International Politics and the Sea: The Case of Brazil

153 Pages·1979·15.751 MB·English

by  Michael A. Morris

International Politics
and the Sea:
The Case of Brazil
Michael A. Morris
Westview Press / Bourder, Colorado
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Contents
To my father, Delyte Wesley Morris, Acknowledgements xi
Educator, Administrator, and Hwnanitarian
1 THE SEA IN BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1
Change and Continuity in the Interna
tional System 2
Ecbnomic implications 3
Political implications 5
Military implications 6
Trends in Brazilian Foreign ·policy 7
Diversification 8
Expansion.of in~erests 8
Greater assertiveness of interests 9
A Westview Replica Edition
Pragmatism 10
Trends in Brazilian Ocean Policy 11
2 BRAZILIAN OCEAN POLICY IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 17
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, elec
The Geographical Setting and Ocean Policy 17
tronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any
Policy Guidelines 18
information storage and retrieval system, without permission
Bureaucratic Politics 28
in writing from the publisher.
Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and
Ocean Affairs 45
Copyright © 1,979 by Westview Press, Inc.
3 BRAZILIAN OCEAN POLICY IN HISTORICAL PER-
Published in 1979 in the United States of America by
SPECTIVE 57
Westview Press, Inc.
5500 Central Avenue
Revisionism and National Ocean Policies 58
Boulder, Colorado 80301
Origins of Brazilian Ocean Policy 59
Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher
International Law Commission Preparatory
Discussions 67
First United Nations Conference on the
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 79-5040
Law of the Sea 7 6
ISBN: 0-89158-456-0
Printed and.bound in the United States of America
vii
Second United Nations Conference on the 9 BRAZILIAN OCEAN POLICY IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 283
Law of the Sea 86
The Road to Revisionism 91
Brazil as an Emerging Major Power 283
Interpretations and Implications 95
Developing States 286
Developed States 287
4 BRAZIL AT THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CON-
Ocean Politics in the International
FERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 113
System 289
International System, National Policy,
and the Law of the Sea Conference 113
Brazil's Emergence as a Major Power
and UNCLOS III 115
Prelude to UNCLOS III, 1967-1970 119
Preparations for UNCLOS .III, 1971-1973 137
The Conference Sessions 144
5 NAVAL TRENDS 169
The.Brazilian Navy in Transition 169
The Brazilian Navy in Comparative Per-
spective 171
U.S.-Brazilian Naval Relations 181
A Tradition of Convergent Naval In-
terests 182
Readjustments in U.S.-Brazilian
Naval Relations 189
6 NAVAL INTERESTS AND MISSIONS 213
A Changing Hierarchy of Naval Interests 213
Core Interests 218
National Security and Development 218
Secondary Interests 228
Speculative Naval Roles 229
The South Atlantic 235
7 OCEAN RESOURCES 251
Offshore Oil 252
Fishing 255
Great Power Challenges and Brazilian
Responses 257
Fisheries Economics and Politics 262
8 SHIPPING 267
Development of the National Merchant
Marine 267
The Structure of National Shipping 276
viii
Acknowledgements
Special thanks go to two scholars who had con
fidence in this study when it was no more than an
idea. Prof.essor Carlos Astiz of the State Univer
sity of New York at Albany encouraged and assisted
me in this project from the earliest stage. Pro
fessor Candido Mendes of the Conjunto Universitario
Candido Mendes gave support and encouragement for a
stay in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Research support
also was given by the Organization of American States
and the Faculty Research Committee of Clemson
University.
'I',
Thanks are also due for the two typists of the
,, final manuscript, Martha Morris and Judy Payne.
" My wife, Rekha, shared the experiences of this
study with me, and gave me encouragement throughout.
Scores of interviews were conducted in the
United States, Brazil, and several other Latin
American states for this study. Appreciation is ex
pressed to all these individuals, mostly unnamed in
this study at their request, for their time and in
terest. It was particularly through these interviews
that ocean politics emerged as a process involving
people and groups, not just abstract interests.
Earlier versions of some parts of this study
have appeared in published form: (1) "Trends in
U.S.-Brazilian Maritime Relations," Inter-American
Economic Affairs, 17 (Winter 1973), 3-24. (2)
University of Sao Paulo Occasional Paper: "A Nova
Posis:ao do Brasil no Mundo" (The New Position of
Brazil in the World), Geografia e Planejamento, 11
(1974). (3) "The Domestic Context of Brazilian Mari
time Policy," Ocean Development and International
Law: The Journal of Marine Affairs, 4 (1977), 143-
169). (4) "Brazilian Ocean Policy in Historical
Perspective," Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce,
xi
10 (April 1979), 349-.393. (5) "Bi;:azil at the Th~rd
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Ocean Development and International Law: The Journal
of Marine Affairs, 6 (1979), 131-177. (6) "Mudan5!a
e Continuidade nas Rela~oes Navais Brasileiras-..
Americanas" (Change and Conti9u~ty in U:S.-;-Brazilian
Naval Relations), Revista Maritima Brasileira (the
1. The Sea In
official journal of the Brazilian Nav~), (1979) ·
The' narrative of this study carries through
Brazilian Foreign Policy
1978.
Brazil is one of the few viable Third World
candidates for a relatively rapid transition from
developing, somewhat dependent status to developed,
major power status. Not only does Brazil appear to
be crossing the threshold from underdevelopment to
development, but it al~o seems headed toward the
rank of a major power.
Progress toward developed, major power status
ultimateLy depends on Brazil's own continuing domes
tic and international growth, although developments
in the international system and in key diplomatic
relationships with other states also set limits on
growth and upward mobility. Brazil's gradual move
ment upward in international status has coincided
with some fundamental changes in the international
system and in key diplomatic relations with other
states, especially the United States. U.S.-Brazilian
relations have traditionally been close, with the
United States occupying a central position in
Brazil's diplomatic constellation, More recently,
fundamental changes in U.S. global strategy and hemi
spheric policy have coincideo with changes in
Brazilian policy to alter considerably the tradition
al contour of bilateral relations. International
system changes have tended to reinforce these de
velopments. Changes on each of these international
dimensions, all relatively favorable to Brazil's
rise, may be characterized as follows: (1) the in
ternational system has been evolving from a bipolar
toward a multipolar order; (2) Brazilian foreign
policy has been evolving from a position of weakness
toward a position of strength; and (3) U.S.-Brazilian
relations have been evolving from a state of rela
tive dependency and inequality towards one of greater
independence and equality. '
Change in each area, however, has been uneven:
the international system is still largely bipolar in
xii 1
the military sphere; Brazilian foreign policy is
ing d6tente, and the United States and China have
still hampered by important areas of weakness; and
U.S.-Brazilian relations are still influenced by a moved.tow~rd rapp7ochement. Other aspects of the
evolving international system are ridden with con
legacy of dependency. And some other changes have
flicts. Serious problems have arisen between the
tended to brake Brazil's growth.
soviet Union and its former ally, .China, just as
Change and continuity in this foreign policy
U.S. relations with Japan and the European Common
environment have therefore affected Brazil's rise in
Market hav7 been troubled by failure to forge mu
complex ways. Brazil's position in the world is im
tually satisfactory economic relations. And Third
proving, in the sense of being more extensive and
independent than previously, but change and contin world ~ta~es are generally growing more restive with
the existing order.
uity intermingle. In order to clarify these rela-
The shift from a bipolar system toward a multi
. tionships, key factors of change and continuity in
the international system and their economic, politi polar. one. has. imp~rtant economic, political, and
security implications for Brazil's position in the
cal, and military implications for Brazil will be
world.
noted briefly. Trends in Brazilian foreign policy
have been shaped by and have also shaped this inter
Economic implications
national environment, and will be subsequently
analyzed. Key characteristics of the international
The international economy has been relatively
system and of Brazilian foreign policy constitute
congenial to Brazil's gradual emergence as a devel-
the setting .for the topic of this book, trends in
Brazilian ocean policy. In a final section of this oped state, although there have been increasing ·
difficulties in sustaining growth since the 1973-
chapter, Brazilian ocean policy is related to this
larger policy setting and the organization and ra 1974 oil ?r~sis~ .A growing world economy and con
sequent availability of capital have had a highly
tionale of the book are set forth.
positive effect on Brazil's economy. Greater world
economic multipolarity has provided additional for
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
11 eig' nh sources of trade, investm. ent and finance
wh ic played a key role in the 196f 8-1973 economI ic
Certain aspects of the international system re
boom and have helped sustain growth since then. The
main unaltered: the nuclear balance is still shaped
Unit7d States is still Brazil's largest single
by the two superpowers; the Soviet Union and China
trading partner and foreign investor and trade and
are still basically antagonistic to the United
investment between Brazil and the United States
States; and Japan and Western Europe are still the
have been growing in absolute terms, but at a slower
United States' most valued allies. The interna
rate than that of Japan and Western Europe. The
tional system is nevertheless shifting gradually
U.S. share of cumulative foreign investment in
from·a bipolar order toward a multipolar one. The
Brazil has declined from about one-half in the early
resurgence of Japan and a united Europe have con
1960s to about one-third of total foreign investment
tributed toward ecoriomic multipolarity and the new
pragmatism of China has contributed to political in t~e.country at present, and the U.S. share of
Brazilian trade fell as well from 33.7 per cent in
multipolarity. The achievement by the Soviet Union
1964 to between a fourth and a fifth of the total ·
of nuclear parity, the commercial challenge posed by
in recent years. Western Europe and Japan together
Japan and the European Common Market, and the gradu
now share over one-third of Brazilian trade and
al expansion of Chinese influence have all contri
about half of foreign investment in Brazil. In
buted to a relative decline of U.S. power. The
recent years, petroleum.has averaged about a quarter
emergence of multipolarity has then involved changes
of total imports, mostly from the Middle East.2
in the positions of all five major poles of power
. The declining U.S. share of trade and foreign
in the international system--the United States,
investment is, in part, simply a natural concomitant
the S<?viet Union, Japan, a united Europe, and China.
of g7eater economic multipolarity. However, the
Some aspects of the emerging new order augur
decline also reflects problems in the bilateral re
well for peace. The United States and the Soviet
Union have eased their cold war competition by seek- latio~ship. For Br~zil, important aspects of pres
ent bilateral relations were shaped during the p~riod
2
3
of greater Brazilian dependence on the·United petitor, is larger than that of any other developing
States, so that greater economic multipolarity, by sta~e, and r~nks tenth in the world. Greater eco
lessening reliance on its traditionally dominant nomi7 power.is su~porting an increasingly active
ally, has been welcomed. foreign policy, with resultant expansion of Brazilian
Brazilian vulnerability to external economic influence in the international arena.
conditions still remains considerable, and the However, the t7ansition to developed, major
Brazilian ability to shape these conditions contin power st~tus, even if relatively rapid, promises to
ues to be relatively limited. Recent external de last until at least the end of this century
velopments with unfavorable implications for Brazil Brazil's development has been most uneven ~ith rapid
include uncertain economic conditions in the de in~us~rial growth in south-central Brazil1taking
veloped states and soaring oil prices. In fact, the priority.ove7 ba~anced regional development and in
increasing openness of Brazil's economy and greater come redistribution. Per capita national income of
reliance on foreign investment, commerce, and tech some~hat.over $~,000 falls far short of that in the
nology tend to make it more vulnerable.than pre ~eading 7ndust7ial states. Domestic development and
viously to such adverse developments in the inter international influence will be hindered as long as
national economy. fundamental disparities in the economy are not cor
New forms of dependency, however, may be more rected.
acceptable than the traditional ones. Brazil's
economic dependency is much more diffuse than pre Political implications
viously, since no one state occupies a dominant pos.l:
tion in its foreign economic relations. Rapid Multipolarity has tended to increase diplomatic
transition to developed status in a multipolar order flexibility for Th~rd World states, especially the
still involves national dependence on the world larger, more dynamic ones, such as Brazil. New
economy, because of the importance the Brazilian poles of p~w~r have increased alternatives and cold
economic model places on external economic rela war competition has become more diffuse and has
tions as an engine for domestic growth. But most shi~t~d from the military toward the economic and
d~veloped states are themselves subject to similar political spheres. As Brazil continues to emerge
vulnerabilities because of increasing global inter as a m~jor power in this setting, it is increasingly
dependence. recog~ized to occupy a distinctive position between
Some recent studies have recognized that the First and Third Worlds. But Brazilian access to
Brazilian dependence in general and on the United key deci~ions af~ecti.1:1-g ~he contours of the global
States in particular has varied over time on a ~rder still rem~ins difficult. As an aspirant ma
number of levels. Viewed from such a dynamic per JOr power, Brazil has objected to this lack of ac
spective, Brazilian dependence has tended to de cess4or "freezing of [the structures of] world pow
crease in recent years as national economic power er," alt~ou?h such freezing of power appears less
and diversification of foreign economic relations characteristic of the emerging multipolar order than
have accelerated.3 of the preceding bipolar one.
Domestic developments have complemented the The United States has indeed recognized Brazil's
relatively favorable global setting to project new status as the predominant power in Latin America
Brazil into a more prominent international position. oi:i repeated occ~sion~, and has sought to adjust the
An impressive array of natural and human resources bilateral relationship accordingly. The transition
'is being mobilized to support increasingly diversi to gr~ater Brazilian independence and equality in
fied industrial and agricultural production. t~e bilatera~ relationship has been facilitated,
Brazil's potential for ma:jor power status has long ~ince the United States and Brazil continue to share
been acknowledged, but only with increasing mobiliza important common interests and both sides favor
tion of national resources has a significant rise in compromise in resolving differences. Differences in
international influence appeared attainable. perspec~i~e continue, however, about the implications
Brazil's gross national product, over $100 billion of Bra~il s growth and emergence as a major power for
dollars annually by the late 1970s, is already about the United States.
three times that of the nearest South American com- Brazilian policy-makers continue to value close
4 5
relations with the United States, but recognize that nist threats to the Third World has been deempha
national growth tends to diversify foreign relations, sized. As on the economic front, bilateral military
lessen dependency, and lead to distinctive Brazilian ties have accordingly declined relative to other
interests which do not necessarily correspond with international military contacts. Compatible re
u.s. interests. Increasingly vigorous pursuit of gional powers, as noted, are still encouraged to
distinctive Brazilian interests therefore may con take up the slack left from a diminished U.S. world
tribute to a regional order, and indeed to a world role to establish stable regional orders.
order, unlike that envisaged in U.S. policy. Brazilian policy-makers have welcomed a more
Brazilian concern with the freezing of power illus benign international security environment, but they
trates just such a difference of perspective. have explicitly rejected seeming regional implica
U.S. policy, in contrast, still harbours a tions of recent U.S. policy of spheres of influence
paternalistic attitude, since Brazil's growth seems and Brazilian regional hegemony. Instead, they
to be regarded more in terms of relieving U.S. have moved to diversify military contacts and en
responsibilities on U.S. terms than as an autonomous visage self-sufficiency in the longer-run. Develop
process of national self-assertion. A key implica ment of a mutually acceptable image of Brazil's
tion of the Nixon Doctrine's emphasis on accommoda more influential position in the world is perhaps
tion between the five major world power centers and the m0st basic challenge posed by change for the
relative U.S. disengagement from the Third World was bilateral relationship.
encouragement of regional orders compatible with
U.S. interests.5 In this scheme, Brazil, as the only
emerging major power in Latin America, would be dele TRENDS IN BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY
gated U.S. regional responsibilities and would as
sist integration of a stable regional order into a In spite of differences in emphasis, all mili
five power world order. Subsequent U.S. administra tary governments since the 1964 coup have shared
tions have continued to stress order in the Third certain common aims, which differ in several impor
World on U.S. terms while finding it difficult to tant respects from those held by preceding civilian
commit sufficient resources to assist the evolution governments. A more active foreign policy has been
of compatible regional systems. Accordingly, the promoted to assist domestic economic development
U.S. has continued to look to strong regional allies, and enhance national security.6 Although this for
including Brazil, for support as regional poles of eign policy orientation is primarily concerned with
power and stability, but with uneven results. supporting domestic concerns, especially economic
development and national security, correction of
Military implications uneven regional development and income disparities
is not stressed. In sum, "foreign policy has be
Security considerations, especially cold war come a conscious instrument of an increasingly con
competition between the two superpowers, tended to scious national development policy. 117 In the long
shape international politics during the bipolar era. run, the attainment of major power status is ex
The Third World acquired considerable importance as pected to result from Brazil's domestic and inter
a cold war battleground, and security interests national growth. Eventual attainment of developed,
seemed to require a substantial U.S. commitment to major power status may shift the central concern of
economic development of developing states. For Brazilian foreign policy from domestic development
example, bilateral relations both before and after toward international prestige and influence, but
the 1964 coup included close collaboration between such a trend is still inchoate.
the Brazilian and American militaries and sizable Considerable continuity in the conduct of
assistance for development. Superpower detente and Brazilian foreign policy by successive military
the emergence of multipolarity have contributed to governments since 1964 has flowed from common ob
subsequent U.S. reassessment of its global security jectives. Continuity in foreign policy will char
interests and commitment to Third World development. acterize the new Figueiredo administration as well,
Superpower military competition has become less which is to take office on March 15, 1979, according
prominent and traditional U.S. concern with commu- to the Foreigh Minister-designate, Ramiro Elisio
6 7
Saraiva Guerreiro. Of particular interest for this oriented toward support of internal needs--to assist
study, Sr. Saraiva Guerreiro has been a leading mem domestic development and enhance national security-
ber of the Brazilian maritime community, including Brazil's domestic and international growth is tend
head of the Brazilian delegation to the Third United ing to expand Brazilian international interests.
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. This includes Brazil's emergence as an aid donor and
A general foreign policy approach endorsed by heightened Brazilian con9ern with achieving a direct
the successive military governments, albeit with participant role in decisions on global economic,
differences of emphasis, may be described through political, and military issues. The diversification
four major characteristics. These four characteris policy, too, tends to expand Brazilian international
tics, taken together, have adapted the aspirations interests.
of an emerging major power well to the situational This expansion of interests has been largely
constraints and opportunities of an emerging multi benign, in spite of arguments to the contrary. Some
polar order. I nationalist circles in Spanish Am~!:,iCg, for example,
have argued that increasing Brazilian involvement
Diversification in Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay demonstrates
imperialistic designs. The broad Escola Superior de
A concerted program to diversify markets and Guerra definition of national security does lead to
products for export has been carried out in order to concern about possible instability in the border
boost economic development at home while lessening areas, although Brazil's growing international in
diplomatic dependence on the United States and volvement has largely been limited to expansion of
economic dependence on specific commodities. economic and political interests. As noted, Brazil
Brazilian dependence on coffee, for example, has de has rejected any hegemonic designs in Latin America,
clined considerably in the past decade. The share either on its own or in association with the United
of coffee in Brazilian exports fell from 53 per cent states. The impact of Brazil's growth is neverthe
in 1964 to less than 20 per cent in recent years, less being felt most directly in neighboring Latin
while the proportion of industrial exports rose in American states, since Brazil has not been con
the same period from 5 per cent to about one-third fronted with a freezing of the structures of power
of the total. Changes in the international system, on a regional scale, as has tended to occur on a
especially the emergence of economic multipolarity, global scale.
have facilitated diversification of export markets
as well. Trade diversification has been especially Greater assertiveness of interests
marked in the cases of Western Europe and Japan, as
noted, and relations with Latin America, other The transition from bipolarity to multipolarity
developing states, and the socialist states are has not altered many features of the international
also being intensified. system which Brazil regards as inimical to its prog
The first military government of Castello ress toward developed, major power status. Brazil
Branco did maintain particularly close relations has expressed its dissatisfaction with unfair or
with the United States, while all subsequent mili biased economic, political, and military structures
tary governments have pressed diversification more embedded in the existing international order, and
and have not hesitated to defend national interests has clearly defined positions critical of the status
vigorously when in confli.ct with those of the quo. For example, Brazil has criticized the existing
United States. In retrospect, even the foreign structure of world trade, especially trade barriers
policy of Castello Branco was not subservient to in the developed states, as making the transition
the United States, and instead seems to have re toward development difficult. Disarmament and arms
garded especially close cooperation with the United control efforts, such as the non-nuclear prolifera
States as necessary in dealing with the domestic tion treaty, have been criticized as often serving
political and economic crisis. the interests of the established great powers. The
sudden concern of the developed states with pollu
Expansion of interests tion--maritime or land-based--has been regarded as
self-serving as well and possibly inimical to
While Brazilian foreign policy remains largely
8 9