Idiot-Proofing the Air Force

13 Pages·2017·0.15 MB·English

Idiot-Proofing the Air Force
Human Factors Engineering and
the Crisis of Systems Maintenance
LayneKarafantis DanielVolmar
NationalAir&SpaceMuseum HarvardUniversity
Presentedat“MaintainersII:Labor,Technology,andSocialOrders”
StevensInstituteofTechnology,Hoboken,NJ
April7,2017
Abstract
Thispaperexplorestheresearchandengineeringof“humanfactors”inthemaintenanceofcomplex
aerospacesystems,whichintendedtoidentify,taxonomize,andmitigatethephysicalandcognitive
limitsoftheidealizedmaintenanceworker. Predominantly,theseinitiativessoughttoanticipate
sourcesoferrorandimpose“maintainability”throughdesignelementssuchascolor-coding,stan-
dardizedconnectorsandfasteners,andsealed,replaceablecomponents.Thoughsimpleandeven
traditionalinprinciple,space-agehumanfactorsengineeringdistinguisheditselfwitharelentless
devotiontosystem,which,inthiscontext,meantdesigningup-frontandmanagingtop-down.Nev-
ertheless,someresearcherseventuallybegantoacknowledgethatthis“objective”approach,which
reducedthehumanbodytoanengineeringconstraint,couldanticipateonlythesimplestproblems.
Inmanycases,theynoted,themaintainersactuallyhadtoworkaroundtheerrorsoftheengineers.
BombersB-52isaterriblemovie,butitisstillthebestfilmevermadeaboutagrumpy,middle-aged
AirForcemechanicwithanantipathyforahotshotpilotandfoppishofficer-playboywho,coincidentally,
happenstobechasinghisdaughter. OriginallytitledFlightLine, WarnerBrothersdevelopedthe1957
pictureindirectcollaborationwiththeStrategicAirCommand.1 Unusualamongsimilarpropagandist
productionsofthetime,BombersB-52glamorizedablue-collarenlistedmanintheotherwiseunglamorous
roleofaveteran“crewchief”: theleaderofanaircraft’smaintenanceteam. Suchpersonnelhadbecome
highlyprizedonSACairbasesduringthe1950s,butalsoincreasinglyscarce. “AlthoughSACisanelite
command,”Fortunewrotein1954,“itsmostcriticalmanagementproblemisitslowre-enlistmentrate. The
presentannualturnoveris20percent.”2 ThenatureoftheAirForceitselfexacerbatedtheproblem. “SAC
1SteveCall,SellingAirPower:MilitaryAviationandAmericanPopularCultureAfterWorldWarII(CollegeStation:Texas
A&MUniversityPress,2009),119–122.
2JohnMcDonald,“GeneralLeMay’sManagementProblem,”Fortune,May1954,104. Cf. WilliamS.Borgiasz,The
StrategicAirCommand: EvolutionandConsolidationofNuclearForces(Westport,CT:Praegar,1996);PhilipS.Meilinger,
Bomber:TheFormationandEarlyYearsoftheStrategicAirCommand(MaxwellAFB:AirUniversityPress,2012).
1
Idiot-ProofingtheAirForce
trainsairmentotechnicalproficiencyinradio,radar,air-trafficcontrol,photography,motormechanics,
communications,andthelike,onlytofindprivateindustrybiddingmorefortheirservicesinmoneyand
livingconditionsthanSACoffers.SACis,ineffect,runningatechnicaltrainingcollegeforthebenefitofU.S.
industry.” InBombersB-52,thedramatictension—suchasitis—concernsaveteranmaintainerdeciding
whethertoretirefromtheAirForceinordertotakeupalucrativejobintheroaringaerospaceindustry.This
beingaquasi-officialpropagandapiece,ourshirt-sleeveherovaliantlychoosescountryovercommerce—or
maybejusttokeepplayingwiththebiggesttoys(itisreallynotveryclear).
1 The maintainability crisis in aerospace systems
TheAirForcefacedacleardilemmaduringthemid-to-late1950s. Ontheonehand,ithadverynearly
realizedthefantasticalfuturepresentedinTowardNewHorizons,alsocalledthe“VonKármánreport”: the
thirteen-volumestudythathadguidedUSAFresearchanddevelopmentpolicysince1945.3 Theyears
between1955and1960witnessedtheintroductionofvirtuallyeveryadvancementinaerospacetechnology
foreseeableattheendofWorldWarII—supersonicaircraft,automaticfire-controlsystems,guidedand
ballisticmissiles,artificialsatellites,thermonuclearwarheads,over-the-horizonradar,anddigitalelectronic
computers—notmerelyintestsandprototypes,butasoperationallydeployedequipment. Atthesame
time,however,theworkforceneededtomaintainthesenewandcomplicatedsystemsdwindledbothin
quantityandexperience. Despiteseriouseffortstoretainthem,thefractionofenlisteesleavingtheservice
attheirfirstopportunityjumpedfrom54%to76%between1959and1961,whentheAirForceshedmore
than18,000personnelinmaintenancespecialtiesitclassifiedas“highlytechnical.”4 Meanwhile,theratioof
maintenance-to-flyinghoursforaheavybomberhadmultipliedbyafactorofsixsincetheendofthewar.
In1961,astudycommissionedbytheAirForce’sBehavioralSciencesLaboratoryreportedthatovera
five-to-ten-yearperiod,asystemcost10to100timesinmaintenanceasithadtoprocureinthefirstplace.5
MaintenanceconsumedathirdoftheAirForce’soperatingcostsandoccupiedanequalproportionofits
3MichaelH.Gorn,ed.,ProphecyFulfilled:“TowardNewHorizons”andItsLegacy(Washington:AirForceHistoryand
MuseumsProgram,1994)reprintstheexecutivesummaryalongwithanhistoricalintroduction.SeealsoMichaelH.Gorn,
HarnessingtheGenie:ScienceandTechnologyForecastingfortheAirForce,1944–1986(Washington:OfficeofAirForceHistory,
1988).TheentirestudyisavailableonlinefromGovernmentAttic:http://www.governmentattic.org/TwardNewHorizons.
html.
4GeorgeF.Lemmer,USAFManpowerTrends,1960–1963(Washington: USAFHistoricalDivisionLiaisonOffice,
March1965),AirForceHistoricalSupportOffice,https://media.defense.gov/2011/Mar/21/2001330246/-1/-1/0/AFD-
110321-038.pdf,36–41.ManpowerfiguresderivedfromtablesinUnitedStatesAirForceStatisticalDigest,FiscalYear1958
(Washington:DirectorateofStatisticalServices,Headquarters,USAF,n.d. [1958?]),AirForceHistoricalStudiesOffice,
https://media.defense.gov/2011/Apr/11/2001330055/-1/-1/0/AFD-110411-023.pdf,287andUnitedStatesAirForce
StatisticalDigest,FiscalYear1961(Washington:DirectorateofDataSystemsandStatistics,Headquarters,USAF,n.d.[1961?]),
AirForceHistoricalStudiesOffice,https://media.defense.gov/2011/Apr/12/2001330047/-1/-1/0/AFD-110412-016.pdf,
253.
5LynnV.RigbyandJoelI.Cooper,“ProblemsandProceduresinMaintainability,”ASDTechnicalNote61-126(Wright-
PattersonAFB:BehavioralSciencesLaboratory,AeronauticalSystemsDivision,AirForceSystemsCommand,October1961),
HathiTrustDigitalLibrary,https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015082477111.
2
2. Personnelmanagement: Theoriginal“humanfactor”
personnel. Atanyonetime,aboutthree-fourthsofitsequipmentrequiredsomekindofrepair,and13%
hadbrokendownentirely. Onlyofficeadministrationconsumedmorecollectiveman-(andwoman-)hours,
andasignificantfractionofthatrelatedtomaintenanceactivitiesaswell. Withcostsandcomplexityrising,
andthelaborandtalentpoolsshrinking,itisnoaccidentthatmilitaryofficialsandprofessionaltechnology
managerssuddenlybegantalkingabouta“maintainability”crisisinaerospacesystems.6
Tothepracticingmaintenanceengineer,maintainability,ortheeaseandefficiencyofmaintenance,is
amultifacetedproblem. Itweighssuchconsiderationsasdiagnostics,reliability,componentization,and
qualitycontrol.Here,wefocusononebroad,interdisciplinaryaspectknownas“human-factorsengineering,”
orHFE.Withinaerospaceengineering,HFEincludesconsiderationssuchasthenumberofinstrumentsa
humanpilotcanmonitorsimultaneously,thedistanceanarmcanreachwhilesubjectedtovariousG-forces,
ortheamountoftimeapairofastronautscanspendconfinedtoaclaustrophobic,sense-deprivingspace
capsulebeforeoneofthemblowstheotheroneouttheairlock.7 Inthecontextofmaintenancespecifically,
HFEasksquestionslike:Howfarcantheaveragemanreachabovehisheadandstillturnascrewdriver?Ifit
couldcauseashort,shouldn’tthisplugfititsconnectorinonlyoneway?Andwhatpartof“DONOTSTEP”
didyounotunderstand? Thismaysoundtrite,buthumanfactorsinmaintenanceengineeringconcern
elementsofphysiology,cognitiveandsocialpsychology,andoperationsresearch,andassuch,theyspeakto
thewayscientists,engineers,andmanagersviewedthehumanlaborerasasubjectofstudyandcontrol.8
TheAirForce’smaintainabilitycrisisreflected,inpart,acondescendingworrythatthedullesttoolsand
dimmestbulbsintheshopwouldbethemaintenanceworkersthemselves.
2 Personnel management: The original “human factor”
HFEinaerospacemaintenancecombinedoneoftheAirForce’snewestproblems—managingtechnologyas
integrated“systems”—withoneofitsoldest: personnelclassificationandjobselection.9 “Thereisprobably
6Whilefocusedonelectronics,EdwardJones-Imhotep,“MaintainingHumans,”inColdWarSocialScience,editedbyMark
SoloveyandHamiltonCravens(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2012),175–196istheonlysecondarysourceweknowto
havefullyappreciatedthisphenomenon.Forthemoment,retrospectiveaccountsaremostlylimitedtoparticipantmemoirs,
suchasL.ParkerTemple,Implosion:LessonsfromNationalSecurity,HighReliabilitySpacecraft,Electronics,andtheForcesWhich
ChangedThem(Piscataway,NJ:Wiley–IEEEPress,2013).
7AclassictropefromsuchpopularaccountingsasTomWolfe,TheRightStuff (NewYork:Farrar,Straus,andGiroux,
1979),somerecenthistoricalworktouchingonthesethemesincludeDavidA.Mindell,DigitalApollo:HumanandMachinein
Spaceflight(Cambridge:MITPress,2008);SlavaGerovitch,“Human-MachineIssuesintheSovietSpaceProgram,”inCritical
IssuesintheHistoryofSpaceflight,editedbyStevenJ.DickandRogerD.Launius(Washington:NationalAeronauticsandSpace
Administration,2006),107–140;MatthewH.Hersch,InventingtheAmericanAstronaut(NewYork: PalgraveMacmillan,
2012);andMarciaE.Holmes,“PerformingProficiency:AppliedExperimentalPsychologyandtheHumanEngineeringof
AirDefense,1940–1965”(PhDdiss.,UniversityofChicago,2014).EduardoSalasandDanMaurino,eds.HumanFactorsin
Aviation,2nded.(NewYork:Elsevier,2010)isacontemporarypractitionerperspective,whileDonaldA.Norman,TheDesign
ofEverydayThings,repr.(NewYork:BasicBooks,2002[1988])reflectsonhumandesignprinciplesingeneral.
8SeeJones-Imhotep,“MaintainingHumans”forfurtherelaborationonthispoint.
9Ontheenlistedcareer,seeMarkR.Grandstaff,FoundationoftheForce:AirForceEnlistedPersonnelPolicy,1907–1956
(Washington:AirForceHistoryandMuseumsProgram,1997);comparewithVanceO.Mitchell,AirForceOfficers:Personnel
3
Idiot-ProofingtheAirForce
nohuman-factorsareathathasreceivedasmuchattentionbythearmedforcesandisthesubjectofsomuch
competentresearchastheassessingandcatalogingofskills,capabilities,andbackgroundsofpersonnel
intheiremploy,”observedtwoengineersworkingforanAirForcecontractorin1961.10 Sincetheriseof
industrialwarfare,militaryorganizationshavehadtorelyonenlistedpersonneltoperformincreasingly
skilledtasks,suchasmaintainingaircraftandelectronics,whichrequirecorrespondinglymoretrainingand
experience. Nevertheless,evenafederalagencywithdemandsastechnicalastheUnitedStatesAirForce
muststillrespectthegeneralframeworkforpersonnelpolicyestablishedbyCongressandcannot“hire”
and“fire”accordingtotheirimmediateneeds,whichmaynotalignwithpoliticalexpedience.11 Relatedto
thispointisthefactthatthemilitaryneedsworkersforjobsthatdonotexistinprivateenterprise. Atemp
agencycannothelpyoufindaqualifiednuclear-weaponsmechanic—oratleast,onehopesnot.
Thisbeingthecase,thestakesarehighwhenselectingrecruitsfortraininginhighlytechnicalsubjects.
DuringandafterWorldWarII,thearmedforcesbecametheprimarysponsorsofmeasurementsfor“intelli-
gence”and“aptitude”forthepurposeofpredictingfutureperformance. Accordingtoonesurveypaper,
the“basicreasonforusingteststoselectmenfortrainingliesinthefactthatitcostslesstotestamanthan
itdoestoattempttotrainhimanddiscoverthatheisuntrainable.”12 Inthemilitary,thecostswerenot
onlymonetary,buttemporal,sinceanenlistedmantypicallybecameeligibleforreservestatusafterfour
yearsofactiveduty. Whilecontemporarycritiquesofstandardizedtestingcertainlyapplyhere,atthetime,
AirForcepersonnelresearchersweremoreinterestedintheproblemofsorting thanscreeningperse.13
“Priorto1947,assignmentofenlistedpersonnelintheserviceswasbasedalmostsolelyuponthesingle
scoreachievedfromtheArmyGeneralClassificationTest(AGCT),”thesurveycontinued. Thestate-of-art
layinthedevelopmentofso-called“battery”tests,whichwouldconceivablysurpassgeneralmeasuresof
“intelligence”and“ability”bydiscerningspecificaptitudeswithinthetestpopulation:
ClassificationbasedonasinglegeneralscoresuchasAGCTisaswastefulastheuseofageneralpurpose
fertilizeronalltypesofsoilwithoutregardforananalysisofthenutritionalelementsavailableineach
type. Foranygivensoiltype,manyofthemineralsinthefertilizerarewastedbecausetheymayalready
beavailableinsufficientquantity. Similarly,whenpersonnelareselectedforaspecifictrainingcourse
becauseofhighAGCTscore(highaveragescoreonseveraldifferentabilities),theirhighabilitieson
factorsnotparticularlyrelevanttothatcoursearewasted.14
PolicyDevelopment,1944–1974(Washington: AirForceHistoryandMuseumsProgram,1997). JanetR.Bednarek,The
EnlistedExperience: AConversationwiththeChiefMasterSergeantsoftheAirForce(Washington: AirForceHistoryand
MuseumsProgram,1995)isanoral-historicalreflectiononenlistedlife,mostduringtheearly-to-midColdWar.
10B.H.ManheimerandJ.R.Kelley,“AnOverviewofHumanFactorsinElectronicMaintenance,”IRETransactionson
HumanFactorsinElectronics2,no.2(September1961),doi:10.1109/THFE2.1961.4503309,75.
11Cf.JamesQ.Wilson,Bureaucracy:WhatGovernmentAgenciesDoandWhyTheyDoIt(NewYork:BasicBooks,1989).
12WilliamB.Lecznar,“SurveyofTestsUsedinAirmanClassification,”TechnicalDocumentaryReportPRL-TDR-63-5
(LacklandAFB:PersonnelResearchLaboratory,AirForceSystemsCommand,February1963),DefenseTechnicalInformation
Center(AD0403831),http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD0403831,17.
13Thescholarshiphereisrobust,buttheobligatoryreferenceisStephenJayGould,TheMismeasureofMan,2nded.(New
York:W.W.Norton,1996).
14Lecznar,“SurveyofTestsUsedinAirmanClassification,”16.
4
2. Personnelmanagement: Theoriginal“humanfactor”
Inotherwords,AirForcerecruitersalreadyknewhowtoeliminate“unsuitable”candidatesfairlywell,and
theyalsorealizedthatthehighestaggregatescoressuggestedlikelysuccessinanyvocation. Whatthey
wantedwastodistinguishafuturevehiclemechanicfromanelectronicstechnician,orametalworkerfroma
wiringinspector. TheAirForcehadplacesforworkersofwidelyvaryingdegreesofskillandcompetence,
andinadditiontooptimallyfillingthesepositions,itwasthoughtthatgoodcareermatcheswouldhelp
improvereenlistmentrates.
Complementarytotheproblemofsortingcandidatesintofavorablecareerfieldswasthetroublewith
definingthefieldsthemselves. The1956editionoftheAirmanClassificationManuallisted43careersfor
enlistedmen,eachwithseveraltracksdividedfurtherintohundredsofindividualAirForceSpecialtyCodes,
orAFSCs.15 Atahighlevel,manipulatingenlistedcareer-tracks—forexample,byofferingopportunitiesfor
quickpromotionandadvancedtraining—wasanimportantpartoftheincentivestructureforattracting
andretainingskilledpersonnelaccordingtoanticipatedneeds. Descriptionsandrequirementsfluctuated
wildly,however,particularlyinAFSCsrelatedtomaintainingaircraft,missiles,andelectronics. Whilethe
AirForcetrackedandapprovedAFSCsatheadquarters,personnelofficersinthefieldconductedmost
“occupationalanalysis”: observingandclassifyingwhatpeopleactuallydidonthejob.16 Thusspecialty
codestendedtoemergefromworkinspecificplacesunderlocalconditions,anddespitesystematicefforts
togeneralize,theyweredifficulttoapplythroughouttheorganization. In1954,researchersreportedseeing
B-29mechanicswiththesameAFSCperformingdifferentfunctionsdependingonwheretheyworked
orwhotheirsupervisorswere. Anyonemechanicgernallyperformedonlyasubsetofthetasksinwhich
hewasformallytrainedwhileperformingmanyothertasksinwhichhewasnot.17 Atthesametime,they
alsodeterminedthatelectronicstechnicianscouldnoteasilytransfertheirproficiencywithonepieceof
radar-bombingandnavigationequipmenttoafunctionallysimilaritem,eventhoughthedistributionof
requiredskillsandabilitiesweremoreorlessidentical.18
TheAirForce’srecruitment,training,andcareerpracticesresembledasortofsocialengineeringatthe
leveloftheentireorganization. Itimaginedahumanmachine,witheachpartgearedtofittheoverarching
bureaucraticorder.19 Thiswasonlyanideal,ofcourse,realitybeingacontinuousfluxofrecalcitrantself-
agentswho,despitevirtuallysurrenderingtheirpersonalautonomyasaconditionofmilitaryservice,often
didnotbehaveastheirsupervisorsdesiredorexpected. Whileeffortstomachinetheorganizationdidnot
15WarrantOfficerandAirmanClassificationManual,AFM35-1,vol.1(Washington:DepartmentoftheAirForce,March
1,1956),HathiTrustDigitalLibrary,https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uiug.30112107822378.
16OccupationalAnalysis,AFM35-2(Washington: DepartmentoftheAirForce,August1,1954),HathiTrustDigital
Library,https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uiug.30112104237984.
17GuyG.Besnard,“Shred-OutsofTasksPerformedbySeniorB-29Mechanics(AFSC43151-B),”AFPTRC-TR-54-4
(LacklandAFB:AirForcePersonnelandTrainingResearchCenter,April1954),HathiTrustDigitalLibrary,https://hdl.
handle.net/2027/mdp.39015081946058?urlappend=%3Bseq=37.
18RobertB.Miller,JohnD.Folley,Jr.,andPhilipR.Smith,“AComparisonofJobRequirementsforLineMaintenanceof
TwoSetsofElectronicsEquipment,”AFPTRC-TR-54-83(LacklandAFB:AirForcePersonnelandTrainingResearchCenter,
December1954),HathiTrustDigitalLibrary,https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015081945951?urlappend=%3Bseq=65.
19Cf.GarethMorgan,ImagesofOrganization(London:SAGEPublications,1986).
5
Idiot-ProofingtheAirForce
abate,mountingcostsandsafetyissues,combinedwithexternaldisruptionstoitspersonnelpolicy,inspired
theAirForcetofindanewwaytodisciplinethemindsandbodiesofmaintenanceworkers: deliberately
re-engineeringthetools,equipment,andphysicalenvironmentwithwhichtheyworked.
3 Human factors: Engineering systems for maintainability
Postwar“mission-critical”systems(namely,anyinvolvingnuclearwarfare)catalyzedtheAirForce’sinterest
inandadoptionofHFEtechniquesinmaintenance. AirForcelaboratoriesconductednumerousstudies
andcontributeddisproportionatelytotheriseofthefieldintheoryaswellaspractice,offeringsuchready
materialastheGuidetoDesignofElectronicEquipmentforMaintainability,firstissuedin1956. “Thisguide
waswrittentoprovideprinciplestobeappliedduringelectronicequipmentdevelopmentfor‘buildingin’
provisionsformoreeffectivemaintenance,”accordingtotheauthors.“Thebasicpremiseoftheguideisthat
relativelysmallexpendituresoftimeandmoneyformaintainabilitywillproducemuchlargersavingsin
maintenancecosts.”20 Thefirstsectionpresentedasetofmanagementtechniquesforengineerstoaccount
forhumanfactorsatthedesignstage,encouragingthemtoplanfornecessitiesrangingfrominstallationand
supplyprovisionstodocumentationandtestequipment. Theremainderofthe150-pageguidepresenteda
heavilyillustratedcollectionof“dos”and“don’ts”fordesignerstoguardagainstsuchcommonfaultsasbent
pins,strippedscrews,mismatchedconnectors,andpinchedcables,aswellasadviceformoving,opening,
inspecting,adjusting,andreplacingparts. Itrecommendedplacementpositionsforhandholds,testpoints,
hinges,componentslots,andaccesshatches,whilealsoprovidingbiometricdataonthedimensions,reach,
liftingcapacity,sight,anddexterityofthe“average”maintenanceworkerinvariouspostures. “Manyof
therecommendationsinthisguideare‘rulesofthumb,’”theauthorsacknowledged. “Somearenotyet
supportedbyadequateresearchdatabecausehumanresearchdataformaintenanceisnewandrelatively
undeveloped.”21 Asthefieldadvanced,theAirForce’shuman-engineeringlaboratorypublishedotherwidely
usedhandbookssuchastheGuidetoDesignofMechanicalEquipmentforMaintainabilityandtheGuide
toIntegratedSystemDesignforMaintainability.22 Whilecompliancewasatfirstvoluntary,theAirForce
eventuallybegantoimposemaintainabilityguidelinesoncontractorsthroughthesystems-management
20J.D.FolleyandJ.W.Altman,GuidetoDesignofElectronicEquipmentforMaintainability,WADCTechnicalReport
56-218(Wright-PattersonAFB:AeroMedicalLaboratory,WrightAirDevelopmentCenter,April1956),DefenseTechnical
InformationCenter(AD0101729),http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD0101729,2.
21FolleyandAltman,GuidetotheDesignofElectronicEquipmentforMaintainability,3.
22JamesW.Altman,AngelineC.Marchese,andBarbaraW.Marchiando,GuidetoDesignofMechanicalEquipmentfor
Maintainability,ASDTechnicalReport61-381(Wright-PattersonAFB:BehavioralSciencesLaboratory,AeronauticalSystems
Division,August1961),HathiTrustDigitalLibrary,https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015082477749;LynnV.Rigby,
JoelI.Cooper,andWilliamA.Spickard,GuidetoIntegratedSystemDesignforMaintainability,ASDTechnicalReport61-424
(Wright-PattersonAFB:BehavioralSciencesLaboratory,AeronauticalSystemsDivision,October1961),DefenseTechnical
InformationCenter(AD0271477),http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD0271477.SeealsoRebeccaJ.Green,HerschelC.
Self,andTanyaS.Ellifritt,50YearsofHumanEngineering:HistoryandCumulativeBibliographyoftheFittsHumanEngineering
Division(Wright-PattersonAFB:AirForceMaterielCommand,1995),HathiTrustDigitalLibrary,https://hdl.handle.net/
2027/mdp.39015034905318.
6
3. Humanfactors: Engineeringsystemsformaintainability
process. OnceNASAadoptedanearlyidenticalpolicy,boththeArmyandtheNavyhadtoadapttothe
changingindustryaswell.23
Thegovernment’spromotionofHFEconsiderationsinmaintenancefurtherprecipitatedstudiesin
industryandacademia,whichfedbackintotheAirForce’sowndesignandresearchprograms. By1960,
ElectronicIndustriesAssociationhadheldthreeannualconferencesontheMaintainabilityofElectronic
Equipment,resultingintheeditedcollection,ElectronicMaintainability,aportionofwhichdirectlyaddressed
maintenanceissueswithinthearmedforces.24 In1961,theIRETransactionsonHumanFactorsinElectronics
(predecessoroftheIEEETransactionsonHuman-MachineSystems)devoteditssecondissuetodesigning
formaintenance. Whilenoneofthearticlesspecificallyaddressedaerospacemaintenance,almostallof
themsharedresearchapplicabletotheneedsoftheAirForce. Forexample,oneauthorcitedthereduction
ofdowntime—thatis,aperiodduringwhichequipmentisinoperable—measuredagainstdesigncosts
asaprimaryreasontodesignformaintainabilityupfront,consideringnotonlytoolsandmanuals,but
maintenancetechnicianswith“variouslevelsofcompetenceasassuredbytheirselectionandtraining.”
The“over-allreturnonasmallengineeringinvestmentcanthusbeenormous”afteraccountingforthecost
ofmaintainingthedeviceorsystemthroughoutitsentireoperationallifetime.25 FortheAirForce,the
potentialtoreducelong-termpersonnelrequirementswasjustasattractiveasthepossiblefinancialrelief.
Toanextent,researchersdidrealizethatworkerscouldbeassetstosystemsdevelopment,insteadof
justconstraintstobedesignedaround. Inthesamevolume,contributorsfromtheAmericanInstitutefor
Research—anonprofitestablishedin1946bypioneeringaviation-psychologistJohnFlanagan—calledon
engineerstobetterrespecttheirsubjects’“expertjudgment.” Withregardtomaintainability,theyargued
that“the‘real’experts…arethemaintenancetechniciansorfieldengineerswhoactuallyhavetomaintain
theequipmentunderfieldconditions”—notthedesignersorsystemmanagers.26 Anotherauthorurged
designersnottoautomatesimplyforthesakeofautomation,buttodesignintegratedsystemsthat“capitalize
uponboththemeritsofautomationandthecapabilitiesofhumans.”27 In1963,aspeakerattheElectronic
SystemDivision’sMaintainabilityConferenceconcludedwithapleatoconsiderdesignfromthemaintainer’s
perspective. “Ifanyoneshoulddoubttheimportanceofamaintainabilityprogram,heneedsonlytolisten
tothepeoplewhousetheequipment”:
Irecentlyconductedastudyofhumanerrorsintheoperationofelectroniccheckoutequipmentwhich
tookmetotenfieldorganizationsusingandmaintainingfivecompletelydifferentweaponsystems.
23GeorgeA.SteinerandWilliamG.Ryan,IndustrialProjectManagement(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1968).
SeealsoStephenB.Johnson,TheUnitedStatesAirForceandtheCultureofInnovation,1945–1965(Washington:AirForce
HistoryandMuseumsProgram,2002).
24F.L.Ankenbrandt,ed.,ElectronicMaintainability(Elizabeth,NJ:EngineeringPublishers,1960).
25JosephG.Wohl,“WhyDesignForMaintainability?”IRETransactionsonHumanFactorsinElectronics2,no.2(September
1961),doi:10.1109/THFE2.1961.4503312,87,89.
26M.R.Munger,M.P.Willis,andJ.W.Altman,“QuantificationofExpertJudgmentinMaintenanceDesignDecisions,”
IRETransactionsonHumanFactorsinElectronics2,no.2(September1961),doi:10.1109/THFE2.1961.4503314,97.
27RobertG.Demaree,“DesigningtheHumanElementintoMaintenance,”IRETransactionsonHumanFactorsinElectronics
2,no.2(September1961),doi:10.1109/THFE2.1961.4503317,110.
7
Idiot-ProofingtheAirForce
Iinterviewedsupervisorsandadministeredquestionnairestoscoresoftechnicians,gatheringmuch
informationabouterrorsanddifficultiesthetechniciansexperiencedaswell astheiropinionsand
suggestionsforimprovementofthemaintenancesystem. Thereweremanyreportsofpartsandcheck
pointshardtoreach. OnetechnicianreportedthattoreplaceacertaintransformeronaTacan[tactical
air-navigation]unit,itwasnecessarytoremovetheentirefrontoftheunit,disconnectingotherwiring
andparts,requiringabouttwohours. Ifthetransformerhadbeeneasilyaccessible,tenminuteswould
probablyhavebeenadequate. Alsoremovingandreplacingthefrontpaneloftenresultedinother
malfunctionsorrequiredcircuitadjustments.28
Furthermore,“alargepercentofalltechniciansinthisstudyfeltthatbettertechnicaldata,diagramsandcheck
listswouldspeedupmaintenance. Muchoftheequipmentinthesesystemsdidnothaveadequatehandles
forlifting,hadinadequatelymarkedaccessopeningsandpartslocationsonchassis.” Effortstoimprove
maintainabilitywouldcontinuetosufferthesesetbacksuntilengineersrespondedmoreenthusiasticallyto
feedback.
Whydiddesignersresist? AccordingtoAlanSwain,amaintenanceengineeratSandiaNationalLabora-
tory,itwasnotthattheyfailedtoappreciatetheimportanceofthe“humanelement,”butrather,theway
theythoughtaboutit.Atasymposiumin1964,hecriticizedthefieldforits“Alice-in-Wonderlandviewpoint
towardhumanerrors,”whichdevolvedinto“wishfulthinking”:“‘Iftheywouldjusttrainpeopleproperly…’”
or“Ifpeoplewoulddowhattheyaresupposedtodo,therewouldn’tbeanyproblem.” Unfortunately,“the
willingnesstoassignblameforerrorstotheoperatorortotheproductionworkerischaracteristicoftoo
manydesignengineersandmanagers”:
Someeventalkaboutproviding“idiot-proof”designswhichmakemaximumuseof“goonmeters”for
“trainedapes.” AndMurphy’sLawhasreceivedsomuchover-emphasisthatsomedesignengineers
believe,inspiteofevidencetothecontrary,thatthewaytoareliablesystemistoeliminatemanfrom
thesystem…Itmaybeeasierforadesignertoblameman,yetthe“cause”ofhumanerrormanytimes
liesnotsomuchintheattitudeormotivationorskillofthehumanasthedesignofthecontrolsand
displaysorotherequipmenthemustread,manipulate,ordealwithinsomeway.29
Whilecertainlyphrasedmoresympathetically,Swain’sviewswereultimatelynotsounlikethoseofhis
hypotheticalrhetoricalopponent,inthattheybothaspiredtoanticipateandchangetheworker’sbehavior
throughdesign. “Whenwethinkaboutchangingpeople,”hesaid,“weoftenareattackingsymptomsrather
thancauses.” Forexample,“atonemilitaryinstallation,maintenancetechniciansconsistentlywalkedona
largebomb[presumablynuclear]associatedwithanaircraft”:
Theauthoritieswereupset,andrightlyso;thustheyrecommendedthatcautionsignsbeprintedonthese
bombs. Thereviewingagencyrejectedthisrecommendation;thisagencystatedthatthetechnicians
shouldbeindoctrinatednottowalkonthebombs. Adifferentrecommendation,butthesametype
28LouisT.Pope,“HumanFactorsandMaintainability,”inProceedingsoftheESDMaintainabilityConference,12–13March,
1963(L.G.HanscomField: ElectronicSystemsDivision,AirForceSystemsCommand,June1963),DefenseTechnical
InformationCenter(AD0406780),http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD0406780,IVA-5.
29A.D.Swain,“HumanFactorsinDesignofReliableSystems,”SandiaReprintSC-R-748(Albuquerque:SandiaCorpora-
tion,June1964),SciTechConnect(4070176),https://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/4070176,2.
8
3. Humanfactors: Engineeringsystemsformaintainability
ofthinking. Apparentlynoonethoughttogetbeyondthesymptomandlookforthecause. Whydid
technicianswalkonbombs? Didtheyneedaworkstand? Largebombsprovideareasonableandhandy
facsimileofaworkstandtoatechniciantryingtomeethisschedule.30
Takentoitslogicalend,thisapproachwouldseemtoplaceanenormousresponsibilityonthedesigner
toactasasocialpsychologist, withtremendousempathyandunderstandingforthesubject, aswellas
anengineer—atremendousfeatofculturaltranslationforanyone. “Designershavetoknowthemselves
too,todesigneffectivelyforothers,”Swainacknowledgedwhileneglectingtheproblemsinherentinhis
proposition:
Theymustrememberthattheyhavecollegeeducations(orequivalent)andthattheyprobablyhave
higherthanaverageintellectualabilitiesandthattheyareintenselymotivatedtomaketheirgearwork
properly. Theaverageproductionworker,ontheotherhand,isprobablynotcollegetrained. Heoften
hasaverageorevenbelowaverageintellectualability. Hisprimarymotivationcanbemerelytoputin
histimeonthejob…Agooddesignerwillmakeithisbusinesstofindoutasmuchashecanaboutthe
typeofoperatorwhowillusehisdesignsandtheconditionsunderwhichthedesignsmustbeused. An
efficientdesignfirmwillseetoitthattheirdesignersgetthiskindofinformation.31
Theargumentwasverynearlycircular;HFEmaynothaveregardeditsgoalsocrudelyas“idiot-proofing”
sensitiveequipment,butitwasatleastinthebusinessofbuildingbetteridiots.
Thisambivalenceisperhapsbestillustratedbyresearchonso-called“job-performanceaids.”Philco-Ford
surveyedthetopicfortheDepartmentoftheLaborin1967,drawingprimarilyonmaintainabilitystudies
generatedbyAirForcelaboratoriesandcontractors. InthemidstoftheGreatSociety,theiraspirations
appearednotablybenign. “Whetherornotexpresslystated,theassumptionthatunderliesmostofour
effortstocombatpovertyandunemploymentisthat,givenaparticularsetofjobrequirements,thereare
onlytwovehiclesforobtaininghumanworkperformance: selectionandtraining.”32 Jobaidsoffereda
thirdpossibility,which,accordingtothedefinitionadoptedinthereport,werenotmerelytoolsortraining
materials,butmediatingdevicesthatcompensatedfor“basicaptitudedeficiencies”asidentifiedthrough
testingorlackofcredentials. “Whetheritbeachecklist,anomograph,oracomputerizedjobinformation
system,themainconsiderationisthatthe‘device’assisttheworkerbystoringorotherhandlinginformation.”
Forexample:
Thelubricationchartinthefillingstation,byspecifyingtheactivitiestobefollowedandshowingthe
locationsofthepartstobelubricatedforeachmodelandyearofcar,isanexcellentexampleofajob
aidwhichsubstitutesforthelengthytrainingandexperiencethatwouldotherwiseberequiredifthe
mechanichadtorelyexclusivelyuponhismemorytoaccomplishsuchtasks. Withonlyaminimumof
training,anygasstationattendantutilizingthejobperformanceaidcanlubricatemostvehiclestothe
30Swain,“HumanFactorsinDesignofReliableSystems,”2.
31Swain,“HumanFactorsinDesignofReliableSystems,”4.
32AlbertB.ChapulskyandThomasJ.Kopf,“JobPerformanceAidsandTheirImpactonManpowerUtilization,”WDL-
TR3276(PaloAlto:WesternDevelopmentLaboratories,Philco-FordCorporation,May1967),EducationResourcesInfor-
mationCenter(ED015316),https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED015316,4.
9
Idiot-ProofingtheAirForce
samelevelofperformance,andverylikelywithgreaterreliability,thanwouldbeachievedbyaskilled
mechanicwhohadtorelyentirelyuponhisprevioustrainingandexperience.33
Theauthorsultimatelyhopedthatmethodscultivatedbythemilitarycouldalsohelpequalizecivilsociety,
addressing“theemploymentproblemsofthenon-whiteortheolderworker,thehandicapped,andother
disadvantaged groups” as well as “the basic question of how we can improve the effectiveness and the
efficiencyofourmethodsforachievingsatisfactoryhumanperformanceinaworkenvironmentwitha
rapidlyacceleratingrateofchange.”Theinconsistencyintheirambition,howeverlaudable,isnotdifficultto
detect. Afterall,itwasnotasifAirForceofficialshadeverbeencoyabouttheirintenttouseHFEinorder
toreducetheirmanpowerrequirements.
NowhereweretheymoresuccessfulthantheMinutemanprogram.Unlikeearlierintercontinental-range
ballisticmissiles,suchasAtlasandTitan,Minutemanwasthefirstweaponssystemdesignedtofitintoits
logisticsandmaintenanceorganization,andnottheotherwayaround. Morethan1,000Minutemenwere
onfifteen-minutealertwithinadecadeoftheprogram’sinitiationin1958,whileAtlashadbeenretired
completely,andonly54TitanIIsremained.TheideafortheprojectoriginatedwithintheAirForceBallistic
MissileDivisioninLosAngeles,whereacolonelnamedBenjaminP.Blasingamereactedunfavorablyto
arequestfromtheUnitedStatesAirForcesinEuropeforasolid-fueledrockettoreplacetheantiquated
TM-61Matadorcruisemissile.“IdonotfeelthattheIRBM[intermediate-rangeballisticmissile]programis
agoodobjectiveforthe[solid]propellantprogram,”BlasingamewrotetohissuperiorinJuly1957.“Ourreal
needisforanadequatedeterrentforce;thiscanbeguaranteedtobeeffectiveonlywhenitissecurelybased
onourownsoilandoperatedbyourownpeople.”34 GeneralBernardSchriever,thedivisioncommander,
ultimatelyagreedtodefertheIRBMconcepttoanewlyformedsolid-propellant“workinggroup,”which
wouldalsoconsiderplansfora“next-generation”ICBM.35
AlthoughBlasingameremainedwiththeTitanprogram,hisattitudeguidedthesolid-propellantgroupas
itevolvedintoadedicatedprojectoffice. Afterameetingaboutthefutureprojectorganization,Blasingame
urgedhiscolleaguesto“considerthehistoryoftheTitansystem”:
All of our procurement data described only the missile itself. There is not a single word in all the
procurementdataaboutthebasetowhichthismissilewastobeadaptednorwasthereasingleword
about the ground support system which would go with this bird. History today shows that these
elementsof[ground-supportequipment]andbasedesignarethemostimportantelementsofamissile
systeminsofarastheAirForceisconcerned. Theyaremanytimesasexpensiveasthebirditself.36
33ChapulskyandKopf,“JobPerformanceAids,”1,3.
34Col.BenjaminP.Blasingame,Director,WS-107A-2ProjectOfficetoCol.CharlesH.Terhune,DeputyCommander,
BallisticMissileDivision,“ICBMSolidPropellantProgram,”July17,1957,exhibit21inRobertF.Piper,TheDevelopment
oftheSM-80Minuteman(Wright-PattersonAFB:HistoricalOffice,DeputyCommanderforAerospaceSystems,AirForce
SystemsCommand,April1962),DigitalNationalSecurityArchive(NH00024).
35Maj.Gen.BernardA.Schriever,Commander,BallisticMissileDivisiontoMaj.Gen.J.W.Sessums,ViceCommander,
AirResearchandDevelopmentCommand,September20,1957,exhibit28inPiper,DevelopmentoftheSM-80Minuteman.
36Col.BenjaminP.Blasingame,Director,WS-107A-2ProjectOfficetoCol.CharlesH.Terhune,DeputyCommander,
BallisticMissileDivision,“NewBallisticMissileSystemOffice,”September18,1957,exhibit27inPiper,Developmentofthe
10