Intelligence and Punta Huete Airfield

12 Pages·2016·2.23 MB·English

Intelligence and Policy
Intelligence and Punta Huete Airfield: A Symbol of Past
Soviet/Russian Strategic Interest in Central America
By Robert Vickers
About 60 km by road northeast of Nevertheless, the episode is an
Managua, Nicaragua, sits an airfield excellent example of the role that
with one of the longest runways in intelligence played in support of US
Central America. Officially known strategic policy in Central America
as Punta Huete, its presence is a little during a period of intense compe-
The status of the Punta
remembered but important legacy of tition for global influence between
Huete airfield and the the Cold War. It was constructed in Washington and Moscow. Since then,
the early 1980s—soon after the leftist the Sandinistas have returned to pow-
possibility that Moscow
Sandinista regime took power—with er in Nicaragua, and Punta Huete has
might send jet fighters
Soviet funds and Cuban technical finally been completed with Russian
and other Soviet mili- assistance. Punta Huete was designed financial assistance. Strange though
as a military airfield, with a 3,050 it may seem, this raises the possibil-
tary aircraft there were
meter runway capable of handling ity that Punta Huete may once again
key national security
any aircraft then in the Soviet inven- become a high priority for US intelli-
issues during the ad- tory. It also had revetments for fighter gence as Moscow renews its strategic
aircraft. interests in the Western Hemisphere.
ministration of Pres-
ident Ronald Reagan The status of the airfield and the
possibility that Moscow might send
(1981–1989).
jet fighters and other Soviet mili- The Beginning
tary aircraft there were key national
security issues during the adminis- The Sandinista regime came to
tration of President Ronald Reagan power in Nicaragua in July 1979 by
(1981–1989). As a result, the US overthrowing the country’s long-time
Intelligence Community (IC) mon- dictator, Gen. Anastasio Somoza.1
itored Punta Huete closely, and the The Sandinistas had already estab-
administration made heavy use of lished close ties with Fidel Castro,
intelligence to support its policy of beginning with a covert visit by in-
attempting to limit Soviet influence surgent leaders Daniel and Humberto
and military presence in the region. Ortega and Thomas Borge to Havana
in September 1978. Soon after the
The airfield was never completed visit, the Cubans began covertly
during the Cold War and the MiGs providing arms to the Sandinista
were never delivered, however, and insurgency via Costa Rica. Once the
Punta Huete lay abandoned and un- Sandinistas seized power, Daniel
used after the Sandinistas lost control Ortega became head of the ruling
of Nicaragua’s government in Febru- junta. His brother, Humberto, became
ary 1990 and after the Soviet Union defense minister, and Borge became
collapsed the following year.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of
the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US
government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Studies in Intelligence Vol 60, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2016) 13
Intelligence and Policy
chief of internal security as The estimate focused on
minister of interior. what were seen to be more
aggressive Cuban and Soviet
From the regime’s in-
policies in the region, which
ception, the most important
were judged to include more
foreigner in Managua was
military support for leftist
Cuba’s ambassador, Julian
insurgents and greater assis-
Lopez. The ambassador was
tance to the new revolutionary
considered Fidel Castro’s
governments in Nicaragua and
personal representative and
Grenada. It noted:
was in charge of all strategic
aspects of military relations Castro has more influence
between the two countries. and prestige at stake in Nic-
He was also included in all aragua than he has ever had
strategic decisions regarding in a Latin American country
the Soviet Union and Nicara- [and] Cuban support, es-
gua, including military agree- pecially in the military and
ments. The Soviets preferred security fields, is already
that all such agreements be Daniel Ortega and Fidel Castro review troops greeting the increasing, including more
handled by a tripartite com- latter’s arrival in Managua to help celebrate the regime’s sophisticated equipment
mission of the three coun- first anniversary in July 1980. The relationship with Cuba supplied from Cuban inven-
tries, and Havana’s approval was Nicaragua’s most important at the time. Photo © Bett- tories and transshipped from
man/Getty.
was required.2 the USSR.5
already extremely concerned about
Thus, when Defense Minister what they saw as growing Soviet and This NIE was followed by another
Ortega led a delegation to Moscow in Cuban influence in Latin America, in September 1981, titled Insurgency
May 1980, the Soviets agreed to help especially in Central America and the and Instability in Central America.
train and equip the new Sandinista Caribbean. They were particularly Its key judgments included the fol-
armed forces, but the details were worried, in view of Fidel Castro’s lowing assertion:
to be worked out by the tripartite strong support to the Sandinistas,
The principal objectives of
commission. In November 1981, that Nicaragua could become another
Cuba and the USSR in Central
after negotiations were complete, Cuba.
America are to consolidate the
Ortega returned to Moscow to sign a
full scale military aid treaty with the When William Casey became Sandinista revolution in Nicara-
Soviet Union, the details of which the director of central intelligence gua, and to use Nicaragua as a
remained secret. Nevertheless, the (DCI) a week after Reagan’s inau- base for spreading leftist insur-
regime publicly announced that guration, he made it clear that he gency elsewhere in the region.
with foreign assistance, Nicaragua wanted a strong, new intelligence Indeed, by virtue of its location,
intended to build a military force of focus on Cuba and Central America.4 cooperation with Communist
200,000, including active duty mem- One immediate result was a national and other radical advisers, and
bers and militia.3 intelligence estimate (NIE) titled support for Central American
Cuban Policy Toward Latin Amer- insurgencies, Nicaragua has be-
ica. Produced in June 1981, it was come the hub of the revolution-
the first estimate in nearly a decade ary wheel in Central America.
Growing US Concern
to cover the topic of regional Cuban
influence.a
When President Reagan took
office in January 1981, he and his
with varying degrees of redactions. They
senior national security officials were a. All the NIEs and intelligence products are available in the FOIA Electronic Read-
cited in this article have been declassified, ing Room in www.cia.gov.
14 Studies in Intelligence Vol 60, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2016)
Intelligence and Policy
The estimate went on to state that a
secret defense pact had been conclud-
ed between Managua and Havana,
and that as a result, Nicaragua already
had the largest standing army in the
region. By this time, US intelligence
satellites and aircraft had begun to
detect the arrival in Nicaragua of
Soviet heavy weapons, including
tanks and artillery. Reports also began
arriving of Nicaraguan pilots training
in Bulgaria and of Soviet and Cuban
plans to provide MiG-21s to the San-
dinistas. The estimate added that the
aircraft could arrive in Nicaragua by
early 1982.6
Concerned about this intelli-
gence, Reagan met with his National
Daniel Ortega during a highly publicized visit in May 1982 to Moscow and a meeting
Security Council (NSC) in November
with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, who promised a visit to Nicaragua. None of the
1981 to discuss countering the Soviet public statements alluded to any aid beyond diplomatic support to the Sandinista leader-
and Cuban actions in the region. ship. Photo: © Tass/Getty.
Discussions were also held about
the delivery of the aircraft to the at his request. The first was a spe-
Soviet provision of additional MiG-
Sandinistas.9 cial NIE (SNIE) titled Short-Term
23 (Flogger) fighter aircraft to Cuba
Prospects for Central America. It
and the potential delivery of MiG-21
The next step was a press briefing
focused on the threat the IC believed
(Fishbed) fighters to Nicaragua. The
at the State Department in March
moderate democratic governments
results were two national security
1982, at which Deputy Director of
in the region faced in the growing
decision directives (NSDDs): NSDD
Central Intelligence Bobby Inman
strength of the Sandinista regime and
17—Cuba and Central America and
and Deputy Director of Defense
its “continued cooperation with Cuba
NSDD 21—Responding to Floggers
(Intelligence) John Hughes addressed
in promoting Marxist revolution else-
in Cuba issued in January 1982.
the growing threat to the region of
where in Central America, together
Nicaragua’s increasing acquisition
NSDD 17 tasked senior govern- with its military buildup toward
of advanced Soviet weaponry. They
ment officials to develop military dominance in the region.” The SNIE
used declassified SR-71 imagery
contingency plans against Cuba and added that, with Soviet and Cuban
and other intelligence to make their
Nicaragua and a public affairs strate- assistance, Nicaragua had already
case. They highlighted the reported
gy to inform the public and Congress built the strongest ground force in the
training of 50 Nicaraguan pilots on
of the situation in the region. NSDD region and that once it received MiG
advanced jets in Bulgaria, and they
21 explicitly stated that the United fighter aircraft, it would have the best
showed photos of the extension of
States “will not tolerate the introduc- air force as well.11
runways at several airfields in Nica-
tion of fighter aircraft into Nicara-
ragua that would make them capable The second SNIE was the first
gua.”8 Later in the year, Reagan and
of supporting MiG-21 fighters.10 At done on Soviet policy in the region in
his security team agreed that if Nica-
the time, US intelligence was still more than 11 years. Titled Soviet Pol-
ragua acquired MiGs, the US military
unaware that construction of Punta icies and Activities in Latin America
would attack and destroy them. In
Huete Airfield was about to begin. and the Caribbean, its key judgments
addition, both the Nicaraguan and
began by stating that Soviet activity
Soviet governments were warned that
Then in June 1982, DCI Casey
and interest in the region had ex-
the United States strongly opposed
approved two more estimates done
Studies in Intelligence Vol 60, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2016) 15
Intelligence and Policy
panded significantly in the past few
years and that Soviet leaders shared
Fidel Castro’s perspective that the
prospects for the success of revolu-
tionary regimes in Central America
had increased. Moreover, both gov-
ernments viewed the consolidation of
the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua as
central to promoting leftist gains in
the region. The estimate noted that,
while recent US warnings to Moscow
of the consequences of delivering
fighter aircraft to Nicaragua may
have prompted a deferral of the deliv-
eries, “preparations for their arrival
were continuing.” These included
on-going expansion and upgrading of
some Nicaraguan airfields and report-
ed training of Nicaraguan pilots to fly
MiGs. The key judgments concluded
that “over the longer term, there is a
possibility that the Soviets will seek
access to naval and air facilities in
Nicaragua” and that “such access
would have a significant impact on
US security interests, especially with
regard to the Panama Canal.”12
As a result of administration
concerns about the escalating threat
to US strategic interests in Central
America, Reagan addressed a joint
session of Congress on the situation The inset map above shows the relative locations of Managua and Punta Huete—about
in April 1983. After stating that the 25 kms across Lake Managua. It appeared in SNIE 83.3-3-85, Nicaragua: Soviet Bloc
and Radical Support for the Sandinista Regime, March 1985.
region was of vital importance to the
United States because of its location
buildup. He noted that Nicaragua Discovery of Punta Huete Airfield
adjacent to the Caribbean Basin
now had the largest army in Cen-
and the Panama Canal, he noted the
tral America, equipped with Soviet In July 1982, US intelligence
continued Soviet military presence
tanks, artillery, and aircraft, and was analysts examining images taken
in Cuba, including a combat brigade
assisted by 2,000 Cuban military and over Nicaragua by a recent recon-
and visits by Soviet submarines and
security advisers. He ended by call- naissance satellite mission identified
military aircraft. He then warned that
ing for the withdrawal of all foreign the beginning phases of construction
the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua,
military advisers and troops from of what by the end of the year could
assisted by Cuba and the Soviets, had
the region, and he asked Congress to clearly be interpreted as a large new
become a destabilizing presence in
provide $600 million in new US eco- airfield.14 Named Punta Huete, it was
the region as a result of its support
nomic and security aid to US allies in located on a peninsula on Lake Ma-
for the Salvadoran guerrillas and
Central America to help them resist nagua well away from large popula-
other leftist insurgent groups and
externally supported aggression.13 tion centers (see map above).
because of its continued military
16 Studies in Intelligence Vol 60, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2016)
Intelligence and Policy
The IC continued to monitor the
construction closely, employing
satellite imagery and photos taken
by SR-71 reconnaissance missions.
The development of Punta Huete was
also brought to the attention of senior
policymakers, who continued to see
the delivery of MiG fighter aircraft
to Nicaragua as a provocative Soviet
and Cuban move to upset the region-
al arms balance.a
The construction of Punta Huete
continued at a slow but steady pace
over the next few years. By late
1984, pavement of a 3,050 meter run-
way and taxiway was complete, and
16 aircraft revetments were under
construction. No support facilities
had been built yet, but three anti-
aircraft artillery sites defended the An overhead image of Punta Huete airfield that was used in an unclassified joint State
airfield.15 and Defense Department booklet on Soviet and Cuban military activity in Central Amer-
ica. The document was published in March 1985.
US warnings to the Soviets and
moored near a dock on which were gunships, useful for the Sandinistas
Sandinistas against the delivery of
seen crates that could contain up to 12 in their escalating conflict with US-
the MiG-21s grew more public and
MiG-21s. Several days later, the ship armed Nicaraguan insurgents, the
intense as the airfield neared comple-
had left, and the crates had disap- Contras.17
tion. In a defiant response, Defense
peared. Intelligence analysts came
Minister Humberto Ortega publicly
to a preliminary conclusion that the
announced in September 1984 that
crates had probably been loaded onto
the military airfield at Punta Huete
A Soviet Strategic Mili-
the Bakuriani and that the ship was
would be ready to receive both air-
tary Base in Nicaragua?
bound for Nicaragua. Their suspicions
craft and the pilots to fly them by no
were heightened when the ship took
later than early 1985 and that Nica-
Despite the false alarm, Reagan
a long route around South America,
ragua was seeking MiG-21s from the
administration concerns about the
passing below Cape Horn rather than
Soviet Union to station at the new
military potential of Punta Huete
going through the Panama Canal,
airbase.16
airfield by no means diminished. In
where its cargo would have been
March 1985, as a continuation of
The issue of MiG deliveries came subject to inspection.
the administration’s effort to main-
to a public head soon after. On 2 Oc-
News of the potential delivery tain public support for its regional
tober 1984, a US intelligence satellite
leaked to the press on the eve of the policies as outlined in its NSDDs, the
monitoring the Soviet arms export
November 1984 US presidential Departments of State and Defense
port of Nikolayev in the Black Sea
election. The Soviets and Sandinistas jointly issued a monograph titled The
spotted the Soviet freighter Bakuriani
denied the ship was delivering MiGs, Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central
and when the Bakuriani arrived in America and the Caribbean. The
a. The author of this article was involved the Pacific coast port of Corinto, introduction to the 45-page document
in this issue during this period, first as the
Nicaragua, on 7 November, no MiGs promised to provide “information
CIA’s senior military analyst for Central
would be unloaded. Instead, the ship about Soviet and Cuban military
America in the early 1980s and then as the
delivered Mi-24 (Hind) helicopter power and intervention in Central
NIO for Latin America from 1984 to 1987.
Studies in Intelligence Vol 60, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2016) 17
Intelligence and Policy
Soviet Aircraft of Concern in Central America and the Caribbean.
America and the Caribbean.” It went collected intelligence on US military operate in the eastern Pacific Ocean
on to address its concerns about installations on the Atlantic coast and and reach the US west coast.18
Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua, El Salva- monitored US naval activities in the
At about the same time, the IC
dor, and Fidel Castro personally. Atlantic and Caribbean.
published another SNIE on the
Richly illustrated with declassified The report included declassified region, Nicaragua: Soviet Bloc and
photographs, it highlighted Soviet photos of both San Antonio de los Radical Support for the Sandinista
supply of more than 200 MiG-21 Baños and Punta Huete Airfields. Regime. The estimate stated that
and MiG-23 fighter aircraft to Cuba It concluded that once the Soviets Soviet Bloc military and economic
and Soviet use of San Antonio de completed Punta Huete, its runway support to Nicaragua had increased
los Baños Airfield outside Havana as would be the longest military runway dramatically in 1984. It provided
a base for the periodic deployment in Central America, one capable of details of Soviet Bloc arms deliver-
of Soviet long-range Tu-95 Bear-D accommodating any aircraft in the ies, Soviet Bloc military advisers in
naval reconnaissance aircraft. These Soviet inventory. This included the Nicaragua, and Nicaraguan military
aircraft, operating out of Cuba, Tu-95, which would then be able to trainees abroad. It also stated that the
18 Studies in Intelligence Vol 60, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2016)
Intelligence and Policy
DCI Casey took note of the four assessments the IC had
delivery of the Mi-24 gunships to produced in [the past 15 months] and launched into a dis-
Corinto the previous November was quisition on the strategic significance of Soviet activities
the first direct Soviet seaborne de- in Cuba and the danger of its gaining a military foothold
livery of combat arms to Nicaragua.
in Nicaragua.
Previous arms deliveries had arrived
primarily via Cuba, Bulgaria, and
field and other facilities then under speech was an instant public relations
other Soviet Bloc countries.
construction were complete and capa- success, but it took another three
ble of handling all classes of Soviet months, and one failed vote in the
The SNIE went on to update the
aircraft. He further put Soviet activity House of Representatives, before the
status of military facilities in Nicara-
in Latin America into a global context president would win passage of the
gua being built with Soviet Bloc as-
of Soviet efforts to consolidate and aid bill and end the cutoff that Con-
sistance. These included Punta Huete
advance their positions around the gress had enacted in December 1982
Airfield. After noting that training on
world, including Afghanistan, Libya, under the first Boland Amendment.25
MiGs of Nicaraguan pilots continued
Mozambique, Angola, and Vietnam.21
in the Soviet Union, the estimate
Meanwhile, the administration
Casey then gave the floor to the
concluded that while “the Soviets
continued to try to get the Soviet
chief of the Central American Task
have refused to provide the MiG-21
Union to agree not to provide MiG-
Force for a detailed report on the
aircraft desired by Nicaragua because
21s to Nicaragua, either directly or
US supported Contra insurgency in
of concern about a US response,” the
via Cuba. Elliott Abrams, who was
Nicaragua.22
Sandinista air force would be greatly
the assistant secretary of state for
strengthened should it eventually
Secretary of Defense Caspar inter-American affairs at the time,
receive them.19
Weinberger added that Nicaragua was recalls at least three meetings in late
developing into a Soviet base and 1985 and early 1986 with Vladimir
another Cuba unless the United States Kazimirov, his counterpart in the
could restore it to a friendly gov- Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The NSC Reviews the Subject
ernment. Secretary of State George At each meeting, Abrams warned of
On 10 January 1986, the NSC Shultz concluded that the United the negative consequences to US-So-
met to review the situation in the States had laid down a marker on the viet relations if MiGs were delivered
region. In his opening remarks, NSC introduction of MiGs to Nicaragua, to Nicaragua. Each time, Kazimirov
Staff Director and National Security but the administration needed to refused to even discuss the issue,
Advisor John Poindexter noted that do more with Congress to provide saying it was an internal matter be-
Nicaragua was the one significant funding for covert military support tween Cuba and Nicaragua, and that
problem area in the region and that it to the democratic resistance to the Moscow had good relations with both
was a symbolic test of US ability to Sandinistas.23 The meeting ended countries.26
deal with Soviet influence in its own with an agreement not to leak any of
backyard.20 its contents to the public.
DCI Casey followed by observing By mid-March, a vote had been Another Assessment of So-
that the meeting was the first the NSC scheduled on a military aid package viet Strategic Interests
had held on the subject of Central for the Nicaraguan resistance and
America in 15 months. He took note efforts to prevent a communist take- In response to policymaker con-
of the four assessments the IC had over in Central American. To urge its cerns, the IC continued to monitor
produced in that time and launched passage, Reagan went on nationwide the MiG delivery issue and the status
into a disquisition on the strategic television on 16 March and detailed of Punta Huete closely. According to
significance of Soviet activities in the risks his national security team Peter Clement, a senior CIA Soviet
Cuba and the danger of its gaining had discussed in January and closed analyst at the time, the continuing
a military foothold in Nicaragua, with an appeal to the American peo- interest in Moscow’s actions in
particularly when Punta Huete Air- ple to support congressional passage Central America led in November
of the $100 million measure.24 The 1986 to a new CIA intelligence as-
Studies in Intelligence Vol 60, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2016) 19
Intelligence and Policy
“In the longer term, if the Sandinista regime can be con-
solidated, it promises to create a platform for further the Soviets would use the airfield
extending Soviet influence and supporting the left in anytime soon, they again remind-
Latin America.” ed the press of the site’s strategic
importance, observing, as the March
sessment titled Soviet Policy Toward The assessment then detailed 1985 booklet had not, that from Punta
Nicaragua.27 It presented a sober and by-then-familiar perspectives on the Huete, Soviet long-range reconnais-
cautious analysis of Soviet views and Soviet strategic view of Nicaragua sance and antisubmarine warfare
intentions concerning Nicaragua and and the MiG-21 delivery issue. It aircraft could fly missions as far north
the region. stated that “Moscow seeks to build a as Canada and even as far west as
Marxist-Leninist state in Nicaragua Hawaii. One-way missions from the
Its key judgments provided the that is militarily strong…and respon- Soviet Far East could navigate past
CIA view of Soviet strategic objec- sive to Soviet political interests.” It the Alaskan, Canadian, and US west
tives in Central America—which added: coasts to Punta Huete and refuel there
remain relevant to this day—and an for return trips. Nevertheless, the
outlook on Moscow’s likely short- In the longer term, if the San- officials believed the Soviets still did
term actions. dinista regime can be consol- not want to provoke the United States
idated, it promises to create a by delivering MiGs to Punta Huete to
Over the last few years, the platform for further extending help protect the airfield, such as they
Soviet Union has seized new Soviet influence and support- had done in Cuba before they began
opportunities to increase its ing the left in Latin America. deploying reconnaissance aircraft to
influence in Latin America at Inevitably, Moscow will press San Antonio de los Baños.30
the expense of the United States. Managua—as it has Cuba,
Nicaragua is a key element in Vietnam, and other Third World
this policy, second only to Cuba regimes—for military conces-
in importance. While seeking sions, such as air and naval A Defector Provides New In-
over the long term to establish access rights. sights into an Old Issue
a firmer strategic position in
the region through consolida- The assessment concluded by What the IC and the Reagan ad-
tion of the Sandinista regime, weighing the potential pros and cons ministration did not know at the time,
the Soviets hope to exploit the to Moscow’s strategic interests of but which would be revealed in great-
Nicaraguan conflict to isolate eventually delivering the fighter air- er detail in late 1987, was that it was
Washington diplomatically and craft, but it rejected the idea that the not Moscow that was delaying the
encourage the Latin American Soviets would be willing to trade off delivery of the MiGs to Nicaragua.
left. their Nicaraguan interests for US con- Rather, the obstacle lay in Havana.
cessions in other theaters of regional In late 1987, Roger Miranda, a senior
The Soviets are playing for time. conflict, such as Afghanistan.29 Sandinista official who was chief of
They see short-term risks to the Defense Ministry Secretariat and
their interests in precipitating By mid-1987, the Reagan admin- a close aide to Humberto Ortega, de-
a US military move against istration updated the press on the fected to the United States. He soon
Nicaragua—and are thus wary status of the Punta Huete Airfield revealed startling new details about
of provoking Washington by and its continued concerns about the strategic relationship among Ma-
allowing the Sandinistas to its eventual use as a base for Soviet nagua, Havana, and Moscow, includ-
obtain jet fighter aircraft in reconnaissance aircraft. Adminis- ing the construction of Punta Huete
the near term.... We expect the tration officials said the runway at Airfield and the MiG-21 issue.31
Soviets—in conjunction with Punta Huete was complete, but work
their Warsaw Pact partners and on support facilities such as fuel Miranda said the Sandinistas
Cuba—to continue, and indeed storage tanks was still under way wanted the Mig-21s for two reasons:
increase, their military and oth- but that little current activity was to defend the country from a potential
er assistance to the regime.28 apparent. While US officials doubted attack by the United States and/or US
20 Studies in Intelligence Vol 60, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2016)
Intelligence and Policy
Miranda added that the MiG-21s came up again in late
allies and as a symbol of firm Soviet 1987, when Soviet negotiators turned up in Managua and
commitment to Nicaragua’s defense, offered to deliver the fighters in 1992 as part of a new mil-
much as it had done for Cuba. He itary aid agreement.
confirmed that the Soviet Union
had agreed in the secret November Sandinistas should follow the leads gua and offered to deliver the fighters
1981 treaty to provide a squadron of Vietnam and Cuba by changing its in 1992 as part of a new military aid
of 12 MiG-21 aircraft by 1985, as defensive military strategy to concen- agreement being negotiated among
well as to construct a new airfield to trate on an all-out conventional and Moscow, Havana, and Managua.
support them. Moscow would send unconventional ground conflict. He According to Miranda, the Sandinistas
special construction equipment for claimed that the United States was wondered what lay behind the new
the airfield, which would be built not going to kill millions of Cubans offer and even questioned its timing,
near Managua with the help of Cuban willing to defend their country. Castro but they nevertheless accepted it. The
advisers. Moscow also agreed to train added that if the Sandinistas agreed, final agreement called for a continued
Nicaraguan pilots to fly the aircraft. he would send Cuban instructors supply of military aid to the Sandini-
This would consist of three years of to Nicaragua to retrain the MiG-21 stas through 1990 to help defeat the
training in Bulgaria followed by a pilots to fly the helicopters.34 Contras and a massive expansion of
final year in the Soviet Union.32 the Sandinista armed forces between
Miranda said that Humberto Orte- 1991 and 1995, including the MiG
Miranda said the construction of
ga was the most outspoken opponent delivery. The objective on the Nica-
the airfield posed many problems.
of Fidel’s proposal. Ortega agreed the raguan side, according to Miranda,
Cuba, which had much experience
helicopters would be more useful in was still to eventually obtain a Soviet
building military airfields at home
fighting the Contras but that it was far defense umbrella. Miranda never
and abroad, sent a team of advisers
more important to receive the MiGs stated what position the Cubans took
and some equipment but refused to
as a signal of Moscow’s commitment. on this latest Soviet offer, but pre-
provide cement. This critical com-
He added that if the United States sumably they did not object. Miranda
ponent was in short supply in both
attacked the planes, it would violate added that the Sandinistas themselves
Cuba and Nicaragua. The initial
Nicaraguan sovereignty but, even were convinced that they now had
airfield construction phase began
more importantly, defy the Soviet the upper hand and that by 1991 both
in late 1981, according to Miranda,
Union. This might bring Moscow to the Reagan administration and the
but work proceeded slowly. He said
a firm commitment to defend Nicara- Contras would be gone.36
that for years, the project used a high
gua, much as the Cuban missile crisis
percentage of Nicaragua’s production
had led to a firm Soviet commitment
of cement at the expense of other
to defend Cuba. Ortega concluded
important national projects.33 that Managua should not let Castro The Soviet Arms Flow Continues
decide the issue as an intermediary
Nevertheless, Miranda said,
but instead should approach the Sovi- As a result of the new military aid
everything went smoothly until early
ets directly to confirm their position. agreement, Soviet arms deliveries to
1984, when Fidel Castro suggested
Ortega did so in March 1984, when Nicaragua in 1988 continued at the
to Sandinista leaders that they should
he went to Moscow and got a Soviet same high levels reached in 1986 and
forget the MiG-21s and have the So-
commitment to deliver the MiGs 1987. These were all closely moni-
viets deliver Mi-24 attack helicopters
in 1985 as promised. Nevertheless, tored by US intelligence. At the same
instead. Castro said the Mi-24s would
the MiGs were never shipped, and time, the US Congress voted to cut
be much more valuable fighting the
Mi-24/25 helicopters began arriving off all military aid to the Contras in
Contra insurgency, which represented
instead. Obviously, Castro’s influence early 1988, primarily because Daniel
a growing threat to the government.
on Moscow prevailed.35 Ortega agreed at a summit of all five
Castro argued that the US invasion of
Central American presidents to open
Grenada in 1983 showed that the Cu-
Miranda added that the MiG-21s direct cease-fire talks with the Con-
bans could not defeat the Americans
came up again in late 1987, when tras. The two Nicaraguan sides agreed
in a conventional air war and that the
Soviet negotiators turned up in Mana- to that cease-fire in March 1988 and
Studies in Intelligence Vol 60, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2016) 21
Intelligence and Policy
Soviet arms deliveries to Nicaragua came to an end later
in 1990, not because of US efforts but as a result of the that the US Intelligence Community
surprising defeat of the Sandinistas in the promised na- may have understated Soviet deter-
tional elections of 25 February 1990. mination to gain a strategic military
foothold in the region through the
agreed to negotiate a political settle- observers to observe election process. Sandinistas.
ment. After prolonged and inconclu- The winning democratic opposition
Ironically, the rise of President
sive talks with the Contras during the formed a governing coalition head-
Putin to power in Russia in 2000 and
rest of the year, Daniel Ortega agreed ed by President Violeta Chamorro,
the return of the Sandinistas to power
at another Central American summit widow of a prominent oppositionist,
in Nicaragua in 2006 renew the
in February 1989 to hold free and but as a result of a transition agree-
possibility that Moscow may again
open democratic elections no later ment with the Sandinistas, Humberto
seek military access to Nicaragua for
than 25 February 1990.37 Ortega retained his position as the
the same strategic reasons the Soviet
minister of defense.40 Ortega held the
Union sought access to Central Amer-
During the last months of the Rea- position until he retired in 1995, but
ica. As US relations with Moscow
gan administration and in the early Soviet and Cuban influence in Nic-
have grown strained, Moscow has
months of the George H. W. Bush aragua declined dramatically during
shown new interest in the region. In
administration, US officials sought his tenure.41
September 2008, two Russian Tu-160
an agreement with President Mikhail
strategic bombers made a surprise
Gorbachev and Soviet officials to
visit to Venezuela, the first ever flight
end the arms flow from the Soviet
Union and Cuba to Nicaragua and to The Bottom Line to the region of such an advanced air-
craft. Soon after, a Russian naval task
leftist Central American insurgents,
particularly in El Salvador. In the last The Punta Huete episode and the force, following a brief stop in Cuba,
meeting of Elliott Abrams and his possibility the Soviets would pro- visited both Venezuela and Nicaragua
new Soviet counterpart, Yuri Pavlov, vide Mig-21s to the Sandinistas and for the first time.42
Abrams urged him to reduce military deploy their own strategic aircraft
In 2010, the Sandinistas finally
aid to Nicaragua. Pavlov refused, to Central America showcase the
made Punta Huete operational as a
saying Moscow would cut off arms interrelationship of intelligence and
commercial airfield, with Russian
to Nicaragua only if the United States policy. In this instance, that relation-
financial assistance.43 Additional
stopped all military aid to El Salvador ship was fraught with controversy
visits of ships and aircraft would
and the rest of Central America.38 because of the covert US attempts
follow. A particularly notable one was
Gorbachev later agreed not to send to undermine the Sandinista regime
a second stopover of Russian Tu-160s
new Soviet arms to Nicaragua, but through the Contras and because of
in October 2013. After stopping in
the flow of older weapons continued, claims that national intelligence was
Venezuela, the bombers made a high-
mostly indirectly via Cuba. Thus, de- being slanted and misused for policy
ly visible landing at Sandino Interna-
spite repeated US efforts through the purposes.
tional Airport outside Managua rather
rest of 1989, Soviet arms deliveries to
While the record of the IC—as than at the more remote Punta Huete
Nicaragua that year continued at the
seen in released US intelligence Airfield.45 Moscow subsequently an-
same high levels as the previous few
assessments, a number of which are nounced that it was seeking military
years.39
cited here—shows a strong consen- air and naval access agreements with
Soviet arms deliveries to Nicara- sus among senior US policy officials eight countries, including Nicaragua,
gua came to an end later in 1990, not about Soviet Union aims in the re- Cuba, and Venezuela.46
because of US efforts but as a result gion, the record also indicates that IC
Putin made his first visit to Latin
of the surprising defeat of the Sandi- support was both timely and gener-
America in July 2014, stopping
nistas in the promised national elec- ally accurate. Indeed, the revelations
briefly in Havana and Managua on
tions of 25 February 1990. The Sand- of Sandinista defector Roger Miranda
his way to Brazil. There he attended
inistas were so confident they would and statements of senior State Depart-
the World Cup soccer final and par-
win that they invited international ment official Elliott Abrams indicate
22 Studies in Intelligence Vol 60, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2016)