Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics

303 Pages·1995·1.22 MB·English

by  Susan E. Waltz

Preferred Citation: Waltz, Susan E. Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North
African Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1995 1995.
http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft2t1nb1vf/
Human Rights and Reform
Changing the Face of North African Politics
Susan E. Waltz
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
Berkeley · Los Angeles · Oxford
© 1995 The Regents of the University of California
Preferred Citation: Waltz, Susan E. Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North
African Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1995 1995.
http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft2t1nb1vf/
― vii ―
PREFACE
The North African states of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria had all won political
independence by 1962, but this did not usher in the halcyon days many had
dreamed of and hoped for. Over the past thirty years, governments or their
agents have been responsible for blatantly contrived political trials,
"disappearances," political assassinations, and the torture and imprisonment
of opponents. Human rights practices raised concern both at home and
abroad, and in the late 1970s, individuals from within the region began to
organize national human rights groups. This book is an effort to tell their
story and understand their place in North African politics.
"Human rights" is often framed as a moral issue of vital concern to those
with humanitarian or idealistic interests but only marginally related to the
world of politics, where interest in order, security, and power prevails. That
is not my approach. My understanding is that all human rights activists have
an interest in the way power is used, and human rights groups in North
Africa, the Maghrib, are essentially political actors. They are different from
other kinds of political actors, however, in that they neither vie for spoils
within the political system nor attempt to overthrow that system. Rather,
they work from within a recognized game of national politics to change its
operating rules. Neither saints nor revolutionaries, they are political actors
with a stake in the system, seeking reform.
This book is thus a comparative study of North African politics in the second
half of the twentieth century, viewed from the perspective of an important,
but understudied, set of political actors. The analysis of their efforts and
speculation about their impact depends, not simply on their own actions or
the responses they have elicited from those in power, but also on the
historical and cultural context in which they operate. Accordingly, a
substantial portion of the book is devoted to an analysis of national
― viii ―
politics that takes into account the power of both state and society. In each
case I have traced political structures back to a precolonial period, both to
combat enduring misconceptions that political life in North Africa began with
the arrival of the French and to emphasize the very deep roots of certain
political patterns. Deeply seated structures serve as both context and target
for the work of human rights groups; moreover, they condition the
strategies developed by the groups themselves.
Current academic interests in democratization and social movements provide
some of the conceptual underpinnings of my analysis. This book is a product
of its time both in terms of the concepts it uses and the phenomenon it
studies. Scholarship generally follows the march of history, and in due
course the academic interests that frame the study will fade. Indeed,
developments in eastern Europe and the former soviet republics have
already caused enthusiasm for democratization to wane, and students of the
Middle East are now less sanguine about prospects of democratization in that
region than they were even a few years ago. Recognizing that events will in
time overtake this book, I would point readers to the questions it raises
about the nature of political structures and the way they are shaped and
transformed. This, I believe, will be its most enduring feature. In writing this
book I hope to record an important moment in North African history, but it is
also my intent to offer a comparative view of political developments and to
present an analytical framework that will accommodate a long view of
politics in the Maghrib.
My analysis and conclusions are critical of contemporary leaders and policies
they have pursued, but I do not intend the book to be hostile. In the course
of writing it, I have come to appreciate the difficulties of political
restructuring for all concerned. Set patterns are not easily altered, and
power is not readily surrendered, or shared, by those who hold it. Nor should
it necessarily be. Political philosophers have long wrestled with questions
about who should hold political power, and a case can be made even for the
despot or an oligarchical class that makes difficult political decisions to
ensure stability and enhance prosperity. But power is also seductive. Lord
Acton is so often quoted because the truth he offered resonates with
experience: power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Despite
legal commitments to the contrary, North African leaders have not refrained
from abusing the powers they hold.
In the preparation of this book I have incurred many debts, the oldest of
which is an intellectual debt to John McCamant. Long before it was
intellectually fashionable, he asked questions about human rights,
repression, dominance, and resistance. I was fortunate to be his student. At
about
― ix ―
the same time, Charles Micaud introduced me to the Maghrib, and I also
wish to acknowledge at the outset the impact that has had on my life. Over
the past twenty years, North Africans have taught me much about
compassion, generosity, duty, and the depth of human connection; my life is
richer for having crossed theirs.
In writing the book I owe the greatest debt to participants in the North
African human rights movement themselves. In trips to the region or as they
visited the United States, from 1989 to 1993, I interviewed more than two
dozen individuals actively involved in the creation and/or the continuing
function of Maghribi groups. Some spoke guardedly; others were more
candid in their assessment of the human rights movement and its place in
politics. Collectively, those I interviewed provided rich insights, without
which the book would undoubtedly have taken a different direction. It is thus
with regret that I have decided not to acknowledge them by name in these
pages or to cite interviews with them in the text. Many of these individuals
are quite prominent in political life and relatively immune to persecution, and
in any case are willing to assume risks. Some would surely appreciate
recognition. Others, though, are more vulnerable, and I wish to avoid
making their lives more difficult. As I write, many human rights activists in
Algeria live in fear of their lives; a member of the Moroccan Association of
Human Rights was tried and convicted for crimes of opinion in 1993; and in
Tunisia human rights lawyers who have defended Islamists are followed by
plainclothesmen, and their telephone lines are monitored. Activists in
international human rights organizations are less subject to such pressures,
so I very gratefully acknowledge here an interview accorded me by Maître
Daniel Jacoby, president of the International Federation of Human Rights,
and the assistance in locating documents and verifying facts extended to me
by researchers at Amnesty International's International Secretariat and
Maryam Elahi at AIUSA's Washington office.
Universities make research of this sort possible, and at various stages
Florida International University made generous contributions to the research
and writing effort, as did the Office of International Studies and Programs at
Michigan State University while I was on sabbatical leave in 1991–92. The
American Institute for Maghrib Studies supported some of my travel to North
Africa, and I have been grateful for the periodic use of its research facilities
at the Centre d'études maghrébines à Tunis. I have also benefited from the
support of a wide circle of friends, family, and colleagues, and regret not
being able to mention them all by name. I would, however, like to
acknowledge the contributions of Karen Dainer-Best, Darden Pyron, and
Ralph Clem, who provided encouragement at critical mo-
― x ―
ments along the way. Miraan Sa, Jody Pavilack, Dan Pierce, and Cheryl
Grimshaw helped prepare the manuscript, and I am grateful for their able
assistance. For their comments on individual chapters or the entire
manuscript, I am indebted to Damian Fernandez, Ann Mayer, Jill Crystal,
John Ruedy, Henry Munson, Liz Hodgkin, John McCamant, Marguerite
Rollinde, Nicholas Onuf, and Mohiaddin Mesbahi. Their insights and
suggestions strengthened both the analysis and its presentation. Any
remaining errors and omissions are, of course, my responsibility alone.
The costs of writing this book have been borne primarily by two people, Jack
Smith and Dan Pierce. Dan's wisdom and understanding by far exceed his
years; I am grateful for His patience, his impatience, and his readiness to
celebrate. As my partner, Jack has been a thoughtful critic and dear friend
throughout the enterprise; without him, quite simply, this book would never
have been.
― xi ―
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AI Amnesty International
AIS Armée islamique de salut (Army of Islamic Salvation, Algeria)
ALN Armée de libération national (National Liberation Army, Algeria)
AMDH Association marocaine des droits de l'homme (Moroccan Association
of Human Rights)
ANP Armée nationale populaire (National Popular Army, Algeria)
ASDHOM Association pour la défense des droits de l'homme au Maroc
(Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Morocco)
CDT Confédération démocratique des travailleurs (Morocco)
CGT Confédération générale des travailleurs (General Confederation of
Workers, Tunisia)
CNRA Comité national de la révolution algérienne (National Committee of
the Algerian Revolution)
CNS Compagnies nationales de sécurité (National Security Units, Algeria)
CRUA Comité révolutionnaire d'unité et d'action (Revolutionary Committee
of Unity and Action, Algeria)
ENA Etoile nationale algérienne (Algerian National Star)
FDIC Front pour la défense des institutions constitutionnelles (Front for
the Defense of Constitutional Institutions, Morocco)
― xii ―

FFS Front des forces socialistes (Front of Socialist Forces, Algeria)
FIDH Fédération internationale des droits de l'homme (International
Federation of Human Rights)
FIS Front Islamique de Salut (Islamic Salvation Front, Algeria)
FLN Front de libération nationale (National Liberation Front, Algeria)
― xiii ―

(Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties, Algeria)
OADP Organisation pour l'action démocratique et populaire (Organization
of Democratic and Popular Action, Morocco)
OMDH Organisation marocaine des droits de l'homme (Moroccan
Organization of Human Rights)
OS Organisation spéciale (Special Organization, Algeria)
PA Parti d'action (Action Party, Morocco)
PAGS Parti avant-garde socialiste (Avant-Garde Socialist Party, Algeria)
PCM Parti communiste marocain (Moroccan Communist Party)
PDC Parti démocratique constitutionnel (Democratic Constitutional Party,
Morocco)
PDI Parti démocratique et de l'indépendence (Democratic Party of
Independence, Morocco)
PI Parti Istiqlal (Independence Party, Morocco)
PLI Parti des libéraux indépendents (Liberal Independents' Party,
Morocco)
PLS Parti de libération et socialisme (Liberation and Socialism Party,
Morocco)
PND Parti national démocratique (National Democratic Party, Morocco)
PPA Parti du peuple algérien (Algerian People's Party)
PPS Parti du progrès et du socialisme (Party of Progress and Socialism,
Morocco)
PRS Parti de la révolution socialiste (Party of the Socialist Revolution,
Algeria)
PSD Parti destourien socialiste (Socialist Destourian [Constitutional]
Party, Tunisia)
PUP Parti d'unité populaire (Party of Popular Unity, Tunisia)
RCD Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique (Democratic
Constitutional Rally, Tunisia)
RNI Rassemblement national des indépendants (National Rally for
Independence, Morocco)
RSP Rassemblement socialiste progressiste (Socialist Progressive Rally,
Tunisia)
SM Securité militaire (Military Security, Algeria)
― xiv ―

SN Sûreté nationale (National Security, in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco)
SNL Syndicat national des lycéens (National Syndicate of Secondary
Students, Morocco)
UC Union constitutionnelle (Constitutional Union, Morocco)
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UDU Union des démocrates unionistes (Union of Democratic Unionists,
Tunisia)
UGAT Union générale des agriculteurs tunisiens (General Union of Tunisian
Farmers)
UGTT Union générale des travailleurs tunisiens (General Union of Tunisian
Workers)
UNEM Union nationale des étudiants marocains (National Union of
Moroccan Students)
― 1 ―
PART I
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
POLITICS OF CHANGE
Politics has been defined as a matter of who gets what, when, and how, and
accordingly, the game of politics may be discussed in terms of the rules that
govern the allocation of political values. Political analysis generally begins
with recognition of the parameters of a political game, and analysts make
their task one of identifying operational rules and the moves that can be
made within their bounds. By definition, "illegal moves" lie beyond the scope
of regular political play and so for the most part escape scrutiny.
That is not to suggest that rules are never challenged. Revolutionary
movements offer only the most dramatic evidence of efforts to change the
rules of the political game. Most systems harbor some players, or would-be
players, who contest existing structures, but more often than not, their
actions are without consequence. Through political repression or legal
constraints they are excluded from play, and the game goes on.
Some players inevitably persist, however, and a combination of contextual
factors that include social and economic conditions, political leadership, the
history of political institutions, and the power of the zeitgeist may carry
reform or revolutionary efforts to fruition. In the 1980s, such possibilities
captured imaginations around the globe. Voices were raised against
authoritarian rule, and repressive governments fell. Scholars wrote tomes on
the process of democratization, which in a fundamental sense involves
changing the rules of the game.
A vision of democratizing reform and expanding possibilities of participation
touched North Africa, as it did other regions, and this book traces the efforts
of one set of actors inspired by the possibilities of structural transformation.
Human rights groups in North Africa have spearheaded a democratization
movement, but ironically, their efforts have not received
― 2 ―
the attention they merit. Their position in the game of politics, whether as
monitors or as challengers of the rules, puts them beyond a scope of vision
focused on established structures and conventional players. Human rights
activists have not been conventional players, but their contribution to the
North African games of politics has been substantial. Part I of this book
develops an analytical framework that allows their efforts to come into focus.
― 3 ―
1
Introduction
Attention to the possibility of democratic transformation that has gripped
scholars in recent years initially swept unnoticing past the Middle East. In
consequence, interesting developments in Middle Eastern societies were
neglected. Although the region as a whole remains characterized by
authoritarian rule, by the late 1980s there was evidence of a growing
concern about the linkage between governed and governors.[1] In
November 1989, Jordan held its first full legislative election in more than
twenty years. The popularly chosen parliament began to exercise atrophied
muscle by investigating allegations of corruption in government agencies,
referring several of them for judicial investigation. Following dissolution of
the Kuwaiti parliament in 1986, Kuwait saw a popular expansion of its
diwaniyya , a system of informal networks that generally promoted the
sharing of interests within occupation groups. Diwaniyyas in the late 1980s
evolved into political fora where the "guest audience" frequently numbered
in the hundreds. Parliament was restored in 1992, and the new legislature
promptly formed a human rights committee. In Egypt, associational life
began to expand, and the concerns of intellectual critics increasingly found
voice.[2] Within the greater Middle East, democratization seemed in the late
1980s to stand its best chance in the Maghrib, where the forced departure of
Tunisia's President Habib Bourguiba focused attention on political problems,
and where just a year later, turmoil provoked by economic crisis called the
viability of Algeria's social contract into question. Expectations of
democratization were raised high across the region.
In the interim, the euphoria has waned; skepticism has in large measure
replaced the optimism of the late 1980s. All the same, societal pressures for
democratization remain stronger than at any time in the recent past. Among
elites in and out of power, questions of structural change still pro-
― 4 ―
voke animated debate. Into the 1990s, across the Maghrib, small groups of
individuals, most of them professionals, found themselves meeting in homes
or restaurants specifically to discuss matters of public policy and political
action. Their relatively quiet, but persistent, efforts to effect liberalizing
political change merit close examination. It is to such efforts that this book
directs attention.
Efforts, of course, are not to be confused with results. Regardless of
expressed concerns and accompanying efforts, democratic transition is far
from a certain outcome in the contemporary Maghrib. Many forces are at
work, and the ventures of democratically oriented elites are only one among
them. An eventual transition is far from assured, but likewise, it cannot be
precluded. From the vantage of this book, the outcome of the present
ambiguous situation is less critical than understanding pressures for
structural change and how they are articulated. Even the truncated stories of
failed or incomplete transitions can reveal much about the impetus for
structural reform. Studies of accomplished democratic transitions have
pointed up weak areas in our understanding of the process by which change
is initiated. Little is known, for example, of the tactical decisions made by
opposition elites, who in many situations have provided the impulse and the
framework for democratization. As useful as it is to identify the conditions
under which their actions are likely to be successful, of equal relevance are
the factors that make them decide to act. An investigation of the exertions of
opposition elites as actions are planned and executed affords a different
perspective than that presented in post hoc studies of achieved transitions.
Retrospective studies that project backward from successful transitions may
screen out false starts and negative outcomes. Such an approach is
appropriate when the focus is on the success of structural transformation; it
necessarily yields fewer insights into the impetus for action that initiates a
transition and carries it forward. A close-up, in situ view offers an
opportunity to observe crafting in progress and apply analytic tools to help
understand the process of democratization.
What is to be understood as "democracy" in a region where there are few
indigenous referents? Even in the abstract, consideration of democratization
is problematic, for the meaning of the word democracy itself is subject to
dispute. The historical evolution of democracy and democratic theory from
classical Athens to the contemporary period has given rise to a variety of
governmental forms and theoretical models. With choices as extreme as
those represented by Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill, democratic thought is
like a tree with many grafted branches: the varieties of fruit may be only
distantly related. Dominant perspectives alternatively
― 5 ―
emphasize representation and participation, and historical combinations
have been myriad. What at root serve as the common denominator to
different perspectives are twin notions of popular choice and accountability,
although exactly who constitute the responsible citizenry remains at