Incremental peace in Afghanistan Incremental peace in Afghanistan

162 Pages·2017·5.1 MB·English

Accord
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an international review of peace initiatives Editors
Lseopgeor adtrea welne mase nts Anna Larson and
with overlaps
coloured seperately Alexander Ramsbotham
2018
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Accord
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an international review of peace initiatives
Incremental peace
in Afghanistan
June 2018 // Editors
Anna Larson and Alexander Ramsbotham
Accord // ISSUE 27 // www.c-r.org
Published by Conciliation Resources, to inform and strengthen peace processes
worldwide by documenting and analysing the lessons of peacebuilding
Published by Acknowledgements
Conciliation Resources
We would like to give special thanks to Professor
Burghley Yard, 106 Burghley Road
Michael Semple for his extensive expert advice
London, NW5 1AL
and substantive editorial input and support for
www.c-r.org this Accord publication. Professor Semple's
experience, insights and ideas have been
Telephone [phone]
integral to conceptual development and practical
Fax [phone]
implementation throughout this Accord project.
Email [email protected]
We would also like to thank the following:
Charity registered in England and Wales Ali Wardak, Heela Najibullah, Christine Bell,
(1055436). Company limited by guarantee Charlotte Morris, Scott Worden, Sippi Azerbaijani
registered in England and Wales (03196482). Moghaddam, Jonathan Cohen, Ed Hadley, Chris
Sell, Jawed Nader, Noah Coburn, Erika Tarzi,
Kate Clark, Emma Leslie, Veronika Tesarova,
Editors
Beatrice Liese, Timor Sharan, Sayed Abdullah
Anna Larson and Alexander Ramsbotham
Ahmadi, Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Mohammed
Executive Director Munir Salamzai, Ali Hassan Fahimi, Shaharzad
Jonathan Cohen Akbar, Ahmad Shuja, Malais Daud, Rahmatullah
Hashemi, Sayed Ali Faisal, Lotfullah Najafizada,
Director of Accord
Amir Hussain Hussaini, Tahir Qadiri, Mohammed
Alexander Ramsbotham
Hussain Hasrat, Wali Naeemi, Hamish Nixon,
Director of Policy and Learning Francesc Vendrell, Tom Rodwell, Behrouz
Teresa Dumasy Afagh, Hameed Hakimi, Jenny Norton, Daud
Qarisadah, Marika Theros, Elizabeth Winter,
Senior Advisor, Peace and Transition Processes
Christopher Langton, Kathryn Tomlinson
Zahbia Yousuf
and Andrew Nethercott.
Senior Advisor, Gender and Peacebuilding
Special thank you to Veronika Tesarova for
Sophia Close
her invaluable role throughout the project
Policy, Accord and Learning Officer and publication.
Felix Colchester
Opinions expressed by all contributors are
Accord, Policy and Practice Assistant their own.
Veronika Tesarova
This report is an output of the Political
Copyedited by Aaron Griffiths Settlements Research Programme, funded by
UK aid from the Department for International
Designed and typeset by Soapbox
Development for the benefit of developing
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countries. The views expressed and information
© Conciliation Resources 2018 contained in it are not necessarily those of
Permission is granted for reproduction and or endorsed by DFID, which can accept no
use of the materials for educational purposes. responsibility for such views or information
Please acknowledge your source when using the or for any reliance placed on them.
materials and notify Conciliation Resources.
www.politicalsettlements.org
Cover photo: No matter how high the mountain, Twitter.com/PolSettlements
there will always be a way up. (Dari proverb)
View of a village in Nuristan province,
Afghanistan // © MohibNoor/iStock
ISSN 2397-5598
ISBN 978-1-905805-26-6
Contents
Acronyms 4
Foreword 5
Introduction 7
Section 1: Looking back – lessons from Afghanistan’s past 13
Afghanistan’s political history 15
Lessons from Bonn 20
Transformative politics in 20th century Afghanistan 25
President Najibullah and the National Reconciliation Policy 30
Taliban history of war and peace in Afghanistan 35
Peace in Afghanistan: a northern, non-Pashtun perspective 41
Section 2: Looking forward – peace initiatives 46
Elusive settlement in Afghanistan 48
Perspectives of leaders of five Taliban caucuses – interviews 56
Women’s participation in Afghan peace talks 63
Integrating a military and peace strategy – interview with Amb. Douglas Lute 68
Statement by the Taliban Political Office in Qatar 72
Brokering local settlements in Helmand 74
Local peacebuilding in Afghanistan 80
International support for a political process 85
Section 3: Looking forward – institutional change 91
Inclusive politics as a path to peace 93
Local perspectives on peace and elections – Herat Province 102
On elections and peace: Dr Habiba Sarabi – interview 104
Local perspectives on peace and elections – Nangarhar Province 106
On peace and political reform: Younus Qanooni – interview 109
Local perspectives on peace and elections – Balkh Province 113
Theses on peacemaking in Afghanistan 115
Local perspectives on peace and elections – Ghazni Province 119
Human rights, security and Afghanistan’s peace process 122
On war, peace and transition: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – interview 128
Institutionalising inclusive and sustainable justice in Afghanistan 132
Conclusion 138
Chronology 143
Glossary 147
Profiles 148
Key texts 152
References 154
Accord series 156
Incremental peace in Afghanistan // 3
Acronyms
ACJC – Anti-Corruption Justice Centre ISK – Islamic State of Khorasan
ADR – Alternative dispute resolution KHAD – State Intelligence Agency – Khadamat-e Aetla’at-e Dawlati 
AIBA – Afghanistan Independent Bar Association MoJ – Ministry of Justice
AIHRC – Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission MoWA – Ministry of Women’s Affairs
ANA – Afghan National Army NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ANP – Afghan National Police NDS – N ational Directorate of Security
ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces NRP – National Reconciliation Policy
BAAG – British & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group NUG – National Unity Government
BRI – Belt and Road Initiative OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
CDC – Community Development Council PDPA – People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
DDA – District Development Assembly PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team
DDR – Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration SERC – Special Electoral Reform Commission
HIG – Hezb-i Islami-ye Gulbuddin SNTV – Single Non-Transferable Vote
HRSU – Human Rights Support Unit SSR – Security Sector Reform
HRU – Human Rights Unit UN5PPP – UN five-Point Peace Plan
IEC – Independent Electoral Commission UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
INLTC – Independent National Legal Training Centre USIP – United States Institute of Peace
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force USV – Upper Sangin Valley
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence
AFGHANISTAN 64° 66° UZBEKISTAN68° 70° 72° 74° CHIN
TAJIKISTAN A
JAWZJAN
TURKMENISTAN KUNDUZ
BALKH
TAKHAR BADAKHSHAN
36° 36°
SAMANGAN
FARYAB BAGHLAN
IS BADGHIS SARIPUL PANJSIER NURISTAN AFGHANISTAN Jammu
LA BAMYAN PARWAN KAPISA MAN KUNAR and
M GH Kashmir
I WARDAK Kabul LA
34C ° HERAT GHOR DAY LOGAR NANGARHAR 34°
R KUNDI Islamabad
E
P PAKTYA
U GHAZNI KHOST
B PAKISTAN
L URUZGAN
I
C FARAH PAKTIKA
ZABUL
32 O° 32°
F

I National capital
R NIMROZ KANDAHAR International boundary
A
N HELMAND Provincial boundary
IN
D
IA
0 50 100 150 200 250 km
30° 30°
Map: United Nations 0 50 100 150 mi
62° 64° 66° 68° 70° 72° 74°
4 // Accord // ISSUE 27
Foreword
Mohammad Kareem Khalili
His Excellency Mohammad Kareem
Khalili is Chairman of the High Peace
Council of Afghanistan. HE Khalili
served as Vice-President of Afghanistan
from 2002–14 during both the Interim
Administration and then under elected
Portrait of His Excellency Mohammad Kareem
Khalili in Kabul, Afghanistan.
President Hamid Karzai.
The country known as ‘Afghanistan’ has been burning in Of course, questions remain as to the conditions under
the fire of war and violence for nearly forty years now. which peace can be achieved. But despite these questions,
These destructive wars have inflicted all kinds of injury Afghanistan’s political class is confident that peace
on every aspect of the country. From the widespread and offers the best way to escape the current crisis without
largescale slaughter of our people, to the destruction of precipitating a new one.
housing and economic infrastructure, to the degrading of
the natural environment, to the traumatised psychology Undoubtedly, peace in Afghanistan is intimately linked to
of the war-affected. From the violation of the rights and international peace. The problem of conflict in Afghanistan
freedoms of women and children, to the crumbling of the is a manifestation of contemporary global conflict.
rule of law. And from the emergence of all kinds of negative Therefore, progress towards peace in Afghanistan will not
phenomena in the domain of social relations, to the damage just save the residents of this country from the evils of war,
to the nation’s cultural life. These are all consequences it will also contribute to the solution of a global problem.
which the continuous wars have inflicted on the people Accordingly, while the peace process in Afghanistan is
of Afghanistan. Therefore, to extricate the country from Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, it requires the clear and
this horrendous, bitter state requires a transformational committed support from the countries of the region and
approach. This approach is peace and understanding! at the international level.
Only peace offers a sustainable and fundamental solution
to the Afghan crisis. In 2001, the international community achieved a rare unity
of action with regard to Afghanistan. It was thus able to
The necessity of achieving peace is one issue on which there transform positively the lives of millions of our people and
is no difference of opinion. Over the past ten months the turn a new page in the life of the country. That page is titled
Afghanistan High Peace Council has conducted broad-based ‘peace’ and ‘an end to war’.
consultations about peace across the political spectrum and
at all levels of society. These consultations have involved I want to express my appreciation for the unstinting efforts
national figures, the leaders of political parties, religious of the international community and the international
scholars, civil society activists, women’s rights defenders, partners of Afghanistan in the quest for peace. I am hopeful
media figures and people from other parts of Afghan society. that this cooperation will reach even higher levels and
The point on which all of these figures reached a consensus become stronger and more effective.
was the necessity of achieving peace in Afghanistan. They all
emphasised the point that any solution to the problems of The peace process faces multiple challenges. These
Afghanistan depends upon peace and understanding. challenges are not restricted to the practical domain.
Incremental peace in Afghanistan // 5
Indeed, we must also continue our work in the theoretical I am pleased that the peace process in Afghanistan, which
and conceptual domain. On the other hand, we already since 2010 has been headed by the High Peace Council,
know that peace is not just a political phenomenon and does has achieved important and promising results. Now this
not merely imply an absence of war. Peace spans social, process is following a clear road map. Furthermore,
cultural, legal, psychological and economic dimensions. We structures and institutions have been established at the
can only talk of peace having taken hold in a society when the national and provincial level, which are competent to
members of that society properly comprehend the nature of cooperate with national and international forces and ensure
peace, when peace is accorded due respect as a universal that the pursuit of peace is a fundamental approach and
human-social value and when the structures required to permanent obligation.
facilitate and strengthen peace have been duly established.
The compilation and publication of this significant
The compilation of this volume required the dedication of volume can build upon the successes and achievements
a team of intellectuals, possessed of profound knowledge of the peace process. It can help to attract the
of Afghan affairs with a deep familiarity and a determination international attention to this important process, which
to elucidate the Afghan issue for today’s audience. I am we so clearly require.
grateful for the efforts of the contributors, who have
approached the issue of peace in Afghanistan in such With hope for the realisation of a sustainable peace
a scholarly and professional manner. Such endeavours in Afghanistan.
are required to facilitate the peace process, to nurture
new perspectives, broaden our horizons and stimulate
our people towards fresh political and practical initiatives.
6 // Accord // ISSUE 27
Introduction
Progressive peace for Afghanistan
Anna Larson and Alexander Ramsbotham – with thanks to Professor Michael
Semple for substantive input, insights and ideas.
Dr Anna Larson is Senior Teaching Fellow in Development (Columbia, 2014), and holds a PhD in post-war recovery from the
Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University University of York.
of London, and before this worked as a researcher in Afghanistan.
She has been writing on politics, democratisation and peace in Alexander Ramsbotham is Director of Accord and Series Editor
Afghanistan since 2005, is co-author with Noah Coburn of Derailing at Conciliation Resources.
Democracy in Afghanistan: Elections in an Unstable Political Landscape
ABSTRACT
Accord editors Anna Larson and Alexander of Afghan and international men and women from
Ramsbotham introduce the publication, explaining its academia, the military, government, armed opposition
rationale, focus areas and structure. They identify the and civil society, many with direct experience of conflict
need for a radical change in approach to move beyond and peace in Afghanistan.
peace rhetoric in Afghanistan through a progressive,
step-by-step process towards political settlement, Section 1 looks back to historical lessons of
which builds stability, confidence and legitimacy over conflict and peacemaking to understand how
time. This would pursue two phased objectives: first, departures from established, violent political
short-term – to reduce violence which inevitably paths might be possible. Sections 2 and 3 look
involves a central role for the conflict parties, forward to possibilities for peaceful transition in
principally the Taliban and the Afghan government; and the future, with Section 2 considering priorities
second, long-term – to achieve a more broadly inclusive for peace initiatives and Section 3 examining
social contract representative of all Afghans which options for institutional change. In conclusion,
is only achievable with involvement and ultimately the editors draw lessons from these different
endorsement across Afghan society. contributions and put forward recommendations
for policymakers and peace practitioners.
This Accord is structured in three main sections.
Contributors span a range of perspectives and insights
Incremental peace in Afghanistan // 7
Afghanistan faces two possible futures: an indefinite And second is the long-term objective of achieving a more
continuation of violent conflict, or incremental progress broadly inclusive social contract representative of all
towards sustainable peace. Drivers of both scenarios Afghans which is only achievable with involvement and
are documented in the contributions to this Accord ultimately endorsement across Afghan society.
publication. Drivers of conflict include a well-established
war economy, which fuels and funds violence. Both Short- and long-term objectives are distinct but also
main parties to the war – the Taliban and the Afghan interdependent. Creating conditions in which Afghans can
government – remain determined to fight on and have renew their social contract first requires a reduction of
secured sufficient external backing to do so. Underlying violence. As Michael Semple describes in this publication,
the violence are persistent political disputes over how an incremental approach in which agreement is phased
power is shared and how future reforms are configured. would allow for confidence-building over time to increase
Potential drivers of peace include war fatigue among the parties’ willingness to consider more ambitious
the Afghan actors, significant overlap between visions measures or embrace compromise. The cessation of
of a future Afghanistan espoused by many in the Taliban violence would represent the single most important
movement and pro-government Afghans, plus continued action to build confidence and help launch dialogue on
international interest in achieving peace. Virtually all core substantive issues. Such an approach recognises the
parties acknowledge that war can only end through a importance of rebuilding relationships between the parties
negotiated settlement. There is no military solution. in expanding the possibility of agreement. Rather than
involving a single text such as the 2001 Bonn Accords, an
President Ashraf Ghani’s February 2018 offer to the incremental peace in Afghanistan might consist of a series
Taliban of a political process provided a stark illustration of agreements sequenced from easy to hard, with agreed
of the dilemma inherent in Afghanistan’s current position. reforms and confidence-building connecting the parallel
Contributions to this Accord by different Taliban caucuses short- and long-term tracks over a period of years.
document that the idea of achieving some form of
political status without either surrendering or rejecting But initiatives to reduce violence must be linked to a more
their identity as Taliban has some resonance within the transformative agenda in order to broaden their legitimacy
movement. But publicly the Taliban leadership has been and appeal. The terms on which de-escalation measures
sceptical of the proposal, and violent attacks continue. are agreed should not close down space for more inclusive
Pro-government Afghans are also split. Interest in seeing transition and institutional reform subsequently. Heela
an end to fighting is offset by resistance to sharing political Najibullah in this publication describes a multilayered
space or fear of compromises on human rights that a approach to negotiating with armed opposition groups in
peace settlement with the Taliban is perceived to imply. Afghanistan in the late 1980s which combined practical
efforts to establish local non-aggression or peace
The way forward from rhetorical offers to actual protocol pacts with a pragmatic political strategy to
engagement in dialogue and a reduction in violence has so build domestic support and international legitimacy.
far been elusive. Indeed, a persistent theme of the Afghan International actors can play a role to help ensure that
conflict is the glaring gap between words and actions progress in violence reduction includes commitments
– with both sides talking peace while intent on waging to an inclusive settlement in the longer term. Ed Hadley
war. The resultant violent stasis has again intensified and Chris Kolenda in this publication lay out some options
with the 2018 Taliban spring offensive, while the Afghan for international support for a phased and multi-level
government and its international coalition partners political process in Afghanistan.
remain committed to increasing military pressure
on the insurgency. Evidence from past peace processes in Afghanistan
and elsewhere shows that settlements agreed among
Incremental peace battlefield elites do not inevitably progress to address
In order to move beyond the peace rhetoric a radical the root causes of the conflict, which can contribute to
change in approach is needed. An incremental, step- a return to violence. Christine Bell et al. writing in 2017
by-step process towards political settlement offers a assert that the success of peace agreements to resolve
potentially more effective way forward, which builds immediate violence has not been matched by longer-
stability, confidence and legitimacy in phases over time. term commitments to broader reform such as relating to
This must pursue two objectives. First is the short-term tackling gender exclusion. In fact, peace agreements have
objective of achieving a reduction in violence which tended to lead to uncertain and often impermanent peace
inevitably involves a central role for the conflict parties, and political stalemate. Astri Suhrke in this publication
principally the Taliban and the Afghan government. describes how the Afghan armed factions represented in
8 // Accord // ISSUE 27
the 2001 Bonn talks were able to establish themselves in social contract. But the fact that the settlements were
positions of power and how such privileging of ‘warlords’ established outside any national peace framework meant
with records of serious human rights abuses led to the that not only did national authorities fail to follow through
securitisation of the post-Bonn new order that blocked the on locally-agreed commitments, but state institutions
advancement of stability and justice. like the National Directorate of Security actively opposed
efforts to implement them. All these local settlements
Sustainable progress towards peace also requires ultimately collapsed. Local peacemaking in Afghanistan
balancing centre–periphery or national–sub-national has also fallen foul of resistance by Taliban central
priorities for reconciliation. M. Nazif Shahrani in leadership. For example, government reconciliation and
this publication explains how many non-Pashtun reintegration programmes that effectively sought to ‘buy-
communities in northern Afghanistan see the war not off’ local Taliban fighters on terms akin to capitulation
between the government and the armed opposition, were seen as a threat by central leadership and failed to
but between ‘included’ Pashtuns and ‘excluded’ non- gain significant traction.
Pashtuns. Factionalisation within the Taliban, alienation
of many Taliban caucuses from the central leadership Practical steps
and increasing internal frustration with the armed An incremental approach to peace in Afghanistan could
campaign further suggest the potential of more localised start locally, reducing violence from the ground up. This
peacemaking options – for example engaging responsive responds to the fractured nature of the insurgency and
Taliban regional groups and local governance structures the high levels of violence in Afghanistan, as well as the
in joint violence reduction initiatives. inclination towards de-escalation demonstrated by some
Taliban caucuses, as described in this publication. It can
Previous sub-national peace efforts in Afghanistan also build on momentum of the recent groundswell of
have shown early signs of success but have ultimately pro-peace local activism such as the Helmand Peace
been undermined by active resistance from the centre. March Initiative. Practical steps could include reciprocal
Julius Cavendish in this publication describes how local measures for de-escalation towards ceasefire, locally-
peace settlements agreed in Helmand in 2006 and 2010 agreed provisional peace zones in which the terms of a
were effective in realising short-term reductions in more permanent ceasefire can be renegotiated, tangible
violence as well as some level of renegotiation of the local dividends and guarantees to convince local armed
Box 1: Peace and elections
Translating peace rhetoric into concrete gains for electoral monitoring and fraud prevention. These measures
both short-term violence reduction and a longer-term would represent active steps on the part of the Afghan
renegotiation of the social contract will require strategic government and international partners towards filling the
navigation of the existing political landscape – ensuring, substantial trust deficit that exists between Afghan citizens
for example, that potential spoilers within and outside the and the institutions and donors that orchestrate elections.
Afghan government do not have the opportunity to derail
In the longer term, following the presidential poll in 2019, the
progress towards either. The forthcoming electoral cycle,
newly-elected president and international partners should
with parliamentary polls scheduled for October 2018 and
commit to establishing a high-level consultative group on
presidential elections in 2019, presents a key moment
political reform, to be tasked with conducting nationwide
for such disruption by these spoilers – by preventing
consultations about the overhaul of the political system.
participation, thus undermining government legitimacy;
or by manipulating the electoral process towards the Commitment towards this kind of reform will be necessary
further entrenchment of their own interests. to help substantiate President Ghani’s offer to consider the
Taliban a legitimate political actor. At present within the
While it may be too late to incorporate elections formally
National Unity Government there is little space for formal
into any national-level peace process, it will be important
political opposition – and as both Thomas Barfield and Amin
to mitigate the efforts of spoilers as far as possible. One
Tarzi note in their Accord contributions, this has been the
way in which to do this in the short term would be to use
case historically also. If the Taliban are expected to see this
parliamentary and then presidential elections as pilot
offer as one worth taking up, the political system must allow
opportunities for commitments towards the de-escalation
for political actors of different ideological persuasions to
of violence in certain designated areas, alongside greater
have influence in government.
international commitments towards candidate vetting,
Incremental peace in Afghanistan // 9