Humanity without dignity: moral equality, respect, and human rights

321 Pages·2017·15.349 MB·English

by  Sangiovanni, Andrea

HUMANITY WITHOUT DIGNITY

Humanity Dignity
without
Moral Equality, Respect, and Human Rights
AndreA SAngiovAnni
Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England
2017
per i cicci
Copyright © 2017 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of Amer i ca
First printing
Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Names: Sangiovanni, Andrea, author.
Title: Humanity without dignity : moral equality, re spect, and human rights /
Andrea Sangiovanni.
Description: Cambridge, Mas sa chu setts : Harvard University Press, 2017. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016046030 | ISBN 9780674049215 (alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Equality— Philosophy. | Human rights— Philosophy. |
Dignity— Philosophy.
Classification: LCC HM821 .S17 2017 | DDC 305— dc23
LC rec ord available at https:// lccn. loc. gov /2 016046030
Cover art: Sacking and Red, 1954, Alberto Burri (1915-1995). © Fondazione Palazzo Albizzini
Collezione Burri, Città di Castello (Perugia) / DACS 2016. Photograph © Tate, London 2016.
Cover design by Lisa Roberts
CONTENTS
Preface ix
Introduction 1
Guide for the Reader • 6
A Note on Methodology • 7
PART I. FOUNDATIONS
1 Against Dignity 13
Desiderata • 14
The Aristocratic Tradition • 16
The Christian Tradition • 27
The Kantian Tradition • 36
The Regress Reading • 37
The Address Reading • 50
The Distinction between Basic Moral Status and Equal
Moral Status • 60
vi Contents
2 Moral Equality, Re spect, and Cruelty 72
Treating as Inferior • 73
Cruelty • 75
Res pect • 86
Consent • 99
Variation and Status • 100
Punishment • 110
Conclusion • 112
3 When and Why Is Discrimination Wrong? 113
The Concept of Discrimination • 116
Discrimination and Social Meanings • 120
Demeaning and Disrespecting • 129
A Fresh Start: The Expressive Harm Account • 131
Stigma and Dehumanization in Racial Discrimination • 133
Reverse Discrimination • 138
Infantilization, Objectification, and Instrumentalization
in Sex Discrimination • 139
Infantilization • 140
Objectification and Instrumentalization • 149
Indirect Discrimination • 160
PART II. HUMAN RIGHTS
4 The Concept of Human Rights: The Broad View 177
Desiderata • 178
Against Orthodox Views • 180
Against Po liti cal Views • 186
A Merely Verbal Disagreement • 190
The Broad View • 191
The Concept • 191
The Diversity That Stands between Concept and Conception • 194
Avoiding Merely Verbal Disagreement • 200
How Does the CSBV Help to Satisfy the Four Desiderata? • 203
The Subclass Desideratum • 203
The Fidelity Desideratum • 203
Contents vii
The Normativity and Determinacy Desiderata • 205
Conclusion • 205
5 International Legal Human Rights and Equal
Moral Status 207
A Defense of the Grounding View • 212
The Obligation to Establish and Maintain an International Legal
Human Rights System • 220
The Duty of Reciprocal Protection and International Legal
Human Rights • 229
Looking Ahead • 233
6 Fundamental Rights, Indivisibility, and Hierarchy
among Human Rights 235
Basic Rights • 235
Fundamental Rights • 240
Indivisibility and Hierarchy among Human Rights • 246
Notes 257
References 289
Index 303

PREFACE
“Humanity” has two sets of meanings. The first refers to the h uman
race, or to t hose attributes that make us, as h uman beings, distinctive.
The second refers to a virtue—a cting with humanity.1 This book argues
that to understand our commitment to moral equality, we must seek an
account of humanity as a virtue rather than as a property. We treat
each other as moral equals, I claim, when we treat each other with hu-
manity. On this view, treating another as inferior is wrong when and
because it is inhuman, a kind of cruelty, rather than b ecause it over-
looks a special worth, or dignity, that, like “a jewel . . . shines by itself.”2
We re spect another’s equal moral status not when we bow before their
capacity to choose in accordance with reason, but when we recognize the
vulnerability to which they are subject as beings who must, as Rousseau
remarks, “live in the eyes of others.”3
I have spent many years thinking through t hese issues. I am not sure I
have gotten them right, but I have many people to thank for preventing
me from going too far astray, and who have, along the way, given me not
only invaluable advice and criticism but also encouragement and warmth.
I would like to thank Chuck Beitz, Duncan Bell, Colin Bird, Jude Browne,
Ian Car ter, Emanuela Ceva, Rowan Cruft, Sylvie Delacroix, Tom Dough-
erty, Daniel Elstein, Sarah Fine, Miranda Fricker, Pablo Gilabert, Ulrike