Islam and the Post-Revolutionary State in Iran

271 Pages·1994·29.397 MB·English

by  Homa Omid (auth.)

ISLAM AND THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY STATE IN IRAN
Islam and the Post
Revolutionary State
in Iran
HomaOmid
© Homa Omid 1994
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1994 978-0-333-48446-3
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of
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Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this
publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil
claims for damages.
First published in Great Britain 1994 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS
and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library.
ISBN 978-1-349-23248-2 ISBN 978-1-349-23246-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-23246-8
First published in the United States of America 1994 by
Scholarly and Reference Division,
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC.,
175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10010
ISBN 978-0-312-10737-6
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Omid, Homa.
Islam and the post-revolutionary state in Iran I Homa Omid.
p. em.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-312-10737-6
I. Islam and politics-Iran. 2. Iran-Politics and
government-1979- I. Title.
DS318.825.046 1994
306.6'97'0955-{!c20 93-31444
CIP
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97
This book is dedicated to my beloved mother, who set me an example which
was hard to follow and impossible to forget, and to my adored father, who
remained philosophical about my indiscretions and tolerant of our different
views, politics and interpretations. Despite his constant fear for my life, he
always retained his sense of humour and continued to be supportive, patient and
loving throughout his life. This book is a small token of my immense love and
gratitude to them both.
Contents
Acknowledgements ix
Map X
1
Introduction
1 Ulema and Secularisation: Conflict or Coincidence 3
of Interest
2 The Arms of the Bureaucracy and the Embrace of 18
Theocracy
3 Valayateh Faqih: A Blueprint for Islamic Government? 40
4 Theocracy Defeats its Opponents 63
5 The Revolution Betrayed 85
6 The Armed Forces: Divided We Rule 106
7 Valayateh Faqih in Disarray 130
8 Freedom, Culture and Education in Khomeini's State: 153
What Price Islam?
9 Women and the Post-Revolutionary State 178
I 0 Islam for the People and Mammon for the Economy 205
Notes 220
Bibliography 243
Glossary 249
Index 253
Acknowledgements
I am most grateful to RAW R for his encouragement and for cheerfully reading
through the earlier draft of this book and finding out more than he ever wished
about Iranian politics - a kindness well beyond the call of duty. His prompt and
incisive comments have been invaluable. I should also like to thank PK for his
detailed and extensive comments on Chapter 3, I very much appreciate his help
and advice. Similarly many thanks to VP for information concerning the Iranian
government's debt and foreign currency loans. Of course all mistakes, and
misrepresentations remain entirely my responsibility.
I would also like to thank T.F. who accepted the very first book that I ever did
and has remained optimistic and kind ever since; he continued to believe in the
arrival of this book, despite the numerous delays and never-ending shifts of
deadline. Now I will not need the special room for delinquent authors that he
had reserved for me in the Tower of London!
Last but not least I would like to thank my children for giving me the time to
work and MMD for holding the fort throughout. Without his constant help this
work would not have been completed.
ix
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Introduction
The 1979 revolution in Iran is a landmark in the implementation of revivalist
Islamic policy. It enabled the Iranian religious institution, ulema, to set up the
Islamic Republic and to claim to be the first truly populist Shia rule since the
death of the first Imam, Ali ibn Abu Taleb.
The Shia ulema who have through the centuries proclaimed themselves to be
the defenders of the poor and dispossessed, have traditionally contested secular
rule in Iran and twice in the twentieth century have joined forces with the
intelligentsia to form a revolutionary force. But the diffuse political aims of the
revolutionaries - and the religious institution itself-have resulted in a political
and economic flux which has continued throughout the decade.
The diffuse polity is a reflection of the hierarchy and the ambivalent approach
of the ulema to the twentieth-century state formation in Iran. It is in part the
result of the rejection of temporal power by the twelver Shia. In principle the
doctrine accepts only the legitimacy of the rule of the Prophet and the twelve
imams that followed and reject all other rulers as usurpers. The true believers
should await the rule of the twelfth imam who will return from occultation to
bring justice to the world. But such rejection has had to coexist with the reality
of tacit collaboration of the ulema with dynasties of rulers in Iran.
The post-revolutionary State in Iran has been characterised by a profusion of
administrative and theocratic institutions working, not always harmoniously,
with the newly emerging revolutionary organisations, which occasionally du
plicate, often compete with, or even work against, the older established bureau
cracy. At the level of government there is a similar development of pre- and
post-revolutionary decision-making bodies and command structures coexisting
uncomfortably. In the first decade of the revolution, the inherent conflicts that
arose were often resolved by the personal intervention of the Ayatollah Rouhollah
Khomeini, whose directives were to be obeyed to the letter. With the demise of
the leader of the revolution, the political containment of these differing chains of
command is becoming more difficult. Such bureaucratic pluralism is rooted in
the character of the religious establishment in Iran and therefore difficult to alter
in the context of the current theocracy. The post-revolutionary political structure
is the product of the fragmented, competitive and sometimes contradictory
attempts of the ulema at curbing and controlling the process of secularisation.
It is the contention of this author that the form of conservative, theocratic,
government that has emerged in Iran, does not only counter the vision of the
revolutionaries, but also goes against the very core of Shiism. The conservatism
of the religious institution has stripped Shiism of its embattled, egalitarian and
progressive impetus. As a result, what has emerged over the past decade and a
half is a stumbling, self-serving administration, that has failed its people and has
chosen to forget the high-minded aims and ideals that Islam and Shiism had set.
1
2 Introduction
After a long revolution, an eight-years war and untold bloodshed, Iranians-men
and women-find themselves poorer, less educated, more numerous and, in the
case of women, considerably more oppressed than before. This was a revolution
that betrayed its cause and its people.