International Trade Agreements Before Domestic Courts: Lessons from the EU and Brazilian Experiences PDF
Preview International Trade Agreements Before Domestic Courts: Lessons from the EU and Brazilian Experiences
Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira International Trade Agreements Before Domestic Courts Lessons from the EU and Brazilian Experiences International Trade Agreements Before Domestic Courts ThiSisaFMBlankPage Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira International Trade Agreements Before Domestic Courts Lessons from the EU and Brazilian Experiences MariaAngelaJardimdeSantaCruzOliveira Brasilia Brazil ISBN978-3-319-13901-2 ISBN978-3-319-13902-9 (eBook) DOI10.1007/978-3-319-13902-9 LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015932773 SpringerChamHeidelbergNewYorkDordrechtLondon ©SpringerInternationalPublishingSwitzerland2015 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpart of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionor informationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilar methodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publicationdoesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexempt fromtherelevantprotectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse. Thepublisher,theauthorsandtheeditorsaresafetoassumethattheadviceandinformationinthisbook arebelievedtobetrueandaccurateatthedateofpublication.Neitherthepublishernortheauthorsorthe editorsgiveawarranty,expressorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinorforanyerrors oromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade. Printedonacid-freepaper Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com) Foreword What is, or should be, the role of domestic courts in the enforcement of interna- tional law, more specifically, state-to-state trade commitments? This is the ambi- tiousquestionmasterfullytackledinthisvolume. The work is unique inthat it examinesthe interplay not from the conventional perspectiveofEUorUScourts,butfromthevantagepointofdevelopingcountries, in particular, Brazil. It does so not in the abstract but with reference to rich jurisprudence before Brazilian courts, juxtaposing it, in particular, to the EU experience. The research also reaches a controversial conclusion: Brazil, which gives direct effect to trade agreement in its domestic courts, is not lauded as the championoffreetrade.Instead,itisstronglyadvisedtostopgivingdirecteffectto tradeagreementsbeforeitsdomesticcourts. Thestartingpointofthebookisanintriguingpuzzle:WhyisitthattheUnited States,theEU,Canada,JapanandevenChina,India,andSouthAfricahaverefused to give direct effect to WTO and other trade agreements before their domestic courts, whereas Latin American countries like Brazil, Mexico and Argentina do continuetogivesuchdirecteffect?Whatexplainsthis“LatinAmericanexception- alism”?Doesitmakesense?TheauthorprovidesaforcefulcaseforBraziltoend this“exceptionalism.” Statesarefreetodecidehowtheywillimplementtreatycommitments.Nothing underinternationallawobligesthemtogivedirecteffecttotreatiesbeforedomestic courts. Indeed, when looking at the largest trading countries, almost all of them havedecidedtocreateawedgebetween(1)theirinternational,state-to-statetrade obligationsbefore,forexample,theWorldTradeOrganization,and(2)whatbinds them vis-(cid:1)a-vis private parties under domestic law or before domestic courts. As a result, in neither the United States nor the EU can traders invoke WTO commit- mentsofthestatebeforedomesticcourts.TherecentlyconcludedCanada–EUFree TradeAgreement (CETA)goesasfarasstatingthat“[n]othinginthisAgreement shall be construed ... as permitting this Agreement to be directly invoked in the domesticlegalsystemsoftheParties”(Chapter33,Article14.6).AlsoChina,India and South Africa have done the same. In Brazil, in contrast, a rich jurisprudence v vi Foreword existswheredomesticcourtshaveapplied,interpretedandfoundviolationsoftrade agreements binding Brazil at the request of (often non-protectionist-inspired) privateparties. TraditionalinternationallawyersmayapplaudBrazil’scommitmenttointerna- tional law. On their view, enlisting domestic courts in the enforcement effort of international law can compensate the flaws in the international enforcement of international law and thereby contribute to the effectiveness of the discipline. Dr. Oliveira tells a different story. In her view, and relying on rational choice approaches,allowingnationalcourtstoenforcetradeagreementsattherequestof privatepartiesiscounterproductive,evenfortheeffectivenessofinternationallaw. Building on the Brazilian experience, she points at a number of “unintended consequences”:(1)afloodofindividualcases,(2)diverseandinconsistentrulings among domestic courts within Brazil, (3) domestic courts’ interpretation of WTO rules different from the international and foreign interpretation oftrade rules, and (4) disequilibrium in international trade’s concessions and rights. In the Brazilian experience, she argues, the executive, not courts (especially not lower courts) are more inclined to favor international law compliance. Direct effect shifts power from the executive to courts and is, on this view, more likely to harm rather than helptheeffectivenessofinternationallaw. The book presents a nuanced theoryofhow countries should assess the role to givetotheirdomesticcourtsinrelationtointernationallaw:notaone-size-fits-all solution, but a calibrated one, based on the subject matter and type of treaty in question. A variable solution also that may change over time, depending on the needs of the country. New, relatively weak countries may find it attractive to tie theirhandstointernationallawthroughdirecteffecttosignaltheirgoodcitizenship in the world community, to attract foreign direct investment, or for internal pur- poses,e.g.,forcentralgovernmentstokeepsub-federallevelsofgovernmentunder controlortotieindomesticreforms.Incountrieswithapastofmilitaryrule,such handtyingenforcedbydomesticcourts(nottherulersoftheday)makessense.It may be further explained by a country’s colonial past, especially if it resides in continental Europe, where a strong “monist” commitment to international law prevailed at least until recently. However, in Dr. Oliveira’s opinion, “as the Latin American economies grow, and their stance at the international trade system increases, it seems fairly reasonable to expect a move from traditionalism [direct effect]totherationalchoicetheory[nodirecteffect]...asithappenedinEuropean courtsandUScourts.” Itremainstobeseenwhetherthispredictionwillmaterialize.Inanyevent,this book is an eye opening read, to be taken seriously by anyone interested in how emergingeconomiesshouldstructuretheirdomesticengagementwithinternational law,lookingnotonlyattheoriesbutatpracticalexperience,includingunintended consequences. Washington,DC,USA JoostPauwelyn 29October2014 Acknowledgments Thisbookwouldhaveneverbeencompletedwithoutthegenerosityandwisdomof numerouspeoplethatsupportedmethroughthisjourneythatIwanttoacknowledge andgivemyheartilythanks.IamgreatlyindebtedtoJoostPauwelyn,whokindly encouragedmewithinsightfulguidanceandforward-thinkingvision.Withouthim, noneofthisworkwouldhavebeenpossibletoachieve.IamalsothankfultoAndrea Bianchi, whose authoritative and challenging views stimulated me for academic dialogue and impelled me to deepen my argument with his invaluable insights. I would like to extend my gratitude to George Bandeira Galindo for his hard questions,thought-provokingcommentsandconstructivefeedback. AspecialnotemustbemadetoNunoGaroupa,forhisilluminativeperspective onjudicialbehavior,profoundintelligenceandstraightforwardconversations.His friendshipandsupporthasbeeninvaluabletothedevelopmentofthisbook. IamgratefultotheHonorableJusticesCelsodeMello,EllenGracieNorthfleet and Gilmar Mendes, for their kind support of my engaging in scholarly research. MygratitudealsogoestoMarceloKohen,forsupportingmyacademicinterestin international law, and Vera Thorstensen, for enlightening me about complex economic aspects of international trade and guiding me through the works of the WorldTradeOrganization.IamalsothankfultoDeisyVentura,forherinsightful andthoughtfulcommentsattheinitialphaseofthiswork. I would also like to express my appreciation for the help and guidance that various people have given me in different capacities throughout this research. I wouldliketothankCarlBaudenbacherforhisgenerousinvitationtothe2ndSaint- Gallen International Dispute Resolution Conference, and Christine Peter da Silva formyattendancetothe2ndWorldConferenceofConstitutionalCourtsinRiode Janeiro.IamthankfultoFranciscoAcun˜a,LorenaSander,andArmandoReinafor theirhelpfulinsightsoftheMexicanlegalsystem.MythankstoAdrianaDreyzinde Klor, Alejandro Perotti, and Juliana Peixoto Batista for their kind availability to sharetheirknowledgeaboutArgentineancourts.IalsorecognizethehelpofCelso deTarsoPereira,FranzStirnimannFuentes,LuizEduardoSalles,GrazielaPicinin, Mattias Bietti, A´ngel Horna, and Eva Keszeliova. Further, thanks to Brigitte vii viii Acknowledgments Reschke, Julia Bieler and the Springer team for their valuable expertise and efficiencyinthepublicationofthisbook. Most importantly, I would like to express my infinite gratitude to my parents who have always supported my intellectual endeavors. My deepest appreciation goestomybelovedhusbandJose´ CarlosSantiagoforhisadorablecompanionship duringthewritingofthisbook,andforhisendlesssupplyofpatienceandspirited conversations.Idedicatethisbooktohim. Contents 1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 OutlineofArgument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2 TheRelationsBetweenInternationalLawandDomesticCourts. . . 13 2.1 ComparativeStudiesontheApplicationofInternationalLaw byDomesticCourts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.2 TheRoleofDomesticCourtsRegardingInternationalLaw: GeneralApproachesintheInternationalLegalScholarship. . . . . . 17 2.2.1 WaysDomesticCourtsUsuallyEnforce InternationalLaw. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.2.2 TraditionalInternationalLegalScholarshipontheRole ofDomesticCourtsRegardingInternationalLaw—or Traditionalism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.2.3 RationalChoiceTheoryintheLawandEconomics ApproachontheRoleofDomesticCourtsRegarding InternationalLaw. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 2.3 TheRoleofDomesticCourtsinInternationalTradeLaw: ASubstantialFieldApproach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 2.3.1 TheTraditionalismv.RationalChoiceTheoryDebate ontheRoleofDomesticCourtsRegardingtheWTO Agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 2.3.2 TheAmericanCreationoftheGATTandItsLeadership intheAdoptionoftheRationalChoiceTheory inInternationalTradeAgreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2.4 AnAssessmentontheRoleofDomesticCourtsinInternational TradeAgreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 2.4.1 TheFunctionandObjectiveofInternationalTrade Agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 ix
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