Hunger and the Sword: Warfare and Food Supply in Roman Republican Wars (264-30 B.C.) PDF
Preview Hunger and the Sword: Warfare and Food Supply in Roman Republican Wars (264-30 B.C.)
HUNGERANDTHESWORD Google Original from Digitized by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN DUTCH MONOGRAPHS ON ANCIENT HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY , EDITORS H.W. PLEKET - F.J.A.M. MEIJER VOLUMEXX P. ERDKAMP HUNGER AND THE SWORD Google Original from Digitized by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PAUL ERO.KAMP -- _,, ., ,.---- ; .... . -- , HUNGER AND THE SWORD WARFARE AND FOOD SUPPLY IN ROMAN REPUBLICAN WARS (264 - 30 B.C.) J.C. GIESEN, PUBLISHER AMSTERDAM 1998 Google Original from Digitized by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN j ) 6-- 69 13 . E I -- No pail of this book may be translated or reproduced in any fonn, by print, photoprint, microfilm~~y other means, without wrillen pcnnission from the publisher. © by P. Erdkamp, 1998 / .Printed in The Netherlands / ISBN 90 5063 608 X Google Original from Digitized by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CONTENTS Acknowledgements. Introduction. 1 Part One, Chapter One. Supplying annies. Problems and methods. 11 Chapter Two. The soldier's rations. 27 Chapter Three. Magazines and transport. 46 Chapter Four. The means of acquisition 84 Chapter Five. Living off the land. 122 Chapter Six. Food supply and strategy. 141 Chapter Seven. Logistical restraints. A case-study of the Second Punic War in Italy. 156 Part Two. Chapter Eight. Civilian food supply in the ancient world. 188 Google Original from Digitized by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Chapter Nine. Agricultural production in times of war. 208 Chapter Ten. Food supply and survival in times of war. 241 Chapter Eleven. Population and recovery. A case-study of the Second Puoic War in Italy. 270 Conclusions. 2'17 Bibliography. 305 Samenvatting. 325 Maps. Gaul 107 Spain 131 Greece and Macedon 143 Italy and Sicily 157 Google Original from Digitized by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Acknowledgements Many friends, scholars, and colleagues have been generous in their support and encouragement, foremost my promotores L. de Blois and J.S. Richardson (University of Edinburgh) and my co-promotor Th. Engelen. I owe special thanks to J.S. Richardson, who kindly undertook the task of correcting my English. Needless to say, any slips of grammar or spelling which remain are exlusively mine. Those who have read and offered advice on the manuscript or specific parts of it at one stage or another, apart from my promotores and co-promotor, include E. Badian (Harvard, Cambridge Mass.), G. Lewis (University of Edinburgh), L. de Ligt (Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht), J.A. Lynn (University of Illinois, Urbana), F. Millar (Brasenose College, Oxford), H.W. Picket (Rijksuniversiteit Leiden) and C.R. Whittaker (Churchill College, Cambridge). I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to all of them, and to those who are not mentioned for reasons of brevity, but whose assistance is appreciated not less. This work could not have been written without the generous financial support of the Netherlands Organiz:ation for Scientific Research (NWO). Funding for the early stages of the research leading to this book was provided by the Reiman-de Bas Fonds, Stichting Dr. C.L. van Steeden Foods, and Stichting Wilcordia. These organiz:ations provided me with the opportunity to make use of the excellent facilities of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, the University of Edinburgh, and Brasenose College, Oxford. Finally I want to thank my parents for teaching me the value of a good education, and express my gratitude to my wife Shirley for her helpfulness and continuing patience, and for her refreshing lack of interest in Roman history. Google Original from Digitized by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Google Original from Digitized by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Introduction. Roman wars, like those of later times, took place in a landscape - a landscape not only consisting of moUJ1taios, plains and rivers, but also of men tilling the soil, travelling across sea or land, or employing other means in their struggle for survival (and even happiness). This book undertakes to examine Roman wars in this context of the natural and human environment. Roman warfare is generally examined from the viewpoint of the ancient authors on whose narratives our understanding depends. As a consequence, however, Roman wars seem to have become events that took place on the pages of a book rather than in the environment of the Mediterranean world. The way Roman wars were fought was determined by the geography and climate of the Mediterranean peninsulas, by the ecological restraints on agriculture and transport, and by the economic and social structures of the society of which the armies were a significant part. This book relates warfare to one of the main conditions of survival: it examines on the one band the food supply of the many thousand'> that manned the Roman armies, and oo the other the impact of war on the food supply of those people not waging war. Ao examination of the military food supply makes clear that the ecological factor bad not been overcome, as can be seen most clearly from the fact that in most of their campaigns the Rnmaos had to abort their operations at the approach of winter and bad to retreat to winter-quarters, where they awaited the return of conditions that would allow their large armies to be sustained securely while fighting their foes. The Greek Polybius once remarked on the extraordinary tenaciousness of both sides during the Roman campaigns in Spain. Only the approach of winter, he says, could disrupt the continuous fighting.' Though the necessity of feeding thousands of people under often hazardous circumstances was not the only aspect of the seasonality of war, it was the major element to impose limits on the generals' plans. On the other band, when an advantage over their enemy could be gained, generals would undertake operations at the fringe of the logistically possible. The seasonality of war and the limitations placed oo campaigns, as well as the accounts of armies threatened by starvation, show that warfare can not adequately be explained without atteotioo to the armies' food supply. The generals of Antiquity understood very well that an adequate food supply could never be taken for granted. The precariousness of the army's provisionment often made it a welcome target for the adversary's actions. For example, Plutarch informs us that during bis campaigns against Mithridates (73-67 B.C.), "Lucullus was oot waging war merely for the show, but, as the saying goes, was kicking in the belly". The fourth century author Vegetius told bis readers: "to distress the enemy more by famine than the sword is a mark of consummate skill.• It even was a well-known saying, we are told, that more succumbed to hunger than to the sword.2 Tactical strength often was a precondition for successful provisioning, and the limitations posed by logistics could 1 Polybius 35. I. 2 Plutarch, Luc. 11,l; Vegetius, Epit. 3.3; 3.26. I Google Original from Digitized by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN decide between defeat and victory. The problems of army logistics should be situated against the background of the production and distribution of food in Graeco-Roman society as a whole. Historians are increasingly realizing the importance of food supply in the existence of the population of Antiquity. The production and distribution of food in the Graeco-Roman world could guarantee most people no more than a precarious existence between abundance and hunger, the result of man-made disruption as well as the natural insecurities governing agriculture and transportation. This precariousness gave rise to many cropping techniques and social strategies, the purpose of which was to alleviate risk, and which shaped agriculture and the social relations of the ancient rural society. Even if these mechanisms were often successful in warding off individual starvation, most people felt continuously threatened in their survival. When harvest failures were widespread or disturbance of distribution prolonged, the coping mechanisms failed and famine was inevitable. Producers would store food as a precaution against bad years, but they did not always have control over their production, and thus the balancing out of occasional gluts and shortages was not always successful. Also the compensation of regional differences often proved difficult, since the obstacles posed by the landscape had to be overcome by largely animal- and wind-powered transportation. In such a precarious situation, access to food is best when it is as direct as possible, as is witnessed by the general emphasis in Antiquity on autarky. The food supply of the groups within society who depended for their sustenance oo the production of others was easily disturbed even at best of times. Accordingly, the sheer existence of ancient cities and towns was based on economic, social and political rights, which had to stabilize their access to food. These structures are at the heart of a major discussion in current ancient economic history, concerning the validity for Antiquity of the concept of the 'consumer city'. Because of their size Roman armies were like mobile cities, moving across the ancient natural landscape, and having their peculiar place in the economic and social environment of the Roman world. Warfare is usually seen as an external factor in the food supply, upsetting and disturbing a precarious balance, thus leilding to shortage and even famine. Rightly so, ooe may add. The sources on ancient wars often paint a bleak picture of armies ravaging fields, plundering stores, burning farm houses, and driving away livestock, thus leading to flight and starvation. A healthy scepticism towards our sources should not lead us to reject such a picture a priori. When analyzing the risk-management strategies of the producers against shortage and famine, it is necessary to distinguish between natural and man-made disruptions of agricultural production. Cropping strategies that were aimed at minimizing the risk of harvest-failure were ineffective against plundering and ravaging armies. War shaped its own set of circumstances in which to judge the usefulness of alleviating measures. By disrupting production and distribution, and by draining off all powers of resilience, wars often caused famine, a situation that was aggravated by the dislocation of the economy as a result of war. In addition, flight and malnutrition stimulated the rise of epidemic diseases, thus leading to temporary depopulation. Ancient authors were not exaggerating when describing wars as dreadful catastrophes. However, warfare and the mechanisms to sustain the military effort should also be seen as elements within the structures of society. Roman armies had become a constant 2 Google Original from Digitized by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
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