent decades
that is of most interest it is important not to forget that regionalism is one of the
oldest problems which exists in Europe.
Bearing in mind these issues, it is useful to differentiate between two categories
of regionalism. Separating out the diversity of contemporary manifestations of
regionalism into broad categories allows the phenomenon to be more easily under-
stood and analysed. Although the categories are by no means the only ones that
could be used, they are useful because they allow distinctions to be made between
the various types of regionalism. The categories used here are ‘institutional’ and
‘autonomist’ regionalism. The former relates more to the processes of ‘regionalisa-
tion’ which have taken place within and between European states, whereas the latter
referstotheformsof minority,separatistandethnic regionalismswhichhavegained
increasing exposure in recent decades. Also, it must be pointed out that the two
categories are not mutually exclusive because there are often many links between
the two, for example, often the processes of regionalisation within a state develop
into, and provide legitimisation for, forms of ‘autonomist’ regionalism.
In the 1960s, many European states adopted regional development policies as an
extensionofschemesofnationalandsectoralplanning.Theseschemeswerejustified
on both political and economic grounds; firstly, because it was argued that such
schemes would facilitate development in peripheral regions and so ultimately
enhance national output. In political terms, it was another way of legitimising state
B.Giordano/PoliticalGeography19(2000)445–471 449
power byproviding financial andinfrastructuralsupportto peripheralregions,which
inturn(itwashoped)wouldtranslateintosupportforcentralpoliticalauthorityfrom
the periphery (Keating, 1996). There are several examples of such regional schemes
across Europe, for example, in Italy, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (the ‘Fund for
the South’) was set up to provide aid and assistance to the Italian South in order to
promote its socio-economic development.
The overall results of these regional development schemes were variable; in some
Europeancountriestheoutcomewasafairdegreeofregionaleconomicconvergence,
however, in others divergence between theperiphery and the core remained marked.
Consequently, over time regional development became increasingly politicised and
conflicts developed between central governments and peripheral regions, mainly
because in certain countries such regions had gained a greater degree of power. The
consequence was that certain peripheral regions were becoming more assertive in a
variety of ways, in order to gain greater funds and assistance from central govern-
ment. However, in certain peripheral regions the demands placed upon the centre
went much further than simple financial support; in some cases, new social forces
emerged and historical claims for regional and national distinctiveness were
reasserted (Keating, 1996). Thus, in certain cases the processes of regionalisation
have helped to legitimise and give scope to the emergence of forms of autonomist
andethnicregionalism,whichhaveasserteddifferentkindsofpressuresanddemands
upon central governments.
Ohmae (1995, p. 5), on the other hand, formulates an economic-institutional defi-
nition of regionalism. He uses the term ‘region states’, to define those entities that
may lie entirely within or across the borders of a nation-state but have very little to
do with ethnic or nationalistic identities. According to Ohmae, what defines ‘region
states’ is not the location of their political borders but the fact that they are the right
size and scale to be the true, ‘natural’ business units in today’s global economy.
Ohmae (1995) argues that the nation-state is increasingly a nostalgic fiction and it
makes even less sense today, for example, than it did a few years ago to speak of
Italy or Russia or China as single economic units. Instead, these countries are made
up of a combination of different territories, which have vastly different economic
needs and roles within the global economy (Ohmae, 1995, p. 12). In particular, in
relation to Italy, Ohmae (1995, p. 16) poses the question:
what sense does it make, for example, to think of Italy as a coherent economic
entity within the EU? There is no ‘average Italy’. There is no large social group
or economic group precisely at the midpoint represented by such averages no
constituency specially advantaged by — and, therefore, eager to support — split-
the-difference political compromises. There is, instead, an industrial north and a
rural south, which are vastly different in their ability to contribute and their need
to receive. In economic terms, there is simply no justification for treating Italy
as a single-interest entity.
This is certainly a provocative statement, even if it is somewhat generalised in its
viewoftheItalianeconomy.ItexemplifiesOhmae’seconomicfocusonregionalism.
450 B.Giordano/PoliticalGeography19(2000)445–471
Thus, in an ever increasingly globalised economy, Ohmae (1995, p. 80) argues that
it is geographical units like Northern Italy; Baden Wu¨rtemberg; Wales; San
Diego/Tijuana; Hong Kong/southern China; the Silicon Valley/Bay Area in Califor-
nia, which more accurately constitute the territorial dividing lines of the world map.
These dividing lines are based purely on economic status and strength within the
global economy and are not political units (Ohmae, 1995, p. 89). However, Ohmae
somewhat over simplifies the case for economic regionalism not least because the
economic units he quotes are not complete homogenous units but actually contain
asignificantdegreeofinternaleconomicdifferencesthemselves.Moreover,Ohmae’s
view of regionalism is (pre)conditioned by his economic liberalism and preoccu-
pation with deregulation and ‘hollowing out’ as an economic project. In addition,
Ohmaemakesnomentionofethnicityandculturaldifferenceandtheirimpactsupon
regionalism, which are complicating factors.
Conversely, ‘autonomist’regionalism, which isthesecond broadcategoryismore
directly related to issues of ethnicity, culture and identity and is precisely the form
ofregionalismwhichhasgainedthemostattentioninrecentyears.Thisisespecially
the casewith theresurgenceofregionalpoliticalmovementssuchastheLNin Italy.
The complexity of this form of regionalism is related to the fact that it borders on
what might also be termed ‘nationalism’. Both regionalism and nationalism are very
closelyrelatedespeciallywhenlinguisticorculturalcharacteristicsdefineaparticular
region and there is also a regional political movement striving for greater autonomy
(Kellas, 1991, p. 87). Indeed, some writers treat nationalism and regionalism as the
same subject, and it is certainly very difficult to draw a line between them in some
countries. For example, Keating (1988) uses the term ‘regional nationalism’ to
describeregionalpoliticalmovements.Thishastheadvantageofrootingthesemove-
ments in territory, and distinguishing them from non-territorial movements for self-
government (Keating, 1996, p. 54).
Other commentators utilise other terms to define examples of ‘autonomist’
regionalism, such as ‘stateless nations’, ‘separatists’ and ‘secessionists’, which is
testimony to the complexity of the issue. Both Piccone (1991, p. 8) and Biorcio
(1993,p.43)usetheterm‘regionalpopulism’asanotherwayofdefiningcontempor-
ary regionalism. They argue that since the end of the 1980s there has been a
resurgence of regional populism in the more industrialised European countries and
new populist political organisations have come from many ideological directions.
One element of this growth has been in political movements seeking regional auto-
nomy such as the LNin Italy, or the Flemish VlaamsBlok (Biorcio, 1993, p. 44/45).
Piccone (1991, p. 8) argues that new populist political formations, such as the LN
in Northern Italy, which is theparadigmatic expression of this phenomenon, warrant
careful scrutiny precisely because within the context of contemporary societal trans-
formations, they articulate the same democratic spirit that gave rise to the original
American Constitution and the Swiss Confederation.
The difficulty in defining regionalism is quite apparent. However, in spite of this
there are certain common components, which are fundamental to the majority of
regionalist political movements, which vary according to the specific geographical,
political, socio-economic and cultural contexts of each of the different regionalist
B.Giordano/PoliticalGeography19(2000)445–471 451
political projects. The three most important components are the views and opinions
of the central state, another is the identification with some piece of territory as a
sourceofregionalandpoliticalidentityandanotheristhedevelopmentofsomekind
of group identity (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982, p. 427).
The first of these components relates to the reaction against what is perceived as
inefficient state centrality, which has fuelled a number of regionalist tensions and
problems. Indeed, Miglio (1991–92, p. 41) claims that:
from Canada to what was Yugoslavia, from Belgium to the ex-Soviet Union,
the unitary State is increasingly in crisis because its ‘static nature’ and its size
can nolonger satisfy the variousneeds ofits citizens by coercivelyhomogenising
them. These needs multiply and particularise relentlessly and to a hitherto
unknown extent,giving birth onceagain to micro-nations as the appropriatenatu-
ral locations inwhich tofind recognitionand satisfaction.Consequently, anentire
phase of the history of the modern State — from the seventeenth through to the
twentieth century — is coming to an end. No longer may the State be considered
an imposing entity which will always endure, unitary and immobile, across the
centuries as a trans-historical reference point.
The reaction against state centralism seems to be a common theme amongst the
rhetoricofregionalpoliticalmovements.Thisismainlybecauseoftheconcentration
ofpoliticalauthorityandresourcesatthecentre,whichhashinderedthedevelopment
of sufficient power to the regions away from the centre. Thus, the centralism of the
modernstatehas,incertaincases,engenderedtheperceptionofgeopoliticaldistance,
socio-cultural difference, and socio-economic dependence between certain regions
and the central state (Hueglin, 1986, p. 448).
Secondly, the importance of territory is paramount for regional political move-
ments, and any group that is not territorially concentrated will find it much more
difficult to mobilise support (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982, p. 427). One of the reasons
for the significance of territory relates to the processes of economic globalisation
and the increasing recognition that territory is an important element in economic
adaptation. The key pointis that what matters politically is not so much the changes
in the global economy as their impact in particular places (Keating, 1996, p. 48).
Therefore, territory is an important resource for regional political mobilisation but
alsoasarhetoricaltoolinregionalistprojectsinrelationtotheprocessesofglobalis-
ation.
The third crucial element in the mobilisation of support for contemporary
regionalist claims is the (re)creation of some form of ‘group’ identity. Indeed, more
or lessallcontemporaryregional movementslayclaimto someform ofgroupident-
ity (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982, p. 428). What constitutes a ‘group’ identity is variable;
for some regional movements’ ethnicity, language and a common heritage form the
basis of the group identity. Political mobilisation is easier where there is linguistic
distinctiveness because language is a key political resource for any regional move-
ment and one which easily leads to potential conflict (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982, p.
428). de Saussure (1974) asserts, in relation to the issue of identity in language, that
452 B.Giordano/PoliticalGeography19(2000)445–471
it is wholly a function of difference. This difference is defined not by the positive
content of language but negatively, by relation to others. The precise characteristic
is in being what the others are not (de Saussure, 1974, p. 117). On the other hand,
language is not the only factor upon which a regional sense of ‘identity’ is built;
there are in fact a range of other factors which constitute a sense of identity, the
most notable being religion. However, it is apparent that whatever factor constitutes
group identity the main factor is that it is really difference which is constitutive of
identity (Morley & Robins, 1995, p. 45).
Schlesinger (1987, p. 235) also offers a useful perspective in relation to identity
formulation. He argues that:
identity is as much about exclusion as it is about inclusion, and the critical
factor for defining the ethnic group therefore becomes the social boundary which
defines the group with respect to other groups… not the cultural reality within
those borders.
Howthe‘groupidentity’isformulatedandmaintainedisalsoakeyissue.Clearly,
‘group identity’ is not abstract but is a matter of the relative power of different
groups to define a particular identity, and their abilities to mobilise different defi-
nitions through their control of cultural institutions (Morley & Robins, 1995, p. 47).
Consequently, it isthe dominant cultural groups that can sustain a particular identity
through the control of state institutions. Hobsbawn and Ranger (1983) refer to this
as the ‘invention of tradition’, arguing that tradition is a malleable concept which
can be modified over time from generation to generation. In addition, Wright (1985)
argues that tradition is very much a matter of present-daypolitics, and that powerful
institutions function to select particular values from the past, and to mobilise them
incontemporarypractices.Itispreciselythroughsuchmechanismsofculturalrepro-
duction that a particular version of the ‘collective memory’, and thus a particular
sense of regional (or national) identity, is produced and sustained over time
(Morley & Robins, 1995, p. 47)
Understanding precisely the ways in which regions, or territories emerge, is the
focusoftheworkofPaasi(1986)whodefinesaseriesofabstractionstomakevisible
how regions originate, continue to exist and how they maybe transformed in the
course of regional transformation (MacLeod, 1998). According to Paasi (1986), a
region represents the condensation of a complex history of economic, political and
social processes into a specific cultural image. The way in which the image of a
region is crystallised,Paasi (1986, p. 121) argues, is a socio-spatialprocesswhereby
the territorial unitemerges as a partof the spatial structureof a society and becomes
established andclearly identified indifferent spheresof social action and socialcon-
sciousness. This processof regional institutionalisation comprisesfourstages, which
are inter-dependent and only distinguishable from each other analytically (Paasi
1986, 1991, 1996, 1997).
The first stage in the process of regionalisation concerns the ‘assumption of terri-
torialawareness andshape’.Through thelocalisedsedimentationofeconomic,polit-
ical and cultural practices and conventions, a territory assumes a bounded shape in
B.Giordano/PoliticalGeography19(2000)445–471 453
the collective consciousness and also becomes identified as a distinct unit in the
spatialstructureofsociety(MacLeod&Jones,1999).Paasi(1997,pp.42–43)claims
that in order to undertake this first stage in the institutionalisation process:
…power-holding actors in a territory (or outside it) define and symbolise the
spatial and social limits of membership and create the discourses and practices
for inclusion and exclusion [to the extent that] territorial shaping refers not only
to the creation of boundaries but also to their representation, to their roles both
as social institutions and symbols of territory.
ThesecondstageinPaasi’sregionalisationprocessisthe‘formationoftheconcep-
tual or symbolic shape’. This involves the use of certain territorial and cultural sym-
bols (such as flags, cartographies, monuments, memorabilia) in order to establish a
group solidarity and help to demarcate the territorial unit concerned. In particular,
the naming of a region, or territory, is of vital importance in formulating a regional
consciousness(Paasi,1996).Thethirdstageconcernsthe‘emergenceofinstitutions’,
which involves the establishment of more formal vehicles such as education, law
and the media, alongside local or regional politics, economics, administration and
culture (MacLeod, 1998). Such institutions and organisations provide an ‘effective
meansofreproducingthematerialandmentalexistenceoftheterritories’inquestion
(Paasi, 1991, p. 246). Indeed, for Paasi it is the institutions of a territory, which
eventuallybecomethemostimportantfactorsinthemacro-reproductionoftheregion
andregionalconsciousness(Paasi,1986).Thefourthandfinalstageisthe‘establish-
ment’ of a region in the spatial structure and social consciousness of society so that
it assumes the form of an institutionalised ‘terriorial unit’ (Paasi, 1991, p. 247).
Undoubtedly, Paasi’s emphasis on region building as an active, on-going process,
which isrich inpolitical strategy andcultural expression isa helpful one. Moreover,
his focus upon the institutionalisation of regional formation is an important one that
clearlyresonateswiththeLN’sattemptstoinventaregion,orterritorycalled‘Padan-
ia’. However, the important issue in the Italian case, as well as elsewhere, is what
transforms a territorial base and agroup identity(however this may bedefined),into
a regionalist political response. It is clear that resources, such as linguistic identity,
only constitutea potentialfor regionalism(Rokkan &Urwin, 1982, p. 429).Clearly,
oneimportantcatalystiseconomicchange,whichcancreateconflictsbetweendiffer-
entregionalgroupsandinturnitisconflictwhichcanmakeregionalpoliticalmobil-
isation more potent in certain circumstances (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982, p. 428).
There are two contrasting scenarios in which economic conflicts may cause
regionalist tendencies. Firstly, it may well be a question of inconsistency between
economic strength and/or potential and cultural status. Secondly, a potentially sig-
nificant regional territorial challenge, in contemporary Europe, comes from those
regions with a superior economic status. It is from these regions, such as Northern
Italy, Catalonia or Flanders, that the resurgence of regionalism has been the most
pronouncedinrecentyears.Furthermore,suchdemandsforgreaterautonomypresent
centralgovernmentswithnewchallengespreciselybecauseoftheeconomicsuperior-
454 B.Giordano/PoliticalGeography19(2000)445–471
ity of such regions, which have the economic power to counterbalance the political
resources of the centre (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982, p. 429).
The prevalence of economic catalysts in mobilising territorial and regional claims
andconflictsshouldnotbeunder-estimated.Althougheconomicchangeinthebroad-
est sense may be necessary, it is not solely sufficient, but when combined with a
cultural and ethnic base regional political mobilisation becomes a serious threat
(Rokkan & Urwin, 1982, p. 430). This is even more the case when a regionalist
movement has a degree of institutional and political power at the local or regional
level. This gives the regionalist party greater capacity for financial and bureaucratic
decision making and also to gain recognition both nationally and internationally
(Keating, 1996, p. 54).
In the 1990s, in the context of the emerging new world (dis)order, the resurgence
of regionalism within (and outside) the EU is a challenge to governments at every
scale. However, there is no easy and straightforward answer to the question of why
there has been a resurgence of regionalism in recent decades. The rest of the paper
focusesuponthesituationinItaly,whichisoneexamplewithintheEUwhereserious
questions have been raised about the existing structure of government and society.
The specific socio-political, economic and cultural situation is in many respects dif-
ferent from the majority of other countries in the EU. However, examining the
reasons for this resurgence of regionalism in Italy is important in understanding the
different manifestations of regionalism elsewhere in Europe.
The regionalist resurgence in Italy is based upon the rise in political prominence
of theLN sincethe beginningofthe 1990s. TheLN’s politicalproject isbased upon
some of the factors which are more common to regionalist political parties across
Europe. For example, the party has articulated a strong anti-State rhetoric and has
also attempted to formulate a ‘group’ identity for the people of Northern Italy (or
‘Padania’). However, as the next section explores the LN’s attemptsto invent a new
territorial space, and hence identity, for the people of Northern Italy based upon a
place called ‘Padania’, is clearly a relatively unique and new strategy amongst
regionalist political parties.
The political project of the Lega Nord
Accounting for the rise of the LN is a complicated task. The party has benefited
from (and been implicated in) the transformations which have altered the face of
Italian politics, economy and society during the last decade or so (Giordano, 1998).
Italiancitizenswerebecomingincreasinglyresentfulatemergingeconomicandpolit-
ical problems. This was especially the case in the North of the country, where there
were widespread fears that the years of ‘economic boom’ were coming to an end.
In the midst of this scenario, the LN was successful because it was able to exploit
the problems facing the people of the North of Italy as well as interpret and modify
their concerns for its own political advancement. The enduring political stance of
the LN is that it is the South of Italy (and especially Rome) which is the cause for
all that is wrong with Italian society and politics. The LN argues that the North and