India’s Accommodation in the Emerging International Order: Challenges and Prospects

18 Pages·2018·0.633 MB·English

by  Vikash Chandra

Article
India Quarterly
India’s Accommodation
74(4) 420–437
© 2018 Indian Council
in the Emerging
of World Affairs (ICWA)
SAGE Publications
International Order:
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0974928418802075
Challenges and
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/iqq
Prospects
Vikash Chandra
Abstract
This article has two-fold goals: to develop a coherent concept of accommodation
and explicate variable shaping the process of accommodation; and to analyse and
evaluate the challenges and prospects of India’s accommodation in the emerging
international order. It defines accommodation as a ‘state strategy’ and ‘process’.
It figures out six determinants viz. the sphere of influence, structural variables,
convergence/divergence of national interest, perception and intention towards
the international order, political and socio-cultural values, and costs of non-
accommodation. Instead of addressing the process of accommodation from
accommodation-seekers’ perspective, the article investigates the issue from accom-
modators’ perspective. Therefore, rather than describing traditional foundations
of India’s claim of accommodation, i.e. population, territory, military, and democ-
racy, it illustrates conditions under which the established power accommodate
rising powers. By comparing and contrasting India’s interests, principles, and values
vis-à-vis the USA and China, it demonstrates how differing strategic calculations,
economic and commercial interests and divergence in political socio-cultural norms
and values, China is posing or may pose challenges to India’s accommodation.
It suggests that India needs to strike a balance between the declining America and
rising China. It will have to learn how not to turn China from an adversary to an
enemy. A prudent strategy for India will be to balance China, however, in the non-
[AQ2] military, i.e. diplomatic, political and economic realms. Nevertheless, the engage-
ment dimension should not be marginalised, actual or even perceived.
Keywords
Accommodation, international order, balancing, rising powers, the established
power, policy of containment
Corresponding author:
Vikash Chandra.
E-mail: [email protected]
Chandra 421
Introduction
There is a difference between India’s perceived self-image and its perception
abroad. India perceives itself as civilisational state aspiring to become a leading
power while regarded a ‘poor and middle power’ (Ayres, 2018, p. 25). Underlining
this divide, Barry Buzan has noted that ‘it is difficult to find many voices outside
India that either accord it the status of great power or allow it to trade on its potential
for development’ (Buzan, 2004, p. 61). The divide may be a result of persisting
belief that India’s ‘leadership role in the international order remains much more
constrained than that of secondary powers’ (Mazarr et al., 2017, p. 109). However,
military modernisation, acquisition of the nuclear weapon, rising share in inter-
national organisations and more recently, membership to Australia Group, Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Wassenaar Arrangement have forced
scholars and policymakers to rethink their approach (See Saran, 2017; T. C.
Schaffer & H. B. Schaffer, 2016). Now some scholars have started believing
that India’s rank in the international order is changing from a minor player to
major power (Ayres, 2018, p. 6). Nevertheless, a question still haunts: will the
change in scholarly recognition be translated into international recognition and
accommodation in the international system peacefully? Last 500 years history
shows that the relationship between the established and rising powers remained
mired in Thucydides Trap,1 as out of 16, only on 4 occasions, rising powers were
accommodation without war (Allison, 2017).
In this background, this article seeks to answer two questions. What is accom-
modation and which variables determine the prospects of accommodation? What
are major challenges to India’s accommodation? To explicate the concept of
accommodation, its determinants and to underscore major challenges, it is divided
into four sections. The introductory section explains the context and paves the
way for the study. The second defines the concept of accommodation. Instead of
conventionally describing foundations of India’s claim such as population,
territory, military and democracy, this section explicates six variables—sphere of
influence, structural variables, convergence/divergence of national interest,
perception and intention towards the international order, the political and socio-
cultural values, and costs of non-accommodation—that largely determine whether
a rising power will be accommodated or not. The third section underscores how
these six variables provide opportunity and/or pose challenges to India’s accom-
modation. The concluding section analyses India’s prospects of accommodation
and suggests what needs to be done in this regard.
Accommodation and Its Determinants
Accommodation is defined and understood differently. Some define it as an
instrument of peaceful power transition while others as a process. Robert Ross
sees accommodation in the context of alignment pattern and attaches great signifi-
cance to geography and military power. To him, if military power of accommodation-
seeker is strong, prospects of accommodation are greater; but if military power is
weak, the prospects of balance are greater (Manicom & O’Neil, 2010, pp. 27–28).
422 India Quarterly 74(4)
Accommodation refers to a process in which states (the established and rising
powers) recognise the status of a rising power and decide to include it in the
international system with accordingly role and responsibility and, in exchange,
the accommodated state willingly agrees to give up its revisionist intention, at least
for a short term.
Here accommodation is used in two ways: as a strategy and as a process.
Accommodation as strategy refers to a state’s carefully crafted policy to maximise
its national interests while ensuring peaceful power transition in the international
system. At this level, the accommodator may agree to recognise the status of a rising
power or decide against it. As a strategy, it is used by the established and rising
powers in three scenarios. First, as a strategy of the established power, it stands for
the established power’s policy whether it is willing to give membership and due role
and responsibilities to accommodation-seekers in the international order or decides
against it. Second, accommodation is also as a strategy of rising powers to adjust
status among rising powers themselves. Status adjustment among rising powers is
equally important because if two or more regional states are rising simultaneously,
peaceful power transition will also depend on how they adjust their status mutually.
It is possible that the established powers accommodate rising powers peacefully,
but rising powers fail in adjusting their status peacefully. In case of failure, they may
enter into a regional war which may escalate and destabilise the international order.
Consequently, the significance of status adjustment among rising powers can neither
be ignored nor undermined. Finally, rising powers also use accommodation vis-à-
vis the established power. For instance, David C. Kang has defined accommodation
as a strategy, through which ‘a secondary state attempts to cooperate and craft
stability with a great power’ (Kang, 2007, p. 53).
Accommodation as a process is the second step in peaceful power transition.
Once the established or rising powers decide to accommodate a rising power,
accommodation as process comes into action. Defining accommodation as a process,
T. V. Paul has propounded that accommodation ‘implies that the emerging power
is given the status and perks associated with the rank of great power in the inter-
national system, which includes in many instances a recognition of its sphere of
influence, or the decision not to challenge it militarily’ (Paul, 2016, p. 5). There is
disagreement over the meaning of status and perks. Somewhere else, with others,
Paul has defined status as ‘collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued
attributes’, which include ‘wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic
position, socio-political organization, and diplomatic clout’ (Larson, Paul, &
Wohlforth, 2014, p. 7). Clarifying where to give status and perks, Larson et al.
(2014, p. 7) have stated that the status ‘manifests itself in two distinct but related
ways: as membership in a defined club of actors, and as relative standing within
such a club’. Thus, accommodation according to Paul implies not only giving the
membership but also giving due role in it.
However, limiting the scope of accommodation to the multilateral fora could not
be regarded as sufficient because most important decisions in international politics
are often taken outside the multilateral fora. The extension of the role and responsi-
bility beyond the institutional apparatus is also important from the legitimacy point
of view. Even if the rising power is accommodated in the multilateral realm and
given perks associated with it but denied outside it, sooner or later newly accom-
modated state may feel betrayed and turn back to the revisionist path. Such a turn
Chandra 423
may push the international order once again in turmoil. Therefore, the extension of
the role and responsibilities must include various issues being debated and solved
even outside the multilateral institutions.
There are six variables that determine the process of accommodation.
These can be put in perspective as follows:
The Sphere of Influence
The sphere of influence2 is an important variable that determines the prospect and
degree of accommodation. If the accommodating and accommodation-seekers
have distinct spheres of influence and they mutually respect each other’s sphere,
the prospect of accommodation increases. Even if there is an overlapping but the
accommodator is willing to accept accommodation-seekers’ claim within its
sphere of influence, or the accommodation-seeker agrees to not challenge the
accommodator’s sphere of influence, the latter may accommodate the former.
In contrast, if the accommodators’ and accommodation-seekers’ sphere of influence
converge and the established power is adamant on not conceding its sphere of
influence to a rising power and/or the rising power willingly decides to challenge
the established power’s sphere of influence, the prospect of accommodation
becomes quite grim, leading to inevitability of conflict.
For instance, in the seventeenth century, the conflict between England and the
Dutch Republic becomes inevitable because England challenged the freedom of
navigation and free trade, the pillars of Dutch supremacy. The Dutch were adamant
on not conceding or sharing its sphere of influence with England. Dutch leader
Johan de Witt declared that ‘“we would shed our last drop of blood” before we
“acknowledge [England’s] imaginary sovereignty over the seas”’ (de Witt cited in
Allison, 2017, p. 107). On the other hand, England claimed sovereignty in its
neighbouring seas and by enacting Navigation Act in 1651, retained exclusive
right to regulate trade in its colonies. The Dutch regarded these actions as a major
challenge to their domination that eventually resulted in breakout of three wars in
last quarter of the seventeenth century.
Structural Variables
States behaviour in the international system is constrained by structural variables.
Rising powers’ behaviour and its implications for international and regional order
are key to understand the accommodators’ strategy towards them. The accommo-
dator’s response is determined by ‘the type of regional order that a leading state
prefers and the type of power shift that it believes is taking place’ (Montgomery,
2016, p. 3). If the rising power seeks to establish an order based on a distinct and
opposite set of principles, norms and values that may undermine the international
order, the established power will prefer containment. The rejuvenation of the
‘quad’ is regarded as containing China because the later is posing or perceived as
posing challenges to the established order in the Asia-Pacific.
According to the preponderance-of-power realism, the established power
‘favor parity in peripheral regions’; therefore, they ‘oppose any nations that try to
424 India Quarterly 74(4)
achieve primacy’ (Montgomery, 2016, p. 7). If a dominant regional power is likely
to challenge the international order but is being challenged by a challenger in the
same region, to strike a balance of power in the region, the established power
may accommodate the challenger of the dominant regional power. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, Britain had maintained primacy in the
Far East. But when Russia became third largest naval power and started expand-
ing towards the Korean peninsula, Britain felt its primacy in the region threatened.
To retain primacy, by supplying ‘naval reinforcements’, Britain assisted Japan in
crushing Russia (Claar & Ripsman, 2016, p. 158).
Convergence or Divergence of National Interest
The convergence or divergence of national interest is another important variable
in determining accommodation process. The prospects of the accommodation
increase ‘if the challenger is not perceived as threatening to the declining great
power’s core interests, at least over the short term’ (Claar & Ripsman, 2016,
p. 152). Although the convergence or divergence can take place at various levels,
yet, three domains are crucial: perceived security threats, economic competition
or interdependence, and alignment pattern. First, if the accommodators and
accommodation-seekers face similar threats and the former find it difficult to cope
individually, then they may accommodate the accommodation-seekers to tackle
the challenge collectively. Common threat of the USSR was an important variable
that pushed the USA to accommodate China in the 1970s. In contrast, if they
face diverging threats, the possibility of accommodation decreases. The USA and
its allies failed to accommodate Japan in the 1930s because they ‘viewed Japan’s
search for territorial expansion in China and, later, South East Asia, as predatory
and dangerous’ (Taliaferro, 2016, p. 173). The diverging national interests pushed
the USA to join Britain and the Netherlands in containing Japan through imposing
sanctions.
Second, if accommodators and accommodation-seekers have specialisation in
producing the same goods and services and vie for same sources of natural
resources and market to sell their product, the prospects of accommodation will
be grimmer. In contrast, if they produce different goods and services and sell in
distinct markets; the prospect will be brighter. Even if the states concerned
produce the same goods and services but extract raw material from different
sources and sell finished goods in different markets, it will not hinder the prospects
of accommodation. The case of colonial India represents a good example, where
Portugal, Britain and France fought bloody wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth
century to control natural resources and market. Finally, alignment pattern also
affects the process of accommodation. If an accommodation-seeker has an alliance
or close relationship with other accommodation-seekers against the accommodator
and may pose threats to accommodator in future, the accommodation of the states
in question will be difficult. In contrast, if the accommodation-seeker is in an
alliance with or has a close relationship with the accommodator, either the estab-
lished power or other rising power, the prospects of accommodation increase
significantly.
Chandra 425
Perception and Intention Towards the International Order
Another variable significantly affecting the prospects of accommodation is
accommodation-seekers’ perception towards the international order: whether it is
‘poised to reinforce, establish, undermine, or overturn the type of local order that
a leading state prefers’ (Montgomery, 2016, p. 17). Accommodation-seekers’
prospects of accommodation will be brighter if it is status quo, willing to accept
‘the existing ordering principles of the international system’ (Chan, 2004, p. 216),
and ‘its goals are non-threatening, it might coax the existing great powers to
accommodate its rise’ (Claar & Ripsman, 2016, p. 172) and agrees to ‘preserve
the essential characteristics of the existing international order’ (Schweller, 1998,
p. 24). China’s accommodation in the World Trade Organization became possible
only when it embarrassed liberal economic policies and ‘re-endorsed Deng’s
reform policy’ to build ‘a socialist market economy’ (Zhang, 2015, pp. 18–19).
In contrast, if the accommodation-seeker is a revisionist state, seeking to
‘undermine the established order for the purpose of increasing their power and
prestige in the system’ (Schweller, 1998, p. 24), the prospects of its accommoda-
tion will recede. If the accommodation-seeker has values and principles different
and contrary to the existing international order, it can provide an alternative to the
existing international order. The presence of an alternative vision offers an incen-
tive to accommodation-seeker to establish an order reflecting her own norms,
value and principles. Such revisionist accommodation-seekers can establish a
parallel order that may undermine or replace the current international order. Such
states are more likely to be contained. American containment policy towards the
USSR during the Cold War and today’s China could be cited as examples. In both
cases, the USSR and China offered an ideological and political alternative to the
norms and values underpinning the current liberal international order.
Political and Sociocultural Values
Political, social and cultural values play a significant role in determining the
accommodators’ strategy. Similarity leads to a favourable or at least less threaten-
ing perception. It is believed that ‘if the states in question share similar domestic
political structures and ideological outlooks, it may make accommodation more
likely, whereas a large difference between the states might make confrontation
more likely’ (Claar & Ripsman, 2016, p. 152). About British accommodation
of the USA in the early decades of the twentieth century, Charles Kupchan
(2010, p. 105) has rightly noted that Britain and America were ‘liberal polities.
Their governing institutions were structured to check and balance power, ensure
the rule of law, and discourage the exploitation of political advantage’. In contrast,
divergence may culminate in a policy of containment because generally, similar-
ity creates attraction while divergence distraction. Distraction may lead to a suspi-
cious or adverse perception that will weaken the prospect of accommodation.
But neither similarity always leads to accommodation nor divergence to contain-
ment. The US accommodation of China in the 1970s is a good example.
426 India Quarterly 74(4)
The Costs of Non-Accommodation
The perceived cost also affects accommodation. If the cost of containment is
lesser than accommodation, the accommodators prefer containment because
rational actors do not want to share its position and prestige easily. But if the cost
of containment is higher than accommodation, the accommodator’s preferred
strategy may be accommodation. There is a tendency among accommodators that
despite the cost of non-accommodation being high, they prefer containment
because when the issue of prestige comes into the way, cost becomes secondary.
However, when the cost of containment or non-accommodation becomes extremely
high, the accommodators are forced to find buck-catcher3 or accommodate. This
is the reason why accommodation-seekers use a strategy called costly signalling
meaning ‘to show the hegemon what it really wants as well as how seriously it
wants them’ (He, 2016, p. 203).
The cost of accommodation depends on various factors such as the possession
of nuclear weapons, the presence/absence of a regional rival of the rising power
and the potential of the rising power to challenge the existing order and establish
a new international order. The chances of accommodation increase if the estab-
lished and the rising powers possess nuclear weapons because nuclear deterrence
and assured mutual destruction increase the cost of containment significantly.
Second, by providing an instrument to containment, the presence of a rival of the
dominant regional power decreases the cost of non-accommodation. China’s
accommodation in the 1970s and presence of regional rivals in case of Security
Council reforms are two pertinent cases in this regard. Ultimately, it can be
deciphered that the higher the cost of non-accommodation, fairer the chances of
accommodation; the lower the cost of non-accommodation, grimmer the chances
of accommodation.
Challenges to India’s Accommodation
Shifting Balance of Power in Asia
As the power in the international system is distributing and ‘the pivot of inter-
national politics is shifting from the Euro-Atlantic zone to Asia-Pacific’ (Chandra,
2017, p. 108), a resurgent China under Xi Jinping has started challenging American
domination and seeking to alter status quo in the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand,
the USA is trying to balance China’s rise and limit its influence by maintaining
status quo or slowing down the pace of change. To this end, the USA needs a
regional balancer or buck-catcher. At a time when the weakness of Australia and
Japan as counterweights to China is evident, it is believed that ‘India’s emergence
as a great economic success story will provide … a possible strategic counter-
weight to China’ (Pei, 2011). Given its geostrategic location, historical enmity and
inherent tensions with China, India is being regarded as the right choice to balance
China. The way ‘India stood up to its muscle-flexing neighbour in a 10-week
border standoff’ (Chellaney, 2017) on the Doklam issue has further convinced US
Chandra 427
policymakers about the viability of the Indian option. These strategic calculations
push the USA to accommodate India.
However, the most powerful challenge to India’s accommodation comes from
China because ‘Washington’s embracement of India as a strategic partner drives
fear into Chinese strategists who see India as America’s counter-balancer against
China’ (Pei, 2011). Chinese perception of India as potential challenger may lead
former to block India’s bid for accommodation. Moreover, India’s accommoda-
tion by the USA is not so simple as it appears because the USA will continue to
support India’s bid until it pursues a policy to contain China’s rise. The shift in
present American policy towards China or any compromise between China and
the USA will reduce India’s strategic importance for the USA. India’s prospects
will become grim if American policymakers realise that India is no more inter-
ested or unable to balance China or they find a more appropriate balancer.
American support to India’s bid for accommodation will last till India continue
containing China.
India’s Sphere of Influence
As a rising state, India is eager to protect and willing to expand its sphere of influ-
ence. India regards South Asia as its sphere of influence and seeks to further
expand it in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. Like other regional powers,
‘India is very sensitive about any presence of external Great Powers in South
Asia’ (Brewster, 2016, pp. 4–10). To protect its sphere of influence in South
Asia, ‘India has sought primacy and a veto over the actions of outside powers’
(Mohan, 2006). With the enlargement of a blue-water navy, India has sought to
expand its influence in the Indian Ocean, and with active support from Singapore
and Vietnam, it is also trying to enter into the South China Sea. In the extended
neighbourhood regions, ‘India has sought to balance the influence of other powers
and prevent them from undercutting its interests’ (Mohan, 2006).
India’s sphere of influence appears to diverge with the USA while converging
with China. There is hardly any convergence of the spheres of influence between
India and America. India ‘no longer suspects Washington of trying to undercut
its influence in the region’ (Mohan, 2006). In contrast to undercutting India’s
influence, the USA wants India’s influence to expand in the Indo-Pacific region
(National Security Strategy, 2017, p. 47).
Pertaining to India’s sphere of influence in South Asia, China is of the view
that ‘India would have important (but not exclusive) influence in South Asia’ and
expects from India that it will leave ‘China preeminent in East and Southeast
Asia’ (T. C. Schaffer & H. B. Schaffer, 2016, p. 260). In recent years, China’s
presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean has increased. Some smaller neigh-
bours have sought China’s support to neutralise India’s dominance. China has
developed and further developing critical infrastructures like ports and monitor-
ing and installing intelligence gathering technologies in these states. Given the
historical enmity and antagonistic relationship with China, India ‘views any Chinese
attempt to strengthen its relationships with India’s neighbours as threatening’
428 India Quarterly 74(4)
(Pu, 2017, p. 152). In coming years, India’s presence in Southeast Asia and
Asia-Pacific may challenge Chinese perceived exclusive sphere of influence
and the international community may see increasing tensions between India and
China. Such converge of the sphere of influence will adversely affect the mutual
perception, which may eventually result in a containment strategy from China.
India’s Perception and Intentions Towards the International Order
Accommodation-seekers’ perception and intention towards international order
shape accommodators’ response to accommodation-seekers’ bid for accommoda-
tion. India’s norms, values and principles are largely consistent with current
US-led international order.4 Intentionally, it is not a ‘revolutionary power that
seeks to overthrow the current order’ (Wojczewski, 2017, p. 112). Rather, it is
interested in ‘upholding a liberal international order’ (Saran, 2017, p. 202). It is of
the view that ‘the organizing principles around which the world order is identified
… like respect to the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial
integrity, non-use of force and non-intervention in internal affairs, are deemed as
sacrosanct’ (Murthy, 2010, p. 211). Therefore, instead of overthrowing the current
international order, ‘India seeks to shape the world order in ways that enhance
India’s status and ensure its socio-economic transformation’ (Wojczewski, 2017,
p. 120). At best, it ‘aspires to a seat at the table’ (Sinha, 2016, p. 226). Although
India’s economic system is not entirely congruent with the current international
economic order. But in the post-Cold War era, India has ‘initiated a gradual
process of economic liberalisation, including reducing restrictions of imports, a
major liberalisation of foreign direct investments (FDI) and the introduction of
greater competition in various sectors of the Indian economy’ (Wojczewski, 2016,
p. 100). Consequently, it has gradually started converging. And states having
‘political regimes, economic systems, social systems and human rights regimes in
line with the existing international order are less likely to be revisionists while
those with distinct visions are more like to be so, as they believe they are discrimi-
nated against’ (Chandra, 2018, p. 16).
However, this does not mean that India’s position is completely in line with the
USA. India ‘still objects to interferences in the internal affairs of other states, even
though it has endorsed globalization’ (Wojczewski, 2016, p. 108). On the relation-
ship between human rights and state sovereignty and territorial integrity, India’s
stand differs from American position. Unlike the Western urge to breach the
principle of state sovereignty to protect people from atrocities, India agrees only
to an exceptional breach either with the consent of the host state, self-defence, as
a last resort, or with proper authorisation from the UN Security Council (Bass, 2015;
Puri, 2012, para 6; United Nations, 2011, p. 18).
India’s political and economic system is in contrast to the Chinese system.
De facto, Chinese political system is an authoritarian system with a single party
while Indian is a multi-party democracy. The Chinese model of economic
development ‘is more statist in orientation’,5 primarily because ‘a disproportion-
ate amount of its GDP is produced by the state-owned sector’ (Basu, 2017).
It also puts ‘emphasis on financial and political controls’ (Huang, 2010, p. 33).
Chandra 429
Through disinvestment in public sector enterprises and opening of the retail sector
for private sector investment, gradually, India is moving from a ‘mixed economy’
to a privatised, less regulated and open market economy while China is marching
from Deng Xiaoping’s reform to what President Xi Jinping has called ‘socialism
with Chinese characteristics’ (Kondapalli, 2017). However, unlike the Chinese
model that ‘offers an alternative to the policy toolkit offered to developing
countries’ (Kondapalli, 2017; Yağci, 2016, p. 30), ‘India’s foreign policy discourse
does not articulate an alternative vision of the world order that could replace exist-
ing institutional arrangements’ (Wojczewski, 2017, p. 121). In the absence of an
alternative vision of international order, India is less likely to become a revisionist
state. Chinese perception is that this divergence may hamper its vision of interna-
tional order if realised in future. Such belief and perception will push China to
block India’s accommodation.
India’s norms and values are slowly marching towards the attainment of
parity with the current international order. The Indo-US nuclear deal and India’s
inclusion in the MTCR and Wassenaar Arrangement has further reduced India’s
revisionist intent. Even where there is a divergence, it is not too wide to not to be
managed amicably. Given the growing convergence, India neither wants to over-
haul nor overthrow the current international order. This convergence may push
the USA to accommodate India in the present order. But India has significant
differences with China. Chinese decision makers may also perceive India’s liberal
values as a long-term competitor. If allied with the USA, Indian norms and values
strengthen liberal values that are significantly different from Chinese values.
This may incentivise China to prevent India’s accommodation.
Divergence in Political and Sociocultural Values
India is the largest democracy in the world, where every citizen has the right to
participate in the political process by voting, contesting elections and forming
political parties or becoming a member of one of them. Through the rule of law,
periodic elections, decentralisation of powers, freedom of the press and vibrant
civil society, the roots of democracy are further deepening. India is gradually
moving from procedural to substantial democracy. Moreover, incorporating
‘democracy’ as a foreign policy goal (Bandyopadhyaya, 2003, p. 59) and partici-
pating in the Community of Democracies and UN Democracy Fund, India’s
approach is converging towards the USA. Socially, India was a plural hierarchical
society, organised around the Varna system which was further subdivided into
thousands of castes. But Constitution has superseded traditional discriminatory
practices and had granted rights and liberties to individuals, groups and religions
against individuals and state. Post-independence, Indian society has been organ-
ised around liberal principles, where the individual is at the core and enjoys
constitutionally granted rights, liberties and other entitlements. For instance,
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution provides equality before the law and equal
protection of the law to every citizen while Article 17 prohibits the practice of
untouchability (Basu, 2008), a defining feature practised in the Varna and caste