Israel, the Embattled Ally

673 Pages·1981·40.84 MB·English

by  Nadav Safran

ISRAEL
THE
EMBATTLED
ALLY
With a new Preface and Postscript by the Author
NADAV SAFRAN
THEBELKNAP PRESS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England
To Gaby
In memoriam
Copyright © 1978, 1981 by the President and Fellows ofHarvard College
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States ofAmerica
10 9 8 7
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 81-80393
ISBN 0-674-46881-3 (cloth)
ISBN 0-674-46882-1 (paper)
Preface, 1981
American-Israeli relations and their underlying dynamics, I wrote in the
original Prefaceto this volume, have been characterized bychange and evo
lution. If that was true of the first three decades of Israel's existence, it
proved to be much more so ofthe three and a halfyears since those words
were written. It can indeed be said that since the latter part of 1977, the
change and evolution were·so far-reaching as to·attain revolutionary rather
than incremental dimensions. Hence the need for a substantial addition to
this volume.
The principal fundamental change that took place was, of course, the
signinginMarch 1979, underAmerican aegis, oftheEgyptian-Israeli Peace
Treaty,thefirsteverbetweentheJewishstateandanyArabnation.Matching
that event in importance and an indispensable prelude to it was President
Sadat's historic visittoJerusalem sixteen months earlier. Ifuntil November
1977American-Israeli relations couldconveniently bedescribed in terms of
stages demarcated by Arab-Israeli wars, since that date they could only be
considered in terms of the transition from war to peace. That is what the
additional chapter in the present volume attempts to do.
The Egyptian-Israeli peace embodies the potential for momentous dip
lomatic-strategic realignments in a region which has come to assume vital
importance for the Western industrialized countries. Although that poten
tial isstilltoofarawayand uncertaintowarrantdiscussion atpresent, some
ofitsoutlinesmay deserve mention here. Clearly, theEgyptian-Israelipeace
broke the historical dichotomy of Arabs versus Israel and opened up the
possibility ofcombinationsincludingIsrael and someArab statesin opposi
tion to groupings of other Arab states. This, in turn, opened up for the
United States the possibility of viable formal or informal regional defense
arrangements long sought by it buthitherto frustrated by the overridingin
trusion ofthe Arab-Israeli conflict. Forthe time being, such possibilities are
limited to Israel, Egypt, and perhaps small but strategically located Oman;
iv I Preface, 1981
butintelligentdiplomacy mightbe able to avail itselfofexistingleveragesto
enlarge the scope ofthe possible combinations so as to include Saudi Ara
bia,Jordan, andothercountriesrelevanttosecuringWestern accesstoMid
dle East oil. Finally, the Egyptian-Israeli peace has created a new arena for
American-Israeli relations in addition to the one that centered on the two
countries' relations to the Middle East arena as a whole and on their tradi
tionalone-to-onerelationship. ThetrianglecomprisingtheUnitedStates, Is
rael, and Egypt has alrady begun to function in several ways, including at
least one instance where Egypt and Israel lined up in opposition to the
United Statesoverthe issue ofthe best avenue for furthering the peacepro
cess.
On amoreimmediatelevel,theEgyptian-Israelipeacehasreducedcon
siderably, though ithas byno meanseliminated, the chancesofa large-scale
Arab-Israeli warin the foreseeable future. It is easy to conceive scenarios in
which an Arab coalition excluding Egypt deems itselfsufficiently strong to
challenge Israelto some kind ofwar; however, such scenarios mustpresup
pose apreparationperiod ofmanyyears, amongothermore orless difficult
conditions. In the meantime, the danger of an American-Soviet confronta
tion over the Arab-Israeli conflict would be reduced, as would the chances
of another Arab oil embargo, nondeliberate or deliberate. The diminished
war prospects provide a breathing spell in which the Western dependence
on Middle East oil could be eased.
Notable developments in Israel's internal affairs during that period in
cluded the complete fizzling out of the Democratic Movement for Change
andtheevaporationofthepossibilitiesofanewalignmentofpoliticalforces
thathadbeenbrieflyraisedbythatparty'smeteoricrise. Thedeclinewasthe
resultofinternalsplitsanddefections, theresultingrumpparty'slackofany
programmatic coherence and organizational underpinnings, and the politi
cal ineptitudemanifestedbyitsoncestar-leader,formerGeneraland Profes
sor Yigael Yadin. An additional reason was that the rump party hitched its
fortunes completelytoBegin'sown,whichreachedazenithaftertheconclu
sion of the Camp David Accords in September 1978 and then tumbled
down a precipitous slope as a result of disastrous mismanagement of the
economy. The Labor Party was the residual beneficiary of these develop
ments, and the latest opinion polls show it gaining an absolute majority in
any imminent election. Were that to happen in fact, it would be an almost
revolutionary development in Israel's politics.
The economic troubles underlying the political changes are reflected in
an inflation thatseems to have run amuck. From a rate ofabout35 percent
in theyeartheBegingovernmentwasinstalled, in 1977,inflation jumpedto
an annual average ofover 50 percent in 1978, close to 80 percentin 1979,
and more than 130 percent in 1980, the highest rate in the world. It is easy
to misunderstand the significance ofthese figures. In many another society,
Preface, 1981 I v
such apace ofinflation would soon destroy democracy and disintegrate the
social order, but in Israel, such results have been prevented by the fact that
almosteverybodyisorganizedinsomeinterestgroup andalmosteverything
is indexed to everything. Nevertheless, the effects that did take place have
been serious enough: indices have not always assured automatic compli
ance, and their application to specific instances has been the cause ofcon
stantdisputesandbitterstruggles.ThenetresulthasbeenthatIsraelisociety
has been running a treadmill, with all groups exerting themselves ever
harder to stay in the same place.
N. S.
Cambridge, Massachusetts
January 1981

PREFACE
About the United States and Israel one mightsay that seldom in the history
ofinternational relations has such aworldpowerbeen involvedso intensely
for so long with such a small power. What significance this phenomenon
may have is a question for the philosophers of history to ponder. How it
cametopassandthe relevance ofwhathappenedto thefurther unfoldingof
American-Israeli relations is the subject ofthis study.
In order to assay properly that extraordinary relationship, I have at
tempted first to depicta comprehensive portrait of Israel before goingon to
analyze the historical development of the relations between the two. The
keynote of both sections of this book is change and evolution, their
dynamics andtheirimplication. Fornothingis moreinimicalto an adequate
understanding of either Israel or American-Israeli relations than a static
conception ofthem, which all too many Americans have been prone to en
tertain, perhaps because oftheir intense involvementwith the subjecton an
almost daily basis.
An inkling ofthe scope, depth, and rapidity ofthe transformation that
took place may be gained by looking at what has happened since 1963,
when I wrote a similar, much smaller book-The United States and
Israel-on the subjects discussed here. General wars tend to constitute
watersheds in the international andinternalhistories ofmostnations; Israel
fought two suchwars in the interveningyears-in 1967and 1973-inaddi
tion to a grueling "war of attrition" in 1969-1970. One consequence of
these wars has been that the nature of the United States' relationship with
Israel has evolved from a connection ofqualified friendship to a bond ofal
liance between friends. Thus, whereas in 1956-1957, for instance, the
UnitedStates applied relentless pressureon Israelto force ittosurrenderthe
fruits ofits victory in the SinaiWar, in 1967it stood firmly behind Israel to
help it retain the gains achieved in the Six Day War until the Arab states
were prepared to negotiate a settlement that satisfied the Israeli and Ameri-
viii I Preface
can basic interests. On the same principle, the United States intervened in
the 1973 Yom KippurWarwith amassive airlift ofarms to help Israel frus
trate theattemptofthe Arab states to settlethe conflicton theirterms by re
sorting to force. In the process, American and Israeli relations with the
Soviet Union, Europe, the Arab countries, and the Third World were sig
nificantly reshaped again and again.
One crucial result of these events was that the United States emerged
after the 1973 war in the role ofpeacebrokerbetween Israel and the Arabs.
In pursuing that role, the United States was able to bring about a series of
partial agreements between the belligerents, butin the process ofpromoting
these accords the United States assumed such extensive commitments and
obligations toward Israel that they amounted to a formal alliance in all but
name. In the meantime, American practical support for Israel was increas
ing by leaps and bounds. During the entire fourteen years covered by my
earlier volume, for example, American aid to Israel amounted to about
$800 million; the averageannual aid in the past four or five years has been
more than twice that total amount, and in the crucial year of 1973 it
amounted to three times as much.
Indicators of internal changes in Israel during that period are no less
dramatic. Annual defense outlays, for example, multiplied twelvefold in
constantdollars between 1961 and 1975.As apercentageofGrossNational
Productthey increased fourfold. The GNPitselfgrewthreefold inrealterms
in those years, involvingcorrespondingchanges in the structure and sophis
tication ofthe economy. The population grew by about 60 percent, and its
composition and character underwenteven greater change. The very physi
calenvironmentchangeddrastically, as Israelassumedcontrolofconquered
territories sixtimes its original size, and as rapideconomicdevelopmentleft
its not-always-pretty imprint on its pre-1967 territory. Naturally, these
transformationscouldnotbutprofoundly affectthetemperandworkingsof
the Israeli polity and politics; and although the change there remained for
some timeconcealed from all butthe most penetratingeyes, in May 1977it
exploded in ·an electoral upheaval that overthrew a half-century of labor
dominance and installed a new regime led by the Likkud. Only with regard
to one issue discussed in my previous volume can it be said that the change
has been less impressive than the continuity, and thatis the problem ofreli
gion and the state. But that fact itself is so remarkable that it begged for
elaboration, ifonly by way ofproviding a new case-study illustration.
This bookseeksto reachthe broadpublicas well asspecialists, andthis
aim has guided my treatment of even highly technical material, including
economic and military affairs. I have avoided referring to the massive and
often confusing sources underlying the facts cited, or expounding fully the
complex deliberations behind all the judgments stated. To the professional
student of international politics and history I offer two partial compensa-
Preface ix
tions for those omissions: I have dwelt in greater detail in the text itselfon
the lesser-known events ofrecent years, and I have provided in the Bibliog
raphy references to available sources that are extensive in direct proportion
to the degree to which a subject matter is unfamiliar. I should point out,
however, that the available data, especially for the diplomacy of recent
years, are scarcely ofthe kind that permits definitive historical conclusions.
Therefore, intryingtomake senseofthe material thatcould beassembled, I
have had to rely agreatdeal on myintuition, trained andenlivened, Ihope,
by a quarter-century of systematic study and teaching of the Middle East,
travelingin its variousparts, and discussingitsproblems with Israelias well
as Arab and American leaders, officials, and people in all walks oflife. This
book should therefore be viewed as a preliminary attempt at an overall un
derstanding of Israel and Israeli-American relations-what Max Weber
called Verstehen-a necessary prelude to the pursuit ofdefinitive particular
studies as the comprehensive data needed for such endeavors become
available.
Cambridge, Massachusetts N.S.