In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq (Chicago Studies in American Politics)

437 Pages·2009·5.99 MB·English

by  Adam J. Berinsky

1. CONTENTS
2. List of Figures
3. List of Tables
4. Acknowledgments
5. 1 Introduction: America at War
6. PART I. Historical Perspective
1. 2 Public Opinion and War: A Historical
Perspective
2. 3 The Myths and Meaning of Public Opinion and
World War II
7. PART II. The Structure of Support for War
1. 4 The Calculation of Costs: An Innocent Public
2. 5 Partisan Structure of War Support: Events,
Elites, and the Public
3. 6 Ethnic Groups: Attachments, Enmities, and
Support for War
8. PART III. Public Opinion and War: Back to the
Water’s Edge
1. 7 Civil Liberties and War
2. 8 Elections during Wartime
9. 9 Conclusions
10. APPENDIX A: Description of Data and Weighting
11. APPENDIX B: Iraq War Casualty Survey Analysis
12. APPENDIX C: Congressional Record Content
Analysis
13. APPENDIX D: Statistical Significance of Ethnic
Variables
14. APPENDIX E: Relationship between Support for War
and Support for Restricting Civil Liberties
15. APPENDIX F: NES Analysis of Retrospective War
Support
16. Notes
17. References
18. Index
In Time of War
chicago studies in american politics
A series edited by Benjamin I. Page, Susan Herbst, Lawrence R. Jacobs, and James
Druckman
also in the series:

Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion by Donald R.
Kinder and Cindy D. Kam
The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became

Republicans by Matthew Levendusky
Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public by Jennifer L. Merolla

and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister Agendas and Instability in American Politics, Second

Edition by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones The Private Abuse of the
Public Interest

by Lawrence D. Brown and Lawrence R. Jacobs The Party Decides: Presidential

Nominations Before and Aft er Reform by Marty Cohen, David Karol, Hans Noel, and

John Zaller Same Sex, Different Politics: Success and Failure in the Struggles over

Gay Rights by Gary Mucciaroni
The University of Chicago Press chicago & london Adam J. Berinsky is associate professor
of political science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press,
Ltd., London © 2009 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved. Published

2009 Printed in the United States of America 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 1 2 3 4
5
isbn-13: 978-0- 226-04358- 6 (cloth)
isbn-13: 978-0- 22604359- 3 (paper) isbn-10: 0-226- 04358-4 (cloth) isbn-10:
0-226- 04359-2 (paper)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Berinsky, Adam J., 1970–
In time of war : understanding American public opinion from World War II to
Iraq / Adam J. Berinsky.
p. cm. — (Chicago studies in American politics) Includes bibliographical references
and index. isbn-13: 978-0-226-04358-6 (cloth: alk. paper) isbn-13: 978-0-22604359-3
(pbk.: alk. paper) isbn-10: 0-226-04358-4 (cloth: alk. paper) isbn-10: 0-226-04359-2

(pbk.: alk. paper) 1. War and society—United States. 2. World War, 1939–1945—
United States—Public opinion. 3. Korean War, 1950–1953—United States—Public
opinion. 4. Vietnam War, 1961–1975—United States—Public opinion.
5. Iraq War, 2003—Public opinion. I. Title.
II. Series: Chicago studies in American politics. hm554.b475 2009 303.6'60973—
dc22
2008053228
o The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the
American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for
Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1992.
To Deirdre, Benjamin, and Lila
CONTENTS
List of Figures / ix List of Tables / xii Acknowledgments / xv
1 Introduction: America at War / 1
part i. historical perspective 2 Public Opinion and War: A
Historical Perspective / 13 3 The Myths and Meaning of Public
Opinion and World War II / 33
part ii. the structure of support for war 4 The Calculation of
Costs: An Innocent Public / 61 5 Partisan Structure of War
Support: Events, Elites, and the Public / 85 6 Ethnic Groups:
Attachments, Enmities, and Support for War / 127
part iii. public opinion and war: back to the water’s edge 7
Civil Liberties and War / 155 8 Elections during Wartime / 178
9 Conclusions / 207 appendix a: Description of Data and
Weighting / 222 appendix b: Iraq War Casualty Survey Analysis
/ 229 appendix c: Congressional Record Content Analysis / 234
appendix d: Statistical Significance of Ethnic Variables / 246
appendix e: Relationship between Support for War and Support
for Restricting Civil Liberties / 251 appendix f: NES Analysis
of Retrospective War Support / 256
Notes / 265 References 309 Index
327
FIGURES
2.1. Trends in support for the Korean War / 16
2.2. Trends in support for the Vietnam War / 21
2.3. Trends in support for the Gulf War / 23 2.4a. Trends in support for the
Afghanistan War, 2001–2 / 28 2.4b. Trends in support for the Afghanistan War,
2006–7 / 28
2.5. Trends in support for the Iraq War / 32
3.1. Trends in opposition to making peace with Germans / 48
3.2. Trends in support for helping England and defeating Germany over staying
out of the war / 49
3.3. Trends in support for using U.S. convoy ships to carry war materials to Britain
/ 51
3.4. Gender gap in support for helping England over staying out of the war / 54
3.5. Gender gap in opposition to peace with the German army / 54
3.6. Gender gap on support for taking an internationalist position aft er the war /
56
5.1. Parties and war rhetoric in Congress, 1938–45 / 89 5.2a. Evidence of
polarization pattern, Gallup, November 1939: Approve of changes to neutrality law /
93 5.2b. Evidence of polarization pattern, OPOR, January 1941: More important to
help England than stay out of war / 93 5.2c. Evidence of polarization pattern,
Gallup, June 1941: Let Germany keep land in exchange for peace / 94 5.2d.
Evidence of polarization pattern, Gallup, June 1941: Use U.S. navy to convoy ships to
England? / 94
5.2e. Evidence of polarization pattern, Gallup, August 1941: Use U.S. Navy to
convoy ships to England? / 95
5.3a. Evidence of mainstream pattern, OPOR, June 1942: Take active part in
world aff airs after the war / 96
5.3b. Evidence of mainstream pattern, OPOR, June 1942: Do not make peace with
Hitler / 96
5.3c. Evidence of mainstream pattern, Roper, March 1943: United States
should take active role in international organization after war / 97
5.3d. Evidence of mainstream pattern, Gallup, August 1943: Oppose peace with
Germany even if Hitler overthrown / 97
5.3e. Evidence of mainstream pattern, OPOR, January 1944: Oppose peace with
Germany even if Hitler overthrown / 98
5.4. Distinctiveness of domestic policy, February 1944 / 98 5.5a. Evidence of
mainstream pattern, Gallup, October 1940: Help England if British lose war without
aid? / 101 5.5b. Evidence of mainstream pattern, Gallup, October 1940: Send
airplanes to England? / 101
5.6. Partisan trends in support for Iraq War, 2003–8 / 102 5.7a. Patterns of
polarization in Iraq War attitudes, August 2004: Current war in Iraq has been worth
fighting / 104 5.7b. Patterns of polarization in Iraq War attitudes, August 2004:
United States made the right decision in using military force against Iraq / 104
5.8. Partisan trends in estimates of Iraq War success, 2003–7 / 106
5.9. Patterns of polarization in estimates of Iraq War success, August 2004 / 106
5.10a. Patterns of polarization in estimates of how well the Iraq War is going,
January 2004 / 107 5.10b. Patterns of polarization in estimates of how well the Iraq
War is going, July 2005 / 107 5.10c. Patterns of polarization in estimates of how well
the Iraq War is going, January 2006 / 108 5.10d. Patterns of polarization in
estimates of how well the Iraq War is going, August 2006 / 108 5.11a. Opinions on
attitudes toward war, 2004 NES, Iraq / 110 5.11b. Opinions on attitudes toward
War, 2004 NES, Afghanistan / 110 5.12a. Vietnam analysis: Opposition to de-
escalation, 1964 / 113 5.12b. Vietnam analysis: Opposition to de-escalation, 1966 /
113 5.12c. Vietnam analysis: Opposition to de-escalation, 1968 / 114 5.12d.
Vietnam analysis: Opposition to de-escalation, 1970 / 114 5.13a. Vietnam analysis:
United States did not make a mistake, 1964 / 116 5.13b. Vietnam analysis: United
States did not make a mistake, 1966 / 116 5.13c. Vietnam analysis: United States
did not make a mistake, 1968 / 117 5.13d. Vietnam analysis: United States did not
make a mistake, 1970 / 117
5.13e. Vietnam analysis: United States did not make a mistake, 1972 / 118
5.14. Partisan trends in support for the Vietnam War, Gallup Poll / 119
6.1. Should the United States trust Russia after the war? / 141
6.2. Should the United States trust England after the war? / 141
6.3. England is fighting only to preserve democracy / 142
6.4. Oppose peace with the German army / 143
6.5. Make peace treaty more severe than last war? / 144
7.1. Support for civil liberties, 1996–2006 / 165
7.2. Partisan gap in support for civil liberties, 1996–2006 / 167
7.3. Partisan polarization in support for civil liberties, January 2006 / 167
7.4. Relationship between support for retaliation for 9 / 11 and support for
restricting civil liberties, September 2001 / 169
7.5. Relationship between support for the Iraq War and negative civil liberties
judgments, 2001–6 / 169
7.6. Support for Vietnam War and civil liberties judgments / 172
7.7. Support for civil liberties, 1938–45 / 174
7.8. Support for World War II and negative civil liberties judgments / 176
7.9. Support for World War II and allowing free speech for radicals / 176
8.1. Estimated net contribution of retrospective evaluations of war on
presidential voting / 183
8.2. Johnson’s, Nixon’s, and Humphrey’s placement on the Vietnam future action
scale / 185
8.3. Weighted change in real disposable income as a predictor of the
incumbent’s vote share of a two-party vote / 187
8.4. Trends in fear of terrorism, 2001–7 / 194
8.5. Bush’s feeling thermometer ratings, 2000–2004 / 195
8.6. Bush’s leadership ratings, 2000–2004 / 196
8.7. Relationship between Bush’s leadership and Bush’s feeling thermometer,
2000–2004 / 196
8.8. British political preferences, BIPO polls 1943–45 / 203
9.1. Polarization between parties in the House of Representatives, 1877–
2005 / 221
TABLES
3.1. The Gender Gap on Questions of Intervention, August 1939 / 53
4.1. Effect of Partisanship and Information on Predicted Probability of
Estimating Correct Casualty Level / 78
4.2. Experimental Effect of Casualty Information on Support for the Iraq War
/ 81
4.3. Experimental Effect of War Information on Support for the Iraq War, Autumn
2005 / 84
5.1. Korea Experiment, 2006 / 121
6.1. Racial Variables and Support for Sanctions against South Africa, 1986 /
134
6.2. The Power of Ethnic Attachments, before the United States’ Entry into World
War II / 137
6.3. Distribution of Ethnic-Group Attachments and Enmities, August 1939 / 145
6.4. Group Attachments and Enmities and Support for Isolationist Positions,
August 1939 / 149
8.1. Estimated Effect of Opposition to War on the Vote for the Incumbent
Candidate / 181
8.2. War Scenarios and percent Vote for FDR in the 1940 Election / 198
8.3. War Scenarios and percent Vote for FDR in the 1944 Election / 199
8.4. Estimate of Effect of War on the Vote for FDR in the 1944 Election / 201
8.5. War Scenarios and the Strength of FDR Support, October 1944 / 201
8.6. Class Cleavages on Churchill Approval and Conservative Party Support /
204
b.1. Multinomial Logit Analysis of Determinants of Estimates of War Deaths /
233
b.2. Probit Analysis of the War Effects of Casualty Estimates on Support for the
Iraq War / 233
c.1. Support for the Neutrality Act, November 1939 / 240
c.2. Support for U.S. Navy convoys, July–August 1941 / 241
c.3. Statistical Test of Differences: Support for the Neutrality Act, November 1939
/ 242
c.4. Statistical Test of Differences: Support for U.S. Navy convoys, July–August 1941
/ 243
c.5. Probit Results of the Iraq War Casualty Survey / 244
d.1. The Power of Ethnic Attachments, before the United States’ Entry into World
War II / 247
d.2. The Power of Ethnic Attachments, before the United States’ Entry into World
War II / 248
d.3. The Power of Ethnic Attachments, after the United States’ Entry into World
War II / 249
d.4. Bivariate probit selection model analysis of sanctions against South Africa
/ 250
e.1. Partisan Polarization on Civil Liberties Restrictions, 2006 / 252
e.2. Support for War and Support for Civil Liberties, 2002 / 253
e.3. Effect of Support for the Vietnam War on Civil Liberties Judgments / 254
e.4. Effect of Support for World War II on Negative Civil Liberties Judgments,
November 1940 / 255
f.1. 1952 NES Election Analysis of the Retrospective War-Support Measure / 257
f.2. 1952 NES Election Analysis of the Prospective War-Support Measure / 258
f.3. 1968 NES Election Analysis of the Retrospective War-Support Measure / 259
f.4. 1968 NES Election Analysis of the Prospective War-Support Measure / 260
f.5. 1968 NES Election Analysis of the Hawk–Dove War-Support Measure / 261
f.6. 1972 NES Election Analysis of the Retrospective War-Support Measure / 262
f.7. 1972 NES Election Analysis of the Hawk–Dove War-Support Measure / 263
f.8. 2004 NES Election Analysis of the Retrospective War-Support Measure / 264
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I like reading acknowledgments. They give us a sense of the
intellectual history of a project and shed some light on the
twists and turns taken by the researcher as he or she brought
the book to completion. Because you are reading this section,
you must like acknowledgments too, so please indulge me—this
represents the culmination of a long journey.
This book is the product of nearly six years of work
conducted at four diff erent institutions, but its roots run deep
into my intellectual past. In fact, I can think of three distinct
events that shaped the project.
The first occurred in the fall of 1990, when, as a junior at
Wesleyan University, I took a class on public opinion and
foreign policy with Richard Boyd. Although I read many of the

works that ended up in this book’s ref erence list, what I
remember most was a question on the final exam, which asked
us, in December 1990, to predict the dynamics of opinion