Intelligence success and failure: the human factor PDF
Preview Intelligence success and failure: the human factor
i Advanced Praise for Intelligence Success and Failure “Psychological dysfunctions have long been a preoccupation of post- mortems on intelligence failures. Bar-Joseph and McDermott contribute important insights of this sort regarding failures in warning and response. More importantly, however, they go further to apply them in powerful ways to the all-too neglected dimension of intelligence studies: cases of success in assessment and decision. Their study provides new perspectives on old cases and useful lessons for future analysts.” Richard K. Betts, Director, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, and author of Enemies of Intelligence “This fascinating book, based on a series of important case studies, moves the reader squarely into the realm of psychology—a discipline too often ignored in political science and national security studies—as these outstanding authors search for reasons why some policymakers are unable to understand and cope with indicators that point toward an incipient surprise attack.” Dr. Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of International Affairs, University of Georgia “This finely crafted study makes a major contribution to the intelligence literature. It is an extraordinary combination of theory and historical detail that enriches and adds a new dimension to our understanding of intelligence and deterrence failure.” James J. Wirtz, Dean, School of International Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School ii iii Intelligence Success and Failure iv v Intelligence Success and Failure The Human Factor vwv Uri Bar- Joseph and Rose McDermott 1 vi 1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2017 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress ISBN 978– 0– 19– 934173– 3 (hbk) ISBN 978–0–19–934174–0 (pbk) 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Paperback printed by WebCom, Inc., Canada Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America vii In memory of Alexander George, Michael Handel, and Amos Tversky, and the ever vital presence of Robert Jervis. viii ix CONTENTS Acknowledgments xiii Introduction 1 PART I: The Theoretical Framework 1. Surprise Attack: A Framework for Discussion 9 a. The concept and the context 9 b. Surprise attacks: success and failure 13 c. Surprise attacks: academic comparative studies 17 d. Pearl Harbor: uniqueness and methodological implications 19 e. Warning failures: the human factor 25 2. Examining the Learning Process 27 a. Psychological factors 29 i. Psychological factors and the learning process 29 ii. Social psychological factors: universal contributions 31 b. Unique psychological issues 41 i. Personality style: openness 42 ii. Narcissism 45 c. Applying the learning process to examine the nature of failure and success 48 PART II: The Empirical Evidence 3. The First Dyad: Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow 53 Introduction 53 Case Study I: The Failure 56 a. Hitler’s road to war 56 b. The Soviet surprise 61 i. The Soviet intelligence assets 61 ii. The information 67 iii. Intelligence estimate and the decision-m aking process 74 ( ix )
The list of books you might like
