HITLER’S SECOND BOOK: GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY ADOLF HITLER The Full Text of the Unpublished 1928 Book Translated, Introduced and Annotated by Arthur Kemp B.A. (Intl. Pol., Pol. Sci., Pub. Ad.) Ostara Publications 2 Hitler’s Second Book: German Foreign Policy By Adolf Hitler Translated, Introduced and Annotated by Arthur Kemp Ostara Publications © 2104 http://ostarapublications.com 3 CONTENTS Introduction: The Story of the Manuscript Foreword The South Tyrol question—Blindness of the bourgeois nationalists—Italy, not France, the desirable ally Chapter I History is the story of peoples’ struggles for existence—Peace and war as means of waging the struggle—Neither should be the sole means—Too much war kills off the elite—Too much peace leads to submissiveness and emigration. Chapter II Territorial conquest is necessary for a people’s security and healthy growth— Morality of conquest: no one owns any part of the Earth—Birth control eugenically unsound—Spartan exposure logical—Emigration sacrifices best elements—Increase in productivity of no help competitively—Export trade vanishing as other nations modernize—Necessity of strife. Chapter III Weapons on hand no gauge of national strength—National will the decisive factor—Old German army as source of people’s will and discipline—National- Socialist mission to revitalize national will—Blood and folk values superior to internationalism—Leadership superior to mass democracy Chapter IV Must learn from the past—Must forge the instruments for change to a fruitful German foreign policy—Correct ideas valueless unless translated into action— The Pan-German League—Necessity of taking risks—Policies must be carried out with vigor even if total success not guaranteed—Breaking the circle of enemies of Germany. Chapter V NSDAP is socialist and nationalist—Bourgeois nationalists aim to restore Germany’s pre-war frontiers—NSDAP foreign policy aims at territorial expansion, and bringing Germans under German sovereignty—Folkdom as basis of policy. Chapter VI Need of alliances to achieve German aims—German borders unsatisfactory both 4 economically and militarily Chapter VII Lack of national goals after Bismarck—Democracy responsible for bungling— Goal should have been acquisition of German areas of Europe—Worthlessness of Hapsburg Empire—German part of South Tyrol would be German territory today if territorial policy had been followed—Catholic Center and Jewish Social Democrats blocked territorial policies—Worthlessness to Germany of Triple Alliance—Destruction of Germanism in Austria-Hungary—Unwise failure to support Italy in Tripoli—Italy cannot oppose England—Austria sole profiteer from Triple Alliance—German colonial policy a blunder, led to conflict with England— Western Russia the proper area for German expansion. Chapter VIII Lack of German war aims in World War—Aim should have been territorial, prize lands for fighter-farmers—Decline of “old” army—Deficiencies of today’s mercenary army—Bismarck and preventive war—Germany’s two-power land standard—America has upset balance of power—Reichswehr turned into domestic police force—Need for nationalist spirit—Border-restoration policy will lead to coalition of victor nations—Beer-hall patriots’ empty talk of “national honor”. Chapter IX Germany today powerless to defend honor or borders—Increased production no solution—England won’t tolerate merchant trade competition—Emigration no solution—American racial immigration policies—Pan-Europeanism no solution, leads to loss of folk-values—American values based on dominant kindred groups. Chapter X Neutrality as policy means some other nation wins—Desirability of action— Worthlessness of League of Nations—American greatness the result of intervention in World War—Italy justified in deserting Triple Alliance. Chapter XI Franco-Russian and Anglo-French alliances surround Germany—Militarily indefensible German borders—Vulnerability of German cities to attack from the air—Russian alliance would be catastrophic—France always the enemy—Soviet Russian goal is Jewish communist poisoning of Germany—Jews have destroyed Russian elite—Russo-German alliance would mean invasion of Germany from West—Russian alliance would block German expansion by conquest of Russian territory—Jews dominate Russia, but could in future be displaced by “National 5 Bolshevism.” Chapter XII Eight principles. Chapter XIII Inaction dangerous—Peaceful economic expansion no solution—Border restoration policy futile—Necessity of Völkisch territorial policy. Chapter XIV English race-values—Colonies—England doesn’t oppose continental power, but does oppose trade and naval rivals—Wilhelm II squandered resources on German fleet—Could have had understanding with England—England threatened by France on continent, America on the seas, and Russia in Asia—Jewry in England a threat to an Anglo-German alliance. Chapter XV Italy promising as German ally—Mussolini and race-values—Must forget Italy as enemy in World War—Italy natural enemy of France, natural ally of England— Germany should also have abandoned Austria-Hungary—Blindness of bourgeois nationalists who oppose Italy and Mussolini—South Tyrol—Jews use Tyrol to set Italy and Germany at odds—Germans in Alsace, Poland, etc., just as important as those in South Tyrol—Advice to Mussolini—The true villains who bear guilt for the South Tyrol—US Secret Service Head Reveals Why America Entered the War. Chapter XVI Italy as an ally of Germany—England, and perhaps Hungary and Spain, as allies of Germany—Jewry responsible for German disaster in World War—An overview of Jewish interventionist tactics in International Relations. Appendix 1: How America Entered the War: Article originally meant to be inserted in Chapter XV 6 7 Introduction: The Story of the Manuscript Dedicated in 1928 to Max Annan, Hitler’s personal friend and head of the NSDAP’s publishing house, the Franz Eher Nachfolger GmbH (the “Eher-Verlag”), the unedited and draft manuscript, provisionally titled “Deutsche Aussenpolitik” but later more commonly known as Hitler’s “Second Book,” was never published in Hitler’s lifetime. Various reasons have been put forward as to why the manuscript was never published. It is often claimed that poor sales of Mein Kampf, Hitler’s first book, were the reason. The facts of the situation do not support this claim. Hitler was already independently wealthy from sales of his first book, to the point where he never accepted a salary from the state for the thirteen years he spent as chancellor. The most likely reason for the non-publication of this, his second book, is simply time. The manuscript was completed in 1928, and in the following four years, Hitler and the National Socialist party took part in no less than five major national elections (1928, 1930, July 1932, November 1932, and March 1933). Between this exertion, his hectic speaking schedule and day-to-day politicking, it is clear that Hitler and Max Annan simply never had the time to edit the manuscript properly, and correct any spelling or grammatical errors. The book was also prepared at a time in German history when the question of South Tyrol was specifically in the news, and it was also an attempt to win adherents to the NSDAP. As a result, when there would have been time to finish editing the book, Hitler was already in office—and thus there was simply no need, financially or politically, for another book predicting what the new Chancellor was already doing. Thus the manuscript—of which there were two copies—lay locked up— one in Hitler’s safe at his home in the Obersalzburg, and the other in the safe of the Eher Verlag in Munich. Just prior to the end of the war, by Hitler’s order, the SS garrison at the Obersalzburg burned all his papers—and his house. At the time, no one seemed to know what had happened to the copy in the Eher Verlag’s safe. The matter was forgotten in the immediate aftermath of the war, even though Hitler did refer to the manuscript at least once. On February 17, 1942, he remarked during a discussion on Japan and the 8 Jews, that “In 1925 I wrote in Mein Kampf (and also in an unpublished work) that world Jewry saw in Japan an opponent beyond its reach” (Adolf Hitler, February 17, 1942, as quoted in Hitler’s Table Talk, February 17, 1942, midday). The story of how the manuscript was found was detailed in the October 1962 edition of The American Archivist, published by the Society of American Archivists, Volume 25, Number 4, pages 469–472). According to that journal, in the winter of 1950–51 two enlisted men, military intelligence linguists, were engaged in unpacking crated German records that had been held in storage pending analysis. One of these men later recalled that they had seen then a typescript that an intelligence team had picked up from the Eher Verlag. Although this document was labeled “an alleged unpublished work by Adolf Hitler,” they assumed it to be “a draft copy of Mein Kampf” and had therefore tentatively identified it as a “Mein Kampf manuscript.” It was put in a safe containing other miscellaneous items that could not be assigned to an established series and not left on any of the open shelves— meaning that it was buried even deeper in the paperwork records. In July 1958, a German historian named Erich Lauer, director of the Arbeitskreis fur Kriegsgeschichte, wrote to the US Army Archives, asking for information about an unpublished book by Adolf Hitler with the title Deutsche Aussenpolitik (“German Foreign Policy”). Lauer had information that the manuscript had been acquired from Josef Berg, business manager of the Eher Verlag, by Captain Paul M. Leake, Signal Corps, AUS, the officer in charge of the intelligence team that visited Berg’s firm in April 1945, when Munich was occupied by the US Seventh Army. Richard Bauer, former enlisted linguist in the German Military Documents Section and, in 1958, in charge of the reference service on captured documents, proceeded to make a careful examination of the paper, which he knew to be in the special document safe. He soon realized that the document in question was mislabeled in that it was not a draft of Mein Kampf. Although it had no title or title page, its 324 pages, typed double-spaced in purple ink, did deal with German foreign policy, and the style and phraseology appeared to be Hitler’s. Since the documents in the safe, as indeed many series of captured records, had not been reached in the progressive program of security review and 9 downgrading, the manuscript still retained its confidential classification. Pending the security review and determination of policy with respect to handling the document, Lauer was merely informed that no such document was among the unclassified German records in US custody. At the same time, the document was immediately given a number, EAP 105/40, in the series of miscellaneous documents arranged according to the German Army Unified Documents System (EAP); and it was submitted to the Army Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, with a request for its removal from the confidential classification. Removal of the classification was promptly authorized and in August 1958, the document was submitted informally to the Historical Division, Department of State. By 1959 it had been microfilmed and released into the public domain. German Jewish historian Gerhard Weinberg then quite falsely claimed that he had discovered the manuscript (“Revealed: the amazing story behind Hitler’s second book”, The Telegraph, London, Sept. 25, 2003). In reality, Weinberg had only been told about the manuscript’s existence by Bauer, who should really be credited with finding the book. After obtaining a copy of the manuscript from Bauer, Weinberg then produced a highly-edited (actually a censored) version of the book in German, titled Hitlers Zweites Buck, ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928 (“Hitler’s Second Book, a Document from the Year 1928”), published by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (“Institute of Contemporary History”) in Munich. The Institut für Zeitgeschichte was, and still is, a historical research center set up by the post-war West German government in 1947, at the insistence of the Allied occupying powers, to present anti-Hitler propaganda in Germany. Subsequent to the edited version appearing in German, an unknown “pirate” edition of Weinberg’s version appeared in English. This first translation was pitifully poor, and in some sections, completely incomprehensible. This was probably aggravated by the fact that the original manuscript was also unedited. Finally, another English edition appeared, of better quality, but that remained only a translation of the “edited” Weinberg version. The work you now hold in your hands is the very first complete and accurate translation done in which the basic ideas are put down in readable and everyday English. All of the ideas, thoughts and concepts have been faithfully captured, analyzed and set down in the manner in which they would ultimately have appeared, had it ever been officially printed. 10
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