ISLAM ANd ThE PAThS OF PAkISTAN'S POLITICAL dEVELOPMENT

14 Pages·2009·0.46 MB·English

C A R N E G I E BrieFinG
vol.11
M O S C O W C E N T E R issue 2
April 2009
islam and the paths of pakistan’s
political Development
peter topychkAnov
S u m m a r y
n National identity remains a very serious issue in Pakistan today. There has never been a clear answer to the question of
how many nations live within the country — one or more.
n The constitutional process, accompanied by tensions in communal relations, bears witness to serious ideological differ-
ences in society over the role religion should play in social and political life.
n Pakistan’s Islamization, through giving traditional Muslim standards legal force, has not been completed, but many tra-
ditional standards have now been written into law and have thus become an integral part of the country’s political and
legal system.
n Solutions to Pakistan’s problems should be based on comprehensive approaches that avoid experiments with Islam —
one of the foundations of Pakistan’s statehood — and emphasize administrative, social, economic, and security issues.
In the words of the country’s first prime min- Analysts have identified two groups of is-
ister, Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan is the “heart sues facing Pakistan:
of Asia.”1 Located at the crossroads between Political problems (unstable and ineffec-
the Middle East and South and Central Asia, tive democratic institutions; the closed na-
Pakistan has indeed proved the truth of these ture of Pakistan’s elite, which makes it hard to
words throughout its history. Today, with achieve broad national consensus; the armed
neighboring Afghanistan in dire straits, many forces’ and security agencies’ excessive influ-
are looking to Pakistan in search of solutions ence on the political process; and weak gov-
to Afghanistan’s problems, among them U.S. ernment control of the tribal areas bordering
Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who has Afghanistan and Iran);
repeatedly said that Afghanistan cannot be International security problems (ensuring
stabilized without simultaneously tackling the safety of nuclear weapons, technology and
the challenges of Pakistan.2 materials; the presence of international terror-
2 BRIEFING [ VOL. 11 ISSUE 2 ]
ist groups in the country); regional security introduce the idea of a single Pakistani nation,
issues (the unresolved problem of Kashmir; saying, “Hindus would cease to be Hindus and
the dispute with India over the division of the Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in
Indus River’s water resources; the unresolved the religious sense, because that is the personal
issue of the Afghan-Pakistani border; the activi- faith of each individual, but in the political
ties of regional extremist and terrorist groups sense as citizens of the State.”4
on Pakistani and Kashmiri territory); and do- After Jinnah died in 1948, Prime Minister
mestic security issues (anti-government activi- Liaquat Ali Khan assumed the reins. On
ties by terrorist and extremist groups; conflicts March 7, 1949, he presented the Objectives
between Sunni and Shiite religious groups; Resolution on constitutional organization to
separatist tendencies, not yet very widespread, Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly, which had
among Baluchis and Pashtuns). the task of adopting the country’s constitu-
Peter Topychkanov is a junior
In addition, Pakistan faces serious social tion. The resolution stated that Pakistan must
researcher at Moscow State
and economic problems. “observe in full the principles of democracy,
University’s Institute of
It is clear that in order to stabilize Afghanistan freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice,
Asian and African Studies
and guarantee international and regional secu- as required by Islam, must give adequate guar-
and coordinator of the
rity in general, Pakistan needs to be a united antees for minorities to freely practice their
Carnegie Moscow Center’s
and stable state with an effective government, faith and develop their cultures, and must ad-
Nonproliferation Program.
so as to prevent terrorist and extremist organi- equately protect the lawful interests of minori-
zations from influencing the Pakistani public ties and backward and oppressed classes.”5 It is
and carrying out their activities both inside worth noting that the need to comply with the
and outside the country. As far as those or- principles listed is based on the requirements
ganizations themselves are concerned, many of Islam. Liaquat Ali Khan did not see any
studies interpret their ideologies as a distortion contradiction between prioritizing Islam and
of Islam,3 which is a veiled way of recogniz- upholding basic democratic principles. As he
ing the link between the religion’s fundamental stated on May 3, 1950, “We pledge our loy-
role in the country’s social and political life and alty to the principles of democracy, freedom,
the spread of terrorism and extremism. This equality, tolerance and social justice in accord-
interpretation sometimes produces recom- ance with Islam. This does not mean theocracy.
mendations to reduce the role of Islam in the Islam does not imply that the clergy has the
country’s life, for example, in the educational leading role… No, our concept of democ-
system, which supposedly fosters extremism. racy is even more comprehensive than the one
But a look back through Pakistan’s history based on universal suffrage and government by
shows that these views are one-sided, and thus the majority. We call all of this the Islamic way
such recommendations are debatable. of life, and we adhere to it because, as Muslims,
we cannot follow any other ideology.”6
The author is deeply grateful one nation or two? But in practice, the priority given to Islam
to Professor Vladimir N. Pakistan appeared on the world map in 1947, in social and political life can lead to restric-
Moskalenko, Chief Researcher as a result of the Muslim League’s struggle for tions on the basic rights and freedoms of non-
at the Institute of Oriental
a Muslim state. The party’s ideology was based Muslim citizens. This was the line taken by
Studies of the Russian Academy
on the theory that India was home to two Abul Ala Mawdudi, leader of the Jamaat-e-
of Sciences, for his helpful
nations — Hindus and Muslims. But after the Islami (The Islamic Society). In his view, re-
comments on the draft of the
establishment of the Pakistani sovereign state, strictions on non-Muslims’ social and political
Briefing.
its leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, tried to activities were justified by the need to preserve
ISLAM ANd ThE PAThS OF PAkISTAN’S POLITICAL dEVELOPMENT 3
internal peace and ensure religious minori- same time, the status of non-Muslim com-
ties’ security.7 He thought that non-Muslims munities could be lower than that of Muslim
should not play important roles in Pakistan communities. This raises the question of
and, in particular, should not be allowed to Pakistani citizens’ identity: who are they —
hold senior government posts. This ideology first Pakistanis and then Muslims, Christians,
clearly divides citizens into two categories. Hindus, etc., or the other way round?
It was not just Mawdudi’s supporters who The religious factor has played the central
saw the potential for the division of Pakistani role in the search for a national identity in
society into Muslim and non-Muslim groups Pakistan. The Muslim League’s response to
with different statuses in Liaquat Ali Khan’s res- the identity question was its slogan of the
olution. It raised concerns among the religious early 1950s: “One Nation, One State, One
minorities (Hindus, Parsees and Christians), Language”. Islam and the Urdu language were
whose members held almost 20% of the seats defined as the foundations of the Pakistani
in the Constituent Assembly. One of them, nation (two other components made up the
Jogendra Nath Mandal, Pakistan’s first justice state ideology: Kashmir as an inalienable part
and labor minister, was deeply disappointed by of Pakistan, and the armed forces as the guar-
the resolution’s pro-Islamic character. He sent antee of the country’s development and integ-
the Prime Minister a letter of resignation, in rity).10 The Muslim League’s slogan signaled
which he stated, in particular: “Muslim League a retreat from the principles advocated by
leaders are repeatedly making declarations that Muhammad Ali Jinnah.
Pakistan is and shall be an Islamic State. Islam
is being offered as the sovereign remedy for pakistan’s history shows that giving priority
all earthly evils....In that grand setting of the to islam can be combined with a democratic system
Shariat, Muslims alone are rulers while Hindus of government, as well as with an authoritarian
and other minorities are jimmies [from Arabic regime. ideologically it can take both moderate and
dhimmis, members of other faiths, living in a radical forms, as is the case with any other religion.
Muslim state] who are entitled to protection at
a price.”8 In 1952, Bhupendra Kumar Datta,
another member representing the Hindu mi- The choice of Urdu as one of the nation’s
nority in the Constituent Assembly, called cornerstones was not supported by members of
attention to the incompatibility between the the Hindu minority, who were unhappy that
idea of an Islamic state and the institution of the Bengali language had not been granted
parliamentary democracy.9 the status of an official state language, along
The religious minorities’ criticism of the with Urdu. In February 1948, Dhirendra
concept of an Islamic state highlights two re- Nath Datta, a member of the Constituent
lated issues: its compatibility with the prin- Assembly from East Bengal, proposed rec-
ciples of democracy, and the possible division ognizing Bengali as the state language, as ac-
of society into Muslims and non-Muslims cording to his estimates it was spoken by the
that implementation of this concept could majority of the country’s people (64%). The
entail in practice. In a society based on this country’s leaders saw this proposal, supported
concept, the community, with broad religious in the Constituent Assembly by Hindus alone
autonomy and partial legal and economic au- at the beginning, as a sign of disloyalty to the
tonomy, would be the basic unit of society, state and an attempt to split the unity of the
like the millet in the Ottoman Empire. At the country’s Muslims, that is, the Pakistani na-
4 BRIEFING [ VOL. 11 ISSUE 2 ]
tion, by Hindus with their “bodies in Pakistan the anti-Ahmadiya controversy out of their
but their souls in India.”11 old armoury purely as a political weapon, and
what subsequently happened is an eloquent
pakistan’s constitutions testimony to their shrewdness and judgment
The movement for greater rights for East as a political party.”14
Bengal, which evolved into the Bangladesh Inter-community violence was common-
independence movement, demonstrated how place in the east of the sub-continent — in
the problem of language really did fuel conflict the Indian states of Assam, Bihar, West
and contribute to the centrifugal processes Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, and in Pakistani
underway in Pakistan at the time. But these East Bengal (renamed Eastern Pakistan in
processes were driven not only by those who 1954) throughout the period from the late
were neither Muslim nor non-Urdu speak- 1940s to the first half of the 1960s. Streams
ing. Others, who positioned themselves as of refugees fleeing from one country to an-
representatives of precisely the titular nation, other in an effort to escape the violence fueled
also had an impact. The destructive part they the conflict. Anti-Hindu pogroms erupted in
played emerged clearly in the anti-Ahmadiyya Dhaka in February 1950, after the arrival of
riots in Lahore, the provincial capital of the refugees fleeing anti-Muslim riots in West
Punjab. At the start of 1953, as discussions on Bengal. Inter-community violence in Eastern
a draft constitution were taking place, mem- Pakistan peaked again in 1962-63, provoked
bers of Jamaat-e-Islami and Majlis-e-Ahrar this time by rumors that a hair belonging
(The Ahrar Association) proposed that mem- to the Prophet Mohammed had gone miss-
bers of the Ahmadiyya community (a religious ing from the Hazrat Bal shrine in Srinagar
offshoot that emerged in the Muslim com- (in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir).
munity in the nineteenth century12) should Anti-Hindu pogroms in the Eastern Pakistani
be officially recognized as a religious minority town of Khulna sparked anti-Muslim po-
and its members be removed from govern- groms throughout West Bengal, and the in-
ment posts. The leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami ter-community violence then reached Dhaka,
and Majlis-e-Ahrar used the anti-Ahmadiyya the capital of Eastern Pakistan. A curfew was
riots as a tool for mobilizing political support. imposed in Dhaka in mid-January 1964.
There is a visible correlation between the
there is a visible correlation between
escalation of the problems of religious minori-
the escalation of the problems of religious minorities ties and changes to Pakistan’s political system.
and the changes to pakistan’s political system. The anti-Ahmadiyya riots, for example, were
followed by the adoption of Pakistan’s first
constitution in 1956, and anti-Hindu distur-
Morris James, British deputy high commis- bances took place as the country returned to
sioner in Pakistan in 1952-53 and 1955-56, civilian rule after the period of martial law in
estimated that around 300 people died in the 1958-1962 and adopted its second constitu-
riots.13 The authorities responded to the riots tion in 1962.
by imposing martial law for the first time in the Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly approved
country’s history, though only within Lahore the draft constitution in January 1956, with
itself. A legal inquiry was conducted after a a 65% majority. The constitution came into
new provincial government took office. One force on March 23 that same year. It repre-
of its conclusions was that “the Ahrar brought sented a victory for supporters of the idea of
ISLAM ANd ThE PAThS OF PAkISTAN’S POLITICAL dEVELOPMENT 5
an Islamic state,15 as can be seen from the fact building an Islamic political system, while the
that the 1949 Objectives Resolution became anti-Hindu riots were part of the whole com-
the preamble to this Constitution, as well as plex of problems concerning relations between
those adopted in 1962 and 1973. The fact Pakistan’s western and eastern parts. To a large
that all three constitutions preserved one and extent this explains why, after Pakistan’s defeat
the same preamble suggests that the official
concept of the Islamic state remained virtu- Discussions on the introduction of sharia law
ally unchanged throughout Pakistan’s history. in the 1970s-80s were primarily about the introduction
According to this concept, Islam’s priority in of islamic legal principles, while the government’s
social and political life is compatible with the measures were aimed rather at the islamization
recognition of religious minorities’ rights to of pakistani society through spreading
freedom of worship and freedom to develop the islamic way of life.
their own cultures, as well as the need to
guarantee adequate protection of their law-
ful interests. An indirect restriction on reli- in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, which led
gious minorities’ rights can be seen in article to the secession of Pakistan’s eastern part and
32 of the constitution, stipulating that only the emergence of a new country, Bangladesh,
Muslim Pakistani citizens can run for the of- anti-Hindu disturbances became a rare occur-
fice of president. rence in Pakistan’s social and political life.19 On
The policies of Jamaat-e-Islami and Majlis- the other hand, after 1971, conflict increased
e-Ahrar, which took the form of violence in relations with the Ahmadiyya community,
against the Ahmadiyya community, were one and this was a sign of the Pakistani elite’s ef-
of the factors that helped to destabilize the forts to resolve the national identity crisis trig-
general political situation in Pakistan. This gered by the victory of Bengali nationalism.
explains why Jamaat-e-Islami was banned Under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was
following the military coup led by General president of Pakistan in 1971-73, and prime
Muhammad Ayub Khan, commander-in-chief minister in 1973-77, another constitutional
of Pakistan’s armed forces, in 1958. In March reform took place against the backdrop of
1962, he promulgated a manifesto, the first further debates on Islam’s place in Pakistani
paragraph of which declared that Pakistan was statehood. Bhutto himself said, in 1972, that,
an ideological state based on the principles of “Now and in the future, the Islamic ideology
Islam. At the same time, the rights of religious will be the main factor cementing the coun-
minorities were guaranteed.16 The manifesto try’s national unity.”20 On August 14, 1973,
served as the basis for the 1962 constitu- the country adopted its third constitution,
tion, which did not initially declare Pakistan which proclaimed Pakistan an Islamic repub-
an Islamic state. In 1963, however, the First lic. Religious minorities could take part in
Constitutional Amendment was passed, once political life, but only Muslims could occupy
more declaring Pakistan an Islamic republic.17 the posts of president and prime minister. The
Only Muslims were entitled to run for the of- 1973 constitution was thus more Islamist in
fice of president.18 nature than its antecedents.
If we review the role played by religious Nonetheless, the adoption of the new
minorities in events in Pakistan in the mid- constitution raised tensions between Bhutto
1950s and early 1960s, we find that the anti- and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) that
Ahmadiyya riots were part of the process of he headed, on one hand, and the conserva-
6 BRIEFING [ VOL. 11 ISSUE 2 ]
tive opposition, headed by Jamaat-e-Islami, parties’ demands for restrictions on minorities’
on the other. Islamist parties did not support rights and the introduction of sharia law.22
him for several reasons, partly because they However, discussions on the introduction of
perceived the concept of Islamic socialism he sharia law in the 1970s-80s were primarily
advocated as a threat to Islam. The opposi- about the introduction of Islamic legal prin-
tion insisted on making the constitution even ciples,23 while the government’s measures were
more overtly Islamist, by demanding that all aimed rather at the Islamization of Pakistani
laws and statutes conform to the Koran and society through spreading the Islamic way of
Sunna, and by instituting an electoral system life to all citizens: to Muslims, as members of
based on religious communities. Conflict the umma, and to non-Muslims, as citizens
between the PPP and Jamaat-e-Islami spilled of an Islamic state, who must not offend the
over into a new round of anti-Ahmadiyya ri- majority’s religious feelings.24 In other words,
ots in the Punjab, in which 42 people lost this was not so much a reform of the law as
their lives. The two parties finally agreed on an effort to change public morality. Zia-ul-
a compromise in the form of the Second Haq said this himself in an interview in 1979:
Amendment to the Constitution, which “I think it is the moral rejuvenation which
came into force on September 21, 1974, and is required first and that will be done on the
which declared the Ahmadiyya community basis of Islam, because it was on this basis
a religious minority, thus depriving them of that Pakistan was formed.…”25 According to
the right to consider themselves Muslims. this logic, the Islamic nature of the country’s
national identity was offered as the solution to
incomplete transition Pakistan’s problems.
to sharia law Among the laws passed under Zia-ul-Haq,
According to a specialist on Pakistan, particularly noteworthy were the 1977 law in-
Lawrence Ziring, Bhutto’s reign marked the stituting an election system based on religious
start of Pakistan’s transformation from an communities, the creation of the Federal
Islamic republic into an Islamic state, accom- Sharia Court in 1980, as well as a number of
panied by the consolidation and centralization amendments to the Criminal Code: an anti-
of power.21 This process gathered steam after blasphemy law, a law making it an offense to
the 1977 military coup that brought General insult the Koran, a law making it an offense
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the head of Pakistan’s to insult the wives, family and companions
army, to power. Starting in the late 1970s, a of the Prophet Mohammed, and two laws
on the Ahmadiyya community. Under article
During this process of political and legal
298(B) of the Criminal Code, members of
transformation the position of minority religious the Ahmadiyya community faced up to three
communities received little attention, because it was year’s imprisonment and a fine for using the
felt that a truly islamic state offered non-Muslims all traditional names designating the wives, fam-
the guarantees they needed for a safe existence. ily members and companions of the Prophet
Mohammed to refer to other persons, using
the word ‘mosque’ for their prayer houses,
number of laws were passed deepening the and the word ‘azan’ for their prayers. Article
division between the Muslim majority and the 298(C) prohibited members of the Ahmadiyya
minority religious communities. These laws community from calling their faith Islam and
were in large part concessions to the Islamist designating themselves Muslims. These laws
ISLAM ANd ThE PAThS OF PAkISTAN’S POLITICAL dEVELOPMENT 7
were adopted on April 26, 1984, and became bers, above all Ahmadiyya and Christians,
the basis for restricting the Ahmadiyya com- were frequently involved in such cases. Of
munity’s freedom of worship by destroying its the 38 cases over this period, 18 were against
publications and prohibiting it from build- Muslims, 15 against Ahmadiyya, and five
ing prayer houses and declaring itself part of against Christians.27 Death sentences were
the Islamic community in general. These laws
stipulated punishment of up to life impris- the decade of the ‘democratic interlude’ from the end
onment for sullying, spoiling or defiling the of Zia-ul-haq’s military regime to the start of another
Koran (article 295(B), passed in 1982), and military regime under pervez Musharraf did not entail
up to life imprisonment or death for insulting a revision of the country’s religious policy.
the Prophet Mohammed (1986 amendment
to article 295(C) of the criminal code).
An Ordinance introducing sharia law, pro- handed down in several cases under article
mulgated by Zia-ul-Haq in June 1988, was to 295(C), but were not carried out. There were,
have concluded Pakistan’s transformation into however, increasingly frequent cases of lynch
an Islamic state. This act gave the courts the mobs attacking people they accused of blas-
right to revise laws and statutes that in their phemy, insulting the Koran and so on. More
view did not conform to Islamic principles. than 20 people were killed in such attacks be-
Zia-ul-Haq’s death in a plane crash on August tween 1988 and 2005, including a judge, Arif
17, 1988, prevented this final stage from going Ibaql Bhatti, who acquitted two Christians
ahead (the National Assembly did not pass the accused of blasphemy in 1997. Some mem-
Ordinance into law after Zia-ul-Haq’s death). bers of the judiciary have justified such mob
During this process of political and legal justice. Mian Nazir Akhtar, judge of the High
transformation, the position of minority re- Court of Lahore, said on several occasions be-
ligious communities received little attention, tween 1999-2000 that, faced with blasphemy,
because it was felt that a truly Islamic state Muslims could act in accordance with the law,
offered non-Muslims all the guarantees they or on the basis of traditional rules, without
needed for a secure existence. As Zia-ul-Haq turning to the courts.28
said on August 12, 1983, “In Islam, the mi- This ‘shariatization’ provoked conflict
norities are not regarded as suppressed classes, not just between the religious communities,
rather they are most privileged ones. In fact but also between representatives of different
in a Muslim society their rights are more branches within the Muslim community.
than Muslim populations. In Islamic sys- Tensions rose between the Shiites and Sunnis
tem of Governance their rights will be fully during Zia-ul-Haq’s rule. The Shiites did not
protected.”26 In reality, the priority given to agree with what they saw as the Sunni nature
Islam, as noted earlier, restricted minorities’ of the ‘shariatization’ being carried out, while
rights and encouraged increasing tensions in the Sunnis considered the Shiites’ attitude a
relations with them. Comparing the minor- challenge to Islam and the Pakistani nation.
ity religious communities’ share of the coun- The following figures illustrate the scale of
try’s population with the number of people the confrontation: between 1990 and 1997,
prosecuted for offenses committed under the 580 people were killed and 1,600 injured in
above-mentioned articles of the criminal code various clashes between Sunnis and Shiites.29
between January and October 2000, we see
that minority religious community mem-
8 BRIEFING [ VOL. 11 ISSUE 2 ]
the different faces of ‘islamic supreme law. This time, the National Assembly
democracy’ approved the amendment, but the Senate did
The decade of the ‘democratic interlude’30 not.32 Furthermore, in 1992, Nawaz Sharif’s
from the end of Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime government tried to introduce compulsory
to the start of another military regime under designation of religious identity in the form
Pervez Musharraf did not entail a revision of personal identity cards required in order to
of the country’s religious policy. The reli- be able to attend educational establishments,
gious community-based election system open bank accounts, vote, and obtain a pass-
only ended when General Musharraf, presi- port. Members of minority religious com-
dent from 2001-2008, abolished it in 2002. munities and some Muslim groups held joint
Furthermore, the period of parliamentary protests and succeeded in getting this resolu-
tion repealed.33
in pakistan, traditional Muslim laws apply
Pervez Musharraf, army chief of staff
to the members of other religious communities as
and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
the islamic nature of the state dictates. Committee, made an attempt to revise the
Islamization policy after the military coup of
democracy from 1988-1999 saw two attempts 1999. The revision aimed to make Pakistan a
to complete Pakistan’s transformation into an ‘democratic Islamic state’.34 This revision re-
Islamic state, both made while Nawaz Sharif sulted on January 16, 2002, in the decision
held the prime minister’s office (1990-1993 of the Martial Law Administrator, Pervez
and 1997-1999). In May 1991, President Musharraf, to abolish the separate electorate
Ghulam Ishaq Khan attempted to pass a bill system. At the same time a number of seats
declaring the Koran and Sunna the supreme were reserved for minority religious communi-
law of Pakistan. The draft law’s first paragraph ties, including the Ahmadiyya community.35
declared that nothing contained in this law The attempt to revise the sharia system of
should harm the personal rights, religious punishments introduced under Zia-ul-Haq
for crimes related to theft, sexual relations,
the main ideological forms through which islam’s drinking alcohol and gambling illustrates the
priority manifested itself were Muslim nationalism, restricted and contradictory nature of the
islamic socialism, and pakistani ideology, as well as authorities’ policy. Under Zia-ul-Haq, cases
various radical forms of islamic ideology. related to violations of morality and decency
were removed from civil court jurisdiction
freedom, customs and way of life of non- and placed under the jurisdiction of Muslim
Muslims.31 As in the case of the legal meas- courts, and traditional punishments for these
ures undertaken during Zia-ul-Haq’s rule, offenses were introduced. The Musharraf gov-
the bill aimed to restore morality to Pakistani ernment decided to repeal these laws. A bill
society and root out evils, such as violence, on women’s protection was drafted, abolish-
crime and corruption. The bill was approved ing Islamic punishments for women. Under
by the Senate but did not gain the required this bill, adultery ceased to be a matter for
number of votes in the National Assembly. An legal regulation altogether, and rape was
attempt was made in August 1998 to adopt shifted from sharia law to ordinary criminal
the Fifteenth Amendment to the constitu- law, which completely changed the judicial
tion, which would have made the Koran and procedures and conceptions of responsibility
Sunna, rather than the constitution, Pakistan’s for this crime. The victim no longer had to
ISLAM ANd ThE PAThS OF PAkISTAN’S POLITICAL dEVELOPMENT 9
present four male witnesses (without whom of ideology and bolstering the functional
she could be accused herself of having an un- role of state institutions, thus transforming
lawful sexual relationship, which sharia law an ideological state into a functional state.37
punished by death). The number of witnesses But constraints were imposed on this process
would be defined by the ordinary procedural after Musharraf stepped down as president
regulations. and a change in power took place in 2008.
The authors thought that the bill’s limited Politicians who played major roles during the
nature would not raise any real opposition parliamentary democracy period in the 1990s
from the Islamist parties, but debate on the are back on center stage, and so we can expect
bill in parliament showed that the authorities to see Islamic ideology on the rise once again.
had overstepped the line. The bill’s authors For the minorities this could mean, first of
were forced to agree to have it examined by all, that the divisions between religious com-
a commission of theologians, who affirmed munities in social and political life will stay
that traditional rules should have priority over in place, and second, that traditional Islamic
criminal law and stipulated that rape should laws will apply to them, too.
be dealt with using both sharia and crimi-
islam’s role often overshadows another factor
nal law. The bill was passed on December 1,
that is equally — if not more — important, namely
2006, with these changes.
It should be remembered, when discussing the ‘tangible’ nature of pakistan’s elite, in which
traditional Muslim law, that non-Muslims — hereditary landowning families and the leaders of
if they are accomplices in a crime — can also tribal clans and religious orders are very prominent.
be judged under these laws (the degree of
punishment varies depending on the crimi- Confirmation of these assumptions came
nal’s religious identity). This means that in with the agreement concluded on February 16,
Pakistan, traditional Muslim laws apply to 2009, between the government of the North-
the members of other religious communi- West Frontier Province and the extremist group
ties, as well, as the Islamic nature of the state Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi
dictates. At the same time, the division of (Movement for the Implementation of Sharia,
Pakistan’s religious communities into Muslim banned in 2002), which partly controlled the
and non-Muslim continues today. The law on province’s Malakand District. Under this agree-
Sikh marriages, passed on January 22, 2008, ment, sharia courts were given jurisdiction
regulating marriage, divorce and inheritance over all court cases in the district.38 Members
issues in the Sikh community, illustrates this of the provincial Legislative Assembly also
particular feature of Pakistan’s political and attempted to introduce sharia law in the
legal system.36 North-West Frontier Province in 2002 and
The process of transforming the Islamic re- 2006, but in both cases the laws they passed
public into an Islamic state, as described by were immediately ruled unconstitutional by
Lawrence Ziring, was still not complete. This Pakistan’s Supreme Court. Today, however,
explains why a number of the political and the agreement in the North-West Frontier
legal contradictions described above continue Province is seen by some in the government
to pose problems in Pakistan today. Following as a precedent that can be applied throughout
the period of parliamentary democracy, the Pakistan. Tourism Minister Atta-ur-Rahman,
development of Pakistan’s statehood could for example, a member of the Jamaat-e-ulema-
have changed direction by reducing the role e-Islam (Society of Muslim Theologians), wel-
10 BRIEFING [ VOL. 11 ISSUE 2 ]
comed the Malakand agreement, saying that and political life, especially in education, is
it opens the way to introducing sharia in all of not necessarily the ideal solution, as it would
Pakistan.39 The next step in this direction came lead to the rise of ethnic-nationalist Baluchi,
Pashtun and Sindh movements, which would
to paraphrase U.S. Defense Secretary Gates, we could only aggravate the problems of the country’s
say that it is impossible to solve pakistan’s problems unity, as was the case in the 1960s and 1970s
without solving Afghanistan’s problems. with the Bengali movement in East Pakistan.
Furthermore, the Islamic parties would see
with the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, signed by the authorities’ actions as an excellent pretext
President Asif Ali Zardari on April 14, 2009 for mobilizing mass support under the slogans
(he first sent it to the National Assembly for “Islam in danger” and “Pakistan in danger”.
approval, in order to demonstrate its legiti- Never in Pakistan’s history have these parties
macy to the world). Under the terms of this managed to win more than 11% of the vote
regulation, sharia courts, which were given ju- in elections,43 but such a turn of events could
risdiction over all cases, were established in a open the door for them to take power. Any
number of districts in the North-West Frontier experiments with Islam in Pakistan would
Province, including Malakand and Swat. Laws have unpredictable consequences.
deemed to contradict the Koran and Sunna A comprehensive approach, encompass-
ceased to have effect in these districts after the ing political, economic and social issues, is
law came into force.40 needed to solve the problems of underdevel-
oped democratic institutions and stop the
Beyond the usual models spread of terrorism and extremism. In this
Pakistan’s history shows that giving priority to context it should also be remembered that
Islam can be combined with a democratic sys- Islam’s role often overshadows another factor
tem of government, as well as with an author- that is equally — if not more — important,
itarian regime. The main ideological forms namely the closed ‘tangible’ of Pakistan’s elite,
through which Islam’s priority manifested in which hereditary landowning families and
itself were Muslim nationalism, Islamic social- the leaders of tribal clans and religious orders
ism, and Pakistani ideology,41 as well as radi- are very prominent.44 Pakistan’s current presi-
cal forms of Islamic ideology. Various combi- dent, Asif Ali Zardari, is the son of Hakim Ali
nations of these different forms with political Zardari, a big landowner from Sindh province
regimes gave birth to such ‘hybrid’ concepts as and chief of the Zardari tribal clan. Likewise,
non-liberal democracy in 1988-1999 and lib- prime minister Yousaf Raza Gillani is a de-
eral authoritarianism in 1999-2007,42 which, scendent of Sheikh Abdullah Qadira Gillani,
from the point of view of their conformity the founder of the Sufi Qadiri religious order.
to democratic principles, defy any black and Whether or not it is possible to turn Pakistan
white assessment. After Musharraf’s depar- into a functional state with such an elite is
ture from office in 2008, it is equally difficult also a question with no clear answer.
to apply the usual political science models to The external environment is also important
the current stage of Pakistan’s development. in this context. To paraphrase U.S. Defense
This means that attempts to resolve Secretary Gates, we could say that it is im-
Pakistan’s problems using these models are un- possible to solve Pakistan’s problems without
likely to be effective. In this situation, reduc- solving Afghanistan’s problems. Starting in
ing the role of Islam in various areas of social 1979, Pakistan has been bordering a war zone