Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition

196 Pages·2004·0.79 MB·English

by  Faisal bin Salman al-Saud

iran, saudi arabia and the gulf

Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
Power Politics in Transition 1968–1971
Faisal bin Salman al-Saud
Published in 2003 by I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd
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Copyright © 2003 Faisal bin Salman al-Saud
The right of Faisal bin Salman al-Saud to be identified as the author of this work has been
asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988.
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof,
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without the prior written permission of the publisher.
ISBN 1 86064 881 9
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Typeset in Minion by Hepton Books, Oxford
Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books, Bodmin.
Contents
List of Maps and Tables vi
Preface vii
Acknowledgements xii
1 The Historical Setting 1
2 The 16 January Decision: Britain, the United States and Iran 10
3 From Gunboat Diplomacy to Compromise 29
4 The Nixon Doctrine: Iran and the Gulf 57
5 The Insoluble Disputes 78
6 The Final Year 106
7 Epilogue 125
Notes 130
Bibliography 168
Index 174
List of Maps and Tables
Maps
Map 1 The 1968 Final Offshore Boundary Line Agreed Between
Saudi Arabia and Iran 43
Map 2 The Strait of Hormuz 82
Map 3 Abu Musa: 1971 Administrative Line Dividing the
Northern (Iranian) and Southern (Sharjah) Sectors 118
Tables
Table 1 Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia: Military Manpower 73
Table 2 The Iranian Defence Budget,1968–1972 74
Table 3 Iranian Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of GNP 74
Table 4 Arms Transfer Agreements and Deliveries under the
Foreign Military Sales Programme 75
Preface
Historians often look for events which provide the punctuation marks of history.
It can be argued that the British government’s decision in 1968 to withdraw forces
from the Gulf by 1971 was a turning point of this kind. For reasons of Imperial
strategic interest the Gulf was one of the first areas Britain controlled in the Mid-
dle East; for domestic political and economic reasons it was the last from which
Britain was to depart. The long history of British presence guaranteed the Gulf a
prolonged stability unmatched elsewhere in the Middle East, and delayed the rise
of historical, political and territorial disputes among countries on both sides of
the waterway. At the same time it delayed the development of the small Arab emir-
ates into independent political entities.
The Pax Britannica collapsed in 1968; in the space of four years a viable state
had to be carved out of scattered emirates along the Arab coast and borders de-
fined; regional players had to find rules of common coexistence; and the nature of
external-regional relations had to be redefined. For the first time in modern his-
tory the Gulf was to become an autonomous sub-region in international politics.
The manner in which these issues were resolved continues to be, in some cases, a
source of instabilities and conflict to the present day.
In the Gulf there was no world power waiting to succeed Britain. The United
States was preoccupied with the Vietnam war, and the Soviet Union made no
serious attempt to expand its influence in the region beyond Iraq and South Yemen.
The USSR took account of the interests of its oil-producing allies, especially Iraq,
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v i i i iran, saudi arabia and the gulf
in maintaining their trade with the West, and America’s sensitivity to the potential
disruption of energy supplies. Hence, it developed a cautious and largely non-
provocative policy aimed at developing long-term economic and political gains in
the Gulf region.1 As a result, Gulf politics ‘went local’ and reflected the regional
balance of power, with Iran as the dominant player.
Existing literature on the subject tends to focus on the role played by external
powers, mainly Britain, and treats the period 1968–1971 as the final episode of
the British Empire in the Middle East.2 Works looking at the period from the local
powers’ perspective remain relatively scarce.3 The fact is, however, that at a time
when British power was in decline the superpowers never established unques-
tioned dominance or control over the region.4 In such circumstances, as this book
argues, a better understanding of the new Gulf order can be achieved by empha-
sising local concerns and the degree to which regional powers influenced external
powers’ Gulf policy in those formative years.
The regional balance of power in the late 1960s and early 1970s calls for a focus
on Iran’s role. Iran was by far the largest Gulf state. By the late 1960s it had a
population of around 26 million, nearly 17 million more than the second largest
state, Iraq. From the mid-1960s it had engaged in an extensive military build-up
which exceeded those of its nearest regional rivals, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Iran
also had a rapidly growing economy supported from the early 1970s by increasing
oil prices. In other words, Iran was, of all the local powers, in the best position to
convert its national resources into strong political influence in the region.
Two unique situations developed as a result: first Iran, which since its re-emer-
gence as a centralised state under the Safavids had been surrounded by imperial
powers (Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Britain), or by states with substantial
territory (Afghanistan and Iraq), for the first time in 1968 had neighbouring coun-
tries much smaller in size and possessing a great deal less power. Second, with its
increasing military and economic capabilities, Iran was able to look for a security
role beyond its territorial boundaries.
This new configuration poses two interrelated questions: first how did Iran
handle its regional relations given that it had little experience in direct dealing
with lower Gulf Arabs apart from Saudi Arabia? Second, how did Iran influence
efforts to reorder the Gulf’s political landscape?
From these principle questions this book seeks to clarify how Iran’s Gulf policy
was conducted and the diplomatic tools used to achieve policy goals, taking into
consideration Iran’s own interests, the regional environment, and interaction with
the international system. It was often said by Iranian officials that Iran’s interest in
preface ix
the Gulf was in playing a ‘leading role’. The term ‘leading role’ is elastic and spelt
out can mean any of the following: a favourable settlement of territorial disputes,
taking over military defence duties, playing a leading diplomatic role, or strongly
influencing oil politics.
Thus, Iranian aims will be viewed in the context of an interplay between its
ambitions and the regional-international environments. At the regional level Iran
was entering unknown political terrain as the Shah’s government was unsure of
Arab reaction to its Gulf policy. At the international level it is argued here that the
US had less influence on Iran than is often believed; rather, Iran applied its tradi-
tional policy of playing one world power against the other. In the past such policy
was chosen to maximise Iran’s territorial integrity. This time the aim was to win
support for a long-awaited regional role.
The book begins when the long-standing British order starts to collapse in the
second half of the 1960s. Chapter I discusses the factors which led to the British
decision to withdraw its forces from east of Suez by 1971 and the international
setting at the time of the decision. It stresses the impact of the domestic political
and economic factors which changed Britain’s international position under Wil-
son’s Labour government. This chapter also pays attention to the American position
and the difficulties the Lyndon B. Johnson administration faced in dealing with
rising international challenges during the Vietnam war, as a consequence of which
the US pressed Britain to maintain its Gulf position and refused to take over its
role as guardian of the Gulf. The final section deals with the Iranian position,
which changed as a result of three trends: Iran’s growing national power; the de-
cline of British power; and America’s decision not to succeed Britain.
Chapter 2 focuses on the Iranian reaction to proposals for the future of the
Gulf during the first year of British withdrawal. Although Iran had interests in the
Gulf the main theme of this chapter is that in 1968 Iran did not have a policy in
place to protect those interests. The Iranian government had very little experience
in dealing directly with the Gulf Arab rulers, and the Arab reaction to its claims in
the Gulf was not fully anticipated. Iran began by taking a hard stance on its imme-
diate territorial claims, mainly Bahrain, and strongly opposed the formation of
the proposed Federation of Arab Emirates. However, it gradually modified its po-
sition and reached an accommodation with Saudi Arabia, which led to bilateral
territorial settlements with the Saudi Kingdom known as the Continental-Shelf
Agreement. The historical claim to Bahrain was dropped in January 1969. Long-
term questions over regional co-operation and the Iranian claim to the Hormuz
islands were left unanswered.