Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics

267 Pages·2015·12.371 MB·English

by  Benjamin A. Most, Harvey Starr

Inquiry, Logic, and
International Politics
Studies in International Relations
Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Donald J. Puchala,
Series Editors
Marvin S. Soroos
Beyond Sovereignty: The Challenge of Global Policy
Manus I. Midlarsky
The Disintegration of Political Systems:
War and Revolution in Comparative Perspective
Lloyd Jensen
Bargaining for National Security:
The Postwar Disarmament Negotiations
Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach
The Elusive Quest-
Theory and International Politics
William R. Thompson
On Global War:
Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics
Inquiry, Logic, and
International Politics
BENJAMIN A. MOST
and HARVEY STARR
WITH A NEW PREFACE BY
HARVEY STARR
The University of South Carolina Press
© 2015 University of South Carolina
Published by the University of South Carolina Press
Columbia, South Carolina 29208
www.sc.edu/uscpress
24232221201918 171615
10987654321
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
can be found at http://catalog.loc.gov/
ISBN 978-1-61117-592-9 (paperback)
ISBN 978-1-61117-593-6 (ebook)
"Time is too valuable, life too short,
to waste my time on dead ends. "
Benjamin A. Most (1986:14)
To the memory of BEN MOST
student and teacher, colleague and friend
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CONTENTS
List of Illustrations viii
Preface to the 2015 Edition xi
Acknowledgments xxix
1. INTRODUCTION: Cumulation, Theory, and the Logic of Inquiry 1
2. OPPORTUNITY AND WILLINGNESS: A Pre-Theoretic Framework 23
3. BASIC LOGIC AND RESEARCH DESIGN: Conceptualization, Case
Selection, and the Form of Relationships 47
4. CONCEPTUALIZING WAR: Attributes and Process 68
Appendix to Chapter 4 92
5. FOREIGN POLICY SUBSTITUTABILITY AND “NICE” LAWS: Integrating
Process and Theory 97
Appendixes to Chapter 5 124
6. THE LOGIC OF INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE: Power, War, and
Micro-Macro Linkages 132
Appendix to Chapter 6 162
7. CONCLUSION: Closure, Cumulation, and International
Relations Theory 168
Notes 191
References 213
Index 229
ILLUSTRATIONS
FIGURES
Figure 1.1. Depictions of the Research Process 15
Figure 1.2. The Analysts' Cube 19
Figure 2.1. Opportunity/Willingness and War 41
Figure 3.1. Necessary and Sufficient Relationships between X
andY 50
Figure 3.2. Elaboration of Necessary and Sufficient
Relationships 62
Figure 6.1. Post-World War II Dyads 139
Figure 6.2. Imbalanced and Balanced Dyads: Selected
Hypothetical Systems 143
Figure 6.3. Proportion of Imbalanced Dyads: Selected
Hypothetical Systems 144
TABLES
Table 3.1. Sampling Only Examples with the Occurrence of an
Independent Variable 51
Table 3.2. Sampling Only Examples with the Occurrence of a
Dependent Variable 53
Table 3.3. Consequences of Selective Sampling 54
Table 3.4. Alternative Hypotheses and Consequences of Logic
in Design 64
Table 4.1. A Preliminary Illustration 70
Table 4.2. A Simple Interaction Possibility 77
Table 4.3. A More Complex Interaction Possibility 80-81
Table 4.4. A Deterrence/Balance Illustration 86
Table 5.1. Hypothetical Action-Reaction Process 105-106
Table 6.1. Outline of Simulation Procedures 162-163
Illustrations ix ix
Table 6.2. Simulation of Systems with 10 States and 5 Major
Powers 164
Table 6.3. Simulated Conflict Initiations:
PR(W) = 0.02 165
Table 6.4. Simulated Conflict Initiations:
PR(W) = 0.05 166
Table 6.5. Simulated Conflict Initiations:
PR(W) - 0.02 and 0.05 167