Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War

226 Pages·2004·2.444 MB·English

by  Lawrence G. Potter, Gary G. Sick (eds.)

Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War
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Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War
EDITED BY
LAWRENCE G. POTTER AND GARY G. SICK
IRAN,IRAQ,ANDTHELEGACIESOFWAR
© LawrenceG.Potter and Gary G.Sick,2004.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2004 978-1-4039-6450-2
All rights reserved.No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any
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quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.
First published 2004 by
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ISBN 978-1-4039-7609-3 ISBN 978-1-4039-8042-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781403980427
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Iran,Iraq,and the legacies of war/edited by Lawrence G.Potter and Gary G.Sick.
p.cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1.Iran-Iraq War,1980–1988—Influence—Congresses.2.Iran-Iraq War,
1980–1988—Atrocities—Congresses.3.Middle East—Relations—United
States—Congresses.4.United States—Relations —Middle East—Congresses.
I.Potter,Lawrence G.II.Sick,Gary,1935–
DS318.85.I635 2004
955.05(cid:1)42—dc22 2004040009
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd.,Chennai,India.
First edition:November,2004.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Introduction 1
Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick
1. The Troubled Relationship: Iran and Iraq, 1930–80 11
Shaul Bakhash
2. Position, Function, and Symbol: The Shatt al-Arab
Dispute in Perspective 29
Richard Schofield
3. Between Iraq and a Hard Place: The Kurdish Predicament 71
M.R. Izady
4. The Antinomies of Iran’s War Generation 101
Farideh Farhi
5. The War Generation in Iraq: A Case of Failed
Etatist Nationalism 121
Faleh A. Jabar
6. Iraqi Shi‘i Politics 141
Laith Kubba
7. Outsiders as Enablers: Consequences and Lessons
from International Silence on Iraq’s Use of Chemical
Weapons during the Iran–Iraq War 151
Joost R. Hiltermann
8. The Gulf States and the Iran–Iraq War: Pattern
Shifts and Continuities 167
Gerd Nonneman
9. The U.S. Role: Helpful or Harmful? 193
Rosemary Hollis
Contributors 213
Index 217
Introduction
Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick
The Persian Gulf states, and indeed the entire Middle East, were profoundly affected
by the Iran–Iraq War that raged from 1980 to 1988 and its sequels, the Gulf War of
1990–91 and the war against Iraq in 2003.1The first war was immensely destructive
in terms of lives and infrastructure. It set back the development of both Iran and Iraq
for perhaps a generation, inflamed ethnic and religious tensions, and raised the level
of distrust in the region to new levels. The wars together focused international atten-
tion on the Gulf and led the United States to an unprecedented level of involvement
there, beginning with the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in 1987, continuing in the
dispatch of over half a million American troops to oust the Iraqi army from Kuwait
in 1991, and culminating in the campaign against Iraq.
The Gulf/2000 project has, over the past decade, brought together citizens of the
Persian Gulf states to explore their mutual concerns and to seek ways to improve
personal contact and understanding.2In this case, Iranians and Iraqis were invited—for
the first time, we believe—to join a few “outsiders” for a discussion of how the Iran–Iraq
War affected the personal lives and politics of their respective countries and the region.
This book is based on papers presented at that meeting—the ninth international con-
ference organized by the project—from October 22 to October 26, 2001, in Bellagio,
Italy.3These papers, now revised and updated, help clarify the evolution of relations
between Iran and Iraq—how they developed historically, how they rapidly deteriorated
when war broke out in 1980, and the issues that must be addressed in the context of
future rapprochement. Those issues are likely to be amplified and given greater urgency
by the fall of the Saddam Hussein government in the spring of 2003. The conference
also examined the role of the United States in the region and its effect on the two states,
a subject that has also been cast in sharper relief by subsequent events.
The idea for the meeting was to begin to work out a road map for reconciliation
between the two states, in light of the “cold peace” that had prevailed since the end
of hostilities in 1988. Over the past century, and particularly over the past 25 years,
Iranians and Iraqis were much more likely to meet on the battlefield or in rancorous
negotiations than they were to join in a setting that permitted, let alone encouraged,
a reasoned discussion of their mutual suspicions and interests. We were therefore
pleased to discover that there was a genuine interest on the part of scholars and
officials from both countries to meet their counterparts and begin a dialogue that
could help to shape future relations. The unresolved tension between Iran and Iraq
is one of the most serious potential flashpoints in the future, and the healthy coexis-
tence (or hostility) of these two states is certain to have a profound influence on the
stability and well-being of the Persian Gulf region and the entire Middle East.
2 Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick
The discussions left no doubt that both Iran and Iraq had suffered greatly because
of the war and its aftermath, and that numerous issues arising from this conflict,
both internal and external, urgently needed to be addressed. People in both states felt
a profound sense of victimization, by the international community no less than their
adversary. War in the Middle East has the capacity to transform states and societies,
and the Iran–Iraq War was a dramatic case in point.4 As a new Middle East takes
shape in the wake of the latest war, harmonious relations between Iran and Iraq will
be critical to regional stability.
This groundbreaking conference demonstrated that enough time has passed since
the Iran–Iraq War so that reconciliation can be envisioned, as happened between the
United States and Vietnam or with the Soviet Union. A public debate about these
issues has just begun in Iran, and may soon get underway in the new Iraq. After so
much deceit, confidence-building measures are essential so people can begin to learn
to trust. The path to peace and reconciliation has been hindered in Iraq by the sup-
pression of Iraqi society by the Saddam Hussein government, and in Iran by the con-
tinuing domestic struggle between the reformers who first elected Mohammad
Khatami as president in 1997 and the conservatives ranged in opposition.
A War Without Winners
As noted in Chapter 1 by historian Shaul Bakhash, the war between Iran and Iraq
was not a continuation of previous disputes but a new kind of total warfare with a
strong ideological component. The Iran–Iraq War was one of the longest and costli-
est conventional wars of the twentieth century. Iraq, responding to Iranian provoca-
tions and hoping to enlarge its role in the Gulf, had started what it thought would
be a short, victorious war against its neighbor, which was in the throes of revolution.
It soon became apparent that this was a mistake of historic proportions. Iranians
rallied behind their leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and repelled the Iraqi
invaders in 1982. The war then settled into a bloody stalemate between the smaller
but heavily armed Iraq and Iran, which was ostracized by the world but sustained by
ideological fervor. From the beginning, the war was overshadowed by intense
personal hostility between Khomeini and Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi president.
When the war ended, neither side had achieved its war aims and each felt that out-
side powers had cheated it out of victory. Iraq did not bring down the revolutionary
government in Iran, and Iran did not foment revolution in Iraq. The leaders of both
countries were still in power and their troops, with minor exceptions, were within their
own borders. The number of casualties is still in dispute, with an estimated 400,000
killed and perhaps 700,000 wounded on both sides.5The Economistcommented that
“This was a war that should never have been fought...neither side gained a thing,
except the saving of its own regime. And neither regime was worth the sacrifice.”6
The Iran–Iraq War was an anomaly for the Middle East because it was the first
time the superpowers were on the same side. This partly resulted from Soviet preoc-
cupation with their own internal problems. Although the United States and the
Soviet Union professed neutrality, both in fact aided Iraq—the Soviet Union with
Introduction 3
arms, and the United States with economic, diplomatic, and intelligence support.
The main reason for Western involvement in the war was to protect oil exports.
Paradoxically, although there were short-term fluctuations, the price of oil did not go
up but remained depressed, despite the war on shipping in the Gulf. The superpow-
ers’ cooperation paved the war for greater unity during the Gulf War, and for a
similarly important UN role in ending it.7
Legacy of War
In both Iran and Iraq, but especially in the latter, the conflict and the demonization
of the opponent led to a stronger sense of national identity. Iran’s calculation that the
Shi‘i majority in southern Iraq would rally to its cause and Iraq’s conviction that
theArab citizens in Khuzistan would welcome the Iraqi army as their liberators were
both wrong. The war helped the revolutionary government in Tehran consolidate
power and distracted attention from pressing social and economic problems. Indeed,
it was only when the leadership feared the revolution was in danger that Khomeini
decided to “drink poison” by accepting the UN ceasefire proposal that had been on
the table for a year. In Iraq, as noted elsewhere by Isam al-Khafaji, war and war
preparation became normal as a social condition and a system of government, and
was used to legitimate the regime and redefine Iraqi national identity.8
It was clear from the Bellagio conference, some of whose participants played wartime
roles, that the conflict left a legacy of bitterness and suspicion on both sides that will be
difficult to overcome. Just as the United States had a “Vietnam generation,” which has
taken decades to come to terms with that conflict, so Iran and Iraq both have a war gen-
eration that has not seriously been able to assess their experience, nor have they success-
fully transmitted knowledge of it to the younger generation. The role of this generation
in each country is addressed in path-breaking evaluations (chapters 4 and 5) by Iranian
political scientist Farideh Farhi and by Iraqi sociologist Faleh A. Jabar.
As recounted in chapter 4 by Dr. Farhi, Iran is in the early stages of a debate about
the war. 9The ruling elite today is made up to a large degree of war veterans, some
of whom have sought to keep its memory alive to justify present political actions.
Indeed, many are unhappy that the government has appropriated the war’s legacy to
solidify its own power. The roots of the distinctions between “reformers” and “con-
servatives,” in fact, go back to the war. An examination of issues such as why the gov-
ernment continued fighting after liberating occupied territory in 1982 could be very
divisive and harm the reputations of wartime leaders still politically prominent, such
as Mr. Rafsanjani.10
In Iraq, by contrast, there was no consensus as to why Iraqis were fighting until
the need for self-defense became predominant. There is still little debate about the
war, although bitterness exists that Saddam Hussein rapidly acquiesced to Iran’s
territorial demands in the Shatt al-Arab—a major rationale for the war—on the eve
of the second Gulf conflict. The tortured history of this boundary dispute is
admirably illuminated here by geographer Richard Schofield (chapter 2). In Iraq, the
crisis of the “war generation” runs much deeper since there was no time in between
4 Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick
the first two wars to recover. The conclusion of all three wars has been profoundly
painful and disconcerting for Iraqis.
Clash of Cultures
One reason for the persistence of bilateral tensions is that the clash of cultures and
poisonous rhetoric that was fired up by the Iran–Iraq War has not subsided.11Aside
from the military encounter, the countries waged a fierce struggle on the ideological
and propaganda fronts. They invoked several broad themes: Arab against Persian,
Sunni against Shi‘i, and pan-Arabism against pan-Islam. The region has lived with
the tensions arising from these differences for more than a millennium. They did not
cause the war, but served to reinforce mutual hostility.
Iraq is a country mainly populated by Arabs who speak Arabic, a Semitic
language. Iran has an Aryan heritage, and its official language, Persian, is an Indo-
European tongue. Persians have often regarded their cultural legacy as richer than
that of the Arabs, although their religion, Islam, was founded by Arabs and their holy
book, the Qur’an, was revealed in Arabic. During the war, Iraq emphasized its Arab
identity and characterized the Persian enemy as “racist” and resentful.12 Saddam’s
government promoted the idea that the Arabs were the rightful leaders of Islam,
whereas Khomeini and his government were imposters, apostates, even
Zoroastrians.13Iraq consistently invoked the Arab geographical lexicon—such as in
references to the “Arabian” not “Persian” Gulf, and to “Arabistan,” the former name
of the southwest Iranian province of Khuzistan.
The pan-Arabism of the Iraqi government was opposed to the pan-Islamic vision of
the Iranian revolutionary leadership. Iraq, governed by a Sunni Arab minority, stressed
its ties with other Arab countries in hopes of support against internal and external
threats. Iraq emphasized that it represented and was defending the whole family of Arab
nations in the war with Iran. Khomeini, on the other hand, believed that Islamic soli-
darity was more important than nationalism, and that Islamic unity should take prece-
dence over present-day political frontiers.14Iran believed it had a special responsibility
to liberate Muslims, especially in Iraq, from their insufficiently “Islamic” governments.
The terminology of the war is instructive for the perceptions and attitudes it
reveals. The conflict is known in the west as the Iran–Iraq War or the Gulf War—
terms that focus on the strategic importance of the region. The combatants them-
selves, however, used terminology rich in religious symbolism and colored by
suspicions of conspiracy. In a bid to attract Arab support, Iraq called the conflict
“Saddam’s Qadisiyya,” a reference to the Arab defeat of the Persians in the seventh
century A.D. Iran refers to it as the “imposed war,” based on the belief that the United
States, humiliated by the hostage affair, encouraged Iraq to attack.15
Issues for the Future
While tensions resulting from mutual misperceptions and ethnic and religious dif-
ferences will be slow to dissipate, a number of specific issues arising from the war