Is Russia Fascist?: Unraveling Propaganda East and West

265 Pages·2021·3.455 MB·English

by  Marlene Laruelle

IS RUS SIA FASCIST?

IS RUSS IA
FASCIST?
Unraveling Propaganda East and West
Marlene Laruelle
CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON
Copyright © 2021 by Cornell University
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts
thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from
the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512
East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress
.c ornell. e du.
First published 2021 by Cornell University Press
Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Names: Laruelle, Marlène, author.
Title: Is Rus sia fascist? : unraveling propaganda east and west / Marlene Laruelle.
Description: Ithaca [New York] : Cornell University Press, 2021. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020022432 (print) | LCCN 2020022433 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781501754135 (hardback) | ISBN 9781501754142 (epub) |
ISBN 9781501754159 (pdf)
Subjects: LCSH: Fascism— Russia (Federation) | Po liti cal culture— Russia
(Federation) | Ideology— Russia (Federation) | Rus sia (Federation)— Foreign
public opinion. | Rus sia (Federation)— Politics and government—1991– |
Russ ia (Federation)—F oreign relations—E urope. | Europe—F oreign
relations— Russia (Federation)
Classification: LCC DK510.763 .L374 2021 (print) | LCC DK510.763 (ebook) |
DDC 320.53/30947— dc23
LC rec ord available at https:// lccn . loc . gov / 2020022432
LC ebook rec ord available at https:// lccn . loc . gov / 2020022433
Contents
Acknowl edgments vii
Introduction: Rus sia and the Symbolic Landscape of Fascism 1
1. Rus sia’s “Fascism” or “Illiberalism”? 10
2. The Soviet Legacy in Thinking about Fascism 28
3. Antifascism as the Renewed Social Consensus under Putin 43
4. International Memory Wars: Equating the
Soviet Union with Nazism 62
5. The Putin Regime’s Ideological Plurality 84
6. Rus sia’s Fascist Thinkers and Doers 100
7. Rus sia’s Honeymoon with the Eu ro pean Far Right 121
8. Why the Rus sian Regime Is Not Fascist 138
Conclusion: Rus sia’s Memory and the F uture of Eu rope 157
Notes 167
Bibliography 211
Index 251

Acknowle dgments
I owe a special debt of gratitude to the former director of George Washington Uni-
versity’s Institute for Eu ro pean, Rus sian, and Eurasian Studies (IERES), Peter
Rollberg, who was the first to push me to look at “fascism” as a semantic space,
and to the w hole institute for being such a collegial place in supporting its scholars’
research interests.
I could not have completed this book without the incredible intellectual input
I received on a first draft of the manuscript during an IERES/PONARS “book in-
cubator” workshop and from presenting a summarizing chapter at the DC Area
Postcommunist Politics Social Science Workshop. Paul Goode, Henry Hale,
Stephen Hanson, Charles King, Maria Mälksoo, Robert Otto, Peter Rollberg,
Anton Shekhovtsov, Kathleen Smith, Gerard Toal, Nina Tumarkin, Andreas
Umland, Aleksandr Verkhovsky, and Sufian Zhemukhov all helped me to recon-
sider and reshape the entire manuscript, including the main argument.
I also extend my gratitude to Roger M. Haydon at Cornell University Press and
the two reviewers who provided substantive guidance on the manuscript. Dylan
Royce and John Chrobak assisted me in finalizing this research and polished
the bibliography, and Ellen Powell, Emily Herring, Ann Robertson, and Caleb
Crawford provided much-n eeded editing assistance.
Last but not least, my sincerest gratitude and tribute go to my husband, who
offered me emotional and intellectual sustenance during the writing pro cess,
showing unwavering faith in the proj ect and guiding me through many of the
book’s conclusions.
vii

Introduction
RUS SIA AND THE SYMBOLIC
LANDSCAPE OF FASCISM
In January 2020, the commemoration of the seventy-fi fth anniversary of the lib-
eration of the Auschwitz camp was unexpectedly overshadowed by memory
wars between Rus sia, Poland, and Ukraine over the interpretation of the Second
World War. President Zelensky sided with the Polish interpretation of the war’s ori-
gins and supported the parallel between Nazism and communism, stating, “Poland
and the Polish p eople w ere the first to feel the collusion of totalitarian regimes. This
resulted in the outbreak of the Second World War and allowed the Nazis to launch
the deadly Holocaust.”1 This declaration deeply shocked the Rus sian public;
Putin and the whole po liti cal establishment virulently denounced not only the
idea of paralleling communism with Nazism under the “totalitarianism” label
but also the attempt to make Rus sia and its pre de ces sor, the Soviet Union,
responsible— even indirectly— for the Holocaust.
A few weeks before t hese clashes, in an hour-l ong history lecture, the Russ ian
president, blaming the Polish minister of foreign affairs in 1939, Józef Lipski
(describing him as “a scumbag and an anti-S emitic pig”), accused Poland of hav-
ing colluded with Hitler, supported the deportation of Jews, and therefore con-
tributed to the outbreak of the Second World War.2 At the Victory Parade of May 9,
2019, Putin has already warned: “ Today, we see how a number of countries are
deliberately distorting war events, and how t hose who, forgetting honor and h uman
dignity, served the Nazis, are now being glorified, and how shamelessly they lie
to their children and betray their ancestors. Our sacred duty is to protect the real
heroes.”3 In June 2020, a lengthy article was published in National Interest whereby
1