Internal Perception : The Role of Bodily Information in Concepts and Word Mastery

378 Pages·2017·3.798 MB·English

by  Sara Dellantonio, Luigi Pastore

Studies in Applied Philosophy,
Epistemology and Rational Ethics
Sara Dellantonio
Luigi Pastore
Internal
Perception
The Role of Bodily Information in
Concepts and Word Mastery
Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology
and Rational Ethics
Volume 40
Series editor
Lorenzo Magnani, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy
e-mail: [email protected]
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Atocha Aliseda
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), Coyoacan, Mexico
Giuseppe Longo
Centre Cavaillès, CNRS—Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France
Chris Sinha,
School of Foreign Languages, Hunan University, Changsha, P.R. China
Paul Thagard
Waterloo University, Waterloo, ON, Canada
John Woods
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
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Sara Dellantonio Luigi Pastore
(cid:129)
Internal Perception
The Role of Bodily Information in Concepts
and Word Mastery
123
SaraDellantonio Luigi Pastore
Department ofPsychology andCognitive Department ofEducation Science,
Sciences Psychology,Communication Science
University of Trento University of Bari
Rovereto Bari
Italy Italy
ISSN 2192-6255 ISSN 2192-6263 (electronic)
Studies in AppliedPhilosophy,Epistemology and Rational Ethics
ISBN978-3-662-55761-7 ISBN978-3-662-55763-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-55763-1
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2017951182
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Acknowledgements
Ithasnotbeeneasytowritethisbook.Ittookalongtimeandconsiderableeffortto
bringtogetherthemanyaspectsandideas,toensuretheywereconsistentwitheach
other,todevelopthemintoacoherentthesis,andtoprovideagoodsynthesisofthe
interdisciplinary fields of research under consideration. We tried to analyze the
evidenceavailablefromvariousareasofphilosophyandpsychologyandtodevelop
a truly theoretical—i.e., philosophical—perspective. We leave the reader to judge
whether this attempt was successful.
TheveryfirstpersonwewouldliketothankisMagdaElizabethAltman.Shenot
only edited this book from beginning to end, but was our first reader, a reader
whose opinion also mattered. Often her comments were even more important than
theeditingitself: Her suggestionsmade this book far more clear and accurate. She
not only helped us with the manuscript; her friendship and support were essential
over this long endeavor.
Theseminalideasforthisbookdatebackmanyyearsandbegantobedeveloped
in 2007–2008 when we were working on a project on the epistemological status
of the notion of representation that was financed by CRUI, DAAD, and Ateneo
Italo-Tedescowithintheambitofthe‘Vigoni-Programm.’Wewouldthereforelike
to thank Prof. Hans-Jörg Sandkühler for having promoted and supported this
projectandforhisimportanttheoreticalcontributions.Wewouldalsoliketothank
all the people who, directly or indirectly, contributed to the various initiatives we
organized at the Zentrum Philosophische Grundlage der Wissenschaften at the
University of Bremen in Germany and the Department of Bioethics at the
University of Bari in Italy, by making suggestions and offering opinions on the
perspectives we were proposing. Among them: Sahran Douhib, Silja
Freudenberger,LotharKnatz,AndreasJürgens,MarcoInnamorati,FurioSemerari,
Francesco Saverio Trincia and Manfred Stöckler. These ideas were then further
developed during a period of research we spent at the Centre for Critical and
Cultural Theory at the University of Cardiff in the UK. Our sincere gratitude goes
to Professor Ian Buchanan for sponsoring us as visiting fellows and for taking the
time to discuss our work with us.
v
vi Acknowledgements
Afirstdraftofsomeofthepositionsweargueforinthisbookwaspresentedat
severalconferencesandseminarsheldattheUniversitiesofBari,Bremen,Cologne,
Guangzhou,Osnabrück,Siena,andTrento.Thediscussionswehadattheseevents,
withbothourcollaboratorsandthehighlyqualifiedpublicthatattended,helpedus
togreatlyimproveourarguments.Inthisregard,wewouldespeciallyliketothank
Jagna Brudzinska, Vittorio De Palma, Remo Job, Ping Li, Dieter Lohmar, Valerio
Meattini, Claudio Mulatti, Sandro Nannini, Henning Peuckert, Manfred Sommer,
Achim Stephan, Michela Summa and Giuseppe Varnier. Moreover, our gratitude
alsogoestoanumberofcolleaguesandfriends(mostlyfriendswhoalsohappento
be colleagues). They contributed in many ways to improving the quality of this
book, through mutual discussions, collaborations, suggestions, criticisms, ques-
tions, reflections, and their own work: Saulo de Freitas Araujo, Pierluigi Barrotta,
Claudia Bonfiglioli, Andrea Bosco, Roberto Cubelli, Antonio Di Oronzo, Nevia
Dolcini, Gianluca Esposito, James Hartzell, Pim Haselager, Alexei Krioukov,
Diego Azevedo Leite, Ferdinando Menga, Maria Paola Paladino, Alessandra
Pastore, Francesco Pavani, Giuseppe Saracino, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Achille
Varzi, and Francesco Vespignani. Some other friends—most notably Giorgio
Busatto, Maria Micaela Coppola, Marta Cazzanelli, and Mario Velluso—were
invaluablemerelybytheirpresenceandbypursuingotherprojectswithusthatwe
very much care about.
Figures 1 and 2 in Chap. 3 and Fig. 1 in Chap. 4 include some hand-drawn
illustrations: We are very grateful to Livia Cattani for her artwork.
Parts of sections §3, §4, §5 in Chapter 4 were taken from an article we
published under the title Sensing aliveness in Integrative Psychological &
Behavioral Science. We thank the editor-in-chief, Professor Jaan Valsiner, for
giving us the permission to use this material.
Wewouldalsoliketothankbothourfamilies.Eventhoughtheydonotalways
understandwhatwedoorwhywedoit,theyarealwayssupportiveandextremely
patient, tolerating our bad habit of working on Sundays and holidays.
AspecialthanksisduetoMassimoBaraleforsupportingandencouragingusin
so many ways. Sadly, he did not live to see this work in print: his unexpected
departure was a great loss to us.
Last but not least, we would like to thank Prof. Lorenzo Magnani for believing
in our project and for having the courtesy and the patience to let us work without
pressure for such a long time, even though we made commitments to finish this
workmuchearlier.OurthanksalsogotoourSpringerPublishingEditor,Leontina
diCecco,whoofferedusherprofessionalassistancefromthebookproposaltothe
submission of the manuscript.
This book was truly cooperative. Even though at the beginning we divided the
chapters,thinkingthateachofuswouldbethefirstauthorforhalfofthem,intheend
weexchanged,modified,andrewrotethemtogethersomanytimes,movingsections
back and forth between the chapters, that it is now impossible to say which one
should be considered first authored by whom. So, all of them should be considered
co-authored,whiletheorderoftheauthors’namesonthebookismerelyalphabetical.
Of course, we both take full responsibility for any mistakes we may have made.
Contents
1 First Person Access to Mental States. .... .... .... .... ..... .... 1
1 Mentalism and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind... ..... .... 2
2 The Influence of Logical Positivism and of Psychological
Behaviorism on the Study of Mind... .... .... .... ..... .... 8
3 Third Person Approaches to Mental States as a Strategy
to Develop a Scientific Psychology .. .... .... .... ..... .... 13
4 After and Beyond Ryle: Antimentalist Heritage Within
Mentalistic Renaissance ... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 20
5 Qualitative Properties and First Person Experience... ..... .... 27
6 First Person Experience and Embodiment.. .... .... ..... .... 34
References.. .... .... .... ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 41
2 The Misleading Aspects of the Mind/Computer Analogy. ..... .... 47
1 The Idea of a Symbol System and the Grounding Problem . .... 48
2 Representations and Bodily Interferences in Information ... .... 55
3 The Body as Information Source: Gibson’s Hypothesis
of an Integrated Perceptual and Propriosensitive System ... .... 63
4 ‘Proprioception’ as Propriosensitive Information. .... ..... .... 73
5 Bodily Mapping and Propriosensitive Monitoring.... ..... .... 78
6 Bodily Feelings and Emotional Experience. .... .... ..... .... 86
References.. .... .... .... ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 93
3 Semantic Competence from the Inside: Conceptual Architecture
and Composition.... .... ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 99
1 Concepts and Meanings: Why They Are Not One
and the Same Thing. ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 100
2 Concepts and Meanings: Mutual Relationships.. .... ..... .... 104
3 Lexical Semantic Competence Fully Loaded ... .... ..... .... 109
4 “A Pile of Bird Features Does not Make a Bird”.... ..... .... 113
5 Perceptual and Conceptual Representations: Grounding
Concrete Concepts .. ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 123
vii
viii Contents
6 Schematic Image and Perceptual Schema.. .... .... ..... .... 134
7 The Issue of Referential Competence. .... .... .... ..... .... 140
References.. .... .... .... ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 144
4 In the Beginning There Were Categories . .... .... .... ..... .... 149
1 Categories—Towards a Definition (I): A Brief Overview
of the Classical Philosophical Tradition ... .... .... ..... .... 150
2 Categories—Towards a Definition (II): Contemporary
Cognitive Research.. ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 159
3 The Example of Folk Biological Categories.... .... ..... .... 166
4 The Origin of the Categorical Dichotomy Animate/Inanimate ... 172
5 Folk-Biological Categorical and Conceptual Hierarchies ... .... 178
6 The Cognitive Primacy of Categories. .... .... .... ..... .... 183
References.. .... .... .... ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 191
5 Internal States: From Headache to Anger. Conceptualization
and Semantic Mastery ... ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 197
1 Referential Competence and Internal States .... .... ..... .... 198
2 What are the Criteria We Use to Classify/to Conceptualize Our
Internal States?. .... ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 203
3 The Classification of Internal States and the Analogy Between
Perception and ‘Proprioception’ . .... .... .... .... ..... .... 211
4 Perceptual Theories of Emotion: Can Emotions Be Identified
on the Basis of How They Feel? .... .... .... .... ..... .... 223
5 The Cognitive Theory of Emotion: Why Cognition is Needed
to Identify Emotions. ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 234
6 How We Identify Our Own Emotions:
A Necessary Mediation.... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 240
7 Emotional Concepts and Their Referential Component:
How Feelings Become Schemata .... .... .... .... ..... .... 251
8 Some Clinical Evidence on Impaired Mastery of Emotion
Terms (I): The Alexithymic Condition.... .... .... ..... .... 260
9 When Qualitative Information is Missing. Recent Findings
on the Alexithymic Condition... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 268
10 Some Clinical Evidence on the Mastery of Emotional Terms
(II): Autism Spectrum Disorder . .... .... .... .... ..... .... 278
References.. .... .... .... ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 285
6 The ‘Proprioceptive’ Component of Abstract Concepts.. ..... .... 297
1 Abstract Terms: How Should ‘Abstraction’ Be Interpreted.. .... 298
2 Theoretical and Intratheoretical Terms in Science
and in Ordinary Usage.... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 306
3 TheDeepSenseof‘Freedom’andtheIssueofWhat‘Freedom’
Basically Refers to: An Example of an I-theoretical Concept.... 317
4 Abstract Concepts: Standard Approaches and New Insights. .... 324
Contents ix
5 The Structural Analogy Between Emotion and Abstract
Concepts.. .... .... ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 334
6 Abstraction (in Summary) and the Issue of Establishing Which
Concepts Do Have an Internal Grounding . .... .... ..... .... 341
References.. .... .... .... ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 353
Concluding Remarks ... .... ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 359