Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

177 Pages·2005·15.18 MB·English

by  Daniel N. Posner

INSTITUTIONS AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN AFRICA
This hook presents a theory to account for why and when politics revolves
around one axis of social cleavage instead of another. It does so by examining
the case of Zambia, where people identify themselves either as members of
one of the country's six dozen tribes or as members of one of its four principal
language groups. The book accounts for the conditions under which political
competition in Zambia revolves around tribal differences and the conditions
under which it revolves around language group differences. Drawing on a
simple model of identity choice, it shows that the answer depends on whether
the country is operating under single-party or multi-party rule. During periods
of single-party rule, tribal identities serve as the axis of electoral mobilization
and self-identification; during periods of multi-party rule, broader language
group identities play this role. The book thus demonstrates how formal insti
tutional rules determine the kinds of social cleavages that matter in politics.
Daniel N. Posner is Assistant Professor of Political Science at UCLA. His
research focuses on ethnic politics, regime change, and the political economy
of development in Africa. He has published articles in numerous journals,
and he has received grants and fellowships from the Russell Sage Foundation,
the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, and the Harvard Academy for
International and Area Studies. In 2.oor-2, he was a National Fellow at the
Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He is currently a Carnegie Scholar
of the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
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INSTITUTIONS AND ETHNIC
POLITICS IN AFRICA
DANIEL N. POSNER
University of California, Los Angeles
UCAMBRIDGE
~ UNIVERSITY PRESS
Contents
Preface
page xi
1 Introduction: Institutions and Ethnic Politics I
I: Accounting for the Ethnic Cleavage Structure
Introduction to Part I
21
2 Accounting for Zambia's Ethnic Cleavage Structure I:
The Emergence of Tribal Identities in Colonial
Northern Rhodesia 26
3 Accounting for Zambia's Ethnic Cleavage Structure II:
The Emergence of Language Group Identities in Colonial
Northern Rhodesia 56
II: Accounting for Ethnic Coalition-Building Choices
Introduction to Part II
4 Ethnicity and Ethnic Politics in Zambia
5 Explaining Changing Patterns of Ethnic Politics:
A Model of Political Institutions and Ethnic
Cleavage Outcomes
130
III: Testing the Argument
Introduction to Part III
159
6 Competing Explanations 16r
7 Ethnic Campaigning: Testing the Observable Implications
of the Argument for Elite Behavior 179
8 Ethnic Voting: Testing the Observable Implications of the
Argument for Mass Behavior 217
Contents
IV: Beyond Zambia
Introduction to Part IV 251
9 Regime Change and Ethnic Politics in Africa 256
ro Beyond Regime Change, Beyond Africa 274
Preface
Appendices
A Native Authorities and Tribal Identifications
B Survey and Focus Group Methodologies
C Tribal Affiliations of Parliamentary Candidates
D Tribal Demographics of Electoral Constituencies
Bibliography
Index This is a book about ethnic conflict, but it is not about ethnic conflict in the
usual sense. Most treatments of the subject focus on explaining variation
in the occurrence or intensity of ethnic violence across time and space.
They ask: why did tensions between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda erupt
into full-blown genocide in 1994 (Prunier 1995; Gourevitch 1998)? Why
have Hindu-Muslim riots taken place in some Indian towns but not in
others (Varshney 2002; Wilkinson 2004)? Why, since the mid-197os, has
there been so much more ethnic violence in Sri Lanka than in Malaysia
(Horowitz 1989)? This book, by contrast, seeks to explain not when or
where communal conflict breaks out but why it breaks out along one line
of ethnic division instead of another. It seeks to explain why politics comes
to revolve around the particular axis of ethnic cleavage that it does.
I fell into this research topic by accident. When I first went to Zambia
in 1993, I thought I was going to be studying how Zambia's recent transi
tion to multi-party politics had affected the relations among the country's
ethnic groups. I thought I was going to be studying whether the introduc
tion of competitive multi-party elections had deepened ethnic divisions
and made ethnicity a more salient part of the country's political affairs.
Given this motivating question, I began my research by conducting a
series of open-ended interviews in one of Lusaka's poor residential com
pounds to probe how people from different ethnic communities were
getting along in the new multi-party era. Again and again, I was told that
ethnic politics was rife. I was also told that one group in particular -
the Bembas - were dominating the country and that Zambian politics
had been transformed into a conflict between Bemba power-holders and
everyone else. Almost always, these charges of Bemba domination were
substantiated with long lists of Bembas who had been appointed as cabi
net ministers, diplomats, or senior civil servants, had emerged as business
Preface Preface
leaders, or were otherwise enjoying more than their fair share of the best Tembo. I could not have completed this project without their help. My
jobs and government contracts. nineteen montbs of field research were immensely enriched by the good
Yet when I then met with the people whose names had been provided, company and friendship of Philip and Julie Alderfer, Lisa Cliggett, Mike
many of them told me that they were not, in fact, Bemba. One identi Hall, Melinda Ham, Jim and Michelle Polhemus, Lise Rakner, Jeffrey
fied himself as Bisa; another as Lunda; another as Chishinga; another Ryen, David Simon, and Jeremy Weinstein. I want to especially thank
as Mambwe. All of them were members of tribes that belonged to the Malcolm McPherson, Deborah Hoover, and Heather and Malinda
broader Bemba language family, but they did not self-identify as Bembas. McPherson, who invited me into their family and provided me with a
At first I was confused. How could there be such a disconnect between home base in Lusaka that was truly a home away from home. At the
the way people saw themselves and the way they were viewed by others? Institute for African Studies (now the Institute for Economic and Social
Eventually, I came to understand that Zambians saw their country's pol Research) at the University of Zambia, lise Mwanza and Chris Simuyemba
itics through multiple lenses. Some saw it through the lens of language were, as they have been for foreign researchers in Zambia for more than
group differences. Through this lens, all of the allegedly "Bemba" winners two decades, sources of administrative guidance, advice, and friendship.
in the regime change were, in fact, Bembas, since they all were members I would also like to thank Kumbutso Dzekedzeke, the census manager at
of Bemba-speaking tribes. But other Zambians viewed the country's pol the Central Statistical Office in Lusaka; Joel Sikazwe, director of the Elec
itics through the prism of tribal differences rather than language. Seen toral Commission of Zambia; and the staff of the Zambia Consolidated
this way, all of the "Bembas" who were benefiting from the change in Copper Mines archives in Ndola for help that went well beyond the call
government were from other - and, in some cases, under-represented - of duty. I also thank Fred M'membe and Ngandi Mwananjidi for our nu
ethnic communities. Whether or not Bembas were dominating the coun merous stimulating conversations. To all of these people I am immensely
try depended entirely on the rule -linguistic or tribal- that one applied grateful.
to code the people in the positions of power. This book began as a doctoral dissertation in the Department of Gov
As soon as I recognized that this was what was going on, I realized that ernment at Harvard University. I owe a deep intellectual debt to my three
I had to acquire a better understanding of the conditions under which dissertation advisors, Samuel Huntington, Robert Bates, and Jennifer
people came to understand the country's politics in terms of language dif Widner. Throughout my graduate training, and during tbe two years I
ferences versus tribal differences. My quest for an understanding of when subsequently spent as an Academy Scholar in the Harvard Academy for
and why conflict arises was transformed into a mission to comprehend International and Area Studies, they were wonderful mentors. They were
why conflict was perceived to be taking place along the lines of one ethnic also terrific role models. Much of what I have learned about political
cleavage instead of another. science, about Africa, and about conducting myself as a scholar I have
learned from their fine examples. I am also indebted to a group of remark
In the nearly ten years that I have worked on this project, I have bene able friends and colleagues at Harvard, whose camaraderie and incisive
fited from the support of a number of institutions and from the insights, comments contributed much to this project. In particular, I would like
intellectual stimulation, friendship, and generosity of a great many in to single out Henry Hale, Devesh Kapur, Michael Kevane, Pauline Jones
dividuals. My greatest debt of gratitude is to the hundreds of Zambians Luong, Shaun Malarney, Michael Montasano, Maria Victoria Murillo,
who served as survey respondents and focus group participants and to the Mark Nagel, Karissa Price, Richard Snyder, Edward Steinfeld, Ashutosh
many current and former politicians who patiently answered my endless Varshney, and Steven Wilkinson.
questions. To the extent that this book "gets Zambian politics right," it The Department of Political Science at UCLA and the Hoover Insti
is because of their generous tutoring in its intricacies. tution at Stanford University, where I was National Fellow in 2001-2,
My research in Zambia would have been impossible without the provided extremely supportive environments in which to complete the
hard work of a team of tremendous research assistants: Misheck Banda, project. At UCLA, I benefited from the hard work of research assistants
Richard Banda, Maureen Kashempa, Charlotte Lwanga, Hilary Mwale, Timothy Ayieko, Maria Dahlin, Johan Lanner, Luciana Noguiera, and
Kris Mwanangombe, Robert Mwanza, Godfrey Sibeso, and Joseph David Yaminishi. At the Hoover Institution, Larry Diamond and Joy
Preface Preface
Taylor provided much appreciated help and support. I received useful Finally, I thank my parents, Robert and Rita Posner, who never in
feedback on various pieces of the project at meetings of the Labora a million years would have guessed that their son would write a book
tory in Comparative Ethnic Processes and the American Political Sci about African politics. They taught me how to read and ask questions,
ence Association, and at workshops at Stanford University, Princeton and kindled in me a desire to try to understand the world outside of
University, the University of Chicago, New York University, UCLA, and Tenafly, New Jersey. They did not read a single page of the manuscript or
the Santa Fe Institute. In addition to the helpful criticisms offered by
offer much in the way of comments or suggestions. But their fingerprints
participants in these workshops and seminars, I received valuable com are everywhere on its pages. Most of all, I thank my wife, Rebecca. She
ments and suggestions from Joel Barkan, Carles Boix, Michael Bratton, joined me late in the process of writing this book but provided the love
Kanchan Chandra, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Pierre Englebert, James and support- the home- I needed to finally get it finished. This book is
Fearon, Karen Ferree, Judy Geist, Jeffrey Herbst, Macartan Humphreys, for her.
Nahomi !chino, Nelson Kasfir, David Laitin, Drew Linzer, Beatriz
Magaloni, Shaheen Mozaffar, Benjamin Reilly, Robert Rotberg, James
Scarritt, Kenneth Scheve, David Simon, Smita Singh, Richard Sklar,
Paul Sniderman, Michael Thies, Matthew Turner, Nicolas van de
Walle, Ashutosh Varshney, Leonard Wantchekon, Lisa Wedeen, Steven
Wilkinson, Elisabeth Wood, and anonymous reviewers of the manuscript.
Their comments strengthened the book immeasurably.
Intellectual support may be a necessary condition for writing, but it
is not sufficient for research involving field work and large amounts of
data collection. Financial support is also necessary. I am therefore partic
ularly grateful to the institutions that provided financial support for the
project at various stages. The International Predissertation Fellowship
Program of the Social Science Research Council funded my initial trip to
Zambia. A Dissertation Improvement Grant from the National Science
Foundation made possible a nine-month follow-up trip the next year. The
Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies provided two ex
tremely valuable years of support at the dissertation stage of the project
and underwrote a third field research trip. At UCLA, the Academic Senate
provided support for the project throughout its transformation from a dis
sertation into a book. The Hoover Institution at Stanford provided a year
of support during which I completely rewrote the manuscript. A Facuity
Career Development Award at UCLA also provided useful resources at
a key stage. I also owe thanks to the UCLA International Institute and
the James S. Coleman African Studies Center at UCLA, particularly its
former director, Edmond Keller, for their support of this project.
Lewis Bateman, the senior editor for political science and history
at Cambridge University Press, patiently shepherded this book through
production and was a source of advice and unstinting encouragement
throughout the process. I am very thankful for his support.
1
I
Introduction
Institutions and Ethnic Politics
Nearly all multi-ethnic political systems contain more than one dimension
of ethnic cleavage. Israel is divided by religion, but its citizens are also
divided by their places of origin and their degrees of secularism. South
Africa is divided by race, but also by language differences and by tribe.'
India is divided by language (which serves as the basis for its federalism),
but also by religion and caste. Switzerland is divided by religion and
by language. Nigeria is divided by religion, region, and tribe. Even sub
national units are frequently ethnically multi-dimensional: cities like New
York, Los Angeles, and Miami all contain prominent racial cleavages, but
also cleavages based on their residents' countries of origin, languages of
communication, and lengths of residence in the United States.
Given these multiple bases of ethnic division, when does politics re
volve around one of them rather than another? Journalists and scholars
who write about the politics of ethnically divided societies tend to take
the axis of ethnic cleavage that serves as the basis for political competition
and conflict as a given. They write eloquently about hostilities between
Hindus and Muslims in India but never pause to ask why that coun
try's conflict takes place along religious lines rather than among Hindi
speakers, Bengali-speakers, and Marathi-speakers. They discuss the com
petition among Hausas, Yorubas, and lgbos in Nigeria but never stop to
question why the political rivalries in that nation rage among these broad
ethno-regional communities rather than betvveen Christians and Muslims.
"Tribe" is a loaded word. Here, and throughout the book, I use the term to refer to
an ethnic community that is (or was historically) organized under the authority of a
traditional chief. Membership in a tribe is determined by the answer to the question:
are you (or were your parents) subjects of Chief X? For an extended discussion of
how "tribes" were created during the colonial era, and why "tribe" and "language"
cannot be used interchangeably, see Chapters 2 and 3.
2
Introduction Introduction
They probe the conflict between blacks and Latinos in Miami but never help to determine which ethnic cleavage becomes politically salient in
think to inquire why the city's tensions revolve around racial differences two stages, and via two distinct causal mechanisms. First, they shape
rather than divisions among Haitians, Cubans, Dominicans, and other the repertoires of potentially mobilizable ethnic identities that individu
Caribbean immigrants, or between immigrants and non-immigrants. In als possess. That is, they determine why some of the myriad objectively
country after country and city after city, they provide detailed accounts identifiable bases of cultural difference in society come to be viewed as
of how and why politicians "play the ethnic card." Yet they almost never at least potentially politically salient, and why others do not. Second,
bother to ask why politicians play the particular ethnic card that they do. they shape peoples' incentives for selecting one of these potentially salient
Why, given multiple potentially mobilizable bases of ethnic division, ethnic identities rather than another, and then coordinate these choices
does political competition and conflict come to be organized along the across individuals so as to produce a society-level outcome. To borrow the
lines of one ethnic cleavage rather than another? Why do politicians em metaphor of a card game, political institutions explain, first, why players'
phasize (and why do people respond positively to appeals couched in terms hands contain the cards they do and, then, why the players play one of
of) race rather than language, religion rather than tribe, caste rather than these cards rather than another. They also explain why one player or set
state? Under what conditions does the dimension of ethnic cleavage that of players ultimately wins the game.
is salient change? When does politics shift from being about religious dif The part of the argument about how political institutions shape in
ferences to being about language differences, from being about country dividuals' identity choices - about why players play the cards that they
of origin to being about race? These are the questions that this book seeks do-is built from three simple, well-established propositions: people want
to answer. It seeks to account for when and why, given multiple axes of resources from the state. They believe that having someone from their
ethnic division in a society, one cleavage becomes the basis of political ethnic group in a position of political power will facilitate their access
competition and conflict rather than another. It builds its explanation by to those resources. And they understand that the best way to get some
distinguishing between two distinct, but often conflated, processes: iden one from their ethnic group into a position of political power is to build
tity construction (the process through which the repertoire of political or join a political coalition with fellow group members. Taken together,
identities in society that might be mobilized is constructed) and identity these propositions suggest that ethnic politics can be viewed in terms of
choice (the process through which political actors decide to emphasize one the politics of coalition-building and that ethnic identity choice can be
identity from this set of potentially mobilizable social categories rather seen in terms of the quest to gain membership in the coalition that will
than another). I argue that the cleavage that emerges as salient is the ag be most politically and economically useful. The idea that ethnic politics
gregation of all actors' individual decisions about the identity that will can be interpreted as a kind of coalition-building was first articulated
serve them best, and that these decisions are constrained, first, by the op by Robert Bates, who described ethnic groups as "coalitions which have
tion set from which the actors are choosing, and, second, by the formal been formed as a part of rational efforts to secure benefits created by the
institutional rules that govern political competition, which make some forces of modernization" (1983: 152). This book builds on Bates's insight
identities more advantageous than others. by extending this argument beyond the question of why ethnicity is po
litically useful and applying it to the question of why individuals choose
to emphasize the particular ethnic identities they do.
THE ARGUMENT
Political institutions are the formal rules, regulations, and policies that
phenomena as markets, traditional lineage structures, and even norms of behav
structure social and political interactions.' This book shows how they ior. In the more restricted definition used here, institutions are the formal, codified
rules, regulations, or policies to which the existence of these structures, and norms
might be traced, not the structures and norms themselves. Markets, lineage struc
2 This definition is significantly narrower than, for example, North (1990: 3), who tures, and behavioral norms are (or may be) products of institutions, but, by the
defines institutions as "the rules of the game in a society, or, more formally ... the definition employed here, they are not institutions themselves. How the formal rules
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction." North's definition, like gave rise to these social phenomena is left as something to be explained rather than
that of others (e.g., Bates 1988; World Bank 2002), would include such social simply assumed.
3
Introduction Introduction
Ethnic coalition-building is straightforward in a w6rld where individ understands herself to be due to history, government policy, and childhood
uals have only a single ethnic identity. In such a context, political actors socialization. But she is free to choose between these two identity options
turn to ethnicity because of the mobilizational advantages it brings (Bates to select the one that will be most advantageous given the situation in
r983; Hardin r995; Hechter wor; Chandra 2004) or because of the abil which she finds herself.
ity it affords them to limit access to the spoils that successful mobilization Why, then, do political institutions matter? First, they matter because
provides (Fearon 1999; Caselli and Coleman wor). However, matters the usefulness of any coalition will depend on the boundaries of the arena
become more complicated when we recognize that individuals possess in which political competition is taking place, and these boundaries are
multiple ethnic identities, each of which might serve as a basis for coali products of institutional rules.' As the formal rules governing political
tion formation. Given multiple ethnic group memberships, the question competition change, the boundaries of the political arena will often ex
is: which coalition should a political actor interested in gaining access to pand or contract, and this will cause memberships in ethnic groups of
state resources seek to mobilize or join? The one with their fellow tribe different sizes to become more or less useful as bases for political coalition
members? The one with their fellow language-speakers? The one with building. For example, our Sinhalese Christian found it advantageous to
their co-religionists? Which will be the most advantageous identity to emphasize her language group identity because she was engaged in a com
select? petition for political power at the national level and, at that level, being
To the extent that access to resources is determined through a pro Sinhalese was more useful than being Christian. If she had been compet
cess of electoral competition, the most useful identity to mobilize will ing for a share of power in her town (say, in the context of a mayoral
be, as Riker (r962) showed, the one that puts the person in a winning race) or in her region (say, in the context of an election to a provincial
coalition (or, if more than one coalition is winning, then the one that is council), her choice might have been quite different. The particular ethnic
minimum winning-the one that contains the fewest members with whom coalition in which it will make sense for her to seek membership, and
the spoils of power will have to be shared). Individuals will consider each thus the particular identity she will invoke to try to do so, will depend on
of the identity groups in which they can claim membership (and which the boundaries of the arena in which she is competing. To the extent that
others will recognize as meaningful) and embrace the one that defines these boundaries are defined by institutional rules-in this example, rules
the most usefully sized group. They will consider each of the principles devolving power to municipalities or sub-national units-those rules will
of group division that divide the political community (religion, language, be central to our explanation of her identity choices.
race, clan, etc.), compare the size of their own group with that of the The second reason institutions matter is because, in addition to shap
other groups that each of these cleavages defines, and then select the iden ing the strategic choices that individuals make, they also coordinate these
tity that puts them in a minimum winning coalition. Thus, a Sinhalese choices. People's decisions about which identity will serve them best are
Christian from Sri Lanka would begin by comparing the size of her reli influenced by a great many contextual factors, including who their inter
gious group (Christians) with the sizes of the other religious groups in the acting partners are, the events or issues of the moment, and the physical
country (Buddhists, Muslims, and Hindus) and the size of her language location in which they find themselves at the time they are making their
group (Sinhalese) with the sizes of the other language groups (Tamil and choice. What makes the choice-shaping effects of political institutions dif
English). Then, she would select the ethnic affiliation that puts her in ferent from these more fleeting and individualized sorts of contexts is that
the most advantageous group and attempt to build or join a coalition
with fellow members of that group. In this particular case, she would
choose her language group, since Sinhalese-speakers are a majority vis-:i 3 Institutions may also affect ethnic identity choices more directly by providing for the
preferential treatment of members of certain groups (Weiner and Katzenstein 1981;
vis other language groups in Sri Lanka, whereas Christians are a minority
Horowitz 1985), prohibiting appeals made in terms of certain kinds of identities
vis-:i-vis other religions. Her identity choice - that is, her choice about (Brass 1991), or facilitating political representation by small groups and thereby
which identity to use to identify herself politically-is constrained by the creating incentives for mobilization along such lines, as, for example, in proportional
options in her repertoire (her Christian religion; her Sinhalese language representation (PR) electoral systems (Reilly and Reynolds 1 997). The emphasis here
on how political institutions affect identity choices by defining the arena of political
group membership), both of which are commonsensically part of who she competition is a somewhat different argument from these more familiar ones.