Hitler’s Second Book: German Foreign Policy

323 Pages·2014·1.01 MB·English

by  Adolf Hitler

HITLER’S SECOND BOOK:
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
ADOLF HITLER
The Full Text of the Unpublished 1928 Book
Translated, Introduced and Annotated by
Arthur Kemp B.A. (Intl. Pol., Pol. Sci., Pub.
Ad.)
Ostara Publications
Hitler’s Second Book: German Foreign Policy
By Adolf Hitler
Translated, Introduced and Annotated by Arthur Kemp
Ostara Publications © 2104
http://ostarapublications.com
CONTENTS
Introduction: The Story of the Manuscript
Foreword
The South Tyrol question—Blindness of the bourgeois
nationalists—Italy, not France, the desirable ally Chapter I
History is the story of peoples’ struggles for existence—Peace
and war as means of waging the struggle—Neither should be
the sole means—Too much war kills off the elite—Too much
peace leads to submissiveness and emigration.
Chapter II
Territorial conquest is necessary for a people’s security and
healthy growth—Morality of conquest: no one owns any part of
the Earth—Birth control eugenically unsound—Spartan exposure
logical—Emigration sacrifices best elements—Increase in
productivity of no help competitively—Export trade vanishing as
other nations modernize—Necessity of strife.
Chapter III
Weapons on hand no gauge of national strength—National will
the decisive factor—Old German army as source of people’s will
and discipline—National-Socialist mission to revitalize national
will—Blood and folk values superior to internationalism—
Leadership superior to mass democracy Chapter IV
Must learn from the past—Must forge the instruments for
change to a fruitful German foreign policy—Correct ideas
valueless unless translated into action—The Pan-German
League—Necessity of taking risks—Policies must be carried out
with vigor even if total success not guaranteed—Breaking the
circle of enemies of Germany.
circle of enemies of Germany.
Chapter V
NSDAP is socialist and nationalist—Bourgeois nationalists aim to
restore Germany’s pre-war frontiers—NSDAP foreign policy aims
at territorial expansion, and bringing Germans under German
sovereignty—Folkdom as basis of policy.
Chapter VI
Need of alliances to achieve German aims—German borders
unsatisfactory both economically and militarily Chapter VII
Lack of national goals after Bismarck—Democracy responsible
for bungling—Goal should have been acquisition of German
areas of Europe—Worthlessness of Hapsburg Empire—German
part of South Tyrol would be German territory today if territorial
policy had been followed—Catholic Center and Jewish Social
Democrats blocked territorial policies—Worthlessness to
Germany of Triple Alliance—Destruction of Germanism in
Austria-Hungary—Unwise failure to support Italy in Tripoli—Italy
cannot oppose England—Austria sole profiteer from Triple
Alliance—German colonial policy a blunder, led to conflict with
England—Western Russia the proper area for German
expansion.
Chapter VIII
Lack of German war aims in World War—Aim should have been
territorial, prize lands for fighter-farmers—Decline of “old” army
—Deficiencies of today’s mercenary army—Bismarck and
preventive war—Germany’s two-power land standard—America
has upset balance of power—Reichswehr turned into domestic
police force—Need for nationalist spirit—Border-restoration
policy will lead to coalition of victor nations—Beer-hall patriots’
empty talk of “national honor”.
Chapter IX
Germany today powerless to defend honor or borders—
Increased production no solution—England won’t tolerate
merchant trade competition—Emigration no solution—American
racial immigration policies—Pan-Europeanism no solution, leads
to loss of folk-values—American values based on dominant
kindred groups.
Chapter X
Neutrality as policy means some other nation wins—Desirability
of action— Worthlessness of League of Nations—American
greatness the result of intervention in World War—Italy justified
in deserting Triple Alliance.
Chapter XI
Franco-Russian and Anglo-French alliances surround Germany—
Militarily indefensible German borders—Vulnerability of German
cities to attack from the air—Russian alliance would be
catastrophic—France always the enemy—Soviet Russian goal is
Jewish communist poisoning of Germany—Jews have destroyed
Russian elite—Russo-German alliance would mean invasion of
Germany from West—Russian alliance would block German
expansion by conquest of Russian territory—Jews dominate
Russia, but could in future be displaced by “National
Bolshevism.”
Chapter XII
Eight principles.
Chapter XIII
Inaction dangerous—Peaceful economic expansion no solution—
Border restoration policy futile—Necessity of Völkisch territorial
policy.
Chapter XIV
English race-values—Colonies—England doesn’t oppose
continental power, but does oppose trade and naval rivals—
Wilhelm II squandered resources on German fleet—Could have
had understanding with England—England threatened by France
on continent, America on the seas, and Russia in Asia—Jewry in
England a threat to an Anglo-German alliance.
Chapter XV
Italy promising as German ally—Mussolini and race-values—
Must forget Italy as enemy in World War—Italy natural enemy
of France, natural ally of England—Germany should also have
abandoned Austria-Hungary—Blindness of bourgeois
nationalists who oppose Italy and Mussolini—South Tyrol—Jews
use Tyrol to set Italy and Germany at odds—Germans in Alsace,
Poland, etc., just as important as those in South Tyrol—Advice
to Mussolini—The true villains who bear guilt for the South Tyrol
—US Secret Service Head Reveals Why America Entered the
War.
Chapter XVI
Italy as an ally of Germany—England, and perhaps Hungary and
Spain, as allies of Germany—Jewry responsible for German
disaster in World War—An overview of Jewish interventionist
tactics in International Relations.
Appendix 1: How America Entered the War:
Article originally meant to be inserted in
Chapter XV
Introduction: The Story of the Manuscript
Dedicated in 1928 to Max Annan, Hitler’s
personal friend and head of the NSDAP’s
publishing house, the Franz Eher
Nachfolger GmbH (the “Eher-Verlag”), the
unedited and draft manuscript,
provisionally titled “Deutsche
Aussenpolitik” but later more commonly
known as Hitler’s “Second Book,” was
never published in Hitler’s lifetime.
Various reasons have been put forward as to why the
manuscript was never published. It is often claimed that poor
sales of Mein Kampf, Hitler’s first book, were the reason. The
facts of the situation do not support this claim. Hitler was
already independently wealthy from sales of his first book, to
the point where he never accepted a salary from the state for
the thirteen years he spent as chancellor.
The most likely reason for the non-publication of this, his
second book, is simply time. The manuscript was completed in
1928, and in the following four years, Hitler and the National
Socialist party took part in no less than five major national
elections (1928, 1930, July 1932, November 1932, and March
1933).
Between this exertion, his hectic speaking schedule and
day-to-day politicking, it is clear that Hitler and Max Annan
simply never had the time to edit the manuscript properly, and
correct any spelling or grammatical errors. The book was also
prepared at a time in German history when the question of
South Tyrol was specifically in the news, and it was also an
South Tyrol was specifically in the news, and it was also an
attempt to win adherents to the NSDAP.
As a result, when there would have been time to finish
editing the book, Hitler was already in office—and thus there
was simply no need, financially or politically, for another book
predicting what the new Chancellor was already doing.
Thus the manuscript—of which there were two copies—
lay locked up—one in Hitler’s safe at his home in the
Obersalzburg, and the other in the safe of the Eher Verlag in
Munich.
Just prior to the end of the war, by Hitler’s order, the SS
garrison at the Obersalzburg burned all his papers—and his
house.
At the time, no one seemed to know what had happened
to the copy in the Eher Verlag’s safe. The matter was forgotten
in the immediate aftermath of the war, even though Hitler did
refer to the manuscript at least once.
On February 17, 1942, he remarked during a discussion
on Japan and the Jews, that “In 1925 I wrote in Mein Kampf
(and also in an unpublished work) that world Jewry saw in
Japan an opponent beyond its reach” (Adolf Hitler, February 17,
1942, as quoted in Hitler’s Table Talk, February 17, 1942,
midday).
The story of how the manuscript was found was
detailed in the October 1962 edition of The American Archivist,
published by the Society of American Archivists, Volume 25,
Number 4, pages 469–472).
According to that journal, in the winter of 1950–51 two
enlisted men, military intelligence linguists, were engaged in
unpacking crated German records that had been held in storage
pending analysis.
pending analysis.
One of these men later recalled that they had seen then
a typescript that an intelligence team had picked up from the
Eher Verlag.
Although this document was labeled “an alleged
unpublished work by Adolf Hitler,” they assumed it to be “a
draft copy of Mein Kampf” and had therefore tentatively
identified it as a “Mein Kampf manuscript.”
It was put in a safe containing other miscellaneous items
that could not be assigned to an established series and not left
on any of the open shelves—meaning that it was buried even
deeper in the paperwork records.
In July 1958, a German historian named Erich Lauer,
director of the Arbeitskreis fur Kriegsgeschichte, wrote to the
US Army Archives, asking for information about an unpublished
book by Adolf Hitler with the title Deutsche Aussenpolitik
(“German Foreign Policy”).
Lauer had information that the manuscript had been
acquired from Josef Berg, business manager of the Eher Verlag,
by Captain Paul M. Leake, Signal Corps, AUS, the officer in
charge of the intelligence team that visited Berg’s firm in April
1945, when Munich was occupied by the US Seventh Army.
Richard Bauer, former enlisted linguist in the German
Military Documents Section and, in 1958, in charge of the
reference service on captured documents, proceeded to make a
careful examination of the paper, which he knew to be in the
special document safe.
He soon realized that the document in question was
mislabeled in that it was not a draft of Mein Kampf. Although it
had no title or title page, its 324 pages, typed double-spaced in