Islamist Militant Groups in Post-Qadhafi Libya

24 Pages·2013·1.68 MB·English

FeBRUARY 2013 . VoL 6 . IssUE 2
Islamist Militant Groups in
Contents
Post-Qadhafi Libya
FEATURE ARTICLE
1 Islamist Militant Groups in
Post-Qadhafi Libya By Alison Pargeter
By Alison Pargeter
REPoRTs
5 Yemen’s Use of Militias to Maintain
Stability in Abyan Province
By Casey L. Coombs
7 Deciphering the Jihadist Presence in
Syria: An Analysis of Martyrdom
Notices
By Aaron Y. Zelin
11 British Fighters Joining the War
in Syria
By Raffaello Pantucci
15 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s New
Cease-Fire Offer
By Imtiaz Ali
18 The Significance of Maulvi Nazir’s
Death in Pakistan
By Zia Ur Rehman
20 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity
24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

Libyans celebrate the second anniversary of the Libyan uprising at Martyrs Square on February 17, 2013, in Tripoli. - AFP/Getty Images
I
n july 2012, Libya held its first and currents have emerged in the post-
national elections since the fall of Qadhafi era, including those at the
Mu`ammar Qadhafi. The Libyan extreme end of the spectrum that have
people, however, appeared to taken advantage of central authority
buck the trend of the Arab Spring by weakness by asserting power in their
not electing an Islamist1 parliament. own local areas. This is particularly the
Although Islamists are present in case in the east of the country, which
the newly-elected General National has traditionally been associated with
About the CTC Sentinel
Congress, they are just one force among Islamist activism.
The Combating Terrorism Center is an
many competing in the political arena.2
independent educational and research
While Islamists have not succeeded in Given the murky and chaotic nature of
institution based in the Department of social
dominating Libya’s nascent political Libya’s transition, which has prompted
sciences at the United states Military Academy,
scene, they have come to represent an the mushrooming of local power
West Point. The CTC sentinel harnesses
ever growing and influential force on brokers, it is difficult to distinguish
the Center’s global network of scholars and
the ground. A number of Islamist groups between many of the Islamist militant
practitioners to understand and confront
groups and brigades. While some
contemporary threats posed by terrorism and
groups, such as the Rafallah al-Sahati
other forms of political violence. 1 The term “Islamist” refers to those who engage in politi- Brigade or the February 17 Brigade, are
cal activism articulated through an Islamic discourse. This operating, nominally at least, within
does not necessarily mean those who espouse violence. the official structures of the state,
The views expressed in this report are those of 2 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction others, such as Ansar al-Shari`a,3 are
the authors and not of the U.s. Military Academy,
Party, for example, secured a significant presence in the
the Department of the Army, or any other agency
of the U.s. Government. congress and is now part of the recently appointed gov-
ernment. 3 Ansar al-Shari`a (Partisans of Shari`a) has emerged as
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FeBRUARY 2013 . VoL 6. IssUE 2
functioning independently. Despite the time of the revolution.5 This There is a strong feeling in the east that
the fact that the state attempted to includes figures such as the former the central authorities, as well as the
dissolve these independent militant director of Benghazi security, Colonel Islamist-dominated local authorities,
brigades following the public protests Faraj Mohammed al-Drissi, who was are engaged in a cover-up and are
that erupted in response to the attack killed on November 21, 2012.6 Given pandering to militant elements.12 Such
on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi the nature of the targets, it is widely suggestions may be exaggerated. The
in September 2012, these groups assumed that the attacks are the work of central authorities remain weak and
continue to operate and impose their Islamist militant forces seeking revenge unable to properly project authority.
authority in their communities. This for the suppression they experienced at Despite the repeated efforts to bolster
poses particular challenges for Libya the hands of the former regime.
as it moves through the transition “Given the power vacuum
process. Despite the ongoing violence, the official
that accompanied the fall
bodies of the state have been slow to react
This article examines the nature of or to bring the guilty parties to justice. of the former regime, the
some of the Islamist militant groups They did, however, arrest Majdi Zwai
central authorities have
active in the east of Libya, including (also known as Majdi Dhub), a member
Ansar al-Shari`a, as well as their of the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, on had little choice but to
relationship with the state. It argues charges of having assassinated al-
rely on Islamist brigades
that while these militant groups are Drissi.7 In December 2012, the Shabab
largely working within the confines of Libya channel reported that Zwai had and units to help keep the
the state, this cooperation could quickly confessed not only to al-Drissi’s killing,
peace in certain regions,
turn to confrontation if the formation of but to the killings of other officials.8 He
the constitution does not develop the also reportedly implicated a number particularly in the east
way that they expect. of key Islamist militants operating in
where the national army
the region in the assassinations.9 On
“By Night We Are Benghazistan” December 16, 2012, however, a group of has a limited presence.”
The growing influence of Islamist armed gunmen, believed to be from the
militant elements has prompted Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, attacked the
particular concern among local police station that held Majdi Zwai.10
residents in the east. On December Zwai was freed after a three hour gun the national army, the government and
28, 2012, Benghazi residents staged battle that left four policemen dead.11 the General National Congress remain
another demonstration calling for the largely at the mercy of the militias.
dissolution of the Islamist militias in This fact was highlighted following the
the city, holding banners that declared, attack on the Ain Amenas gas plant in
“By day we are Benghazi, by night we 5 In the week of January 10-17, 2013, for example, two Algeria in January 2013, when in its
are Benghazistan.”4 policemen were killed in two separate bomb attacks in rush to secure its borders and energy
Benghazi and there was also an attempted assassination facilities, the government had to enlist
Authorities suspect that Islamist against the Italian consul-general in the city, Guido de the help of the secular-oriented Zintan
militant groups are behind the Sanctis. See “Curfew Mulled for Benghazi,” Libya Herald, militia in the west of the country.13
deadly string of night attacks and January 17, 2013.
assassinations that have rocked the 6 Kareem Fahim, “Security Chief in Benghazi Assassi- Yet although the ruling authorities may
east in recent months. The near weekly nated, Libyan Says,” New York Times, November 21, 2012. be unable to stem the violence in the east,
bombings and assassinations have been 7 The Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade is one of the largest there is also a reticence on their part
aimed almost exclusively at members Islamist brigades in the east and is believed to number to challenge Islamist elements in any
of the security forces, many of whom around 1,000 members. It is named after a young engi- substantive or sustained way. Unlike in
defected from Qadhafi’s regime at neer, Rafallah al-Sahati, who was killed by the regime neighboring countries, such as Tunisia
on March 19, 2011, during what is known as the battle of and Egypt, where the Arab Spring
Quwarsha in the west of Benghazi. The brigade is based revolutions were largely peaceful,
a significant force in eastern Libya since the toppling of in the Hawari neighborhood of Benghazi and is led by Islamist militant elements in Libya have
the former regime. It is more of a group or current than a prominent Islamist Ismail al-Salabi. The brigade comes a legitimacy born out of the position that
specific militia or brigade, and it has “branches” in both under the authority of the Libyan Defense Ministry. Its they played in the struggle. Islamist
Benghazi and Derna. Like its counterparts in Tunisia headquarters was stormed by protestors after the attack militants comprising former members
and Yemen, its adherents follow an extremist ideology. on the U.S. Consulate in September 2012. See Ibrahim of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
Although the Libyan group insists it is not linked to al- Majbari and Dominique Soguel, “Islamists Flee as Angry (LIFG) and other radical movements,
Qa`ida, its leader in Benghazi, Mohammed Ali al-Za- Libyans Storm Benghazi Compound,” Agence France- as well as jihadists who spent time in
hawi, has expressed his approval of al-Qa`ida’s strategy Presse, September 22, 2012; “Rafallah Sahati, the Martyr Iraq and Afghanistan, played key roles
as well as statements issued by Ayman al-Zawahiri. See Swore that Qadhafi’s Army Would Never Enter Beng-
“Meeting Mohammad Ali al-Zahawi of Libyan Ansar al- hazi,” New Quryna, March 19, 2012.
Sharia,” BBC, September 18, 2012. 8 “An Armed Attack on a Police Station to Free ‘Al- 12 On December 28, 2012, for example, protesters ac-
4 Libya Focus, January 2013. This demonstration was a Dhub,’” Libya al-Jadidah, December 17, 2012. cused the authorities and the local council of being en-
follow-up to the “Save Benghazi Friday” protests held 9 Ibid. gaged in a cover-up. See Libya Focus, January 2013.
after the killing of the U.S. ambassador to Libya in Sep- 10 Ibid. 13 “Libya Reinforces Border, Oilfields After Algeria At-
tember 2012. 11 Ibid. tack,” Reuters, January 23, 2013.
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in the effort to bring down the Qadhafi to rebuild the police and military, the Part of the reason for this shift away
regime. It was these elements, rather people prefer to be protected by their from jihad and toward public works is
than the country’s new political elite, own people.”17 related to the upcoming battle for the
who made sacrifices to effect change. As constitution. While there is a broad
a result, these militant elements (like Furthermore, while some of these consensus in Libya that Shari`a will
all Libya’s revolutionaries) are imbued groups have indulged in the destruction be the primary source of legislation,
with an aura that gives them a special of a number of Sufi shrines as well as there are strong differences of opinion
status and autonomy. cemeteries in the name of eliminating over the extent to which Islamic law
any sign of polytheism, they have so far should be implemented. There are
Moreover, these militant elements have largely refrained from takfir, the practice
proved crucial in providing security of excommunicating fellow Muslims.
“If developments do not
in the post-Qadhafi era. Given the Rather, these groups have responded to
power vacuum that accompanied the the changing political environment by proceed the way that the
fall of the former regime, the central trying to demonstrate their usefulness
Islamist militant groups
authorities have had little choice to society and to spread their rigid
but to rely on Islamist brigades and ideas through charitable works.18 expect, and if Shari`a is not
units to help keep the peace in certain There are elements still engaged in
implemented in full, then
regions, particularly in the east jihad, and these groups clearly reject
where the national army has a limited democracy as an ungodly and Western these elements may take
presence. This includes not only those concept, yet for the most part they are
violent action to alter the
brigades that come under the rubric demonstrating a willingness to work
of the official security structure, with the state rather than against it, at course of events.”
but also those that are operating least at this time.
independently. It was notable, for
example, that following the attempted This is particularly the case with Ansar
dissolution of all Islamist militant al-Shari`a,19 which in line with the some Libyans, including supporters
brigades in September 2012, staff at the recent teachings of Abu Mundhir al- of the country’s more liberal political
Jala’a Hospital in Benghazi demanded Shanqiti, the Mauritanian preacher currents, who want Shari`a to be one
that Ansar al-Shari`a be permitted to who serves as a spiritual reference for source of legislation, but who are
continue operating as their security many extremists, has been focusing its against it being implemented in its
force.14 One doctor at the hospital told efforts on charitable works. Much in fullest sense.22 The Islamist militant
journalists that security provided by the style of the Muslim Brotherhood, groups, on the other hand, are pushing
Ansar al-Shari`a was better than what Ansar al-Shari`a members now provide for Shari`a to be instituted in the
was currently available.15 social services such as welfare support, constitution in its entirety. At a meeting
cleaning and repairing roads, and in October 2012, for example, hundreds of
Charitable Works handing out alms during Ramadan.20 supporters of Ansar al-Shari`a and other
In addition to the role they played in Ansar al-Shari`a has come out into the radical currents came together at the
the revolution, Islamist militant groups open and is taking advantage of the lack Ansar Mosque in Benghazi to establish
have become part of the fabric of Libyan of security to assert its authority in the Islamic Assembly for Shari`a, an
society in other ways as well. the Hay Shabia (popular neighborhoods) organization aimed at “activating the rule
in the country’s eastern cities. It was of Allah so it becomes a visible presence
Unlike groups such as al-Qa`ida, many even reported in January 2013 that in the country.”23
of these radicals are not necessarily Ansar al-Shari`a had established its
regarded as completely alien or own “security gate” at Quwarsha at As Libyan Islamist scholar Salim al-
antithetical to the local culture. As the western entrance to Benghazi, Sheikhi described, the Islamist militant
the Washington Post recently observed, which, according to the group’s leader, groups are not waging war against the
“Ansar al-Shari`a is edging back Mohammed Ali al-Zahawi, was erected state but instead are waiting to see how
into society, and many of Benghazi’s not only to assist with security, but also the constitution develops.24 For al-
residents now say they want it here.”16 to carry out health checks on citizens Sheikhi, the call by these militants for the
Indeed, Libyan government spokesman to ensure that disease was not being full implementation of Shari`a is “a just
Essam al-Zubeir explained, “The brought into the city.21 demand because they are the ones who
people attacked Ansar al-Sharia a few led a large part of the fighting. We don’t
months ago because they were angry. need to treat them with less loyalty.”25
But now they’re asking them to come
17 Ibid.
back because there is no police and no
18 For example, providing welfare support and main- 22 This assessment is based on the author’s personal ob-
real military...Until the country is able
taining public infrastructure. servations.
19 For a profile of Ansar al-Shari`a, see footnote 3. 23 “Ansar al-Shari`a in Libya: Putting Weapons Aside
14 “Benghazi Hospital Staff Want Ansar al-Sharia Back,” 20 “Ansar Shari`a: The Forms of al-Qa`ida’s Response in Favor of Political Involvement,” Libya al-Mostakbal,
Libya Herald, October 4, 2012. to Democratic Transformation in the Arab World,” al- October 14, 2012.
15 Ibid. Hayat, January 3, 2013. 24 “Religious Affairs in Libya,” al-Jazira, December 18,
16 “Islamist Militia Edging Back into Benghazi,” Wash- 21 “Ansar al-Shari`a is Setting Up a Laboratory at the 2012.
ington Post, February 17, 2013. Quwarsha Gate,” Press Solidarity, January 20, 2013. 25 Ibid.
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Yet if developments do not proceed the November 2012, al-Ghariani urged Conclusion
way that the Islamist militant groups Libya’s new rulers to bring Islamist Libya’s Islamist militant groups are
expect, and if Shari`a is not implemented militants into the fold by acceding to not operating in a vacuum. They have
in full, then these elements may take their demands. The mufti declared that become an integral part of the new Libya
violent action to alter the course of Libya did not possess “any groups that and have a key stake in the country’s
events. They may decide to declare we should be scared of,” adding that “if future. Although Libya did not elect
jihad against the state to replace what we can give them what they want, such an Islamist-dominated government,
they deem to be a Westernized political as the application of Shari`a law, but if these militant forces comprise a crucial
system with an Islamic one. Given the we can do it by degrees, [then] we can component of the complex array of forces
power that these groups have been able bring them to our side…We should bring and powerbrokers that are dominating
to amass since the toppling of the former them to our side with good words and on the ground in post-Qadhafi Libya.
regime, such an outcome could prove promises that we will do what they want, Such elements have always been part
disastrous for the new Libya and its but in stages.”29 Similarly, al-Ghariani and parcel of Libya, however repressed
transition to a functioning democratic issued a fatwa against participating in they may have been, and it is little
state. the Benghazi protests in December 2012 surprise that they are exercising their
that called for the dissolution of the strength now that the Qadhafi regime is
Sympathy Within the State country’s Islamist militant groups.30 gone.
The development of Libya’s legal
framework could become even more In fact, January 2013 saw a major While these elements appear to be
complicated given that the official union of parts of the establishment largely working with rather than against
religious establishment, as well and militant groups in the east. On the state, their power and legitimacy is
as certain elements within the January 4-5, the local Benghazi council, such that if they feel their demands are
state, shares with the militants the the Libyan Association for Mosque not being met—especially in regard to
same uncompromising view of the Speakers and Preachers, and the the formation of the new constitution—
constitution. The influential Dar Warriors’ Affairs Committee organized they will become a serious force for
al-Ifta (Fatwa House), the highest a special security conference for the instability in the longer term.
religious authority in Libya, issued a east.31 Local security bodies such as the
statement at the end of November 2012 Benghazi Security Directorate and the Alison Pargeter is a Middle East and North
stipulating that not only should Shari`a Benghazi intelligence services attended Africa analyst who specializes in political
be the source of legislation, but that any the meeting, as well as the various Islamist movements. Her books include:
ruling that goes against Shari`a should brigades that come under the interior Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qadhafi
be considered “null and void.”26 The and defense ministries, including (2012), The Muslim Brotherhood: The
statement also declared that the article those with an Islamist orientation. Burden of Tradition (2010), and The
in the constitution dealing with Shari`a A number of militant brigades also New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam
is not something that can be put to the attended, including Ansar al-Shari`a in Europe (2008). She is also a Senior
people in a referendum because the ruling and the Abu Slim Martyrs Brigade. The Research Associate at Menas Associates, a
of Allah stands above that of the people.27 participants issued a statement at the global consultancy firm.
Likewise, in December, Ghaith al-Fakhry, end of the conference, which declared
the deputy to Libya’s grand mufti, Shaykh that the implementation of Shari`a was
Sadeq al-Ghariani, declared, “The Libyan not up for debate and that the grand
state should stand on two pillars: the mufti was above criticism.32 Even more
constitution that establishes Allah’s controversially and in an indication of
rule and the just ruler who will apply the extent to which the establishment in
the constitution.”28 the east is sympathetic to the militant
brigades, the statement also called
Therefore, the views of the official for an official investigation into those
religious establishment on the who had organized the “Save Benghazi
constitution are close to those of the Friday” protests against the Islamist
Islamist militant groups. The religious militant brigades.33
establishment has displayed a strong
degree of sympathy for these militant
elements, even lobbying the government
on their behalf. At the government’s
29 “Government Signals New Era of Transparency as
first formal cabinet meeting held in
First Formal Cabinet Meeting Opened to the Press,”
Libya Herald, November 21, 2012.
26 “Libya Dar al-Ifta Council Issues Statement at the End 30 “Ghariani Says Libya Faces ‘Many Challenges,’” Lib-
of its Second Meeting,” Libya al-Mostakbal, November ya Herald, December 30, 2012.
25, 2012. 31 “The Final Statement of the Revolutionary Brigades
27 Ibid. and Security Bodies Conference in Benghazi,” al-Manara,
28 “Libya’s Mufti: The New Libyan Constitution Must January 6, 2013.
Apply Shari`a Rulings,” al-Watan al-Libyeea, December 32 Ibid.
22, 2012. 33 Ibid.
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Yemen’s Use of Militias to southern province. If they are pulled into The diverse composition of Abyan’s
Maintain Stability in Abyan local conflicts or are co-opted by political Popular Committees reflects political
rivals, however, Abyan’s Popular and tribal relations that have evolved
Province
Committees could present a new set of since the 1994 civil war in which
challenges for the embattled president. longtime strongman Ali Abdullah
By Casey L. Coombs Salih’s Yemen Arab Republic (YAR)
This article examines the double-edged in Sana`a defeated the Aden-based
in 2011, militants from al-Qa`ida in the role of Abyan’s Popular Committees People’s Democratic Republic of
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Ansar in Hadi’s efforts to prepare Yemen’s Yemen (PDRY) to form the Republic
al-Shari`a secured control of Abyan divided populace for democratic of Yemen.7 According to a Popular
Province in southern Yemen.1 In 2012, elections in 2014, while fighting al- Committee commander in Lawdar,
Yemen’s military reclaimed much of Qa`ida insurgents around the country. “the committees do not belong to any
Abyan after launching Operation Golden After profiling Abyan’s disparate particular party. They are composed of
Swords in May and June, clearing AQAP network of Popular Committees and all political factions, including Hiraak,
and Ansar al-Shari`a fighters out of the outlining the events that led to their Islahis, Salafis and Sunnis.”8 A local
territory’s main population centers.2 proliferation, this article highlights journalist from Abyan described the
Since then, a patchwork of state-backed the economic insecurity that fosters militias in similar terms: “Some of the
local militias, or Popular Committees, shifting loyalties in Abyan. That Popular Committees are affiliated with
in Abyan has emerged as the frontline reality, combined with the potential the Islah Party, others are pure GPC or
security force against the insurgent al- for Popular Committees to spark new Socialist (YSP) and others are members
Qa`ida affiliates that governed the area conflicts in Abyan unrelated to al- of Hiraak.”9 Mohammed Ali Ahmed,
for more than a year. Qa`ida, underlines the need to secure a leading Hiraak figure who returned
the loyalty of the militias to guard to Yemen last year after 18 years in
The Popular Committees’ ability to hold against their co-optation by rival exile, has backed Popular Committee
Abyan has proven crucial to interim political factions and to ensure that forces in his native Lawdar as part of
Yemeni President Abd Rabu Mansur the militias limit the use of force to a political arrangement with Hadi.
Hadi, who is leading the country through Ansar al-Shari`a and AQAP.
a volatile political transition following
border—they are most prevalent in Abyan. Furthermore,
Yemen’s 2011 Arab Spring uprisings Abyan’s Patchwork Militias
as a local analyst pointed out: “Abyan is a strategic area
that unseated President Ali Abdullah In April 2012, about two months after
for AQAP and Ansar al-Shari`a since it was mentioned
Salih.3 If Hadi can preserve this alliance Hadi won office in a single-candidate
in the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, which said,
until early 2014, when parliamentary election and a month before he launched
‘Out of Aden-Abyan will come 12,000, giving victory to
and presidential elections are scheduled Operation Golden Swords, local tribal
the [religion of] Allah and His Messenger. They are the
to mark the conclusion of the transition militias and government troops in
best between me and them.’ Geographically, the area is
period, Abyan’s militias could translate Abyan’s north-central town of Lawdar
also very strategic as it is located in the middle of south-
into valuable political influence in the defeated Ansar al-Shari`a insurgents
ern and northern Yemeni governorates. It is also open on
in a bloody, week-long battle for
the Arabian Sea.” See personal interview, Yemeni politi-
control of the city.4 Hadi and Defense
1 The U.S. State Department considers Ansar al-Shari`a cal analyst, Sana`a, Yemen, August 7, 2012.
Minister Mohammed Nasser Ahmed
an alias of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula. For more 7 Abyan was part of the PDRY. For a detailed discussion
Ali—both Abyan natives—immediately
information on the origins of Ansar al-Shari`a and its of escalating tensions between north and south Yemen
stepped up the provision of arms and
relation to AQAP, see Fernando Carvajal, “Deepening since the 1994 civil war, and their impact on today’s po-
other resources to Lawdar’s Popular
Crises Breed Local Support for Ansar al-Sharia: Part 1,” litical transition, see “Breaking Point? Yemen’s Southern
Committees and intensified the lobbying
Fair Observer, July 3, 2012. Question,” International Crisis Group, October 20, 2011.
of tribal and religious leaders around
2 Personal interview, Yemeni intelligence official, Aby- According to that report, “the war laid to rest the notion
Abyan to organize similar militias.5
an, Yemen, July 2, 2012. of unity and ushered in a period of Northern occupation
By early July, Popular Committees
3 The Gulf Cooperation Council-negotiated political tran- of the South...According to this account, Southerners be-
patrolled checkpoints in and around
sition initiative is backed by the United States and the came second-class citizens at best and, at worst—and in
most of Abyan’s main cities, from
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). See Security its proponents’ words—slaves of the Northern elites.”
Mudiya east of Lawdar southward to
Council Report, Yemen, available at www.securitycoun- 8 Personal interview, Popular Committee commander
the coastal town of Shuqra and west
cilreport.org/yemen/. For an unofficial English transla- from Lawdar in Abyan Province, Sana`a, Yemen, No-
to the provincial capital Zinjibar and
tion of the GCC agreement, see “Next Steps in Yemen’s vember 5, 2012. Hiraak, or the Southern Movement, is a
neighboring Jaar.6
Transition,” International Foundation for Electoral Sys- broad coalition of disaffected southerners from the for-
tems Briefing Paper, March 2012. Hadi’s two greatest mer PDRY. Hiraak’s interests range from the promotion
challenges at present are enforcing military reforms and 4 “Ansar al Sharia Shells Lawder with Artillery and of equal rights among northern and southern popula-
commencing the National Dialogue Conference (NDC). Tanks,” Mareb Press, April 11, 2012. tions, to the redress of past grievances to full secession
Despite three rounds of military restructuring decrees, 5 Personal interview, Popular Committee commander from Yemen’s Sana`a-based government. Islah is Ye-
the most powerful branches of Yemen’s fractured armed from Lawdar in Abyan Province, Sana`a, Yemen, No- men’s main opposition party, composed of tribesmen,
forces remain under the command of feuding elites. vember 5, 2012. businessmen, Yemen’s version of the Muslim Brother-
Meanwhile, ongoing delays to the start of the NDC, a cru- 6 The scope of this article is limited to Abyan’s Popular hood and Salafists.
cial stage in the transition at which the country’s numer- Committees. Although anti-al-Qa`ida militias patrol 9 Personal interview, Yemeni journalist from Abyan,
ous rival factions are expected to agree on the structure of surrounding provinces—particularly Lahj to the west, Sana`a, Yemen, February 7, 2013. The GPC is Yemen’s
a new government, have fueled political insecurity. northern Bayda and Shabwa along Abyan’s northeastern ruling political party.
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The motivations for joining Abyan’s the salaries and only when it was clear Abyan, highlighted the potential for the
Popular Committees vary widely. Ansar al-Shari`a would be driven from autonomous militias to commit violence
Enlisted Yemeni military and security the province,” he said.14 Perhaps the against enemies using the justification of
forces struck a deal with the Ministry of most high-profile defector from Ansar fighting Islamist militants. In November
Defense to return to their hometowns in al-Shari`a is Abdul Latif al-Sayed, a 2012, militiamen from Zinjibar encircled
Abyan with their salaries to fight for the leading Popular Committee commander al-Fadhli’s home days after he returned
Popular Committees.10 Other militiamen based in Batis village north of Jaar. He from a long absence. Militiamen accused
in Abyan claimed they were duty-bound has survived at least five assassination the shaykh of spreading rumors that
to take up arms in the security void left attempts since his defection from Ansar Popular Committees were “mercenaries”
in the wake of Operation Golden Swords, al-Shari`a in 2011.15 and said that al-Fadhli maintained ties
as most state forces deployed elsewhere to al-Qa`ida.19 The subsequent two-
and some lingering units revolted A journalist who regularly reports day siege, in which two of the shaykh’s
against Hadi’s military reforms. “We from Abyan argued that this survivalist guards were killed and several injured,
have never demanded anything from the mentality will lead to problems for the ended only after Hadi, who belongs to
government; we are fighting for the sake government. “It is true that the Popular a sub-tribe of al-Fadhli’s, intervened
of Allah,” a Popular Committee member Committees had a big role in shrinking on his behalf and arranged safe haven
from Lawdar said. “Our support comes Ansar al-Shari`a and AQAP, but they
from the people of Lawdar and our aim do not want al-Qa`ida to disappear “In Yemen’s experience,
is to maintain security and stability in from the scene,” he said. “The Popular the long-term consequence
Lawdar.”11 Committees do not want to end the
existence of al-Qa`ida because they of arming and funding local
Many attribute the rapid propagation know that will end the investment in
militias to do the bidding of
of Popular Committees in Abyan to the fighting them. There are huge amounts
monthly stipends, government jobs and of money being paid for the Popular the state is that they amass
other perks offered by Yemen’s Ministry Committees and other parties in the
enough power to challenge
of Defense in the poverty-stricken name of fighting al-Qa`ida.”16
province.12 A government official in the state.”
Abyan argued that dismal economic From the leadership down through
conditions in the province enabled the rank-and-file, Abyan’s Popular
Ansar al-Shari`a’s populist promises to Committees are keenly aware of their
take root, despite the group’s affiliation value to Hadi and international powers for him and his family in Aden “on the
with al-Qa`ida. “They need to eat, so backing Yemen’s political transition. government’s dime.”20 Al-Fadhli said
where can they go?” he said. “Ansar had According to one Yemeni scholar, the he enjoyed the support of the popular
them in a corner.”13 Popular Committees “want to extract forces in Jaar, but the Zinjibar militias
as much as possible from this situation, were against him.21
That desperation, according to and the threat from Ansar al-Shari`a
an Abyani tribal shaykh, fuels and AQAP will ensure that Hadi relies In the same month, Popular Committee
unpredictability in the province. He on them for a longer period of time.”17 forces from Jaar shot dead a suspected
distrusts the Popular Committees al-Qa`ida member who belonged
because many of them were allied with Tribal Disputes to the Yafa` tribe.22 According to
Ansar al-Shari`a less than a year ago. Complex tribal tensions in Abyan a Yemeni journalist who reported
“They joined [Popular Committees] for complicate the role of Popular Committees. from Jaar during this period, Popular
One political analyst in Sana`a warned Committee commander Abdul Latif
that the armed militias may commit al-Sayed attempted to deescalate the
10 Personal interview, Yemeni journalist from Abyan,
violent acts against their enemies under situation by offerisng blood money,
Sana`a, Yemen, February 7, 2013.
the pretense of fighting al-Qa`ida.18 or diyya, for the murder. The Yafa`
11 Personal interview, Popular Committee soldier,
leadership instead opted for revenge,
Sana`a, Yemen, November 5, 2012.
A recent conflict between Popular or tha`r, he said.23
12 Personal interview, National Security Bureau official,
Committee forces and Shaykh Tariq al-
Sana`a, Yemen, December 17, 2012; personal interview,
Fadhli, the leader of a powerful tribe in
Popular Committee commander from Lawdar, Sana`a,
Yemen, July 2, 2012; personal interview, humanitarian 19 Personal interview, tribal shaykh from Abyan, Aden,
worker from Lahj Province, Sana`a, Yemen, January 15, 14 Personal interview, tribal shaykh from Abyan Prov- Yemen, December 17, 2012; “Commander of Popular
2013; personal interview, Yemeni journalist from Abyan, ince, Aden, Yemen, December 17, 2012. Committees in Lawder: The Return of Fadhli to Zinjibar
Sana`a, Yemen, February 7, 2013; personal interview, 15 Sudarsan Raghavan, “In Yemen, Tribal Militias in a Will Cause Civil War Unless the Government Intervenes
Yemeni scholar, Sana`a, Yemen, January 20, 2013. Lo- Fierce Battle with al-Qaeda Wing,” Washington Post, Sep- to Stop It,” al-Masdar Online, November 5, 2012.
cals in Abyan claimed that “youth” (low-level Popular tember 10, 2012. 20 Personal interview, tribal shaykh from Abyan, Aden,
Committee fighters) receive about 15,000 to 20,000 Ye- 16 Personal interview, journalist from Abyan, Sana`a, Yemen, December 17, 2012.
meni rials (approximately $70 to $100) per month, plus Yemen, February 7, 2013. 21 “Commander of Popular Committees in Lawder.”
food, water and khat, the leafy stimulant chewed by a ma- 17 Personal interview, Yemeni scholar, Sana`a, Yemen, 22 “Boy Killed in Siraar Yafa’a by Popular Committees
jority of Yemeni men. January 15, 2013. Gunfire,” Barakish.net, November 2, 2012.
13 Personal interview, Abyani government official, Aby- 18 Personal interview, Yemeni political analyst, Sana`a, 23 Personal interview, Yemeni journalist, Sana`a, Ye-
an Province, Yemen, July 2, 2012. Yemen, August 7, 2012. men, February 11, 2013.
6
FeBRUARY 2013 . VoL 6. IssUE 2
Deciphering the Jihadist
Conclusion experience, the long-term consequence
In the absence of a monopoly on the of arming and funding local militias to Presence in Syria: An
legitimate use of violence in the country, do the bidding of the state is that they
Analysis of Martyrdom
the Yemeni state has raised local militias amass enough power to challenge the
Notices
on numerous occasions to defend against state, as evidenced by frequent tribal
external threats or to extend political road blockades and the persistent
influence into peripheral regions.24 sabotage of electricity, oil and gas By Aaron Y. Zelin
Saudi Arabia, which shares a 900- infrastructure since 2010.29
mile border with Yemen as well as when the syrian uprising began in
the fallout from instability there, also Despite the potential risks, President March 2011, the presence of jihadists
has a long history of co-opting Yemeni Hadi’s best option is likely to continue in the protests was minimal at best.
tribes as a tool of statecraft.25 funding and arming Abyan’s militias As the rebellion escalated, jihadists
until the volatile transition period began to take advantage of the new
Yemen’s “militiatary”26 strategy is concludes. Indeed, if he can manage to landscape. Fighters associated
not without risks. The Salih regime’s secure the loyalty of Abyan’s Popular with al-Qa`ida’s worldview quietly
co-optation of tribal militias during Committees through the transition, entered the fight in the fall of 2011.
a string of wars from 2004 to 2010 while ensuring that their anti-al-Qa`ida These Salafi-jihadi fighters officially
against the Zaydi Shi`a Huthi mission does not spill over into broader announced themselves in late January
movement in northern Sa`da Province tribal conflicts and create new problems, 2012 under the banner of Jabhat al-
led to the eclipsing of tribal revenge Hadi could benefit greatly from political Nusra (the Support Front) and became
over mediation and arbitration as a influence in the highly contested one of the key fighting forces against
means of conflict resolution.27 In the southern province. Yet incessant delays the Bashar al-Assad regime by the fall
absence of government oversight of the to the start of the National Dialogue of 2012.1
ad hoc forces, corruption has become Conference, along with steady calls
endemic to the practice. Militia fighters for southern independence among Since the Syrian protest movement
in the Sa`da wars reportedly accepted Hiraak factions and fresh U.S.-Yemeni turned into an armed insurrection in
stipends from both sides of the conflict, accusations of subversive Iranian- the summer of 2011, the jihad in Syria
while leaders embezzled large sums of Huthi plots, have stalled the transition has become the du jour locale for fighters
government cash through the creation and cast further doubt on when who want to topple the “apostate” al-
of “ghost soldiers.”28 In Yemen’s conditions might improve.30 According Assad regime for a variety of strategic,
to a prominent political analyst in Aden, geographic, and religious reasons.
“These armed militias will engage in Similar to the Iraqi jihad at its zenith,
24 Sarah Phillips, “Developmental Dysfunction and Di-
armed confrontations, and they might users on al-Qa`ida’s official and
vision in a Crisis State,” Developmental Leadership Pro-
turn into a hard stick in the hands of unofficial web forums began to post
gram, 2011, p. 17. ”Popular” militias fought in the 1960s
any armed faction capable of funding unofficial yet authentic martyrdom
battles against a northern Zaydi Imamate and southern
them. The Popular Committees will notices for individuals—both Syrian
British colonial rule, which gave rise to the first Yemeni
turn into an internal problem for the and foreign—who they perceived to have
states. See Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (New
government.”31 fought on behalf of the jihadist cause.2
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 114-117.
25 Ellen Knickmeyer, “Trouble Down South: For Saudi
Casey L. Coombs is a freelance journalist This article looks quantitatively and
Arabia, Yemen’s Implosion is a Nightmare,” Foreign
based in Sana`a, Yemen. In March 2012, qualitatively at these notices.3 The
Policy, July 5, 2011.
he reported from Ansar al-Shari`a’s then data and biographical information
26 As explained in Martin van Vliet, “The Challenges of
de facto capital Jaar, which the group had collected is based on threads from
Retaking Northern Mali,” CTC Sentinel 5:11-12 (2012), a
renamed Waqar. He has covered Yemen jihadist web forums4 dating from the
“militiatary” strategy is when a “state partly outsources
for the BBC, Foreign Policy, The Jamestown
its primary mandate of security provision to local mili-
Foundation, TIME World and Wired’s blog
tias. While often temporarily integrated into the military 1 For more background, see Brian Fishman, “The Evi-
Danger Room.
chain of command, these armed non-state actors mostly dence of Jihadist Activity in Syria,” CTC Sentinel 5:5
operate outside formal state structures.” (2012); Aaron Y. Zelin, “Jihadists in Syria Can be Found
27 See Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine on the Internet,” al-Monitor, October 18, 2012.
Wells, “Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen - The Corruption Assessment (Burlington, VT: USAID, 2006), 2 Although it is impossible to prove the authenticity of
Huthi Phenomenon,” RAND Corporation, 2010, p. 259; p. 4. all of the martyrdom notices, the forums provide images
“Defusing the Saada Time Bomb,” International Crisis 29 Hasan al-Zaidi, “Interior Ministry Orders Lifting and details on the deceased fighters, and it is unlikely
Group, May 27, 2009, pp. 14-16. A minister of parliament Tribal Road Blockade; Diesel Still Unavailable in Some that this information would be fabricated for so many
from Yafa` further claimed: “More than 20 soldiers from Gas Stations,” Yemen Post, July 21, 2008; Gabriel Koe- individuals. Furthermore, the notices can be cross-refer-
my own district have died since the beginning of the war. hler-Derrick ed., A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes, and enced with videos posted on YouTube or on other Syrian
Neither army soldiers nor volunteers fighting alongside Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen (West Point, NY: Combating opposition sites. In some cases, relatives of foreign fight-
the army have received proper treatment. The families of Terrorism Center, 2011), pp. 107-108. ers conducted honorary funerals even if they were buried
those who were injured or killed did not receive any com- 30 “Yemen Requests Int’l Investigation in Iranian Arms in Syria.
pensation and often were informed very late of what had Shipment,” Yemen News Agency (SABA), February 8, 3 There were limitations in collecting this dataset since
happened. This inevitably created new tensions.” 2013. some notices provided far richer information than oth-
28 “Defusing the Saada Time Bomb.” For more informa- 31 Personal interview, Aden-based political analyst, ers.
tion on “ghost soldiers” in Yemen’s military, see Yemen Sana`a, Yemen, January 14, 2013. 4 The data was drawn from al-Fida’ al-Islamiya,
7
FeBRUARY 2013 . VoL 6. IssUE 2
start of the uprising through January also demonstrates the growing role some
31, 2013. It is likely that some notices jihadists have played in recent battles
have been missed, but it is still useful with the regime, such as the takeover of
to piece together each individual’s the Taftanaz airbase.10
identity, from where they are from,
with whom they fought, and where they
died.
It does not, however, include fighters
mentioned in Jabhat al-Nusra’s official
statements or videos. Therefore, while
the data is useful in providing clarity on
the role of foreign fighters in Syria, it
still suffers from many limitations and
should be considered anecdotal.
Quantitative Data: Basic Metrics
There were discrepancies in the amount
of data provided in each unofficial
martyrdom notice. The quantitative Table 1. Martyrdom notices by country of origin.
data mainly focuses on city of origin,
country of origin, city martyred in, and Table 1 highlights jihadist forum
group joined. There are two levels of martyrdom notices from individuals’
data compiled for these four metrics: country of origin. Predictably, it shows
overall, and in the past four months. Syrians as having the most records.7 It
Organizing the data by time period also tentatively illustrates that similar
helps situate the current trajectories to the Sinjar records captured by U.S.
in the conflict. forces in Iraq, Libyans and Saudis have
played important roles in the fight
In total, there are currently 130 against the al-Assad regime.8 Due to
individuals in the author’s dataset, the proximity and known links between
and 85 of the 130 have been identified al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) and Jabhat al-
in the past four months. The first Nusra, it is somewhat surprising that Table 2. Martyrdom notices by city of death.
recorded unofficial martyrdom notice the number of Iraqis is so low. It is
was posted in February 2012, but this possible that Iraqis might be in more Table 3 confirms what is likely
individual, the Kuwaiti Hussam al- senior positions or facilitating activities uncontroversial: the majority of
Mutayri, actually died on August 29, along the border and therefore not on the unofficial martyrdom notices belong to
2011, fighting with the Free Syrian front lines, but that is only speculation. individuals affiliated with Jabhat al-
Army in Damascus.5 Every individual Nusra. Furthermore, it highlights the
in the dataset has a record of which The data in Table 2, which shows the rapid increase in fighters who have
country they were from. More than jihadist martyrdom notices for the city joined its cause in recent months.11 Table
half (70 out of 130) mentioned the where the individual died fighting, 3 also shows that jihadists in individual
group with which the individual confirms broader assumptions about in capacities have not recently joined
fought, while 76 of 130 locations of what cities jihadists are engaged. Large and died while fighting with brigades
death were provided. Additionally, portions of cities in Table 2 are located attached to the Free Syrian Army.
the city of origin of the martyrs was in the northern and eastern regions of This could suggest that the recruiting
detailed 45 out of 130 times. The steep Syria where many of the Salafi-jihadi networks for Jabhat al-Nusra within
increase in individuals being reported groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra or and outside of Syria have built greater
as martyrs on the forums in the past Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham are based.9 It capabilities. It could also be evidence that
four months, as seen in Table 1, Jabhat al-Nusra has established itself to
provides circumstantial evidence that such an extent that foreign fighters refuse
the growth in the strength of groups such as Jabhat al-
more foreign jihadists have joined the to fight with any other group.
Nusra on the ground as well as backing by global jihadist
battlefield recently.6
ideologues, it is likely that there are more jihadists fight-
ing today. France-Presse, January 18, 2013; Martin Chulov, “Syria
Shumukh al-Islam, Ansar al-Mujahidin, and the al-Jihad 7 If one were to take into account official Jabhat al-Nusra Crisis: Al-Qaida Fighters Revealing Their True Colours,
al-`Alami forums, among other online global jihadist releases, the number would be even higher. Rebels Say,” Guardian, January 17, 2013; “Eastern Syrian
sources. 8 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qa`ida’s Foreign Town Lives Under al Qaeda Rules,” Reuters, January 30,
5 “Awal Shuhada’ Jazirat al-`Arab fi Suriyya (Hussam Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West 2013.
al-Mutayri),” Shumukh al-Islam, February 17, 2012. Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007). 10 Andrew J. Tabler, Jeffrey White, and Aaron Y. Zelin,
6 An alternative conclusion is that the rise in martyrdom 9 Noman Benotman and Roisin Blake, “Jabhat al-Nusra: “Fallout from the Fall of Taftanaz,” The Washington In-
notices is simply because more individuals are posting A Strategic Briefing,” Quilliam Foundation, January 8, stitute for Near East Policy, January 14, 2013.
these statements than in the past. That said, because of 2013; “Kurd-Jihadist Clashes in North Syria,” Agence 11 For more details, see footnote 6.
8
FeBRUARY 2013 . VoL 6. IssUE 2
The records yielded a number of other Similarly, Muhammad al-Shajrawi,
details. Of the 130 individuals in the a Syrian who died in mid-July 2012,
dataset, 10 noted that they previously and Muhib Ru’yat al-Rahman (whose
spent time in prison. A different real name is Jamal al-Yafi), a Lebanese
grouping of 14 showed that they had foreign fighter from Tripoli who died
experience fighting in other conflicts, in December 2012, were both members
three of which stated they had fought and contributors to al-Qa`ida’s forums
in two prior jihads. Seven of the 14 al-Fida’ al-Islamiya and Shumukh al-
individuals fought during the Libyan Islam. Al-Yafi was prolific, posting
uprising against the Mu`ammar Qadhafi 26,761 times on Shumukh alone.16
regime, three during the Iraq war, two in
Yemen, two against Israel, and one each Commanders and Religious Officials
in Afghanistan, the Sinai, Chechnya, In addition to individuals joining the
and Kosovo. This suggests that the fight fight who previously had online careers,
in Libya provided a starting point for some individuals had risen to levels of
Libyans, Egyptians, and Palestinians power either militarily or religiously
to fight in Syria. This is not surprising within rebel groups. For example, Abu
when taking into account that there are `Abad (also known as Abu Mujahid), a
known training camps in Libya that Syrian from Aleppo who was affiliated
provide skills to fighters before they with Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham, a Salafi-
depart for jihad in Syria.14 jihadi fighting force, was a supervisor
Table 3. Martyrdom notices by group affiliation. for the Shari`a court established in
Qualitative Data: Martyrs’ Stories Aleppo.17 He died in mid-September
There is also data for martyrdom There were two themes among the 2012.18 Labib Sulayman (also known
notices by city of origin, but it is of a martyrs’ biographies where details on as Abu Hamza), another Syrian
limited scope.12 That said, similar to the individual’s life were provided:
the Sinjar records, some cities such as involvement with jihadist activism “The trend of affiliation
Zarqa in Jordan and Derna in Libya online, and those who became
points to Syrians and
were responsible for the most recruits. commanders or religious officials in
This could anecdotally suggest that different rebel groups. Additionally, foreigners who have a
some of the older facilitation networks there were other distinctive stories
worldview closely aligned
during the time of the Iraq war are still from the martyrs.
operational or were reactivated in the with al-Qa`ida and who
past year. More information is needed Online Jihadists
join the Salafi-jihadi rebel
to reach a definitive conclusion.13 Over the years, self-described
“jihadists” have moved from non- group Jabhat al-Nusra.”
violent online activism to play a
direct role in fighting on behalf of
12 The full list of individuals martyred by city of origin
al-Qa`ida-affiliated Salafi-jihadi groups.
is as follows: Aleppo, Syria: 5; Zarqa, Jordan: 3; Derna,
The Syrian war is no different. Seven of member of Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham,
Libya: 3; Tripoli, Lebanon: 3; al-Ahsa, Saudi Arabia: 2;
the biographies in the dataset included who died in mid-October 2012, was
Deir al-Zour, Syria: 2; Benghazi, Libya: 2; Tunis, Tunisia:
details on the individual’s online according to a Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham
2; Damascus, Syria: 2; Gaza, Palestine: 2; Alexandria,
activism. official one of the first defectors from
Egypt: 1; Ariana, Tunisia: 1; Ayn Shams, Egypt: 1; Binsh,
the Syrian military from Hama.19
Syria: 1; Dhiban, Syria: 1; Ha’il, Saudi Arabia: 1; Irbid,
For example, Muhammad Abu Yasin, a He previously had been in the al-
Jordan: 1; Ma’an, Jordan: 1; Melbourne, Australia: 1; Pris-
Syrian from Idlib who died in late June Assad regime’s military academy.20
tina, Kosovo: 1; Mahdia, Tunisia: 1; Arar, Saudi Arabia:
2012, helped with the production and He became a commander for a Kata’ib
1; Ceuta, Spain: 1; Fayyum, Egypt: 1; Homs, Syria: 1; Jed-
dissemination of online magazines. He
dah, Saudi Arabia: 1; Damietta, Egypt: 1; Kufr al-Shaykh,
went by the names of `Awasif al-Qa`ida
Egypt: 1; Upper Egypt, Egypt: 1. The number of individu- 16 “Sur `Ars al-Shahid bi-Idhin Allah Ikhwaum --
and Jundi Dawlat al-Islam.15
als martyred in the past four months by city of origin is as Muhib bin Ladin ... al-Nasir Tawala -- mata Sanlahiq
follows: Aleppo, Syria: 1; Zarqa, Jordan: 3; Derna, Libya: bi-l-Qafilah,” Shumukh al-Islam, July 20, 2012; “Li-l-
2; Tripoli, Lebanon: 2; al-Ahsa, Saudi Arabia: 2; Deir al- Tawdhih -- Istishhad al-Shaykh -- Muhib Ru’yat al-Rah-
Zour, Syria: 2; Benghazi, Libya: 1; Tunis, Tunisia: 1; Da- man,” Ansar al-Mujahidin Forum, December 18, 2012.
mascus, Syria: 1; Gaza, Palestine: 1; Alexandria, Egypt: 1; 17 “Istishhadal-Shaykh al-Zahid al-Mujahid wa al-
Ariana, Tunisia: 1; Ayn Shams, Egypt: 1; Binsh, Syria: 1; Mulaqab bi-Abu `Abid al-Mushrif `ala al-Mahkamah
Dhiban, Syria: 1; Ha’il, Saudi Arabia: 1; Irbid, Jordan: 1; 14 “Libya’s Terrorist Training Camps,” CNN, January al-Shar`iyah fi Halab,” Ansar al-Mujahidin Forum, Sep-
Ma’an, Jordan: 1; Melbourne, Australia: 1; Pristina, Ko- 19, 2013; Aaron Y. Zelin, “Jihadism’s Foothold in Libya,” tember 18, 2012.
sovo: 1; Mahdia, Tunisia: 1; Arar, Saudi Arabia: 0; Ceuta, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Septem- 18 Ibid.
Spain: 0; Fayyum, Egypt: 0; Homs, Syria: 0; Jeddah, ber 12, 2012. 19 “Istishhadal-Qa’id al-`Askari li-Katibat Salah ad-Din
Saudi Arabia: 0; Damietta, Egypt: 0; Kufr al-Shaykh, 15 “Al-Shahid bi-Idhin Allah Muhammad Abu Yasin -- Abu Hamzah -- Kata’ib Ahrar ash-Sham,” Shumukh
Egypt: 0; Upper Egypt, Egypt: 0. Jundi al-Dawla Ahad A`dha’ al-Muntada,” Shumukh al- al-Islam, October 11, 2012.
13 Ibid. Islam, July 20, 2012. 20 Ibid.
9
FeBRUARY 2013 . VoL 6. IssUE 2
Ahrar al-Sham’s sub-unit, Katibat Salah al-Halabi), originally from Aleppo, had was cousins with Abu Mus`ab al-
al-Din.21 been studying medicine in Germany Zarqawi, the former leader of AQI.34
at the outbreak of the uprising.27 Al- Even closer-linked, Jarad’s father
There are also individuals who had prior Armanazi made it back to Saadallah al- Yasin was purportedly behind the Najaf
religious training, such as the Syrian Jabri Square in Aleppo for the protests operation that killed Muhammad Baqir
from Deir al-Zour, Shaykh Isma`il on March 15, 2011, and was arrested al-Hakim, one of Iraq’s most prominent
Muhammad al-`Alush (also known the next day.28 He spent two months Shi`a Muslim leaders, in 2003.35 This
as Abu Ayman), who was affiliated in prison, and after his release he highlights the familial connections
with Liwa’ al-Furqan and died in late returned to Germany and helped with that have inspired others to take up the
December 2012, as well as the Jordanian online activities for local committees in cause as well.
Riyad Hadayb (also known as Abu Aleppo.29 He later returned to Syria to
`Umar al-Faruq), who was a member of fight in Idlib and Aleppo, and he died in Conclusion
Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-`Alush purportedly late July 2012.30 With the Syrian war continuing into the
had a master’s degree in Shari`a, while spring with no end in sight, it is likely
Hadayb was an imam before he went Similarly, the 15-year-old `Umar that more unofficial martyrdom stories
to Syria.22 Hadayb became a mufti for Bakirati (also known as Abu Hamza from the jihadist forums will continue
Jabhat al-Nusra before his death on al-Faruq), from Qudsaya, fled Syria to to trickle out about fighters who died
January 23, 2013.23 Turkey with his family.31 He returned waging war against the al-Assad regime.
and became a sniper for Jabhat al-Nusra, The trend of affiliation points to Syrians
These examples show that jihadists, allegedly killing 13 pro-government and foreigners who have a worldview
both Syrian and foreign, are becoming shabiha before he died in Hama in late closely aligned with al-Qa`ida and who
part of the budding civilian societal October 2012.32 Both stories illustrate join the Salafi-jihadi rebel group Jabhat
structure related to the establishment the duty felt by Syrians in the face of the al-Nusra.
of Shari`a courts in Syria. These courts al-Assad regime’s crackdown.
have helped provide a small semblance Moreover, foreigners joining the fight
of relative law and order in some pockets There are also those who had decades will likely continue to come from Libya,
of the country that have been liberated of experience in the overall jihadist Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Tunisia
or partially controlled by rebel forces. movement. For instance, `Abd al-`Aziz based on current trends, proximity, and
al-Jughayman, a Saudi from al-Ahsa capable facilitation networks. As more
Unique Backgrounds and former professor at King Faisal data becomes available, an even clearer
Others in the dataset have stories University, had been involved with some picture will emerge to better understand
that are not threaded together by any of the major fields of jihad dating back who is fighting in the conflict as part of
particular theme. One individual, to the 1980s. According to the forums, the jihadist faction within the broader
Ahmad Raf`at (also known as Abu al-Jughayman fought in Afghanistan on rebel movement.
Bara’), an Egyptian from Kufr al- two different tours, as well as in Bosnia-
Shaykh who died fighting with Herzegovina, Kashmir, and Iraq. The Aaron Y. Zelin is the Richard Borow fellow
Jabhat al-Nusra, had previously been al-Assad regime, however, apprehended at The Washington Institute for Near
imprisoned in Egypt.24 He was released and then imprisoned him for three years East Policy. He also maintains the website
after the fall of Hosni Mubarak, and in the middle of the last decade. He died Jihadology.net, which is a primary source
he swiftly went across the border to fighting against that same regime in late archive for global jihadist materials.
join the fight in Libya against the November 2012.33
regime until Qadhafi’s death.25 Raf`at
then traveled to Syria where he died Finally, there were individuals who
in early July 2012.26 followed in the footsteps of family
members who had previous experiences
There were also cases when Syrians who fighting jihad. For instance, Muhammad
were outside of the country returned to Yasin Jarad, a Jordanian from Zarqa
fight. Hussam al-Din al-Armanazi (also who died fighting with Jabhat al-Nusra
known as Abu `Umar Hussam al-Din in al-Suwayda in mid-January 2013,
21 Ibid. 27 “Al-Shahid bi-Idhin Allah Hussam al-Din min Halab
22 “Istishhadal-Shaykh Isma`il Muhammad al-`Alush,” Taraka al-Tib fi Almaniyya wa-nal al-Shahada fi al-
Ansar al-Mujahidin Forum, December 28, 2012; “Abu Sham-Sura,” al-Sanam Islamic Network, July 31, 2012.
`Umar al-Faruq al-Mufti al-Shar`i li-Jabhat al-Nusra 28 Ibid.
Tabat Hayan wa maytan,” Ansar al-Mujahidin Forum, 29 Ibid.
January 23, 2013. 30 Ibid.
23 Ibid. 31 “Al-Shahid Abu Hamzah al-Faruq ma` Inshudah la
24 “Bushra Istishhadal-Akh Ahmad Rif`at ‘ala Ardh tas’aluni `an Hayyati,” Shabakat Ansar al-Sham, Octo- 34 “IstishhadSuhur Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi fi Midinah
Suriyya fi Muwajahat al-Taghut al-Nusayri,” al-Jihad al- ber 31, 2012. al-Suwayda’ Janub Suriyya wa-l-Urdun Tarfadh Isdar
`Alami, July 11, 2012. 32 Ibid. Shahdah Himam al-Bilawi,” Ansar al-Mujahidin Forum,
25 Ibid. 33 “Sur # Istishhad al-Batal `Abd al-`Aziz,” Ansar al- January 18, 2013.
26 Ibid. Mujahidin Forum, November 24, 2012. 35 Ibid.
10