Human Flourishing and the Dialectic of Happiness

273 Pages·2015·1.36 MB·English

Echoing
 Demystified
 Aspirations:

Human
 Flourishing
 and
 the
 Dialectic
 of
 Happiness

By

Patrick
 Ahern

Dissertation

Submitted
 to
 the
 Faculty
 of
 the

Graduate
 School
 of
 Vanderbilt
 University

in
 partial
 fulfillment
 of
 the
 requirements

for
 the
 degree
 of

Doctor
 of
 Philosophy

In

Philosophy

May,
 2015

Nashville,
 TN

Approved:

Idit
 Dobbs-­‐Weinstein,
 Ph.D.

Gregg
 Horowitz,
 Ph.D.

Jose
 Medina,
 Ph.D.

Andrew
 Cutrofello,
 Ph.D.
Table
 of
 Contents

 Page

DEDICATION……..………………………………………………………………………………………………..iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT…………………………………………………………………………………….......v

CHAPTER

I. Introduction……………………………………………………………....……………………...…1

II. Constructing
 the
 Royal
 Road
 to
 Happiness:
 The
 Case
 of
 Hobbes……….…..24

The
 Physics
 of
 Happiness

Hobbesian
 Individual
 and
 Displacements
 of
 Power

Passions
 and
 the
 Science
 of
 Politics

The
 Construction
 of
 the
 Commonwealth

The
 Paradoxes
 of
 Hobbesian
 Happiness

III. Spinoza’s
 Happiness:
 Beatitude
 and
 the
 Economy
 of
 Affect………….……….90

Beatitudo
 as
 the
 Greatest
 Happiness

Happiness,
 Joy,
 and
 the
 Power
 of
 the
 Affects

Constructing
 the
 Politics
 of
 Happiness:
 Multitude,
 Transindividuality,

and
 State
 Power

The
 Free
 State
 and
 the
 Economy
 of
 Affect

The
 Most
 “Natural”
 State,
 or
 the
 Most
 Absolute
 Power

IV. Marx’s
 Critical
 Relation
 to
 Happiness:
 Ambivalence,
 Sacrifice,
 and

Revolutionary
 Possibilities………………………………………………………….148

 Marxian
 Practice
 and
 the
 Poetics
 of
 Production

 The
 Science
 of
 Emancipation

 The
 Myth
 of
 Origins
 and
 the
 Commodification
 of
 Labor

 Revolutionary
 Chasm
 and
 the
 Materiality
 of
 Time

 Conjunctures
 of
 Unhappiness

 Revolutionary
 Constellations
 and
 Happiness

V. Decayed
 Bodies,
 Redeemed
 Past:
 Adorno,
 Benjamin,
 and
 the
 Deformation

of
 Happiness……………………………………………………………………………..224

 Costly
 Flights

 A
 Tiger’s
 Leap

 Kafka’s
 Cough

 Hunchback’s
 Perspective

ii
VI. Epilogue…………………………………………………………………………………………..253

REFERENCES...................................................................................................................................262

iii
To
 mom
 and
 dad

To
 loving
 Katie

and

To
 Natalie
 and
 Jane,
 who
 remind
 me
 daily
 that
 laughter
 and
 fun
 is
 also
 a
 central
 part

of
 substantial
 happiness

iv
Acknowledgements

This
 work
 would
 not
 have
 been
 possible
 without
 the
 financial
 support
 of
 the

Vanderbilt
 Philosophy
 Department
 and
 the
 Graduate
 School
 of
 Vanderbilt

University.
 I
 am
 grateful
 to
 my
 professors
 and
 peers
 with
 whom
 I
 have
 had
 the

fortune
 of
 working
 and
 learning
 during
 my
 time
 at
 Vanderbilt.

  I
 am
 grateful
 to
 the
 members
 of
 my
 dissertation
 committee
 who
 have
 taken

the
 time
 to
 engage
 with
 my
 work.
 I
 owe
 a
 debt
 of
 gratitude
 to
 Gregg
 Horowitz
 for
 his

close
 reading
 and
 critical
 engagement
 with
 my
 work.

 In
 the
 dialogue
 he
 generated

with
 my
 work,
 he
 has
 offered
 an
 exemplary
 model
 of
 what
 it
 means
 to
 be
 a
 careful

and
 critical
 reader.
 I
 would
 especially
 like
 to
 thank
 my
 philosophical
 mentor
 and

dissertation
 advisor,
 Idit
 Dobbs-­‐Weinstein.
 She
 has
 challenged
 me
 to
 think

historically,
 and
 for
 that
 I
 am
 eternally
 grateful.

  I
 would
 like
 to
 thank
 my
 parents,
 who
 have
 been
 infinitely
 supportive
 my

desire
 to
 follow
 my
 passion
 for
 philosophy.
 And
 last,
 but
 certainly
 not
 least,
 I
 would

like
 to
 thank
 Katie
 for
 her
 loving
 support
 and
 patience.

v
Chapter
 One

Introduction

The
 question
 of
 the
 possibility
 or
 even
 the
 concern
 for
 human
 happiness
 has

proven
 to
 be
 a
 point
 of
 contention
 for
 political
 thinkers
 confronting
 the
 ideological

injunction
 to
 “be
 happy”
 in
 the
 face
 of
 material
 conditions
 that
 stifle
 the
 capacity
 for

human
 flourishing.
 It
 can
 be
 argued
 that
 the
 appeal
 to
 human
 happiness
 as
 a

political
 norm
 occludes
 as
 much
 as
 it
 may
 reveal,
 and
 that
 the
 cult
 of
 happiness
 is

the
 domain
 of
 the
 internalized
 oppressor,
 severing
 the
 avenues
 of
 self-­‐reflection,

social
 critique,
 or
 political
 praxis.
 Simone
 de
 Beauvoir,
 in
 her
 defense
 of
 addressing

the
 issue
 of
 liberty
 over
 happiness,
 expresses
 such
 a
 concern
 when
 she
 writes,
 “It
 is

not
 clear
 what
 the
 word
 happy
 really
 means
 and
 still
 less
 what
 true
 values
 it
 may

mask.
 There
 is
 no
 measuring
 the
 happiness
 of
 others,
 and
 it
 is
 always
 easy
 to

describe
 as
 happy
 the
 situation
 in
 which
 one
 wishes
 to
 place
 them.”1
 Out
 of
 a

concern
 for
 the
 struggle
 of
 women’s
 liberation,
 de
 Beauvoir
 views
 the
 topic
 of

happiness
 as
 regressive,
 giving
 itself
 over
 to
 un-­‐reflexive
 and
 positivistic
 impulses,

thus
 reinforcing
 the
 authority
 of
 oppressive
 power
 structures.
 These
 concerns
 are

well
 founded,
 especially
 in
 light
 of
 the
 most
 predominant
 iterations
 of
 happiness
 in

the
 form
 of
 utilitarian
 ethics
 and
 the
 ‘cult
 of
 happiness’
 founded
 within
 fetishized

consumer
 culture.
 The
 deceptive
 character
 of
 the
 evaluation
 of
 the
 concept
 of

happiness
 as
 a
 feeling,
 particularly
 amongst
 subjects
 immersed
 and
 interpellated

within
 an
 ideological
 field
 that
 reinforces
 the
 interests
 of
 the
 ruling
 powers,
 bears

1
 Simone
 de
 Beauvoir,
 The
 Second
 Sex,
 trans.

 Constance
 Borde
 and
 Sheila
 Malovany-­‐Chevallier
 (New

York:
 First
 Vintage
 Books,
 2009),
 16.

1
the
 dangers
 of
 masking
 the
 conditions
 that
 prevent
 the
 flourishing
 of
 human
 beings

in
 their
 active
 relations.2
 What
 may
 appear
 as
 ‘self-­‐evident’
 to
 the
 empirical

observer,
 the
 fulfilled
 experience
 of
 subjective
 activity,
 turns
 out
 to
 be
 that
 which

the
 concept
 of
 happiness
 in
 such
 instances
 serves
 to
 occlude.

The
 struggle
 for
 human
 flourishing
 guided
 de
 Beauvoir’s
 admonition
 of
 the

explicit
 concern
 for
 human
 happiness,
 and
 the
 gain
 of
 resisting
 cooptation
 into
 all

consuming
 ideological
 forces
 moves
 to
 the
 fore
 instead.
 However,
 might
 not
 the

decisiveness
 and
 enthusiasm
 of
 incorporation
 of
 the
 norm
 of
 happiness
 into

dominant
 ideology
 perhaps
 give
 pause
 to
 those
 opposing
 the
 forces
 that
 stifle

human
 flourishing?
 Rather
 than
 resigning
 to
 the
 fate
 of
 the
 loss
 of
 happiness
 as
 a

mode
 of
 expressing
 or
 experiencing
 the
 aspirations
 for
 human
 flourishing,
 might
 not

a
 resuscitation
 of
 the
 demand
 for
 human
 flourishing
 call
 for
 a
 revaluation
 of

happiness
 in
 opposition
 to
 the
 forces
 that
 deploy
 the
 deflated
 notion
 toward

ideological
 ends?
 While
 Theodor
 Adorno
 sympathizes
 with
 the
 reluctance
 to

address
 happiness
 in
 a
 direct
 manner
 because
 of
 the
 ideological
 menace
 that
 haunts

the
 naïve
 notion
 of
 happiness,
 he
 also
 acknowledges
 the
 critical
 importance
 of
 a

2
 A
 similar
 concern
 against
 a
 positivist,
 subjectivist
 account
 of
 happiness
 is
 expressed
 by
 Sigmund

Freud,
 though
 emerging
 from
 decidedly
 different
 interests,
 when
 he
 writes,
 “We
 shall
 always
 tend
 to

consider
 people’s
 distress
 objectively
 –
 that
 is,
 to
 place
 ourselves,
 with
 our
 own
 wants
 and

sensibilities,
 in
 their
 conditions,
 and
 then
 to
 examine
 on
 what
 occasions
 we
 should
 find
 in
 them
 for

experiencing
 happiness
 or
 unhappiness.
 This
 method
 of
 looking
 at
 things,
 which
 seems
 objective

because
 it
 ignores
 the
 variations
 in
 subjective
 sensibility,
 is,
 of
 course,
 the
 most
 subjective
 possible,

since
 it
 puts
 one’s
 own
 mental
 states
 in
 the
 place
 of
 any
 others,
 unknown
 though
 they
 may
 be.

Happiness,
 however,
 is
 something
 essentially
 subjective.
 No
 matter
 how
 much
 we
 may
 shrink
 with

horror
 from
 certain
 situations
 –
 of
 a
 galley-­‐slave
 in
 antiquity,
 of
 a
 peasant
 during
 the
 Thirty
 Years’

War,
 of
 a
 victim
 of
 the
 Holy
 Inquisition,
 of
 a
 Jew
 awaiting
 a
 pogrom—it
 is
 nevertheless
 impossible
 for

us
 to
 feel
 our
 way
 into
 such
 people
 –
 to
 divine
 the
 changes
 which
 original
 obtuseness
 of
 mind,
 a

gradual
 stupefying
 process,
 the
 cessation
 of
 expectations,
 and
 cruder
 or
 more
 refined
 methods
 of

narcotization
 have
 produced
 upon
 their
 receptivity
 to
 sensations
 of
 pleasure
 and
 unpleasure.

Moreover,
 in
 the
 case
 of
 the
 most
 extreme
 possibility
 of
 suffering,
 special
 mental
 protective
 devices

are
 brought
 into
 operation.”
 Sigmund
 Freud,
 Civilization
 and
 Its
 Discontents,
 trans.

 James
 Strachey

(New
 York:
 W.W.
 Norton
 &
 Co.,
 1961)
 41.

2
dialectical
 account
 when
 defining
 happiness
 as,
 “the
 only
 part
 of
 the
 metaphysical

experience
 that
 is
 more
 than
 impotent
 longing,”
 that
 “gives
 us
 the
 inside
 of
 objects

as
 something
 removed
 from
 objects.”
 The
 cost
 of
 conceding
 the
 idea
 of
 happiness
 to

the
 powers
 that
 thwart
 the
 possibility
 of
 human
 flourishing
 becomes
 evident,

despite
 the
 precariousness
 of
 the
 resistance
 to
 cooptation,
 when
 he
 continues,
 “Yet

the
 man
 who
 enjoys
 this
 kind
 of
 experience
 naively,
 as
 though
 putting
 his
 hands
 on

what
 the
 experience
 suggests,
 is
 acceding
 to
 the
 terms
 of
 the
 empirical
 world
 –

terms
 he
 wants
 to
 transcend,
 though
 they
 alone
 give
 him
 the
 chance
 of

transcending.”3
 According
 to
 Adorno,
 happiness
 bears
 a
 close
 affinity
 to
 the
 capacity

for
 embodied,
 historical
 experience
 that
 enables
 the
 possibility
 to
 resist
 rather
 than

submit
 to
 either
 the
 collective
 delusions
 or
 resignation
 that
 accompanies
 “naïvely”

experienced
 happiness.
 However,
 in
 a
 twist
 of
 irony,
 the
 failure
 to
 harness
 the

critical
 power
 that
 a
 dialectical
 conception
 of
 happiness
 can
 provide
 undermines
 the

capacity
 to
 transcend
 the
 conditions
 that
 foster
 the
 force
 of
 ideological
 or
 idolatrous

notions.
 In
 the
 passage
 above,
 Adorno
 touches
 upon
 a
 paradoxical
 relation
 to
 the

idea
 of
 happiness,
 both
 as
 the
 ruse
 to
 keep
 human
 beings
 under
 the
 thumb
 of
 the

forces
 that
 prolong
 their
 demise,
 and
 as
 the
 source
 of
 liberation
 from
 those
 very

same
 forces.
 I
 will
 claim
 that
 the
 dialectic
 of
 happiness,
 in
 its
 affinity
 with
 embodied

and
 historical
 experience,
 forms
 the
 negative
 relief
 upon
 which
 the
 demand
 for

human
 happiness
 can
 find
 expression.
 The
 challenge
 of
 sustaining
 this
 dialectical

play
 has
 impeded
 historical
 attempts
 to
 conceive
 of
 a
 constructive
 politics
 in

resistance
 to
 the
 forces
 that
 stifle
 human
 flourishing.
 It
 will
 be
 the
 task
 of
 this

3
 Theodor
 Adorno,
 Negative
 Dialectics,
 trans.

 E.B.
 Ashton
 (New
 York:
 Continuum
 International

Publishing
 Group,
 1973),
 374.

3
dissertation
 to
 elaborate
 the
 manner
 in
 which
 historical
 attempts
 to
 construct
 a

politics
 in
 the
 service
 of
 human
 flourishing
 have
 succeeded
 or
 failed
 in
 light
 of
 the

dialectic
 of
 happiness,
 and
 how
 this
 dialectic
 reveals
 the
 possibility
 of
 happiness

remaining
 in
 the
 present.

It
 would
 seem
 counterintuitive
 that
 a
 concern
 for
 human
 flourishing
 could

rely
 upon
 what
 Adorno
 refers
 to
 as
 a
 “metaphysical
 experience”
 without
 regressing

into
 the
 futility
 of
 escapist
 flight
 from
 the
 conditions
 that
 are
 the
 source
 of
 misery.

The
 critical
 strength
 of
 a
 dialectical
 conception
 of
 happiness
 emerges
 from
 an

understanding
 of
 the
 experience
 that
 dissolves
 the
 claims
 of
 empirical
 experience

while
 providing
 the
 possibility
 of
 material
 transformation.
 Adorno
 locates
 the

possibility
 of
 illuminating
 what
 is
 deformed
 in
 empirical
 experience
 in
 both

aesthetic
 and
 theoretical
 terms.
 Both,
 however,
 only
 have
 the
 capacity
 to
 express

these
 experiences
 in
 the
 manifestations
 of
 failure
 or
 loss,
 for
 it
 is
 in
 the
 loss
 or

failure
 that
 the
 deformation
 of
 “naïve”
 happiness
 emerges
 in
 its
 deformity.
 The
 work

of
 Walter
 Benjamin
 is
 largely
 dedicated
 to
 taking
 on
 this
 challenge
 of
 expressing
 the

“metaphysical
 experience”
 in
 which
 the
 domination
 of
 either
 the
 subjective
 or

objective
 elements
 of
 living
 are
 dissolved.
 The
 ‘method,’
 if
 one
 is
 to
 speak
 loosely,
 of

Benjamin’s
 work
 is
 to
 delve
 into
 the
 depths
 of
 experiential
 life
 from
 the
 profane

minutiae
 of
 daily
 life
 to
 the
 seemingly
 lofty
 heights
 of
 messianic
 possibility.
 The

guiding
 thread
 of
 Benjamin’s
 writings
 is
 the
 desire
 and
 possibility
 for
 happiness,
 and

even
 to
 the
 extent
 that
 the
 philosophical
 relationship
 between
 Adorno
 and
 Benjamin

became
 strained
 at
 various
 points
 of
 their
 lives,
 one
 could
 fairly
 note
 that
 their

4
differences
 arose
 from
 a
 divergence
 in
 the
 appropriate
 representations
 of
 the

dialectic
 of
 happiness;
 that
 is,
 a
 shared
 commitment
 to
 the
 “promise
 of
 happiness.”4

In
 the
 “Theologico-­‐Political
 Fragment,”
 Benjamin
 deploys
 the
 theological

concept
 of
 the
 messianic
 in
 order
 to
 express
 the
 possibility
 of
 happiness
 in
 the

secular
 world.
 In
 setting
 up
 a
 peculiar
 alliance
 of
 the
 messianic
 and
 the
 secular,

Benjamin
 gestures
 toward
 the
 manner
 in
 which
 the
 idea
 of
 happiness
 resonates

with
 both
 secular
 and
 messianic
 intensity.
 He
 writes,

“The
 secular
 order
 should
 be
 erected
 on
 the
 idea
 of
 happiness.
 The
 relation
 of
 this

order
 to
 the
 messianic
 is
 one
 of
 the
 essential
 teachings
 of
 the
 philosophy
 of
 history.

It
 is
 the
 precondition
 of
 a
 mystical
 conception
 of
 history,
 encompassing
 a
 problem

that
 can
 be
 represented
 figuratively.
 If
 one
 arrow
 points
 to
 the
 goal
 toward
 which

the
 secular
 dynamic
 acts,
 and
 another
 marks
 the
 direction
 of
 messianic
 intensity,

then
 certainly
 the
 quest
 of
 free
 humanity
 runs
 counter
 to
 the
 messianic
 direction.

But
 just
 as
 a
 force,
 by
 virtue
 of
 the
 path
 it
 is
 moving
 along,
 can
 augment
 another

force
 on
 the
 opposite
 path,
 so
 the
 secular
 order
 –
 because
 of
 its
 nature
 as
 secular
 –

promotes
 the
 coming
 of
 the
 Messianic
 kingdom.
 The
 secular,
 therefore,
 though
 not

itself
 a
 category
 of
 this
 kingdom,
 is
 a
 decisive
 category
 of
 its
 most
 inobtrusive

approach.”5

The
 relation
 of
 the
 secular
 and
 the
 messianic
 arrives
 in
 the
 form
 of
 a
 problem
 and
 a

possibility,
 one
 that
 engenders
 all
 of
 the
 risks
 of
 a
 ‘mystical’
 conception
 of
 history

(i.e.
 one
 that
 stymies
 the
 possibility
 for
 happiness),
 as
 well
 as
 the
 reward
 of
 the

potentiality
 of
 the
 happiness
 in
 the
 category
 of
 the
 secular.
 Benjamin
 encounters
 the

relation
 of
 the
 messianic
 and
 the
 secular
 as
 most
 significant
 for
 the
 realization
 of

happiness,
 and
 the
 ordering
 of
 this
 relationship
 will
 be
 decisive
 in
 the
 struggle
 for

human
 flourishing.

4
 Adorno
 notes
 that
 the
 movement,
 or
 “digressiveness,”
 of
 Benjamin’s
 writings,
 “stems
 from
 a
 quality

which
 intellectual
 departmentalization
 otherwise
 reserves
 for
 art,
 but
 which
 sheds
 all
 semblance

when
 transposed
 into
 the
 realm
 of
 theory
 and
 assumes
 incomparable
 dignity
 –the
 promise
 of

happiness.”
 Theodor
 Adorno,
 “A
 Portrait
 of
 Walter
 Benjamin,”
 Prisms,
 trans.

 Samuel
 and
 Shierry

Weber
 (Cambridge,
 MA:
 The
 MIT
 Press,
 1967),
 230.

5
 Walter
 Benjamin,
 “Theological-­‐Political
 Fragment,
 ”Selected
 Writings:
 Volume
 3,
 1935-­‐1938,
 305.

5