Irish Neutrality and the USA, 1939-47 PDF
Preview Irish Neutrality and the USA, 1939-47
HAN | NEUTRALITY and the USA Although a neutral country of barely three million people, Ireland figured prominently in the diplomacy of World War II. It was believed that naval bases in Ireland were vital to Britain’s war effort and to communications across the Atlantic. The decision taken by Eamon de Valera’s government in 1939 to keep Ireland neutral outraged British opinion and angered Hitler’s enemies in other countries, particularly the USA. Irish Neutrality and the USA 1939-47 casts new light on the conduct of Ireland’s wartime policy of neutrality. The book describes de Valera’s efforts to gain support for Irish neutrality in the USA and examines American press views on the question, together with the activities of Irish-American pressure groups. The book also shows how Churchill appealed to Roosevelt’s administration to use its influence with Irish-Americans, in the hope that de Valera would then be pressed into joining the war. The Dublin government, in reply, began to involve itself in American domestic politics. It enlisted the support of prominent isolationists, many of them Irish-American opponents of Roosevelt, for the Irish position. Inevitably relations between Dublin and Washington became strained. Dr Dwyer draws extensively on the correspondence and papers of President Roosevelt and David Gray, the United States representative in Dublin during the war years and a confidant of the American President. The book reveals the enormous pressures brought to bear on de Valera to join the Allies, ranging from suggestions of active American support for reunification with Northern Ireland to threats of (continued on back flap) et Contents ix PREFACE . NEUTRAL BY NECESSITY De Valera and the coming of World War II . FROM NON-INTERVENTION TO WAR Roosevelt, the Irish-Americans and the World Crisis September 1939—December 1941 24 . DAVID GRAY, THE USA AND PARTITION De Valera refuses to bargain with Irish Neutrality March—July 1940 47 . THREATENING THE BELLIGERENTS The small neutral and the Great Powers April-November 1940 66 . THE SCREWS ARE TIGHTENED Irish ports and the Battle of the Atlantic November 1940—March 1941 85 . THE AIKEN MISSION TO USA The seeds of future discord March—June 1941 107 . NEUTRALS AT ODDS US-Irish relations in the months before Pearl Harbour May-—December 1941 122 contents continued 8. THE UNITED STATES ENTERS THE WAR American troops in Northern Ireland December 1941-—October 1942 139 9. TOSEEK OR NOT TO SEEK THE IRISH PORTS? Irish threats to the Anglo-American alliance October 1942—December 1943 160 10. AXIS REPRESENTATIVES IN DUBLIN The ‘American Note’ and de Valera’s refusal to expel them December 1943—June 1944 179 11. THE BITTER END June 1944—June 1947 201 12. CONCLUSION Upstaging the Playboy of the Western World 211 NOTES 222 GLOSSARY 231 INDEX 237 Preface THOUGH a neutral country of barely three million people, Ireland nevertheless figured prominently in the diplomacy of the Second World War. Initially this was because the British thought that Irish bases were important to the Allied war effort. On 20 September 1939, for example, shortly before he took up his post as Britain’s wartime representative to Ireland, Sir John Maffey candidly told Eamon de Valera, the Irish leader, that if Irish ports became vital, then Britain would seize them. ‘But,’ he admitted, ‘we must think twice and count the gain and the loss.’ During the early years of the war, therefore, de Valera’s policy was to convince Britain that seizing Irish facilities would cause more trouble than they were worth. He did this by making subtle appeals to the United States in such a way as to convince the London government that Irish-Americans might undermine American aid for Britain, if Britain violated Irish neutrality. Winston Churchill countered by appealing to the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt to use its influence to get the Irish- Americans to put pressure on Dublin to allow Britain to use Irish ports. When British efforts began to meet with some success and the American news media called on de Valera to facilitate the British, the Dublin government resorted to less subtle methods and began involving itself directly in American politics by associ- ating with prominent American isolationists and appealing openly for Irish-American help. The diplomatic manoeuvring thus led to a situation in which Dublin was trying to get Ameri- cans to support Irish neutrality while the American leadership was seeking to get Ireland to abandon neutrality. Under these conditions relations between the two governments inevitably became strained. x Trish Neutrality and the USA One of the central characters in those relations was the United States Minister, David Gray, who was probably the most influen- tial diplomat ever to serve in Ireland. Connected with the Roosevelt family by marriage, he had access to the highest Allied counsels and had private wartime discussions on Ireland with such people as Roosevelt, Hull, Churchill, Attlee, Eden, and even de Gaulle. Believing that the United States should provide Britain with all the help necessary to defeat Hitler, Gray worked diligently to secure facilities for the British in Ireland. He begged, bribed, and flattered de Valera, but to no avail. Then turning sour, he warned, threatened, and schemed against Irish neutrality, going so far as to suggest to the White House contingency plans to starve, bomb, and even invade Ireland. Eventually the American Minister used his influence to mastermind a plan to discredit de Valera because he thought the Irish leader posed a threat to postwar peace and stability. A detailed study of Gray’s actions, based mainly on his volu- minous wartime correspondence with Roosevelt, reveals the enor- mity of the task facing de Valera as he successfully sought to keep Ireland out of the Second World War. It also reveals that even before entering the conflict, the United States played a vital—if somewhat reluctant—role in helping de Valera to preserve neutrality. For, in the last analysis, it was not the Irish Army but American public opinion which afforded Ireland the most effec- tive protection against the British and to a lesser extent against the Germans. As a result Irish neutrality cannot be properly understood unless seen within the context of American politics and against the background of the role played by Irish-Americans in those politics, because Irish-Americans not only helped to mollify the German threat to Ireland, but also played a vital part in convincing the British government that it had more to lose than gain by violating Irish neutrality. My interest in United States relations with Ireland developed quite by chance on coming across documentary material while ’ partaking in a seminar on American diplomatic history. Being an American citizen who had lived in Ireland for fifteen years and being the son of a United States Army officer who was killed in Europe during the war, I developed a natural curiosity in the wartime relations between the United States and Ireland. Preface xi Previously my only exposure to recent Irish history had been in connection with my master’s thesis, which concerned events surrounding the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. In it I was critical of the role played by de Valera, so in this study of Irish neutrality I have not been attracted to that particular dynamism of his personality that has enchanted so many people in both Ireland and the United States, nor have I been impressed by his neutral ‘policies on account of any misgivings about American involve- ment in the Second World War. For, even though I believe that the United States of America has engaged in some misguided wars, she was never more right than in the fight against Hitler. I would like to thank all those who have helped me, especially those mentioned in the notes who answered my letters, with particular thanks going to Mr Paul O’Dwyer of New York and Mr Kevin Boland of Dublin for enclosing some very useful material. I would also like to thank the members of my family, my brother, Dr Sean Dwyer in Racine, Wisconsin, who secured research material for me; my aunt and uncle, Dr and Mrs J. N. Hassett in Medicine Hat, Canada; and Dr and Mrs Aidan Kennedy who were kind hosts on my frequent visits to Dublin. In addition, I would like to thank Ronnie H. King in Dallas, Texas, for forwarding research material to me and for checking on sources. TRD Tralee October, 1976
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