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ICLG The International Comparative Legal Guide to: International Arbitration 2017 14th Edition A practical cross-border insight into international arbitration work Published by Global Legal Group, in association with CDR, with contributions from: Accuracy DLA Piper UK LLP Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP Ali Budiardjo, Nugroho, Reksodiputro Dr. Colin Ong Legal Services Popovici Niţu Stoica & Asociaţii AlixPartners Duff & Phelps Portolano Cavallo Studio Legale Andersen Tax & Legal Eric Silwamba, Jalasi and Linyama PUNUKA Attorneys & Solicitors Anderson Mori & Tomotsune Legal Practitioners Rojs, Peljhan, Prelesnik & partners Attorneys at law Ratiolex Ltd Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP Salazar & Asociados Baker McKenzie Georgiev, Todorov & Co. SBH Law Office BDO LLP Gregoriou & Associates Law Firm Secretariat International Bekina, Škurla, Durmiš and Spajić Ltd. HFW Sedgwick Chudleigh Ltd. Bizlink Lawyers Homburger Weber & Co. BMT LAW Kachwaha and Partners Williams & Connolly LLP Boss & Young, Attorneys-at-Law König Rebholz Zechberger Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP BRISDET Linklaters LLP Brödermann Jahn RA GmbH Loyens & Loeff Luxembourg S.à.r.l. Cases & Lacambra Matheson Christophe Dugué – Avocat Moroglu Arseven CMS Cameron McKenna Njeri Kariuki Advocate Costa e Tavares Paes Advogados Norburg & Scherp The International Comparative Legal Guide to: International Arbitration 2017 Preface: ■ Preface by Gary Born, Chair, International Arbitration Practice Group, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP General Chapters: 1 Class, Collective and Mass Arbitrations – Charlie Caher & Jonathan Lim, Contributing Editors Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP 1 Steven Finizio and Charlie Caher, Wilmer Cutler 2 Pre-award Interest, and the Difference Between Interest and Investment Returns – Pickering Hale and Gervase MacGregor & David Mitchell, BDO LLP 8 Dorr LLP 3 Effective Use of Financial Experts in Arbitration – Kathryn Britten & Greg Huitson-Little, Sales Director AlixPartners 11 Florjan Osmani 4 What to Know Before Going Into Arbitration – Carl Jenkins & A. Scott Davidson, Duff & Phelps 17 Account Director 5 Construction Damages in International Arbitration – Theodore E. Needham III & Mark Baker, Oliver Smith Secretariat International 21 Sales Support Manager 6 Arbitrating in New York: The NYIAC Advantage – James H. Carter & John V.H. Pierce, Paul Mochalski Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP 27 Sub Editor 7 Independent Review of a Claim by Experts: Its Rise in Popularity and Benefits – Oliver Chang Anthony Theau-Laurent & Jonathan Ellis, Accuracy 31 Senior Editors 8 The Toolbox of International Arbitration Institutions: How to Make the Best of It? – Suzie Levy, Rachel Williams Professor Dr. Eckart Brödermann & Dr. York Zieren, Brödermann Jahn RA GmbH 35 Chief Operating Officer Dror Levy Asia Pacific: Group Consulting Editor Alan Falach 9 Overview Dr. Colin Ong Legal Services: Dr. Colin Ong, QC 40 10 Australia HFW: Nick Longley & Brian Rom 54 Publisher Rory Smith 11 Brunei Dr. Colin Ong Legal Services: Dr. Colin Ong, QC 64 Published by 12 China Boss & Young, Attorneys-at-Law: Dr. Xu Guojian 73 Global Legal Group Ltd. 13 Hong Kong HFW: Peter Murphy & Fergus Saurin 85 59 Tanner Street London SE1 3PL, UK 14 India Kachwaha and Partners: Sumeet Kachwaha & Dharmendra Rautray 94 Tel: +44 20 7367 0720 15 Indonesia Ali Budiardjo, Nugroho, Reksodiputro: Sahat A.M. Siahaan & Fax: +44 20 7407 5255 Ulyarta Naibaho 105 Email: [email protected] URL: www.glgroup.co.uk 16 Japan Anderson Mori & Tomotsune: Yoshimasa Furuta & Aoi Inoue 116 GLG Cover Design 17 Singapore HFW: Paul Aston & Suzanne Meiklejohn 124 F&F Studio Design 18 Vietnam Bizlink Lawyers: Do Trong Hai & Nguyen Duc Manh 135 GLG Cover Image Source iStockphoto Central and Eastern Europe and CIS: Printed by 19 Overview Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP: Franz T. Schwarz & Ashford Colour Press Ltd July 2017 Krystyna Khripkova 144 20 Austria Weber & Co.: Stefan Weber & Katharina Kitzberger 154 Copyright © 2017 Global Legal Group Ltd. 21 Belarus SBH Law Office: Timour Sysouev & Alexandre Khrapoutski 163 All rights reserved 22 Bulgaria Georgiev, Todorov & Co.: Georgi Georgiev & Tzvetelina Dimitrova 174 No photocopying 23 Croatia Bekina, Škurla, Durmiš and Spajić Ltd.: Hrvoje Spajić & Ivana Ostojić 184 ISBN 978-1-911367-63-5 24 Greece Gregoriou & Associates Law Firm: Stelios H. Gregoriou 192 ISSN 1741-4970 25 Romania Popovici Niţu Stoica & Asociaţii: Florian Nițu & Raluca Petrescu 200 Strategic Partners 26 Russia Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP: Noah Rubins & Alexey Yadykin 210 27 Slovenia Rojs, Peljhan, Prelesnik & partners: David Premelč & Timotej Kozar 226 28 Turkey Moroglu Arseven: Orçun Çetinkaya & Burak Baydar 236 29 Ukraine CMS Cameron McKenna: Olexander Martinenko & Andriy Stetsenko 245 Western Europe: 30 Overview DLA Piper UK LLP: Ben Sanderson & Elinor Thomas 254 31 Andorra Cases & Lacambra: Sheila Muñoz Muñoz & Miguel Cases Nabau 258 Continued Overleaf Further copies of this book and others in the series can be ordered from the publisher. Please call +44 20 7367 0720 Disclaimer This publication is for general information purposes only. It does not purport to provide comprehensive full legal or other advice. Global Legal Group Ltd. and the contributors accept no responsibility for losses that may arise from reliance upon information contained in this publication. This publication is intended to give an indication of legal issues upon which you may need advice. Full legal advice should be taken from a qualified professional when dealing with specific situations. WWW.ICLG.COM The International Comparative Legal Guide to: International Arbitration 2017 Western Europe, cont.: 32 Belgium Linklaters LLP: Joost Verlinden & Matthias Schelkens 268 33 England & Wales Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP: Charlie Caher & John McMillan 278 34 Finland Attorneys at law Ratiolex Ltd: Timo Ylikantola & Tiina Ruohonen 294 35 France Christophe Dugué – Avocat: Christophe Dugué 302 36 Germany DLA Piper UK LLP: Dr. Frank Roth & Dr. Daniel H. Sharma 311 37 Ireland Matheson: Nicola Dunleavy & Gearóid Carey 320 38 Italy Portolano Cavallo Studio Legale: Micael Montinari & Luca Salamone 330 39 Liechtenstein König Rebholz Zechberger: MMag. Benedikt König & Dr. Helene Rebholz 340 40 Luxembourg Loyens & Loeff Luxembourg S.à.r.l.: Véronique Hoffeld 349 41 Netherlands BRISDET: Fanny-Marie Brisdet & Bo Pietersz 357 42 Spain Andersen Tax & Legal: Iñigo Rodríguez-Sastre & Elena Sevila Sánchez 367 43 Sweden Norburg & Scherp: Fredrik Norburg & Pontus Scherp 375 44 Switzerland Homburger: Felix Dasser & Balz Gross 382 Latin America: 45 Overview Baker McKenzie: Luis M. O’Naghten 393 46 Bolivia Salazar & Asociados: Ronald Martin-Alarcon & Rodrigo Jimenez-Cusicanqui 406 47 Brazil Costa e Tavares Paes Advogados: Vamilson José Costa & Antonio Tavares Paes Jr. 413 Middle East / Africa: 48 Overview – MENA Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP: Sami Tannous & Amr Omran 421 49 Overview – Sub-Saharan Africa Baker McKenzie: Gerhard Rudolph & Michelle Wright 428 50 Kenya Njeri Kariuki Advocate: Njeri Kariuki 431 51 Nigeria PUNUKA Attorneys & Solicitors: Elizabeth Idigbe & Emuobonuvie Majemite 438 52 Sierra Leone BMT LAW: Glenna Thompson 454 53 South Africa Baker McKenzie: Gerhard Rudolph & Michelle Wright 461 54 United Arab Emirates Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP: Sami Tannous & Amr Omran 471 55 Zambia Eric Silwamba, Jalasi and Linyama Legal Practitioners: Joseph Alexander Jalasi, Jr. & Eric Suwilanji Silwamba, SC 484 North America: 56 Overview Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP: H. Christopher Boehning & Priyanka Timblo 493 57 Bermuda Sedgwick Chudleigh Ltd.: Mark Chudleigh & Alex Potts 501 58 Canada Baker McKenzie: Matthew J. Latella & Christina Doria 511 59 USA Williams & Connolly LLP: John J. Buckley, Jr. & C.J. Mahoney 520 PREFACE I am privileged to have been invited to preface the 2017 edition of The International Comparative Legal Guide to: International Arbitration, one of the most comprehensive comparative guides to the practice of international arbitration available today. The Guide is in its fourteenth edition, which is itself a testament to its value to practitioners and clients alike. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP is delighted to serve as the Guide’s Editor. As the international business community continues to embrace international arbitration as a means of resolving international commercial disputes, it is critical to maintain an accurate and up-to-date guide regarding relevant practices and legislation in a variety of jurisdictions. The 2017 edition of this Guide accomplishes that objective by providing global businesses leaders, in-house counsel, and international legal practitioners with ready access to important information regarding the legislative frameworks for international arbitration in over 44 individual states. It also surveys national and regional practices concerning international arbitration from the perspective of leading and experienced practitioners in these jurisdictions. This fourteenth edition of the Guide will serve as a valuable, authoritative source of reference material for lawyers in industry and private practice seeking information regarding the procedural laws and practice of international arbitration, provided by experienced practitioners from around the world. Gary Born Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP Chair, International Arbitration Practice Group, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP. Mr. Born is the author of International Commercial Arbitration (2nd ed. 2014); International Arbitration: Law and Practice (2nd ed. 2016); and International Arbitration and Forum Selection Agreements: Drafting and Enforcing (5th ed. 2016). Chapter 1 Class, Collective and Charlie Caher Mass Arbitrations Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP Jonathan Lim 1. Arbitration proceedings involving multiple parties are becoming brought by one or more claimants on behalf of a large and possibly increasingly common. There are several types of multiparty indeterminate number of persons who all have identical arbitration arbitrations: (i) arbitrations involving one contract but more than agreements with the same defendant or defendants. two parties; (ii) arbitrations involving multiple contracts with more 5. Historically, a number of U.S. courts were opposed to class than two parties where either the contracts are related, or there is arbitration on the basis that it purportedly subverted the privity of some relationship or affiliation between the parties; and (iii) large- the arbitration agreement; the courts took the view that only the scale multiparty arbitrations involving a claim by one or a few parties to a particular contract or set of contracts could be parties representatives on behalf of a class or mass of parties, who may to an arbitral proceeding.4 Class arbitration was therefore not have no relationship or affiliation with one another other than the permissible, because the multiple claimants within a class usually fact that their disputes arise out of a common fact pattern. had no contractual relationship at all with one another. 2. This article focuses on the last type of large-scale multiparty 6. That position changed over time, as courts in some U.S. states arbitration, which is less frequently encountered than the other forms – most notably, California – held that class participation in certain of multiparty arbitration. Such arbitrations have been variously arbitrations was permissible.5 These state court decisions also held referred to as “class”, “collective” or “mass” arbitrations. As that class arbitration would offer a fairer and more efficient solution discussed below, these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, than requiring separate causes of action to be pursued in separate although they may carry important conceptual differences.1 Class arbitrations. arbitration originated in the U.S., drawing mainly from class action 7. However, a number of important issues remained unresolved, litigation as understood within in the U.S. court system. While class including: whether an arbitral tribunal had the authority to interpret arbitration has not been replicated elsewhere, with a few exceptions, the arbitration agreement and authorise class arbitration; and whether more broadly conceived notions of collective and mass arbitration class arbitration was allowed even where the arbitration agreement have also developed in both the U.S. and other jurisdictions across does not expressly authorise class arbitration.6 It was also unclear the world, in both commercial and investment treaty arbitration. whether class arbitrations were compatible with the Federal Arbitration 3. This chapter surveys these developments and summarises the Act (the “FAA”), which was enacted in 1925, before the emergence of current jurisprudence and commentary on class, collective and mass class action litigation, and did not address class arbitration expressly. arbitrations. It will therefore cover: 8. In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court considered these issues for a. class arbitration in the U.S.; the first time in Green Tree Financial Corp. v Bazzle.7 In Bazzle, b. class arbitration outside of the U.S.; multiple homeowners under separate loan contracts with Green c. collective arbitration; and Tree initiated several class actions in court, and in response Green d. collective and mass claims in investment arbitration. Tree requested that the court compel individual arbitrations. The lower state court certified the class and ordered arbitration before a sole arbitrator. The arbitrator subsequently issued an award against A. The Development of Class Arbitration in Green Tree, who then challenged the award in the U.S. courts on the the U.S. basis that the imposition of class arbitration was not in accordance with the parties’ arbitration agreements, since those agreements 4. Class arbitration first developed in the U.S. It was based on class were silent on the issue.8 The South Carolina Supreme Court action litigation suits under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil rejected Green Tree’s challenge and upheld the award, holding that Procedure – civil suits in which one or more named plaintiffs assert “class-wide arbitration may be ordered even when the arbitration claims on behalf of a defined class of similarly-situated persons agreement is silent, if it would serve efficiency and equity, and against one or more defendants. Similarly, class arbitration involves would not result in prejudice”.9 one or more named claimants asserting claims in arbitration on 9. The U.S. Supreme Court did not reach a majority decision (split behalf of a defined class of similarly-situated persons against one 4-1-3-1), and issued a fragmented set of opinions. However, a or more defendants.2 In addition, like U.S. class actions suits, majority of five of the nine judges accepted that an arbitrator had the class arbitrations proceed on an opt-out basis, which means that authority to interpret an arbitration agreement and decide whether members of a class (a large and possibly indeterminate group of class arbitration was permitted, even in the case where class action persons) subject to class arbitration would be parties to the dispute, arbitrations are not expressly authorised in the relevant arbitration unless they take affirmative steps to opt out and pursue a separate agreement.10 arbitration claim.3 The typical class arbitration involves claims 1 ICLG TO: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2017 WWW.ICLG.COM © Published and reproduced with kind permission by Global Legal Group Ltd, London Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP Class, Collective and Mass 10. Bazzle was therefore widely interpreted as authority that both in the future. It is relatively well-settled that class arbitration will be arbitrators and judges can order class arbitration even where an permitted where expressly authorised by an arbitration agreement. arbitration agreement does not expressly authorise class arbitration.11 However, where an arbitration agreement does not so provide, it This landmark decision opened the door to a substantial increase in is not clear whether class arbitration can proceed, and whether the number of class arbitrations in the U.S.12 It also prompted two an arbitral tribunal has the authority to interpret the arbitration U.S. arbitration institutions, the American Arbitration Association agreement, such that the U.S. courts must defer to its decision, and (“AAA”) and JAMS, to promulgate specialised rules for class U.S. federal and state courts continue to grapple with these issues.25 arbitrations.13 Following Bazzle, over 300 class arbitrations were initiated under the AAA Rules between 2003 and 2012 alone, B. Class Arbitration Outside the U.S. collectively involving billions of dollars in claims.14 11. Since 2010, however, a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions 17. Outside the U.S., there have been very few reported instances have appeared to limit the effect of Bazzle and cast doubt on of U.S.-style class arbitration. One notable exception is Canada, whether class arbitration is permitted absent express agreement in whose courts have considered, although only obiter dicta, the an arbitration clause. possibility of adopting U.S.-style class arbitration in several 12. In Stolt-Nielson v AnimalFeeds,15 the U.S. Supreme Court decisions invalidating class action waivers in consumer claims, and vacated an award which had held that class arbitration was appear open to permitting class arbitration even where the parties’ permissible even though the various arbitration agreements were agreement is silent on the issue.26 However, there have not yet silent on class arbitration, where the parties had stipulated that been any reported instances of class arbitration in Canada. The their arbitration agreement was “silent” as to the availability of other notable exception is Colombia, where the Colombian courts class arbitration. It held that Bazzle had not reached a majority in the Valencia v Bancolombia case, ordered claims under similar and therefore did not decide this issue. The Court then held that arbitration agreements to proceed by way of class arbitration,27 and an arbitration agreement could not be interpreted as permitting upheld the subsequent class arbitration award.28 class arbitration unless it was clear that “the parties had agreed to 18. In Europe, there have been no reported judicial decisions on the authorize class arbitration”, which could not be inferred from the permissibility (or otherwise) of class arbitration. Many jurisdictions fact of an agreement to arbitrate, without more.16 It also held that the in Europe do not recognise or provide any mechanism for U.S.-style arbitrators had exceeded their authority by considering their “own class action procedures in their domestic litigation systems.29 For consideration of sound policy” based on the perception of a “post- example, English civil procedure rules permit representative actions Bazzle consensus… that class arbitration is beneficial”, rather than through Group Litigation Orders, but these are not like U.S.-style interpreting the parties’ contract.17 The Court further reasoned that class actions because they are not opt-out procedures whereby “class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such members of a class are presumptively treated as parties unless they a degree” that the bare fact of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, specifically choose to be excluded.30 without more, could not be read as consent to class arbitration.18 19. There are a number of challenges to adopting U.S.-style class 13. As commentators have observed, Stolt-Nielson appeared to arbitration in the European context. First, U.S.-style class arbitration reverse Bazzle on the interpretation of silence regarding class procedures are arguably incompatible with the requirement for arbitration in the parties’ arbitration agreement.19 The U.S. Supreme party consent to jurisdiction under many national arbitration laws. Court’s reasoning that class arbitration “changes the nature of For example, in England, Section 35(2) of the English Arbitration arbitration” has also been heavily criticised by commentators as Act 1996 provides that the court can only consolidate multiple reflecting an overly narrow view of arbitration as a small-scale and arbitrations where all the parties consent to such consolidation. This bipartite procedure – one that is out of touch with the actual practice consent requirement would not be satisfied by all members of a class of arbitration, which has taken widely varying and flexible forms, under U.S.-style class arbitration.31 and encompasses multiparty and high-stakes disputes.20 20. Second, U.S.-style class arbitrations raise potential due process 14. In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court again considered the concerns regarding the selection of the tribunal because most of the permissibility of class arbitration under the FAA in Oxford Health class members are unlikely to have any opportunity to participate in Plans v Sutter,21 but this time refused to vacate the tribunal’s award, the selection of the tribunal. This issue may affect the enforceability which had found that class arbitration was permissible. This time, of any class arbitration award.32 Commentators note that such the Court emphasised that the award-debtor bore a significant challenges may be difficult to overcome in European jurisdictions burden of proof in establishing that the arbitrators had exceeded without some form of legislative reform.33 By contrast, such their authority under Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, and this burden concerns do not arise in the U.S. context, because the court retains had not been discharged.22 a role in U.S. class arbitrations to ensure due process protection of 15. The Court distinguished Stolt-Nielson as a special case where absent class members. In addition, in the case of class arbitrations the arbitrators were not construing the contract but attempting to under specialised class arbitration rules, such as the “AAA make public policy.23 By contrast, in Oxford Health Plans, the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations”, there are particular tribunal had focused on the specific text of the arbitration clause provisions addressing the method of appointment of the tribunal.34 that stated “no civil action… shall be instituted before any court” and reasoned that the parties’ intent was to vest in the arbitration process, everything that was prohibited from the court process, C. The Development of Collective which would therefore include class actions. Thus, the Court Arbitration found that the tribunal’s decision permitting class arbitration was entitled to judicial deference because the tribunal did “construe the 21. In recent times, other forms of large-scale multiparty arbitration contract”.24 proceedings besides class arbitrations have developed, both in 16. In light of these recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. and elsewhere. One notable form of such proceedings the current status of class arbitration in the U.S. is unclear, and it is is collective arbitration, which has been defined loosely by uncertain how class arbitration in the U.S. will continue to develop commentators to include all types of large-scale, representational 2 WWW.ICLG.COM ICLG TO: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2017 © Published and reproduced with kind permission by Global Legal Group Ltd, London Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP Class, Collective and Mass or collective redress mechanisms that are not U.S.-style class 28. There has not been much discussion of the compatibility of arbitration.35 The key difference is that collective arbitrations are other major arbitral rules – such as the HKIAC, ICC, LCIA or SIAC not based on an opt-out procedure, whereby members of a class are Rules – with class or collective arbitration procedures. There are no taken to automatically have participated in a class arbitration unless reported cases of class or collective arbitrations under any of these they take affirmative steps to opt out of the action. arbitral rules, although all of them incorporate some form of joinder 22. This section discusses two types of collective arbitration. It also and/or consolidation procedure for administering multi-contract and discusses whether collective or class arbitration would be compatible multiparty disputes. with the joinder, consolidation and multi-contract arbitration 29. It would be very difficult, in principle, to fit class or collective procedures that are provided for under the rules of major arbitration arbitration within these procedures, given the criteria expressed in institutions, such as the HKIAC, ICC, LCIA or SIAC Rules. these rules. For example, the joinder mechanisms tend to require 23. The first type of collective arbitration developed in the U.S., (albeit to varying degrees and expressed in different ways) that partly as a response to U.S. case law on class arbitrations. Under the additional party to be joined be bound by the same arbitration U.S. law, collective arbitration is distinct from class arbitration agreement.48 This would not cover class or collective arbitrations because it provides for opt-in rather than opt-out procedures. where multiple claims are initiated by multiple parties under distinct Unnamed members of a defined class of potential claimants are arbitration agreements. Some rules additionally provide that joinder therefore not parties to a dispute unless they opt to participate in is also possible where all the parties, including the additional party the dispute. Thus, in Velex v Perrin Holder & Davenport Capital to be joined, consent to such joiner.49 Although this may be broad Corp.,36 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New enough to encompass the joinder of a large number of claimants York allowed collective arbitration of certain claims under the Fair within a class, which would resemble something akin to class Labor Standards Act, despite a prohibition of class arbitration under or collective arbitration, it requires the express consent of the the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) Arbitration respondent, which would be extremely difficult (if not impossible) Rules. The court in that case reasoned that the “critically important to obtain in practice. difference” between collective and class arbitrations is that collective 30. Likewise, the provisions for consolidation or multiple contract arbitrations are “opt-in” procedures, and therefore only bind arbitration under these rules tend to require either that the claims similarly situated individuals who have “affirmatively consented to be made under the same arbitration agreement, or that the claims join the action” (for example, by adding one’s name to the action).37 be made under compatible arbitration agreements and arise out of 24. According to commentators, collective arbitration is a recent a single or related series of economic transactions.50 As discussed phenomenon and it is unclear whether and which precedents relating above, the former criterion would not cover class or collective to class arbitration will apply to collective arbitration.38 While some arbitrations. The latter criterion would also not encompass class or decisions have discussed applying the Bazzle approach to collective collective arbitrations because claims on behalf of a class of multiple arbitration,39 there are others that also discuss the non-applicability parties tend to involve separate and distinct transactions whose only of Stolt-Nielsen to collective arbitration based on differences in link is that they involve a common fact pattern and claims against procedures.40 the same respondent – it is highly unlikely that this will satisfy the criteria under the rules. Some rules additionally provide that 25. The second type of collective arbitration developed at the consolidation would be possible where all the parties agree51 – again, initiative of the German Institution of Arbitration (the “DIS”). while this may theoretically encompass class or collective arbitration, Following a decision in April 2009 by the German Federal Court of it requires the express consent of the respondent and therefore such a Justice which held that shareholder disputes were arbitrable,41 the provision is of little practical value to potential claimants. DIS created a specialised set of rules, entitled the “Supplementary Rules for Corporate Law Disputes” (“the DIS Supplementary Rules”). These rules describe a unique form of large-scale multiparty D. Collective and Mass Claims in arbitration that is administered by an arbitral institution for a narrow Investment Treaty Arbitration range of disputes – i.e., those involving limited liability companies and partnerships, but not listed companies.42 Commentators have 31. Largescale multi-party arbitration proceedings have also described arbitration under the DIS Supplementary Rules as featured in the context of investment treaty arbitration. The most Europe’s first form of collective arbitration.43 There are, however, prominent instances of such collective or mass arbitrations in differences with U.S.-style class and collective arbitration, which the investment treaty context can be found in the jurisdictional have been described as “trans-substantive” because they apply awards of Abaclat v The Argentine Republic,52 Ambiente Ufficio regardless of the subject matter and type of dispute.44 v The Argentine Republic,53 and Giovanni Alemanni v Argentine 26. The DIS Supplementary Rules provide that they apply only Republic54 – three cases which arose out of the Argentinian where the parties have referred to these rules in their arbitration government’s attempts to restructure its sovereign debt following agreement within or outside the articles of incorporation, or have the 2001 financial crisis, offering to exchange existing Argentine otherwise agreed on their application.45 debt instruments for new debt instruments at a 65% discount. 27. The DIS Supplementary Rules also provide for mechanisms to 32. In all three cases, claims were commenced by holdout Italian define and involve “Concerned Others” who may be treated as either bondholders against Argentina under the ICSID Convention intervenors or parties, with different rights and responsibilities.46 pursuant to the 1990 Argentina-Italy Bilateral Arbitration Treaty Both claimants and respondents may nominate “Concerned Others”. (“BIT”).55 The tribunals in all three cases accepted jurisdiction The joinder of a “Concerned Other” does not require the consent over and found admissible claims by very large numbers of of the other parties – they may be joined as of right within a fixed claimants: approximately 60,000 in Abaclat; 90 in Ambiente and time of 30 days from the statement of claim, or subsequently at the 74 in Alemanni. Both the Abaclat and Ambiente tribunals reached discretion of the tribunal.47 In contrast, the AAA Supplementary majority decisions that were accompanied by strong dissenting Rules and JAMS Class Action Procedures do not include such opinions, while the Alemmani tribunal’s decision was unanimous. mechanisms or features, and all members of a class (usually 33. All three jurisdictional awards attempted to address the question claimants) are to be treated equally. of characterisation and terminology, using the terms “collective” and 3 ICLG TO: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2017 WWW.ICLG.COM © Published and reproduced with kind permission by Global Legal Group Ltd, London Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP Class, Collective and Mass “mass” but not attaching any particular legal significance to these from that found in a contractual agreement between specific parties terms, choosing instead to focus on substance over form in deciding in the commercial arbitration context.70 Because such consent jurisdiction over and admissibility of such claims. In Abaclat, the is found in an open-ended offer by a host State contained in an majority characterised the claim as “mass proceedings”, following investment treaty, it is “inherently” directed by that State towards a preliminary observation that there was “no uniform terminology a multitude of unspecified and potentially qualifying investors who concerning the various kinds of proceedings involving a high meet the conditions specified in the treaty.71 number of proceedings”.56 It did not ascribe any particular legal 39. There are also recent decisions that appear to limit the significance to the term.57 In Ambiente and Alemanni, both tribunals availability of collective or mass claims in investment arbitration. disclaimed the usefulness of labels such as “mass”, “collective”, For example, in Guaracachi America and Rurelec v Bolivia,72 the “aggregate” or “representative”. The Ambiente majority held that tribunal held that Bolivia did not consent to claims by multiple these were not “technical terms with a fixed meaning, at least not claimants under two different treaties, namely the U.K.-Bolivia BIT in the framework of the ICSID Convention”,58 and found that none and the U.S.-Bolivia BIT. The availability of collective or mass of the terms carried any legal significance under international law.59 claims is therefore likely to be limited where multiple investors are 34. In order to determine jurisdiction, the tribunals in each of the seeking to claim against multiple different treaties. Also, in Erhas three cases focused essentially on question of whether Argentina’s v Turkmenistan, the tribunal declined jurisdiction over a claim by general consent to ICSID arbitration under the Argentina-Italy BIT 22 Turkish investors against Turkmenistan, on the basis that there encompassed consent to claims by multiple investors being brought were entirely “unrelated claims” advanced by unrelated claimants collectively against it in a single arbitral proceeding. The Alemanni in relation to different and unrelated investments.73 tribunal, as well as the Abaclat and Ambiente majorities, took the view that there was such consent. E. Conclusion 35. The Abaclat majority reasoned that, if the tribunal had jurisdiction over each individual claimant, it was difficult to 40. As the disputes submitted to arbitration grow in complexity conceive of how the tribunal could lose such jurisdiction simply and scale, there has been an increased demand for mechanisms because the number of claimants crosses a certain threshold.60 It also that provide an efficient means for resolving large-scale multiparty reasoned that the type of investment, namely bonds, was susceptible disputes, particularly those involving a very large number of claims to a large number of investors which would require “collective based on a similar or substantially similar fact pattern. Courts and relief” in order to provide “effective protection” to the investment.61 tribunals have also, in recent years, paid increased attention to This reasoning was endorsed by the Ambiente majority, which also providing a more efficient means of redress for such claims. considered that the travaux preparatoires of the ICSID Convention 41. The use of such mechanisms can benefit parties, including and the numerous examples of past ICSID cases involving multiple claimants, among several other factors, supported this conclusion.62 through the potential savings in cost and time from a single proceeding, and the avoidance of inconsistent and contradictory The Alemanni tribunal reached the same result based on slightly decisions. Nevertheless, they also raise difficult questions relating different reasoning, choosing to focus on the fact that Article 25 of to consent, which may also create uncertainties at the post-award the ICSID Convention speaks of “consent in writing” and “consent” and enforcement stage. but does not set out a staged process by which some kinds of consent are to be established differently from others.63 42. It is clear that the law regarding class, collective and mass arbitrations is in a state of development. The lack of clarity and 36. The dissenting arbitrators in Abaclat and Ambiente argued that consistency is unhelpful, and undermines the certainty that is there was no consent, observing in both cases that ICSID practice needed by individuals, corporations and government entities who required an additional “secondary consent” from the Respondent deal with transnational economic transactions, and who may have State to the particular type of arbitration proceedings. The Abaclat to deal with large-scale multiparty disputes that span multiple dissent drew on U.S. jurisprudence in Stolt-Nielsen and AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion,64 observing that collective or mass jurisdictions and legal systems. As class, collective and mass arbitrations become more common, the hope is that the international arbitrations were fundamentally different to bilateral arbitration arbitration community and courts will develop a harmonised and and “change[d] the nature of arbitration”, and that therefore a mere consistent approach to the issues. consent to ICSID arbitration under the Argentina-Italy BIT “did not cover collective mass claim actions (regardless of the denomination) and that a special or secondary consent is needed”.65 The Ambiente Endnotes dissent distinguished “mass claims proceedings” (which it stated, tended to be “representative proceedings”) from ordinary “multi- 1. See e.g. Abaclat and others v The Argentine Republic, party proceedings”, reasoning that the former was incompatible ICSID Case No ARB/07/5 (Decision on Jurisdiction and with the ICSID arbitration system in light of the silence of the Admissibility, 4 August 2011), at para. 484. (“It should be ICSID basic texts.66 It stated that, unlike “mass claims proceedings”, stressed that there is no uniform terminology concerning the ordinary “multi-party” proceedings were not incompatible and various kinds of proceedings involving a high number of therefore were capable of being consented to on an ad hoc basis by parties, and that various jurisdictions, courts and authors refer respondent States.67 to different terms and meanings.”) 2. See e.g. S. I. Strong, Class, Mass, and Collective Arbitration 37. The issues regarding consent in Abaclat, Ambiente and Alemanni in National and International Law, 2013, at para. 1.12; R. are difficult and have been hotly debated by commentators.68 For Kent and M. String, Availability of Class Arbitration Under example, some commentators have observed that the Abaclat US Law, in A. Van den Berg (ed.) Legitimacy: Myths, majority undervalued the importance of the State’s consent in Realities, Challenges, ICCA Congress Series No. 18, 2014, international law, and ignored the more important question of 853, at p. 853. whether Argentina had in fact consented to mass proceedings.69 3. See e.g. S. I. Strong, Class, Mass, and Collective Arbitration 38. However, other commentators have pointed out that the nature in National and International Law, 2013, at para. 1.13; of consent in investment treaty arbitration is fundamentally different Keating v Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1208–1209. 4 WWW.ICLG.COM ICLG TO: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2017 © Published and reproduced with kind permission by Global Legal Group Ltd, London Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP Class, Collective and Mass 4. See e.g. Vernon v Drexel Burnham &Co. Inc. 52 Cal.App.3d 28. See L. H. Kuck and G. A. Litt, International Class Arbitration, 706, 716. in World Class Actions: A Guide to Group and Representative 5. Keating v Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584; G. Born, Actions Around The Globe, 2012, 700, at pp. 720–723. International Commercial Arbitration, at pp. 1508–1509. 29. B. Hanotiau, Complex Arbitrations, 2005, at paras. 557–613; 6. A number of decisions by U.S. federal courts (but not the U.S. G. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014, pp. Supreme Court) declined to allow class arbitration, ordering 1523–1524. parties to pursue separate arbitrations under each arbitration 30. See e.g. I. Hunter QC and L. Flannery, Class Action and agreement, unless the parties’ agreement clearly authorised Arbitration Procedures – United Kingdom, in P. Billiet (ed.), class arbitration. See e.g. Gammaro v Thorp Consumer Class Arbitration in the European Union, 2013, 185, at p. 197. Discount Co., 828 F.Supp. 673, 674 (D. Minn. 1993); Champ 31. Because it is very unlikely that such members would have v Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1995). provided specific consent to having their disputes heard in a 7. Bazzle v Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. 444 (U.S. S.Ct. single class action proceeding in their arbitration agreements. 2003). See also I. Hunter QC and L. Flannery, Class Action and 8. Bazzle v Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. 444 (U.S. S.Ct. Arbitration Procedures – United Kingdom, in P. Billiet (ed.), 2003), at p. 444. Class Arbitration in the European Union, 2013, 185, at p. 198. 9. Bazzle v Green Tree Fin. Corp., 351 S.C. 244, 266 (S.C. 2002). 32. See e.g. G. Nater-Bass, Class Action Arbitration: A New Challenge?, ASA Bull. 671, 680-687; I. Hunter QC and L. 10. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 351 S.C. 244, 266 (S.C. Flannery, Class Action and Arbitration Procedures – United 2002), at p. 453; R. Kent and M. String, Availability of Kingdom, in P. Billiet (ed.), Class Arbitration in the European Class Arbitration Under US Law, in A. Van den Berg (ed.) Union, 2013, 185, at p. 198. Legitimacy: Myths, Realities, Challenges, ICCA Congress Series No. 18, 2014, 853, at p. 857. 33. G. Nater-Bass, Class Action Arbitration: A New Challenge?, ASA Bull. 671, 687–689. 11. See e.g. G. Born and C. Salas, The United States Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, 2012 21, at 34. S. I. Strong, supra note 2, at paras. 2.26–2.28. p. 22; R. Kent and M. String, Availability of Class Arbitration 35. S. I. Strong, supra note 2, at para. 1.31. Under US Law, in A. Van den Berg (ed.) Legitimacy: Myths, 36. Velex v. Perrin Holden & Davenport Capital Corp, 769 F. Realities, Challenges, ICCA Congress Series No. 18, 2014, Supp. 2d 445. 853, at p. 857; S. I. Franck, supra note 2, at para. 1.22. 37. Velex, at pp. 446–447. 12. See G. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014, at 38. S. I. Strong, supra note 2, at para. 1.33. p. 1511. 39. Johnson v Long John silver’s Rests. Inc., 320 F Supp. 2d 656, 13. See e.g. S. I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration Change the 668. Nature of Arbitration, 2012, 17 Harv. Neg. L. Rev. 201, at p. 206. 40. JetBlue Airways Corp. v Stephenson, 88 A.D.3d 567, 573– 574. 14. G. Born and C. Salas, The United States Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, 2012, 21, at pp. 30- 41. S v M, Case No. II ZR 255/08 (German Federal Court of 33. Justice, 6 April 2009). 15. Stolt-Nielson S.A. v AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 42. DIS Supplementary Rules, Introduction. (2010). 43. S. I. Strong, Collective Arbitration Under the DIS Supplementary 16. Stolt-Nielson, at 1767-1776. Rules for Corporate Law Disputes, 29 ASA Bulletin 45, 2011, at p. 64. 17. Stolt-Nielson, at 1775. 44. See S. I. Strong, supra note 2, at para. 2.151. 18. Stolt-Nielson, at 1775. 45. DIS Supplementary Rules, Section 1(1). 19. G. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014, at p. 1516; S. I. Strong, supra note 2, at para. 2.5. 46. DIS Supplementary Rules, Sections 2–4. 20. G. Born and C. Salas, The United States Supreme Court and 47. See S. I. Strong, supra note 2, at para. 2.169. Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, 2012, 21, at p. 39; 48. See e.g. HKIAC Rules, Art. 27.1; ICC Rules, Art. 6(4)(i); S. I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration Change the Nature of SIAC Rules, Rule 7.1(a). Arbitration, 2012, 17 Harv. Neg. L. Rev. 201, at pp. 268–269. 49. See e.g. SIAC Rules, Rule 7.1(b). 21. Oxford Health Plans LLC v Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2069–70 50. See e.g. HKIAC Rules, Art. 28.1(b); ICC Rules, 10(b); SIAC (U.S. S.Ct. 2013). Rules, Rule 8.1(b). 22. Oxford Health Plans, at 2068. 51. See e.g. HKIAC Rules, Art. 28.1(a); SIAC Rules, Rule 8.1(a). 23. Oxford Health Plans, at 2070. 52. Abaclat and others v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 24. Oxford Health Plans, at 2070. No ARB/07/5 (Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 25. See S. I. Strong, supra note 2, at para. 1.24; G. Born, 4 August 2011), (“Abaclat Majority Opinion”); Abaclat International Commercial Arbitration, 2014, at p. 1523. See v The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction and e.g. Robinson v J & K Admin. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. 2016 WL Admissibility, Dissenting Opinion, Georges Abi-Saab, 28 1077102 at 4 (5th Cir. Mar. 17, 2016). October 2011), (“Abaclat Dissenting Opinion”). 26. See e.g. Seidel v Telus Comm’ns Inc. 2011 S.C.C. 15; Dell 53. Ambiente Ufficio SPA and others v The Argentine Republic, Coputer Corp. v Union des consommateurs, 2007 S.C.C. ICSID Case No ARB/08/9 (Decision on Jurisdiction and 34; S. I. Franck, supra note 1, at paras. 1.28, 2.11; G. Born, Admissibility, 8 February 2013), (“Ambiente Majority International Commercial Arbitration, 2014, at pp. 1523– Opinion”); Ambiente v The Argentine Republic (Decision on 1524. Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Dissenting Opinion, Santiago Torres Bernardez, 2 May 2013), (“Ambiente Dissenting 27. Luis Alberto Duran Valencia v Bancolombia, digest by Opinion”). Jaramillo for Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA) (Arb. Trib. From Bogota Chamber of Comm. Apr. 24, 2003), 54. Giovanni Alemanni and others v The Argentine Republic, available at www.kluwerarbitration.com. ICSID Case No ARB/07/8 (Decision on Jurisdiction and 5 ICLG TO: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2017 WWW.ICLG.COM © Published and reproduced with kind permission by Global Legal Group Ltd, London Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP Class, Collective and Mass Admissibility, 17 November 2014); Alemanni and others 65. Abaclat Dissenting Opinion, at para. 190. v The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction and 66. Ambiente Dissenting Opinion, at paras. 97–99. Admissibility, Concurring Opinion, J. Christopher Thomas 67. Ambiente Dissenting Opinion, at para. 100. QC, 17 November 2014). 68. See e.g. R. Kabra, Has Abaclat v Argentina left the ICSID 55. The claims in Ambiente and Alemanni have since been with a “mass’ive” problem?, Arb. Int’l, 2015, 1; M. Aggarwal discontinued, while Argentina has very recently agreed to settle and S. Maynard, Investment Treaty Arbitration Post-Abaclat: the claims in Abaclat. See Ambiente v The Argentine Republic Towards a Taxonomy of “Mass” Claims, Cambridge J. Int’l (Order of Discontinuance of the Proceeding, 28 May 2015); & Comp. L., 2014(3), 825. Alemmani v The Argentine Republic (Order of the Tribunal Discontinuing the Proceeding, 14 December 2015); Press 69. M. Weiniger and M. McClure, Looking to the Future: Three Release, Task Force Argentina Announces Final Argentina “Hot Topics” for Investment Treaty Arbitration in the Next Settlement for Italian Bondholders, 22 April 2016, available at Ten Years, 2013, 10(4) TDM 1, 4. http://www.tfargentina.it/download/TFA%20Comunicato%20 70. M. Aggarwal and S. Maynard, Investment Treaty Arbitration 22%20aprile%202016_eng.pdf (last accessed 20 May 2016). Post-Abaclat: Towards a Taxonomy of “Mass” Claims, 56. Abaclat Majority Opinion, at para. 480. The Abaclat Cambridge J. Int’l & Comp. L., 2014(3), 825, at p. 835. majority also observed that the claims were a hybrid 71. M. Aggarwal and S. Maynard, Investment Treaty Arbitration type of “collective” proceedings, with features of both Post-Abaclat: Towards a Taxonomy of “Mass” Claims, “representative” proceedings, i.e. where a high number of Cambridge J. Int’l & Comp. L., 2014(3), 825, at p. 835. claims are brought by a representative on behalf of a mass 72. Guaracachi America, inc. and Rurelec plc v The Plurinational or class, and “aggregate” proceedings, i.e. where a high State of Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2011-17 (Award, 31 January number of claims with a similar fact pattern are aggregated 2014), at para. 334. and managed in a single set of proceedings. 73. See Luke Eric Peterson, An Uncitral Tribunal Declines 57. Abaclat Majority Opinion, at para. 480. Jurisdiction Over a Joint Treaty Claim Brought Against 58. Ambiente Majority Opinion, at para. 121. Turkmenistan By a Series Of Unrelated Claimants, 59. Alemanni, at para. 267. Investment Arbitration Reporter (23 June 2015), available http://www.iareporter.com/articles/an-uncitral-tribunal- 60. Abaclat Majority Opinion, at para. 490. declines-jurisdiction-over-a-joint-treaty-claimbrought- 61. Abaclat Majority Opinion, at para. 490. against-turkmenistan-by-a-series-of-unrelated-claimants/ 62. Ambiente Majority Opinion, at paras. 129–146. (describing Erhas and Others v Turkmenistan, UNCITRAL, 63. Alemanni, at para. 269. Award (8 June 2015)). 64. See Stolt-Nielsen SA v AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp 130 S Ct 1758 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion 131 S Ct 1740 (2011). 6 WWW.ICLG.COM ICLG TO: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2017 © Published and reproduced with kind permission by Global Legal Group Ltd, London

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Preface by Gary Born, Chair, International Arbitration Practice Group, . I am privileged to have been invited to preface the 2017 edition of The.
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