Insecurities and Inaccuracies of the Sequoia AVC Advantage 9.00H DRE Voting Machine

158 Pages·2008·7.62 MB·English

Insecurities and Inaccuracies of the
Sequoia AVC Advantage 9.00H
DRE Voting Machine
AndrewW.Appel∗ MaiaGinsburg HarriHursti
PrincetonUniversity PrincetonUniversity
BrianW.Kernighan ChristopherD.Richards GangTan
PrincetonUniversity PrincetonUniversity LehighUniversity
October17,2008
ExecutiveSummary. TheSequoiaAVCAdvantageisadirect-recordingelec-
tronic(DRE)votingmachineusedinNewJersey,Pennsylvania,andotherstates.
I.TheAVCAdvantage9.00iseasily“hacked,”bytheinstallationoffraudulent
firmware. This is done by prying just one ROM chip from its socket and pushing
anewonein,orbyreplacementoftheZ80processorchip. Wehavedemonstrated
thatthis“hack”takesjust7minutestoperform.
Thefraudulentfirmwarecanstealvotesduringanelection,justasitscriminal
designer programs it to do. The fraud cannot practically be detected. There is
∗ThisresearchwassupportedinpartbyNationalScienceFoundationawardCNS-0627650.Any
opinions,findings,andconclusionsorrecommendationsexpressedinthismaterialarethoseofthe
authorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheNationalScienceFoundation.
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no paper audit trail on this machine; all electronic records of the votes are under
controlofthefirmware,whichcanmanipulatethemallsimultaneously.
II. Without even touching a single AVC Advantage, an attacker can install
fraudulent firmware into many AVC Advantage machines by viral propagation
through audio-ballot cartridges. The virus can steal the votes of blind voters,
can cause AVC Advantages in targeted precincts to fail to operate; or can cause
WinEDSsoftwaretotallyvotesinaccurately.
III. Design flaws in the user interface of the AVC Advantage disenfranchise
voters,orviolatevoterprivacy,bycausingvotesnottobecounted,andbyallowing
pollworkerstocommitfraud.
IV. AVC Advantage Results Cartridges can be easily manipulated to change
votes, after the polls are closed but before results from different precincts are cu-
mulatedtogether.
V.Sequoia’ssloppysoftwarepracticescanleadtoerrorandinsecurity. Wyle’s
ITA reports are not rigorous, and are inadequate to detect security vulnerabilities.
Programmingerrorsthatslipthroughtheseprocessescanmiscountvotesandper-
mitfraud.
VI. Anomalies noticed by County Clerks in the New Jersey 2008 Presidential
PrimarywerecausedbytwodifferentprogrammingerrorsonthepartofSequoia,
andhadtheeffectofdisenfranchisingvoters.
VII. The AVC Advantage has been produced in many versions. The fact that
one version may have been examined for certification does not give grounds for
confidence in the security and accuracy of a different version. New Jersey should
not use any version of the AVC Advantage that it has not actually examined with
theassistanceofskilledcomputer-securityexperts.
VIII. The AVC Advantage is too insecure to use in New Jersey. New Jersey
should immediately implement the 2005 law passed by the Legislature, requiring
an individual voter-verified record of each vote cast, by adopting precinct-count
optical-scanvotingequipment.
NOTEREGARDINGREDACTIONS.Asparagraph1.1andAppendixLex-
plain, this research was conducted pursuant to a Court Order by the Hon. Linda
FeinbergoftheNewJerseySuperiorCourt. SequoiaVotingSystemsfiledamotion
alleging that certain parts of this report contain protected trade secrets. Plaintiffs
dispute Sequoia’s contentions. Judge Feinberg has expressed her intention to pre-
serve Plaintiffs’ objections until the time of the hearing when she will rule on the
meritsofSequoia’sclaimsoftradesecret. WeareconfidentthattheCourtwillthen
permit release of the full, unredacted report. In the interim, the Court encouraged
us to release the report with redactions. Paragraphs 19.8, 19.9, 21.3, and 21.5, as
wellasAppendicesB–G,areredactedinthisrelease.
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Contents
1 Introduction 8
2 DescriptionoftheAVCAdvantage 10
I Fraudulentfirmwarecanstealvotes 15
3 Vote-stealingfirmwarecanbeinstalledintheAVCAdvantage 16
4 Wedemonstratevote-stealingfirmwareinanAVCAdvantage 17
5 InstallingfraudulentsoftwareintoZ80ProgramROM 22
6 Vote-stealingfirmwarecanavoiddetection 24
7 Thetechnicalknowledgetowritevote-stealingprogramsisbasiccomputer
science,widespreadinoursociety 27
8 ItiseasyinNewJerseytogainunsupervisedaccesstoanAVCAdvantage,
inordertoreplaceROMchips 28
9 PickingthelockontheAVCAdvantagecabinettakesonlyseconds 30
10 ThesealsintheAVCAdvantagedonotprovidetamper-evidence 33
11 Reverseengineeringallowsconstructionoffraudulentfirmwareevenwith-
outaccesstotrade-secretsourcecode 40
12 FraudulentfirmwarecanbeinstalledinsidetheZ80processorchip 46
13 Wouldanyonegototheselengths? 49
14 There is no means to reliably detect fraudulent firmware in AVC Advan-
tages 50
15 ManyinsidershaveaccesssufficienttotamperwithAVCAdvantagevoting
machines 51
16 Thedangeroffraudulentfirmwareiswidelyrecognizedbyexperts 52
17 ConclusionofPartI 55
II DaughterboardandWinEDSvirusescandisenfranchisevoters 56
18 Theaudio-kitdaughterboardisasecondcomputerintheAVCAdvantage 57
19 Onecaninstallfraudulentdaughterboardfirmwarebyinsertingacartridge—
evenunwittingly 58
20 Vote-stealingcomputervirusescaninfectAVCAdvantageandWinEDS 61
21 VirusescanpropagatethroughtheAVCAdvantage 63
22 VirusescanpropagatethroughWinEDScomputers 64
23 WinEDS computers have severe security vulnerabilies and are routinely
connectedtotheInternet 67
24 Thedaughterboardcanstealvotesorselectivelydisablevotingmachines 71
25 Nogeniusrequiredfordaughterboardattacks 72
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26 Themotherboardisvulnerabletomaliciousdaughterboardfirmware 73
27 SecurityvulnerabilitiesinWinEDS3.1 74
28 ConclusionofPartII 75
III User-interfaceinaccuraciesandinsecuritiescandisenfranchise
voters 77
29 HowwevoteinNewJersey 77
30 AVCAdvantagefalselyindicatesvotesarerecorded,whentheyarenot 80
31 Pressing an option switch deactivates the Advantage so that no votes are
recorded 82
32 Sound on activation is not an effective signal for voter, pollworkers, or
witnessestodeterminewhenvotesarecast 83
33 TheAVCAdvantage’slackoffeedbackleadsvoterstoundervote 85
34 Votercan’ttellwhichprimaryisactivated 86
35 Pollworkercanseewhothevotervotesfor 86
36 Can’tundowrite-invote,inviolationofFECguidelines 88
37 Proceduresforfleeingvoterleaveopportunitiesforviolatingtheprivacyor
integrityoftheballot 88
38 ConclusionofPartIII 89
IV Design errors and programming bugs make the AVC Advan-
tageinsecure 90
39 Vote data is not electronically authenticated, making it vulnerable to tam-
pering 90
40 ManipulatingResultsCartridges 92
41 SomeNJCountyClerksusethelesstrustworthysourceofdataintabulating
officialelectionresults 94
42 TheAdvantagecanprintapaperreportfromafraudulentResultsCartridge 95
43 OnecanconfusetheAVCAdvantagewithafraudulentballotdefinitionthat
yieldstwovotesforonebutton 96
44 Results Cartridges can be easily converted into other kinds of cartridges
andusedforfraud 98
45 EarlyVotingCartridgespermitfraudinStatesthatusethem 99
46 ManipulatingConsolidationCartridges 99
47 WirelessaccesstoResultsCartridgesopensavenuestomanipulation 101
48 FraudulentintelligentResultsCartridgescouldstealvotes 103
49 Electronicallystored“ballotimages”compromiseprivacyoftheballot 104
50 ConclusionofPartIV 106
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V Insufficiently rigorous design and certification processes leave
thefirmwarevulnerable 108
51 Sequoia’ssloppysoftwarepracticescanleadtoerrorandinsecurity 108
52 WyleLaboratoriesexaminesfirmwareonlysuperficially 110
53 New Jersey officials neglected to read the ITA reports, and thus had no
opportunitytonoticehowtheirinadequacies 112
54 SequoiadoesnotkeeptrackofwhatfirmwareisinstalledinitsDREs 113
55 ConclusionofPartV 116
VI Computer-programming errors have actually disenfranchised
NJvoters 117
56 Primaryelectionparty-affiliationbugdisenfranchisedvoters 117
57 Hardwaremalfunctionscandisenfranchisevoters 123
58 ConclusionofPartVI 130
VII Different versions of the AVC Advantage have different vul-
nerabilities 131
59 Advantageversions9.00Gand9.00Hhaveidenticalvulnerabilities 131
60 TheAVCAdvantagehaschangedagreatdealinsuccessiveversions 132
61 Version10AVCAdvantageisextremelyvulnerabletofraud 134
62 Version8AVCAdvantageisvulnerabletofraudinsomewaysthatversion
9isnot 137
63 ConclusionofPartVII 139
VIII Conclusionsandrecommendations 140
64 NewJerseyshouldnotcontinuetousetheAVCAdvantage9.00,becauseit
isinsecure 140
65 NewJerseyshouldimmediatelyremovetheAudioKits 140
66 Thereisawaytosafelyusecomputerstocountvotes 141
67 Formsofvoter-verifiedpaperballots 142
68 SUMMARYOFCONCLUSIONSREACHEDINTHISREPORT 145
IX Appendices 147
A MemoryDevices 147
B Bufferoverrunreadingmessagesfromdaughterboard 148
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C Technical details of the option-switch bug that disenfranchised some pri-
maryvoters 149
D Howtheballotimagescanbeunshuffled,therebyviolatingvoterprivacy 149
E The Source Code violates the FEC’s software-engineering guidelines for
voting-machinefirmware 149
F InstallingfraudulentsoftwareintoZ80ProgramRAM 149
G ThesecuritymeasuresinTechnicianCartridgesareeasilydefeated 149
H Printerinaccuracycanchangevotetotalsinresultsreport 150
I Inadequateindicationsofundervotes 151
J Cumbersomeprocedurefordealingwithfleeingvoters 153
K BuginWinEDScausesballotprogrammingtobeextremelyslow 156
L TheCourtOrder 157
List of Figures
1 TheAVCAdvantage,fromthefront. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 AVCAdvantagevoterpanelcoveredbyaprintedpaperballot . . . 11
3 ExcerptfromResultsReport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4 ResultsCartridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5 InsidetheAVCAdvantagecabinet,fromtherear. . . . . . . . . . 20
6 ThemotherboardoftheAVCAdvantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7 Z80andROMchipsonthemotherboard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8 ROMreader/programmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9 Unattendedvotingmachinesinpublicplaces . . . . . . . . . . . 29
10 KeysforanAVCAdvantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
11 PickingthelockofanAVCAdvantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
12 Plasticstrapseal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
13 Plastic-strapsealasinstalledbyUnionCounty . . . . . . . . . . . 34
14 DONOTREMOVEsticker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
15 Resultsreporttapewithsealnumbernotfilledin . . . . . . . . . 38
16 ListofAVCAdvantagevotingmachinessoldbyGovdeals.com . . 42
17 DescriptionoftheAVCAdvantagemachinessoldbyGovdeals.com 43
18 Desolderingtool. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
19 Audioballotcartridge,frontandback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
20 WinEDScomputer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
21 Close-upofvoterpanelwithpaper-ballotoverlay . . . . . . . . . 78
22 GreenXappearsbyselectedcandidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
23 CastVotebutton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
24 VOTERECORDEDTHANKYOU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
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25 OperatorPanel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
26 Peekingthroughtheslot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
27 Tinycomputerforhackingresultscartridges . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
28 Cigarette-packhackingdevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
29 HackingaResultsCartridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
30 Buttonsbehindpaperballotonvoterpanel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
31 Eye-ficardforwirelessaccesstocartridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
32 Digitalvoicerecorder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
33 OperatorPanel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
34 Resultsreporttapedemonstratingoption-switchbug . . . . . . . 121
35 Threeresults-reportprintoutsdemonstratinginconsistencies . . . 126
36 InconsistentdatafromPennsauken6,inCamdenCounty. . . . . . 129
37 Version10ResultsCartridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
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1 Introduction
1.1 In 2004 a group of public-interest plaintiffs, represented by Professor Penny
Venetis of the Rutgers Law School, sued the State of New Jersey over the State’s
use of direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines. Most of New Jersey’s
countieshadadoptedtheSequoiaAVCAdvantagefull-faceDRE.
The plaintiffs argued that the use of DRE voting machines is illegal and un-
constitutional. Illegal, becausetheyviolateNewJerseyelectionlawsrequiringall
votes be counted accurately and that voting machines be thoroughly tested accu-
rate, andreliable. Unconstitutional, becausetheyviolatetheNewJerseyconstitu-
tion’s requirement that all votes count. The plaintiffs argued that one cannot trust
apaperlessDREmachinetocountthevote.
The case was dismissed by the trial court in January 2005. The dismissal was
appealed. While the appeal was pending, in the summer of 2005 the New Jersey
legislaturepassed(andthegovernorsigned)abillrequiringthat,nolaterthanJan-
uary1,2008,anyvotingsysteminNewJerseymustproduceavoter-verifiedpaper
ballot.
In2006theAppellateCourtreinstatedthelawsuit,andinstructedthetrialjudge
tomonitortheprogressofStateelectionofficialsinmeetingthelegislature’sdead-
line. In 2008, when the executive branch twice requested that the deadline be
extended,thelegislatureobliged,eachtimewithasix-monthextension. Basedon
an Appellate Division’s decision of June 2006, expressing concern that the State
would not meet the legislature’s January 2008 deadline, the trial judge, the Hon.
Linda Feinberg, ordered a trial to proceed on the constitutional issue. The case is
Gusciora et al. v. Corzine et al., Docket No. MER-L-2691-04, Superior Court of
NewJersey.
JudgeFeinbergorderedthattheStateprovidetoPlaintiffs’expertwitness, for
examination, AVC Advantage voting machines complete with their source code.
AppendixLshowsthetermsoftheCourtOrder. Theauthorsofthisreportexam-
inedvotingmachinesandsourcecodeduringJulyandAugust2008,anddelivered
our report to the Court on September 2. The Court Order permits us to make our
findingsavailabletothepublic30dayslater.
1.2 Based on our examination of the AVC Advantage voting machine, it is our
opinionthat:
1. TheAVCAdvantagecanbe“hacked”tostealvotesbyreplacingitsfirmware;
2. The “hack” can be perpetrated by a person with only ordinary training in
computerscience;
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Figure1: TheAVCAdvantage,fromthefront.
The large full-face voter panel (white) is visible. In normal use it would be
covered by a printed ballot sheet, which is not present in this photo. An array of
buttons,12acrossby42down,isvisible;wheninuse,thesearehiddenbehindthe
printed sheet. Below the voter panel is the write-in keyboard. To the left of the
write-inkeyboardisanLCDdisplay,andtotheright(notquitevisible)istheCast
Votebutton.
ThismachineisownedbyAndrewAppel; thephotographwastakenin2007at
PrincetonUniversity.
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3. A person can easily gain enough access to voting machines to install this
hack;
4. Onceinstalled,thefraudulentfirmwareispracticallyimpossibletodetect;
5. Onceinstalledonavotingmachine, thefraudulentfirmwarecanstealvotes
inelectionafterelectionwithoutanyadditionaleffort;
6. The AVC Advantage is vulnerable to hacks (fraudulent manipulations) in
severaldifferentways;
7. Some of these hacks take the form of viruses that can automatically propa-
gatethemselvesfromonevotingmachinetoanother;
8. Evenwhennot“hacked,”theAVCAdvantage(initsnormalstate)hasdesign
flaws that can cause votes to be lost, or cause voters to be given the wrong
primaryballottovote;
9. Evenwhennot“hacked,”theAVCAdvantageinitsnormalstatehasdesign
flawsthatencouragevotererrorandpollworkererror,andpermitfraud.
1.3 Aspartofthisreport,wehavepreparedavideodemonstratingseveralof
thesevulnerabilitiesandinaccuracies. Thisvideowillbeavailableat
http://citp.princeton.edu/advantage
2 Description of the AVC Advantage
2.1 TheAVCAdvantageisa“direct-recordingelectronic”(DRE)votingcomputer.
That is, thevoter indicates aselection of candidatesvia a user-interfaceto a com-
puter; the program in the computer stores data in its memory that (are supposed
to) correspond to the indicated votes; and at the close of the polls, the computer
outputs(whataresupposedtobe)thenumberofvotesforeachcandidate.
2.2 InthecaseoftheAVCAdvantage, theprimaryinputdeviceusedbythevoter
isalargepanel,containingatwo-dimensionalarrayofbuttonsandlights(seeFig-
ure 1). This panel is covered by a sheet of paper on which contests and candidate
names are printed (see Figure 2). Markings on the paper are placed over the but-
tonsthataretobepressedforthecorrespondingcandidates;thelightsonthepanel,
whenlit,arevisibleshiningthroughthepaper. Onthesideofthemachine,an“op-
erator panel” contains additional buttons and an LCD alphanumeric display with
two rows of 24 characters each. During an election, before each voter can vote, a
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