Hursthouse's Virtue Ethics and Abortion: Abortion Ethics without Metaphysics?

21 Pages·2011·0.25 MB·English

EthicTheoryMoralPrac(2011)14:51–71
DOI10.1007/s10677-010-9230-2
Hursthouse’s Virtue Ethics and Abortion: Abortion
Ethics without Metaphysics?
R. Jo Kornegay
Accepted:4May2010/Publishedonline:2June2010
#SpringerScience+BusinessMediaB.V.2010
Abstract This essay explicates and evaluates the roles that fetal metaphysics and moral
status play in Rosalind Hursthouse’s abortion ethics. It is motivated by Hursthouse’s
puzzling claim in her widely anthologized paper “Virtue Ethics and Abortion” that fetal
moral status and (by implication) its underlying metaphysics are “in a way, fundamentally
irrelevant”toherposition.Theessayclarifiestherolesthatfetalontologyandmoralstatus
do in fact play in her abortion ethics. To this end, it presents and then develops her fetal
metaphysics ofthe potential and actual human being,which she merely adumbrates in her
more extensive treatment of abortion ethics in her book Beginning Lives. The essay then
evaluates her fetal ontology in light of relevant research on fetal neural and psychological
development.Itconcludesthatherimpliedviewthatthelate-stagefetusisanactualhuman
beingisdefensible.Theessaythenturnstotheanalysisoflate-stageabortionsinherpaper
and argues that it is importantly incomplete.
Keywords Abortion.Fetalontology.Fetalmoralstatus.Appliedvirtueethics.
RosalindHursthouse
1 Introduction
When Rosalind Hursthouse begins to address abortion in the second section of “Virtue
Theory and Abortion,”1 an abbreviated and slightly revised version of several sections of
1Despite being widely anthologized, “Virtue Theory and Abortion” has received little scrutiny in print.
Relativelybriefdiscussionsofthispaper(whichareintegratedintoanalysesofothervirtuetheorists’views
of abortion and related issues) are found in John Hacker-Wright, 2007, pp. 449–450, 457–459 and Eric
Rovie, 2002, pp. 142–146. Another exception is the brief criticism of two of Hursthouse’s arguments in
Jeffrey Reiman, 1999, pp. 57–59. With this essay I hope to begin a thorough discussion of Hursthouse’s
paper.
R.J.Kornegay(*)
RyersonUniversity,Toronto,ON,Canada
e-mail:[email protected]
52 R.J.Kornegay
herbookBeginningLives,2sheclaimsthatthoseethicistswhofocusonthemoralstatusof
the fetus and the rights of the pregnant woman conjecture that virtue theorists will have
little light to shed on the morality of abortion (Hursthouse 1991, pp. 233–234). However,
shepromisestoshowthatthevirtueapproachhelpfullytransformsthedebateandthatthese
dual issues, which have dominated so much of the familiar literature, are “in a way,
fundamentallyirrelevant”(Hursthouse1991,p.234).Moreover,(1)movingawayfromthe
issue of fetal status will eliminate the need for academic metaphysics. (2) Moving away
from the issue of the woman’s rights with respect to the fetus will allow various virtue
considerations to come into play since one can exercise a moral right viciously, e.g.,
selfishly, cruelly, self-righteously (Hursthouse 1991, pp. 233–236).3 Her approach will
yieldanuancedanalysiswith“nosinglerightanswer,butavarietyofparticularanswers”to
questions of abortion’s rightness or wrongness (Hursthouse 1991, p. 233).
In this essay I shall explicate and evaluate her purported de-emphasis on fetal ontology
andmoralstatusaswellastherolesthesetwoissuesdoinfactplayinherabortionethics.
First, however, I need to outline briefly the key concepts of Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian
theory. Next, I explain how she applies her framework to abortions in some interestingly
different, realistic cases. I then consider whether she succeeds in giving plausible answers
to two questions, which I believe any adequate account of abortion ethics must provide.
First, why is abortion morally more problematic than contraception? Secondly, why are
late-stage abortions ceteris paribus more problematic than early-stage abortions?
Answers to these questions typically focus on fetal moral status and the underlying
metaphysics—concernsshehaspromisedtomakelesscentral.AlthoughHursthouse“hope
[s] to make both clear and plausible” the way(s) in which fetal ontology and status are
irrelevant (Hursthouse 1991, p. 234), this hope is unfulfilled in her essay. To clarify her
position on these issues and her answers to the two questions I pose, it is necessary to
excavatetheviewsonfetalmetaphysicsandstatuspresupposedbyheranalysesin“Virtue
Theory and Abortion” as well as to analyse her more extensive treatment of abortion and
her sanctity-of-life theory in Beginning Lives.
I conclude that, in her eagerness to introduce various virtue considerations into the
evaluation of abortion decisions, she understates the key roles fetal moral status and
ontologyplayinhertreatmentofthecrucialissueoftheim/permisssibilityofabortions.A
necessary, albeit non-sufficient, condition of a morally right decision to terminate a
pregnancyisthattheabortionbepermissible.Thewoman’srightstoabortmustjustifiably
defeatanyfetalrighttolifeinthesituation.TheanalogousclaimwithinHursthouse’svirtue
framework is that a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of a woman’s morally right
decisiontoabortisthatthewomanmanifestappropriateseriousnessabouthumanlifeinher
2SeeHursthouse,1987,Ch.8,Sect.4,“Abortion,”pp.330–339withadditionalmaterialfromCh.5,Sect.4,
“AbortionasSpecial,”pp.204–213andCh.8,Sect.2,“BearingChildrenasIntrinsicallyWorthwhile,”pp.
307–318.
Beginning Lives has received some limited critical attention. There have been several book reviews,
needfullytoobrieftodojusticetoHursthouse’swork.Forinstance,itwasreviewedfavourablybyChristine
Swanton,1989.ItreceivedadecidedlymixedreviewbyIanTipton,1988,wholamentstheindeterminacyof
Hursthouse’smoralevaluationofmanyabortionsandherfailuretosupportadequatelyhercrucialcontention
thatabortionisalwaysahighlyseriousmoralmatter(p.234).ThebookwasscathinglyreviewedbyPeter
Morriss,1989,whocontendsitsvirtueanalysisofabortionis“insufficientlydeveloped”(p.71).
Acomparativelyrecentarticlehasdealtwithherbookinaminorway,i.e.,byraisingallegedproblemsfor
herrejectionoftheslipperyslopeargument(totheconclusionthatconceptionistheonlynon-arbitrarypoint
atwhichtoholdthezygote-embryo-fetusachievessignificantmoralstatus)inHursthouse1987,pp.36–37.
SeeMichaelJ.Wren2004,pp.554–560
3Cf.Hursthouse1987,pp.11,207–208.
Hursthouse’sVirtueEthicsandAbortion:AbortionEthicswithoutMetaphysics? 53
deliberations. She must apportion due respect for the potential or actual human being and
wisely factor the correct fetal value into her deliberations. Hence, Hursthouse’s virtue
analysis does not avoid the issue offetal moral status; she succeeds only in making it one
among several decisive factors in the acceptability, not mere permissibility, of many
abortions.4
OnHursthouse’sbehalf,Ishallfleshouttheskeletal fetalmetaphysicssheoffersinher
booktosupportthemoralstatussheattributestothefetusatvariousstages.Furthermore,I
arguethatHursthouse’sfetalontologycanbeplausiblydevelopedanddefendedinlightof
empirical findings about the timing and nature of fetal psychobiological development.
Lastly, I consider Hursthouse’s explicit answer to the second question about late
abortionsin“VirtueTheoryandAbortion.”Ipresentherrationaleintermsofpsycho-social
facts about adults. I conclude that, while she does manage to make fetal status and
metaphysics peripheral there, she does so inappropriately. Instead, she should supplement
her analysis with views on fetal metaphysics and status developed from those she merely
adumbrates in Beginning Lives.
2 Hursthouse’s Neo-Aristotelianism and Its Application to Abortion
Following Aristotle,5 Hursthouse makes eudaimonia (leading an intrinsically worthwhile
life)thebasicconceptofherethicaltheory.A‘virtue’isthendefinedas“acharactertraita
humanbeingneedstoflourishorlivewell”(Hursthouse1991,p.226).6Moreover,avirtue
isadispositiontoopine,act,andemotionallyreactcorrectlyinsomesphereoflife,e.g.,in
life’s painful and dangerous situations, the virtue is courage (Hursthouse 1987, pp. 226–
228;1991,p.238).Todeterminethecorrectactionorfeeling,knowledgeofrelevantfacts
and the morally salient dimensions of the case as well as excellent judgment are required
(Hursthouse 1987, pp. 240–244 and 1991, p. 235–236, 244). Furthermore, Hursthouse
defines a ‘virtuous’ agent as “one who has and exercises the virtues.” Finally, a ‘right’
action is defined as “what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances” (Hursthouse
1991, p. 225).7
In applying this framework to abortion, she considers what a virtuous woman must
know to feel and deliberate appropriately when facing an unwanted pregnancy. The
virtuous woman (and anyone assessing her) must know familiar facts about human
reproduction—“that, standardly (but not invariably), pregnancy occurs as the result of
sexual intercourse, that it lasts about 9 months, during which time the fetus grows and
develops,thatstandardlyitterminatesinthebirthofalivingbaby,andthatthisishowwe
allcometobe;”thatwomentypicallycanbearchildrenfrom“latechildhoodtolatemiddle
4Cf. David Boonin’s distinction in his introduction to A Defense of Abortion between the moral im/
permissibility of abortions (whether abortions violate fetal rights) and the broader issue of the “moral
criticizability”ofabortions.Booninconcedesthenarrownessofhisfocusontheformerwithinthebroader
landscapeofthelattermappedoutbyHursthouse.However,hedefendshisworkasfollows:“Thereasonfor
thisfocusissimple:Virtuallyeveryonewhoismorallyopposedtoabortionclaimsthatabortionismorally
impermissible in this sense, that it does violate rights, not merely that it is morally criticizable” (Boonin
2003,pp.5,7).
5Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics,especially,I,II,III.6–12,IV.1,andVI.5–13,1999,pp.3–51,68–89,and
152–173.
6Sheoffersamoreelaborateaccountofvirtuesintermsofdispositionslikelytopromotetheflourishingof
theindividualandhisorhersocialgroupinhermorerecentOnVirtueEthics,1999,pp.198–201.
7Hursthousewiselyemendsthedefinitionof‘right’actionto“whatavirtuousagentwouldcharacteristically
(i.e.actingincharacter)dointhecircumstances”in1999,p.28.
54 R.J.Kornegay
age;”and“thatchildbearingispainful,dangerous,andemotionallycharged.”Sheneedsto
know various psychological and social facts as well, e.g., “that human parents, both male
andfemale,tendtocarepassionatelyabouttheiroffspring,andthatfamilyrelationshipsare
among the deepest and strongest in our lives—and, significantly, among the longest-
lasting.” The wise woman knows that the key intrinsic goods at stake—human life,
parenthood, and family life—are ultimately worthwhile. Thus, the fully wise and virtuous
woman, apprised of these facts, has the correct attitudes to her pregnancy, the fetus,
motherhood, love, family relationships as well as to leading the good life. Furthermore,
these beliefs and values manifest themselves in appropriate emotions, deliberations, and
actions (Hursthouse 1991, pp. 236–238).
Hursthouse then proceeds to considerabortions in interestingly different circumstances,
e.g.,differencesinthewomen’sages,levelsofhealthandmaterialcomfortand,notably,the
reasonsfor which anabortionissought.8 Shethen exploreswhetherthe choice toabortin
each situation manifests virtues or vices. For example, she considers a woman who is
exhausted by repeated childbearing or who must earn her living by physically arduous
work. If this woman opts for abortion because she sees pregnancy as a further severe
hardship,shedoesnotnecessarilyexhibitself-indulgence,callousness,orlight-mindedness
about human life.
Moreover, a perimenopausal woman, who has been a good mother but unexpectedly
findsherselfpregnantwhenshewashopingtobecomeagrandmother,doesnotmanifesta
failure to appreciate motherhood and family relationships in choosing abortion. Nor is an
underappreciation of motherhood and family life indicated by a woman who believes that
having this baby would jeopardize her being a good mother to her current children
(Hursthouse 1991, pp. 239–242).
Bycontrast,awoman,whoseeksanabortionbecauseofsomeidealofpersonalfreedom
oralifeofspontaneousfun,mayfoolishlysquanderanopportunityforenrichingorleading
agoodlife.Similarly,awoman,whooptsforabortionbecausesheiswaitingforfinancial
securityandtheidealtimeinhermarriageandcareer,mightmanifestgreed.Inherfollyto
achieve perfection, she might completely lose the chance for family life. However, a
woman who chooses abortion because she is engaged in some intrinsically worthwhile
pursuit which motherhood would compromise can show responsibility and need not
manifest an under-appreciation of parenthood.
Furthermore,ifateenagermanifestshumilityinacknowledgingthatsheistooimmature
to be a mother, her abortion can be appropriate. However, it cannot be right, when her
unintended pregnancy results from failure to use birth control due to some vice(s)
(presumably, e.g., carelessness) (Hursthouse 1991, pp. 241–243).
Note that the analysis in terms of virtues and vices Hursthouse offers of each of the
abovedecisionstoabortcouldbegiven,withslightornoalterations,hadthedecisionbeen
whether or not to practice contraception, instead of the intuitively more momentous
decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.9 Hence, she needs additional theoretical
resources if she is to draw a non-arbitrary moral distinction between contraception and
abortion as means of birth control.
These resources are found in part in her secularized sanctity-of-life view, according to
which a human life is (almost always) an irreplaceable, intrinsic good and the deliberate
8Cf.Hursthouse1987,p.216.
9PeterMorisssimilarlyobserves,“EverythingthatHursthousesaysagainstabortionholdsagainstcelibacy”
inhisreviewofBeginningLives,p.70;hisemphasis.
Hursthouse’sVirtueEthicsandAbortion:AbortionEthicswithoutMetaphysics? 55
taking of a human life is (almost always) intrinsically wrong (Hursthouse 1987, pp. 290–
291,309–310and1991,note15,pp.242–243).Abortiontakesthelifeofanembryo-fetus.
A fully virtuous woman has the right attitude towards life and death and, hence, believes
abortionisaseriousmatter.Hursthousewrites,“...thecuttingoffofahumanlifeisalwaysa
matterofsomeseriousnessatanystage...”and“...tothinkofabortionasnothingbutthekilling
ofsomethingthatdoesnotmatter,orasnothingbuttheexerciseofsomerightorrightsonehas,
orastheincidentalmeanstosomedesirablestateofaffairs,istodosomethingcallousandlight-
minded,thesortofthingnovirtuousandwisepersonwoulddo”(Hursthouse1991, pp.237–
238).Hence,sheimpliesthat,insofarasabortionisanintentionalkillingofahumanfetus,it
isprimafaciemorallyimpermissibleandwouldbechosenbyafullyvirtuouswomanonlyif
therewerestrongcountervailingreasons,e.g.,bearingandrearingthiswould-bechildwould
impedeanotherintrinsicallyvaluableproject.10Evenif,allthingsconsidered,thedecisionto
abortiscorrect,oneshould“regret”“[t]hatcircumstancesmaymakeitnecessarytodowhat
is,in itself,wrong...” (Hursthouse 1987, p. 335).
Needlesstosay,theseclaimsandimplicationspresupposeviewsaboutfetalmoralstatus.
Clearly, for Hursthouse, the status of the fetus is lower than that of a typical adult or an
infant. Her examples of reasons needed to justify an abortion would not be adequate to
justify homicide or infanticide. Moreover, Hursthouse wants her theory to incorporate the
widespread view that late abortions tend to be morally more problematic than early ones.
She comments, “Abortion for shallow reasons in the later stages is much more shocking
than abortion for the same reasons in the early stages in a way that matches the fact that
deepgriefovermiscarriageinthelaterstagesismoreappropriatethanitisovermiscarriage
in the earlier stages...” (Hursthouse 1991, p. 238). These claims seem to imply that the
fetus’s status grows in significance as it develops.
Thus, one wants to clarify what Hursthouse’s abandonment of the focus on fetal status
amountstoandthewayinwhichacademicmetaphysicsispurportedlyavoided.Sheallegesher
virtueapproachdisplacesthefocusintwoways.First,itdisabusesoneof “...theconvictionthat
wemustgobeyondthefamiliarbiologicalfacts,derivingsomesortofconclusionfromthem,
suchasthatthefetushasrights,orisnotaperson,orsomethingsimilar.”Secondly,itincludes
amongtherelevantbiologicalfacts,notonlythoseaboutthefetus,butalsoasarangeofpsycho-
socialfactsabouthumanreproductionbeyondthoseaboutpregnancy,e.g.,thathumanstendto
lovetheiroffspringintensely(Hursthouse1991, pp.236–237).
With respect to the first purported difference, the impetus behind subsuming the fetus
under some such concept as ‘non-person’ is to produce a premise about the fetus, which
along with some general moral principle, e.g., that only persons have significant rights to
life,willstraightforwardlyimplytheun/acceptabilityofabortion(Hursthouse1991, p. 236).
AccordingtoHursthouse,thisapproachissimple-mindedastherearemorallysalientfeatures
beyondthoseaboutthefetus.Abortionisanuniquetypeofkillinginthreemoralrespects.(1)
It kills what would become another human being in the world (although the victim is not
comparable to a baby or adult); (2) it involves the woman’s right to control her own body;
and(3)it preventsthewomanfrombecomingamothertoachildforthefirsttimeoragain
(Hursthouse 1987, pp.204–206).
In light of these three features, one can now appreciate that Hursthouse’s analysis of
abortionsforvariousreasonsinvariouscircumstancesinherarticleismoremethodicalthan
itatfirstappears.Allofhercasesinvolveallthreefeatures,butthefirstclusterofcasesshe
evaluates (namely, women worn out by childbearing or living by hard labour) emphasize
10In Hursthouse’s terminology, abortion is ‘wrong simpliciter,’ but not ‘wrong absolutely’ (Hursthouse
1987,pp.245–246).
56 R.J.Kornegay
concernsraisedbyfeature(2).Thesecasesinvolverisksandburdensposedbypregnancy’s
physical condition such that carrying the fetus to term amounts to heroic self-sacrifice for
thesakeofnascenthumanlifeorbringinganotherchildintoone’sfamily.Hence,abortions
in these cases do not necessarily indicate “any lack of serious respect for human life or a
shallow attitude to motherhood” (Hursthouse 1991, pp. 239–240). Her second set of
scenarios (e.g., the perimenopausal woman and the feckless woman) highlight feature (3).
The women in these cases manifest in/correct attitudes towards the role the mother-child
relationship tends to play in human flourishing.
Note that only feature (1) focuses on the fetus and raises the issue of whether the
decisiontoabortmanifestsduerespectforfetalintrinsicvalue.Hence,Hursthouse’sclaims
thatfetalmetaphysicsandstatusarelargelyirrelevant(Hursthouse1991,pp.235–236)can
mislead. Indeed, John Hacker-Wright seems to have been misled into virtually collapsing
Hursthouse’s(1) into(3). He incorrectly implies thevalue ofthe fetus,Hursthouseevokes
in (1), is solely dependent on the intrinsic value of motherhood, she evokes in (3). He
writes, ‘Appealing, as Hursthouse does, to the fact that aborting a foetus is “cutting off a
newhumanlife”presumablyhassalienceonlyforonewhosharesherviewofparentingas
intrinsically valuable’ (Hacker-Wright 2007, 459; my emphasis). Further evidence of
Hacker-Wright’s conflation of two dimensions of her approach to abortion is found in his
attempt to summarize that approach as follows: ‘The problem of abortion [then] becomes,
“is this instance of abortion compatible with acknowledging the intrinsic value of
parenting?”’(Hacker-Wright 2007, p. 458, my emphasis).
In claiming that fetal ontology and status are largely irrelevant, Hurthouse probably
intends to contrast her approach with that of many ethicists who, by her lights,
overemphasize fetal nature and status at the expense of other vital considerations. Her
contention is actually that fetal ontology and status are not solely relevant. This point
becomes clearer well into her article when she writes,
The foregoing discussion [of the first cluster of cases], insofar as it emphasizes the
right attitude to human life and death, parallels to a certain extent those standard
discussionsofabortionthatconcentrateonitsolelyasanissueofkilling.Butitdoes
not ... gloss over the fact ... that abortion, wildly unlike any other form of killing, is
theterminationofapregnancy,whichisaconditionofawoman’sbodyandresultsin
herhavingachildifitisnotaborted(Hursthouse1991,pp.240–241,heremphasis).
Herobjectionistothenarrownessofthefocusonthefetusinisolation,inaptlytakenout
of the context of the biological, social, and emotional relations between the woman and
fetus and the would-be mother and child.11 Abortion is a multi-dimensional issue that
11ForHursthouse,theserelationsgiverisetovariousmoralconsiderations.First,theresultofasuccessful
pregnancy is a new, irreplaceable human life with intrinsic value (1987, pp. 309–310. Cf. pp. 290–291).
Secondly,theprocessofbearingachildistheintrinsicallygoodcreationofahumanbeing(1987,pp.312–
315).Thirdly,bearingachildwellmanifestsvirtues,e.g.,bearingsicknesswithfortitudeandrefrainingfrom
drugsandalcoholwithresponsibleforesight(1987,pp.300–303).Moreover,ifthewomanfailstoabort,she
willbeartheheavyresponsibilityofcaringforthechildoroftransferringthatresponsibilitytoanother.Even
thelatterrarelyendsthewoman’sconcernforthechild’swell-being(1987,pp.210–212).Ifthewomanrears
the child, she typically enhances her “emotional development through a natural life-cycle,” experiences
passionatematernallove,andachievesthehighlyvaluablemother-childrelationship(1987,pp.311,315).
In rejecting the traditional narrow focus and seeking a broader social, emotional, and moral
contextualization of pregnancy, birth, and child-rearing, Hursthouse resembles feminist theorists. See, for
example,Gatens-Robinson1992,pp.39–66andSherwin1991,pp.327–342,esp.,pp.331–336.
Hursthouse’sVirtueEthicsandAbortion:AbortionEthicswithoutMetaphysics? 57
requires correct thinking about the nature and moral value, not only of fetal life, but of
gestation and motherhood as well.
However, rejection of a narrow focus on fetal status is consistent with consideration of
fetalstatusasacrucialfactor.12Indeed,Hursthousemustattributesufficientlylowstatusto
the fetus to avoid the implication that abortion is prima facie an unjust killing (i.e., it
violatesarobustfetalrighttolife),whichajustwomanceterisparibuswouldnotseek.Her
implicit reasoning seems to be the following:
(1) Fetal status is rather lower than that of an infant, child, or adult.
Hence, (2) abortions are not prima facie unjust.
However, (2) does not entail
(3) abortions are not prima facie unjustified.
Indeed, (4) an abortion, depending on the case, could manifest vices other than
injustice, e.g., light-mindedness about nascent human life or cowardice, and be
unacceptable.13
Furthermore, Hursthouse contends a wise woman can make a virtuous decision on
abortion without going beyond the well known facts into academic metaphysics.
Hence, I now need to consider how facts about reproduction and fetal development
could be relevant to fetal moral status without the mediation of ontology far beyond
common sense.
Hursthouse’s view seems to be that our belief that the embryo-fetus is human life at an
earlystageofdevelopmentcanbekeptatacommonsensical,intuitivelevel.Weknowitis
human life or a human organism importantly different from human tissue. (One extreme
liberal position, which denies this truism and analogizes the fetus to a woman’s appendix
and insists that abortion is the innocuous exercise of the woman’s bodily autonomy, or
some such right (Hursthouse 1987, pp. 47–48), has counterintuitive implications. E.g., it
implies that no serious injury has been inflicted on a woman if someone causes her to
miscarry against her will (Hursthouse 1987, pp. 50–52)).
Furthermore, we recognize that neither an ovum nor sperm is a potential human being,
butthezygote-embryo-fetusisapotentialhumanbeingfromconception(Hursthouse1987,
12IncharacterizingHursthouse’sapproach,EricRoviedoesnotseemtoappreciatethisfully.Heclaimsshe
‘...avoidsthetrickyquestionaboutthemoralstatusofthefetusbyinsteadfocusingon“familiarbiological
facts”’(2002,p.144).Itwouldbemoreaccuratetostatesheavoidsthepitfalloftakingfetalmoralstatusto
be the crux of the abortion debate. However, his unqualified assertion that fetal status is irrelevant for
Hursthouse (2002, p. 144) is fortunately belied by his claim that she believes, even when an abortion is
morally acceptable, it merits “regret and sorrow” (2002, p. 144) “...strictly on the basis of the (potential)
humanlifethatwascutshort...”(2002,p.145).ThereRovieclearlyalludestothesignificantmoralvalue
Hursthouseattributestothefetusquapotentialhumanbeing.
13MyreconstructionmightappeartosimplifyHursthouse’sviewssinceshewrites,“...ifonetiestheconcept
ofjusticeverycloselytorights,thenifwomendohaveamoralrighttoterminatetheirpregnanciesitmay
followthatindoingsotheydonotactunjustly....Butitisdebatablewhethereventhismuchfollows”(1991,
note 10, p. 235; her emphasis). However, conclusion (2) is consistent with Hursthouse’s claim as I state
“primafacie”unjusttoallowforconsiderationsotherthan(1)thatmightfactorinassessmentsofanact’s
justice,e.g.,awoman’spromisetothefathertobearachildatthetime.SinceHursthouseaccepts(1),the
viceoffailingto respect,or appreciate the valueof, fetal life isnot injustice, butlight-mindedness about
humanlife(1991,pp.238–240).
58 R.J.Kornegay
pp. 74, 80, 86–87).14 Yet, the early-stage fetus is not an actual human being as a baby,
child,oradultis.Indeed,“...causingthedeathofafoetus,particularlyinitsearlystages,is
notjustlikethat”[“killinganaverageadulthuman,withhisowncomplicatedinvolvement
in an ongoing life”] (Hursthouse 1987, p. 205, her emphasis). (The extreme conservative
position, which denies this truism, has counterintuitive implications, e.g., that a woman
whotendstomiscarryshouldceasetryingtobearachildongroundsthatsherunstherisk
of serial manslaughter or murder (Hursthouse 1987, pp. 45–46)). Lastly, we do not need
academic metaphysics, e.g., a neo-Kantian theory of potential personhood (Hursthouse
1987, pp. 64, 72–73, 94–95), to appreciate these differences and to grasp that human life,
including fetal life, has intrinsic value (Hursthouse 1987, pp. 131–134, 309–310) and that
“...the cutting off of a human life is always a matter of some seriousness, at any stage...”
(Hursthouse 1991, p. 238).
Therelativelyun-theoreticalnatureofherviewcanbetracedinparttoherendorsement
of (whatshetakestobe)Aristotle’sviewthatvirtueisachievablebyalmostanyintelligent,
maturepersonwithaproperupbringingandlifeexperience(Hursthouse1987, pp.232,236).
Hence, the knowledge about the fetus needed to make a virtuous decision about abortion
cannotinvolveesotericontologybecausethatwoulddisqualifymostpeoplefromeverhaving
thewisdomrequisite for virtue (Hursthouse 1991, pp. 235–236, includingnote 11).
3 Hursthouse’s Fetal Metaphysics
However, even if one grants Hursthouse’s viewabout theknowledgerequired for virtuous
agency, it does not follow that a satisfactory philosophical account of abortion does not
need to offer an ontology to harmonize and explain common intuitions and to ground the
moralstatusitattributestothefetus.Ihavealreadyinterjectedsomeofhercommonsensical
objections to two extreme views of the fetus she rejects. I now need to consider her
rejection of the more academic views that the fetus is a non-person or merely a potential
person.Thereafter,Ishalllayoutherphilosophicalaccountsofhumannatureaswellasof
the actual and potential human being. This is her metaphysics behind the more
commonsensical understanding she believes one needs to exercise the virtues in the realm
of reproduction.
Accordingtothetheoryofpersonhood,whichderivesprimarilyfromKant,thecapacity
for rationality and self-consciousness are the properties by virtue of which anyone is a
member of the moral community with rights and duties. Other accounts of personhood
emphasizetheseandotherintellectualcapacities,e.g.,touseacomplexlanguage,totakean
14This claim that the pre-embryo is a potential human being is contentious and arguably wrong for two
reasons. First, as Carson Strong argues, the pre-embryo divides and develops into the placenta, amnion,
chlorion,andembryo-disk.Onlythelatter,onceitdevelopsintocellsorganizedaroundtheprimitivestreak
at 14 days, becomesthe embryo proper. Strongborrows the distinction betweenpotential to produceand
potentialtobecome,wherebyonlythelatterpreservesidentity,fromStephenBuckle(1988),pp.230–233.
Strong then concludes that the fertilized cell has the potential to produce an embryo (and, hence, a self-
conscious being), a placenta, etc.; but not the potential to become an embryo (Strong 1997, p. 460).
Secondly,thelackofdifferentiationinthepre-primitivestreakconceptusmakestwinningpossible(Korein
1997,p.14).Theconceptushasthepotentialtoproduceoneormoreembryos.Hence,Hursthouse’sclaim
shouldbemodifiedasfollows:theembryo-fetus(fromtheformationoftheprimitivestreak)isapotential
humanbeing.
Failuretorefineherclaimissymptomaticofhermethodtoapplyavirtueframeworkwithouttheaidof
obscurebiologicalfactsoracademicmetaphysicswithitsinsistencethatadefiniteindividualhumanmust
havebodilyintegrityandcontinuityaswellasunitythroughtime.
Hursthouse’sVirtueEthicsandAbortion:AbortionEthicswithoutMetaphysics? 59
interest in one’s future. Accordingly, a fetus is not a person and, thus, lacks moral status;
and, hence, abortion is intrinsically morally neutral. Furthermore, a baby is not a person
either.15Hence,partlybecausethistheoryfallsafoulofordinarymoralconsciousnessinits
implication that infanticide is (at least intrinsically) morally neutral, Hursthouse rejects it
(Hursthouse 1987, pp. 64, 99–101).16
Hursthousealsoconsiderstheviewthatthefetusquapotentialpersonhassome(partial)
moral status, albeit lower than that of actual persons. Indeed, she does not deny that the
fetus is a potential person (Hursthouse 1987, pp. 72–78, 85–86). However, since she has
serious objections to the central tenet of personhood theory, i.e., that one has full moral
status if and only if one is a person, she rejects the potential personhood view which
presupposes it.
For Hursthouse, the concept of ‘person’ omits a host of morally relevant features of
typical adult humans such as our characteristic responses to the world, emotions, and
temptationsaswellaswhatwetendtofindenjoyable,satisfying,painful,ordisappointing.
It also implies nothing about our attitudes or relationships to others—that humans are
social, sociable, and empathetic beings; that we reproduce sexually; that we tend to want
friends,lovers,andchildren;thattoreachmanyofourgoalsweneedtoworktogether;etc.
We do not merely have an intellectual capacity to communicate via language, we have a
characteristicurgetorespondto,andcommunicatewith,others(Hursthouse1987,pp.226,
249–251). We would not be able to apply many of our moral concepts to persons if they
lacked these non-intellectual dispositions or had radically different ones. For instance, we
couldnotmakesenseofwhatwouldcountascallousorcrueltreatmentofalienpersonsif
theydidnotexperiencephysicalandmentalpainorhadverydifferenttypicalresponsesto
them. ‘Human being,’ not ‘person,’ is the significant category to ground full moral status
(Hursthouse 1987, pp. 251–255).
Humans also have a life-expectancy and a life-cycle with stages from infancy through
childhood, adolescence, and then the major stage of adulthood. Adults reach intellectual
maturity (on which person-theorists focus) as well as emotionalmaturity and,ideally, lead
thegoodlifebyexercisingvirtues andwisdomaboutlife.Indeed,theworktheconceptof
‘person’ was devised to do—to articulate the features of full moral agency and
responsibility, which separate normal adult humans from young children and other
animals—is better done by the concept of ‘human being during the major stage’
(Hursthouse 1987, pp. 255–258).
Thepreanalyticbeliefthathumanbeingshaveintrinsicvaluegiveswaytotheviewthat
membersofhomosapiensoranyotherspecieswiththemorallyrelevantfeaturesofhuman
nature—social, emotional, intellectual capacities; characteristic tendencies, including
appetites; physical vulnerabilities; and the major stage of psychological maturity—would
bemembersofourmoralcommunity.Anyhumanbeingormemberofarelevantlysimilar
species has intrinsic value and, thus, a significant right to life (Hursthouse 1987, pp. 249–
258, esp., p. 249).
Furthermore,thezygote-embryo-fetusisbestconceivedasapotentialhumanbeing,i.e.,
anorganismwhichwill“ofitsownaccord”(givenitsintrinsicconstitution)developintoa
human being, barring external intervention. From conception, the fertilized cell has the
15Current developmental psychology locates the onset of self-awareness and the use of self-referential
languagebetween15and18months,wellintotoddlerhood(Korein1997,p.27).
16Here, Hursthouse has a series of Michael Tooley’s articles on abortion, beginning with “Abortion and
Infanticide”(1972)andhisbookAbortionandInfanticide,1983,primarilyinmind(Hursthouse1987,pp.
107–129).
60 R.J.Kornegay
capacity todevelop intoanactual humanbeing.‘Beinga potentialhuman being’doesnot
meanhavingthechancetobecomeahumanbeing,achancethatcouldbelost,e.g.,byan
embryo’sbeing extracted for research purposes. Only a human zygote-embryo-fetus that
was genetically defective such that it could not survive to term would fail to be a
potential human being (Hursthouse 1987, pp. 80–81, 85–86). Although the fetus qua
potential human being has lower moral status than an actual human being (Hursthouse
1987,pp.72–73),Hursthouseinsists“...asapotentialhumanbeing,itismorallyunique,
and hence ... abortion is, as it were, especially special, in being the killing of such a
being” (Hursthouse 1987, p. 205).
Hence, for Hursthouse, there are two momentous processes. There is the creation of a
potential human being, which she explicitly designates as conception. Then there is the
emergenceofanactualhumanbeingfromamerelypotentialone,aboutthetimingofwhich
her views must be ferreted out.
ItisclearthattheneonateisanactualhumanbeingforHursthouse.Sheneverchallenges
the view that infanticide is intrinsically and seriously wrong. Indeed, she employs it to
reject the personhood approach to abortion, as stated above.
But does Hursthouse believe birth marks the emergence of the fetus-infant as an actual
human being? One can make the case that she does. Hursthouse writes, “... my own view
on the moral status ofthe fetus isthat, asa potential human being,it ismorally unique...”
(Hursthouse1987,p.205).Moreover,indelineatingtheargumentforthepotentialityview,
she writes, “It begins with the premise that the fertilized ovum, unlike the unfertilized
ova and sperm, is a potential human being. It then adds the gradual development
premise that, working forwards from conception through the various stages, there is no
point at which we can say ‘Now it is an actual human being’ until the baby is born”
(Hursthouse 1987, p. 74).17
However, there are reasons to believe that Hursthouse does not accept the potentiality
view in its entirety. After the last quoted passage, she immediately continues, “It [the
argument] is of course open to the by now familiar objections to taking birth as a cut-off
pointandalsototheobjectionabouttheargument’svalidity(thatevenifthereisnopointat
which we can say ‘Here the foetus changed from being a potential to an actual human
being’, nevertheless it may be true that a 2-day-old embryo is (merely) a potential human
being and an 8-month-old foetus is an actual one...” (Hursthouse 1987, p. 74).
Furthermore, in criticizing “the extreme liberal position,” Hursthouse mounts the
following reduction ad absurdum on the view of birth as an absolute threshold. If birth
marked a significant change in moral status, then the differential status between a
premature, 7-month infant in an incubator and a 7-month-old viable fetus in utero would
have to be a function of where each was living. However, according to Hursthouse, it is
absurd to believe status could depend on where something happens to be located
(Hursthouse 1987, p. 34). Her argument rests on the implied premise that moral status is
solelyafunctionoftheintrinsicpropertiesoftheindividual,apremiseshealsoemploysin
two similarly structured arguments (Hursthouse 1987, pp. 46, 52–53).
TheseobjectionsindicateHursthouse’sdissatisfactionwiththepotentialityview’sclaim
thatthelate-stagefetusismerelyapotentialhumanbeing.ItseemsHursthousewouldonly
fully accept a modified version of the potentiality view that was consistent with the
attribution of actual humanity to the late-stage fetus of around 7 months.
17Thiscasewasputtomebyananonymousrefereeforthisjournal,whomIthankforpressingmetomake
thecaseformyalternativeinterpretationofHursthouse’sview.