Identities in Civil Conflict: How Ethnicity, Religion and Ideology Jointly Affect Rebellion

239 Pages·2016·3.09 MB·English

by  Eva Bernauer (auth.)

Studien zur Neuen Politischen Ökonomie
Eva Bernauer
Identities in
Civil Conflict
How Ethnicity, Religion and Ideology
Jointly Affect Rebellion
Studien zur Neuen Politischen
Ökonomie
Herausgegeben von
T. Bräuninger, Mannheim, Deutschland
G. Schneider, Konstanz, Deutschland
Eva Bernauer
Identities in Civil Conflict
How Ethnicity, Religion and Ideology
Jointly Affect Rebellion
Eva Bernauer
Mannheim, Germany
Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Sozialwissenschaften an der Universität
Mannheim unter dem Titel “Civil Conflict in Three Dimensions - Ethnic, Religious and
Class-Based Support of Rebel Groups in the National and International Domain”
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 02.10.2015
Erstgutachter: Professor Dr. Thomas Bräuninger
Zweitgutachter: Professor Sabine Carey, Ph.D.
Drittgutachter: Professor Nicolay Marinov, Ph.D.
Studien zur Neuen Politischen Ökonomie
ISBN 978-3-658-14151-6 ISBN 978-3-658-14152-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-14152-3
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016939109
Springer VS
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Acknowledgments
Having worked for more than four years on this dissertation while studying
at the Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences at Mannheim
University, I would love to thank many people.
First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisor Prof. Dr. Thomas
Br¨auninger, who combines excellent academic and analytic skills with a
great personality, and who let me pursue my own research interests. I am
extremely grateful for the time and patience that he afforded, especially at
the beginning of this dissertation project, when there was most need for
it. As my original interest was primarily in civil conflicts and quantitative
methods,IverygreatlythankThomasforbroadeningmyhorizonbyinsisting
on thorough — at best formal — theorizing. Last but not least, I thank
Thomas for assisting me in gaining financial support throughout the entire
research period.
IamthankfultoProf.Dr.GeraldSchneiderwhosupportedmeinapplying
for the Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences in Mannheim
in the first place. I also thank Prof. Sabine Carey, Ph.D., who shares my
interest in civil conflicts, for serving as a secondary reviewer, and Prof.
Nikolay Marinov, Ph.D., for serving as a tertiary reviewer.
I would love to thank all my colleagues and friends from the CDSS and
fromtheChairofPoliticalEconomyatMannheimUniversityfortheirgreat
companionship. It was good to have so many fellows struggling with the
same challenges when writing a dissertation, being able to discuss technical
issues at workshops or in D7, and at the same time spending a great non-
academic time over lunch or at night. I especially thank Susanne Michalik
and Nathalie Giger for a joyful time in Mannheim and very good friendship.
Most of all, I thank my husband Andreas for providing me with moral
and practical support. In difficult times, Andreas placed his trust in me,
while at the same time holding my ambitions in check. Andreas also had
helpful tips regarding programming, the R Language and Latex, for which
I am grateful. Our three wonderful children were born during the time of
writing this dissertation. It was great that Andreas went on parental leave
for one year so that I was able to finish this book.
Finally, I am deeply indebted to the Graduate School of Economic and
Social Sciences (GESS) in Mannheim and the Mannheim Centre for Euro-
pean Social Research (MZES) for their generous financial support. Without
their support, this research would not have been possible.
5
Contents
List of Tables 9
List of Figures 11
1. Introduction 17
I. National Political Exclusion and Support of Rebel
Groups 23
2. Ethnic, Religious and Class-Based Civil Conflicts 25
2.1. The Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2. Patterns of Favoritism and Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3. Favoritism and Conflict along Identity Lines 41
3.1. The Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2. Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3. A Multidimensional Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4. Testing the Argument on Exclusion and Conflict 63
4.1. Definitions, Data and Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2. Coverage and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3. Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5. A Model of Violent Political Competition 109
5.1. Model Assumptions and The Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2. Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.3. Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
II. Transnational Support of Rebel Groups 145
6. Ethnic, Religious and Class-Based Rebel Support 147
7
6.1. The Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.2. Episodes of Transnational Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7. Transnational Support Along Identity Lines 157
7.1. The Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.2. Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
8. Testing the Argument on Links and Conflict 165
8.1. Data and Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
8.2. Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
9. Conclusion 189
9.1. The Arab Spring — How Does It Relate? . . . . . . . . . . 189
9.2. Exclusion and Support in Three Dimensions . . . . . . . . . 204
A. All Models with Control Variables Displayed 209
8
List of Tables
3.1. How the Identity Setup Changes with the Underlying Di-
mensionality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2. How the Quantities of Interest Change with the Underlying
Dimensionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.1. Key Independent Variables on Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2. Correlation Table for the Excluded Population . . . . . . . 72
4.3. Correlation Table for the Largest Excluded (Sub-)Group . . 72
4.4. Logit Estimations: Effect of Excluded Population Without
Interaction on Conflict Onset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5. Logit Estimations: Effect of Largest Excluded Subgroup
Without Interaction on Conflict Onset . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.6. Logit Estimations: Effect of Excluded Population With In-
teraction on Conflict Onset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.7. Logit Estimations: Effect of Largest Excluded Subgroup
With Interaction on Conflict Onset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.8. Robustness Checks: Autocracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.9. Robustness Checks: Onset2, Onset3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.10.Robustness Checks: Onset2, Onset3, Autocracy . . . . . . . 103
4.11.Influential Obs., Onset1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.12.Influential Obs., Onset2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.1. Morocco’s Identity Setup (in %): Left and Right . . . . . . 125
5.2. Morocco’s Identity Setup (in %): Adding a Centrist Category125
5.3. Morocco’s Opposition to a White Government. . . . . . . . 127
5.4. Morocco’sOppositiontoaWhite, Leftist, RightistGovernment127
5.5. Morocco’s Opposition to a White, Centrist, Rightist Govern-
ment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.6. Guatemala’s Identity Setup (in %) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.7. Thailand’s Identity Setup (in %) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.8. Logit Estimations: Effect of Formally Derived Variables
Without Interaction on Conflict Onset . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
9
5.9. LogitEstimations: EffectofFormallyDerivedVariablesWith
Interaction on Conflict Onset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.10.Robustness Checks: Formal Part . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
8.1. Transnational Links Without Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . 168
8.2. Logit Estimations: Effect of Transnational Links With Inter-
action on Conflict Onset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
A.1. Logit Estimations: Effect of Excluded Population Without
Interaction on Conflict Onset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
A.2. Logit Estimations: Effect of Largest Excluded Subgroup
Without Interaction on Conflict Onset . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
A.3. Logit Estimations: Effect of Excluded Population With In-
teraction on Conflict Onset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
A.4. Logit Estimations: Effect of Largest Excluded Subgroup With
Interaction on Conflict Onset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
A.4. [continued] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
A.5. Robustness Checks: Autocracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
A.6. Robustness Checks: Onset2, Onset3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
A.7. Robustness Checks: Onset2, Onset3, Autocracy . . . . . . . 217
A.8. Influential Obs., Onset1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
A.9. Influential Obs., Onset2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
A.10.Logit Estimations: Effect of Formally Derived Variables
Without Interaction on Conflict Onset . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
A.11.LogitEstimations: EffectofFormallyDerivedVariablesWith
Interaction on Conflict Onset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
A.12.Transnational Links Without Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . 222
A.13.LogitEstimations: EffectofTransnationalLinksWithInteraction
on Conflict Onset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
A.13.[continued] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
10
List of Figures
3.1. Schematic representation of the argument. . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1. Box plots on the size of the largest excluded (sub-)group. . . 71
4.2. Fitted heat map line for Model 1 in Table 4.5. . . . . . . . . 87
4.3. Fitted heat map line for Model 1 in Table 4.7. . . . . . . . . 88
4.4. First difference analyses of the effect of exclusion in non-
competitive regimes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.5. Predicted probability of armed conflict onset and 90% con-
fidence interval for varying values of the variable ERImax,
separately for non-competitive and competitive regimes. . . . 91
4.6. Predicted probability of armed conflict onset and 90% con-
fidence interval for varying values of the variable EImax,
separately for non-competitive and competitive regimes. . . . 92
4.7. Predicted probability of armed conflict onset and 90% confi-
dence interval for varying values of the variable Wall, sepa-
rately for non-competitive and competitive regimes. . . . . . 93
4.8. First difference analyses of the effect of exclusion in compet-
itive regimes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.9. First difference analyses of the effect of exclusion, when
comparing non-competitive and competitive regimes. . . . . 95
4.10.Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, separately
for a model that includes ERImax and its interaction with
regime type, and for a zero model without these variables. . 96
4.11.In-sample predictive power for a model that includes ERImax
and its interaction with regime type. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.12.Robustness check: First difference analyses of the effect of
exclusion in autocratic regimes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.13.Robustness check: First difference analyses of the effect of
exclusion in non-competitive regimes, when onset2 or onset3
is used as a dependent variable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.14.Robustness check: First difference analyses of the effect of
exclusion in autocratic regimes, when onset2 or onset3 is
used as a dependent variable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
11