Is the American Military's Fetish with Technology Harming Mission Accomplishment?

75 Pages·2015·0.9 MB·English

Form Approved
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of
information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
12-06-2015 Master’s Thesis 21-07-2014 to 12-06-2015
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

The Quest for Achilles’ Shield: Is the American Military’s 5b. GRANT NUMBER
Fetish with Technology Harming Mission Accomplishment?
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

Lieutenant Colonel Charles S. Armstrong, U.S. Army 5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT
Joint Forces Staff College
Joint Advanced Warfighting School
7800 Hampton Blvd
Norfolk, VA 23511-1702
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Not for Commercial Use without the express written permission of the author
14. ABSTRACT
United States combat operations and stability and support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed a number of strategic, operational and tactical-level
challenges. Chief among them was the effect the enemy’s use of IEDs had on United States and allied operations. The typical response to most
problems, with the possible exception of the surge of troops in both theaters, was technological. The technological efforts to counter the effects of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) met with mixed results. The development of dismounted mine detectors allowed Soldiers to identify IEDs, reducing
casualties while conducting dismounted operations. The addition of electronic jamming equipment, both vehicle-mounted and dismounted, reduced the
impact of IED attacks for these forces as well. While these technological solutions proved beneficial in the execution of assigned missions, the force
protection technologies were less effective. The Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) series of vehicles provided Soldiers with greatly increased
armored protection while conducting patrols and other combat operations. But solving this problem resulted in a vehicle that was too large to easily transit
the battlespace, had minimal troop carrying capability (depending on the variant), and further isolated the Soldier from the population. This technological
solution to the IED problem resulted in a series of vehicles that made the accomplishment of the primary mission, securing the population, more difficult.
This follows a trend in the United States of focusing primarily on technological solutions for every problem. Without a comprehensive and shared
understanding of the strategic and operational environment, the acquisition of technological solutions like the MRAP generate unforeseen second and
third order effects that negatively impact the ability of units to accomplish their mission.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Mission Creep, Siberian Intervention of 1918-1920, Combatant Command Planning
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE
OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Unclassified 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified Unlimited 49 (include area code)

757-443-6301
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

The Quest for Achilles’ Shield: Is the American Military’s
Fetish with Technology Harming Mission Accomplishment?
by
Charles S. Armstrong

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army
Not for Commercial Use without the express written permission of the author
This page intentionally left blank
THE QUEST FOR ACHILLES' SmELD:
IS THE AMERICAN MILITARY'S FETISH WITH TECHNOLOGY HARMING
MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT?
by
Charles S. Armstrong
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army
A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction
of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.
The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the
Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.
This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.
25 Feb 2015
Thesis Adviser:
Approved by:
Do Golden, Colonel, US Air Force
Committee Member
M. Antis, PhD.
Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting School
),1ot for Commercial Use without the express written pennission of the author
This page intentionally left blank

ii
ABSTRACT
United States combat operations and stability and support operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq revealed a number of strategic, operational and tactical-level challenges. Chief among them
was the effect the enemy’s use of IEDs had on United States and allied operations. The typical
response to most problems, with the possible exception of the surge of troops in both theaters,
was technological. The technological efforts to counter the effects of improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) met with mixed results. The development of dismounted mine detectors allowed
Soldiers to identify IEDs, reducing casualties while conducting dismounted operations. The
addition of electronic jamming equipment, both vehicle-mounted and dismounted, reduced the
impact of IED attacks for these forces as well. While these technological solutions proved
beneficial in the execution of assigned missions, the force protection technologies were less
effective. The Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) series of vehicles provided Soldiers
with greatly increased armored protection while conducting patrols and other combat operations.
But solving this problem resulted in a vehicle that was too large to easily transit the battlespace,
had minimal troop carrying capability (depending on the variant), and further isolated the Soldier
from the population. This technological solution to the IED problem resulted in a series of
vehicles that made the accomplishment of the primary mission, securing the population, more
difficult. This follows a trend in the United States of focusing primarily on technological
solutions for every problem. Without a comprehensive and shared understanding of the strategic
and operational environment, the acquisition of technological solutions like the MRAP generate
unforeseen second and third order effects that negatively impact the ability of units to
accomplish their mission.

iii
This page intentionally left blank

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION…...………………………………………………………1
CHAPTER 2: METHODS…………………………………………………………………..6
Technological Determinism Paradigm………………………………………………7
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)..……………...10
Defeat the Network……….…………………………………………………………12
Train the Force…………………..…………………………………………………..13
Defeat the Device…….. ……………………………………………………………14
CHAPTER 3: MRAP PROLIFERATION…………………………………………………18
Casualties, COIN Politics, and the MRAP…………...……………………………..19
MRAP Acquisition Process…………………………………………………………23
Sustainment Woes: “Six and Twelve” Effects……………………………….…….25
Additional Parts Sold Separately……………………………………………………27
Off-the-Shelf System Blinders….…………………………………………………..30
User Input Not Required……….…………………………………………………....31
Training Not Included……….……………………………………………………....37
Sticker Price…...……………………………………………………………………40
CHAPTER 4: FINAL ANALYSIS…………………………………………………………44
Proving a Negative: MRAP Saves Lives?.................................................................45
The Future of the MRAP……………………………………………………………49
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………….53
Beware Technological Solutions……………………………………………………54
Mythological Quests………………………………………………………………..56
Maintaining Advantage…………………………………………………….............57
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………….61
v
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: MRAP Variants by Manufacturer and Service……………………………………26
Table 2: Estimated GFE Unit Cost Per Vehicle…………………………………………….28
Table 3: MRAP Vehicle Characteristics with Other Combat Vehicle Specifications……...33
Table 4: Cost of MRAP by Variant with Other Combat Vehicle Costs……………………42
Table 5: Percentage of IED-caused Fatalities in Iraq……………………………………….47

vi