Interoperability of US and NATO Allied Air Forces

135 Pages·2003·0.74 MB·English

R
Interoperability of U.S. and
NATO Allied Air Forces:
Supporting Data and Case
Studies
Eric Larson, Gustav Lindstrom, Myron Hura,
Ken Gardiner, Jim Keffer, Bill Little
Prepared for the
United States Air Force
Project AIR FORCE
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under
Contract F49642-96-C-0001. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic
Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Interoperability of U.S. and NATO allied air forces : supporting data and case studies /
Eric Larson ... [et al.].
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
“MR-1603.”
ISBN 0-8330-3287-9 (pbk.)
1. United States Air Force. 2. Air forces—Europe. 3. Combined operations (Military
science) 4. North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Armed Forces. I. Larson, Eric, 1957–
UG633 .I585 2003
358.4'146—dc21
2002152425
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iii
Preface
To help the U.S. Air Force identify potential interoperability problems that might
arise in NATO alliance operations or U.S.–allied coalition operations with NATO
allies over the next decade, and to suggest nonmateriel and technology-based
solution directions to mitigate any identified potential shortfalls, this report
provides background information used in a larger Project AIR FORCE study
entitled Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations.
The focus of that study was on command, control, communications, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) systems and on out-of-NATO-area
operations.
The present report provides additional supporting analytic material for the larger
study’s final report:
Myron Hura et al., Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air
Operations, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-1235-AF, 2000.
This material includes a data-based historical overview of the U.S. experience in
coalition operations up to 1999; a selection of case studies used to identify
common interoperability challenges encountered in coalition operations; and
relevant lessons to be drawn for improving the interoperability of U.S. and
NATO air and C3ISR capabilities. The research was completed in early 1999, and
although some discussion of Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo was added,
no further efforts were made to update the material with detailed information on
more recent operations. The report is being published in the belief that the
information it contains may be of lasting value to scholars, researchers, and
policymakers.1
The research was co-sponsored by the Air Force Director of Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (USAF/XOI), the Air Force Director of
Command and Control (USAF/XOC), and the commander of the Aerospace
Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Center
(AC2ISR/CC). The research was performed within the Aerospace Force
Development program of Project AIR FORCE (PAF), and it builds upon two
_________________
1Some of the data reported here differ from the earlier results reported in Hura et al. (2000) as a
result of some changes to our classification scheme that were suggested by one of our reviewers.
iv
recent PAF study projects: Investment Guidelines for Information Operations—
Focus on ISR, and Developing Future Integrated C2 and ISR Capabilities.
This report should be of interest to policymakers, planners, and program
managers involved in interoperability issues and programs of U.S. and NATO
allies’ air forces. It also should be of interest to planners and operational
commanders involved in the employment of coalition C3ISR and combat
capabilities.
Project AIR FORCE
Project AIR FORCE, a division of RAND, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded
research and development center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air
Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the
development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future
aerospace forces. Research is performed in four programs: Aerospace Force
Development; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and
Strategy and Doctrine.
Additional information about PAF is available on our web site at
http://www.rand.org/paf.
v
Contents
Preface .................................................iii
Figures ................................................ vii
Tables .................................................ix
Summary. ...............................................xi
Acknowledgments ........................................ xix
Acronyms .............................................. xxi
1. INTRODUCTION. ..................................... 1
Objective ............................................ 1
A Framework for Revealing Interoperability Issues ............. 1
2. AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT U.S. COALITION EXPERIENCE ..... 4
For What Missions Is Interoperability Required? ............... 4
A Broad Range of Missions .............................. 4
Several Large and Very Complex Operations ................. 5
With Which NATO Allies Is Interoperability Required? .......... 6
Summary Observations ................................ 9
For What Capabilities and Services Is Interoperability Required? ....11
Patterns in the Size of the Contributions ....................11
Patterns in the Breadth of the Contributions .................16
For What Types of Missions Is Interoperability Required? .........18
Conclusions ..........................................20
3. LESSONS LEARNED IN SOME RECENT COALITION
OPERATIONS ........................................22
Overview ............................................23
Strategic Level ........................................23
Key Challenges and Workarounds ........................23
Unity of Purpose, Effort, and Command ....................26
Flexible Command Structures ............................28
Leadership Enabled by Risk Acceptance ....................28
Tensions Between Political and Military Requirements ..........29
Complexities of Political Control ..........................29
Other Strategic-Level Issues .............................31
Operational Level ......................................34
Key Challenges and Workarounds ........................34
Capability Shortfalls and Performance Deficiencies ............35
Changing Missions and Forces ...........................35
Issues in NATO Operational Planning for Air ................36
Challenges Posed by Dispersed Organizations ................36
Information Overload .................................37
Exercises and Training .................................38
Tactical Level .........................................38
vi
Key Challenges and Workarounds ........................38
Technological Level ....................................39
Key Challenges and Workarounds ........................39
C3ISR Capabilities ....................................39
Conclusions ..........................................41
Afterword on Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF) ...............43
4. CONCLUSIONS ......................................46
Appendix
A. Operations, by Mission Focus .............................49
B. NATO Contributions to Recent U.S. Coalition Operations .........56
C. Analysis of Missions Flown ..............................86
D. Base Access ..........................................99
Bibliography ............................................107
vii
Figures
2.1. U.S. Contributions to Various SWA Operations ..............13
2.2. NATO Partner Aircraft Contributions to Various Balkan
Operations. ........................................14

ix
Tables
2.1. Forty U.S. Multilateral Operations, by Mission Focus .......... 5
2.2. Twenty-Six Recent U.S. Non–U.N. Multilateral Operations ...... 7
2.3. NATO Participation in U.S. Multilateral and U.N. Operations ... 8
2.4. Minimum and Maximum Number of Aircraft Contributed to
Various Operations, by Country .........................12
2.5. Percentage of Aircraft Provided in Various Balkan Operations,
by Country ........................................15
3.1. Key Challenges and Workarounds Identified in Case Studies ....24
A.1. Twenty-Six Recent U.S. Non–U.N. Multilateral Operations ......50
A.2. Fourteen Recent U.N. Operations with U.S. and Allied
Participation .......................................51
A.3. Ten Other Coalition Operations with U.S. Participation with
Allies ............................................52
A.4. Number of Coalition Members in Recent Non–U.N. Operations ..53
A.5. Number of Coalition Members in Recent U.N. Operations ......54
A.6. RAF Operational Deployments, Early 1999 .................55
A.7. RAF Operational Deployments, Early 2000 .................55
B.1. Number of Aircraft Contributed to Recent Coalition Operations,
by Country and Operation .............................57
B.2. Aircraft in DESERT STORM on February 24, 1991 ............57
B.3. Illustrative Allied Ground and Naval Contingents in DESERT
STORM ...........................................58
B.4. Aircraft Contributions to Operation NORTHERN WATCH .....60
B.5. U.S.–Assigned Air Forces to Southwest Asia ................61
B.6. Air Expeditionary Force Deployments to Operation SOUTHERN
WATCH ..........................................62
B.7. Contributions to Operation DESERT THUNDER .............63
B.8. Contributions to Operation DESERT FOX ..................63
B.9. Participation in Land, Air, and Maritime Components of Selected
Bosnia Operations ...................................65
B.10. U.S. and NATO Aircraft in Operation DENY FLIGHT .........67
B.11. U.S. and NATO Aircraft in Operation DELIBERATE FORCE ....69
B.12. Estimated Troop Contributions to IFOR, SFOR, and SFOR II ....70
B.13. U.S. and NATO Aircraft in Operation DECISIVE ENDEAVOR
(IFOR) ............................................73
B.14. U.S. and NATO Aircraft in DELIBERATE GUARD (SFOR) and
DELIBERATE FORGE (SFOR II) .........................74
B.15. Number of Ships Contributed to Operation SHARP GUARD,
1993–1996 .........................................75
B.16. Aircraft Contributed to Operation DETERMINED FALCON ....77
B.17. Aircraft Contributed to Operation DETERMINED FORCE, as of
January 25, 1999 .....................................79
B.18. Number of Aircraft in Operation ALLIED FORCE, by Country ...80
B.19. U.S. and Allied Air Contributions to Operation ALLIED FORCE,
May–June 1999. .....................................80
x
B.20. Number of Fixed-Wing Aircraft, by Type, in Operation ALLIED
FORCE ...........................................81
B.21. French Contributions to Operation ALLIED FORCE ..........82
B.22. United Kingdom Contributions to Operation ALLIED FORCE ...83
C.1. U.S. and Allies Gulf War Mission Totals ...................87
C.2. U.S. and Coalition Sorties Flown in Operation DESERT STORM ..88
C.3. Sorties Flown in Operation PROVIDE PROMISE .............90
C.4. Operation DENY FLIGHT Sorties, by Mission ...............91
C.5. DELIBERATE FORCE Sorties, 8/29/95–9/14/95, by Country ...91
C.6. Operation DELIBERATE FORCE Sorties, by Mission ..........92
C.7. Munitions Used in Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, by
Country ..........................................92
C.8. Munitions Used in Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, by Type ...93
C.9. Sorties Flown in Operations DECISIVE ENDEAVOR (IFOR),
DELIBERATE GUARD (SFOR), and DELIBERATE FORGE
(SFOR II), by Mission .................................93
C.10. U.K. Contributions to Operation ALLIED FORCE ............96
C.11. U.K. Aircraft Munitions Released in Operation
ALLIED FORCE ....................................96
D.1. Bases Used by USAF Units in ODS Deployments .............99
D.2. Basing of Aircraft Assigned to NATO for Operation
DELIBERATE FORCE ...............................100
D.3. Basing of Aircraft Assigned to NATO for Operation
DELIBERATE FORCE ...............................101
D.4. Basing of Non-NATO Forces in Operation DELIBERATE
FORCE ..........................................102
D.5. NATO Nations Providing Airfields Used in Operation ALLIED
FORCE ..........................................103
D.6. Other Nations Providing Airfields Used in Operation ALLIED
FORCE ..........................................104
D.7. Basing of Fixed- and Rotary-Wing Aircraft in Operation ALLIED
FORCE, by Country Total and by Percentage of Overall Total ..105