Hitler's Intelligence Chief: Walter Schellenberg

405 Pages·2013·1.89 MB·English

Reinhard R. Doerries

Hitler’s
Intelligence Chief

Walter Schellenberg

Introduction by
Gerhard L. Weinberg

Includes the original
Autobiography
by Walter Schellenberg
and
Annexe
by Franz Göring

Enigma Books
All rights reserved under the
International and Pan-American
Copyright Conventions.
Published by Enigma Books,
New York

Copyright © 2009 by Reinhard R. Doerries

First Edition

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording, or otherwise without the written permission of Enigma Books.

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN 978-1-929631-77-3

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

Doerries, Reinhard R.
Hitler’s intelligence chief : Walter Schellenberg / Reinhard R. Doerries ; introduction
by Gerhard L. Weinberg. -- 1st ed.

p. : ill. ; cm.

Includes the original “Autobiography” by Walter Schellenberg and “Annexe” by
Franz Goring.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN: 978-1-929631-77-3

1. Schellenberg, Walter, 1910-1952. 2. World War, 1939-1945--Secret service--
Germany. 3. Military intelligence--Germany--History--20th century. 4. Nazis--
Biography. 5. Intelligence officers--Germany--Biography. I. Weinberg, Gerhard L. II.
Title.

DD247.S338 D63 2009
940.54/8743/092
For E
Also published by Enigma Books

Hitler’s Table Talk: 1941–1944
In Stalin’s Secret Service
Hitler and Mussolini: The Secret Meetings
The Jews in Fascist Italy: A History
The Man Behind the Rosenbergs
Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History
Diary 1937–1943 (Galeazzo Ciano)
Secret Affairs: FDR, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles
Hitler and His Generals: Military Conferences 1942–1945
Stalin and the Jews: The Red Book
The Secret Front: Nazi Political Espionage
Fighting the Nazis: French Intelligence and Counterintelligence
A Death in Washington: Walter G. Krivitsky and the Stalin Terror
The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Algeria
Hitler’s Second Book: The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf
At Napoleon’s Side in Russia: The Classic Eyewitness Account
The Atlantic Wall: Hitler’s Defenses for D-Day
Double Lives: Stalin, Willi Münzenberg and the Seduction of the Intellectuals
France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932–1939
Mussolini: The Secrets of His Death
Top Nazi: Karl Wolff—The Man Between Hitler and Himmler
Empire on the Adriatic: Mussolini’s Conquest of Yugoslavia
The Origins of the War of 1914 (3-volume set)
Hitler’s Foreign Policy: 1933–1939—The Road to World War II
The Origins of Fascist Ideology 1918–1925
Max Corvo: OSS Italy 1942–1945
Hitler’s Contract: The Secret History of the Italian Edition of Mein Kampf
Secret Intelligence and the Holocaust
Balkan Inferno: Betrayal, War, and Intervention, 1990–2005
Calculated Risk
The Murder of Maxim Gorky
The Kravchenko Case
The Mafia and the Allies
Hitler’s Gift to France
The Nazi Party, 1919–1945: A Complete History
Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations
The Cicero Spy Affair
The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb
Target Hitler
The Orlov KGB File
NOC Non-Official Cover: British Secret Operations
Table of Contents

Introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg ix

Preface xiii

I. Years of Apprenticeship 3

II. Chief of Amt VI Foreign Intelligence 43

III. Twilight of the Gods 111

IV. Postlude to Hitler’s Germany 219

Appendices

Editor’s Comment 293

Appendix I

Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg. Amtschef VI, Autobiography,
Compiled During His Stay in Stockholm 296

Appendix II

Annexe Written by Hauptsturmfuehrer Göring to Schellen-
berg’s Report on His Transactions with Count Bernadotte
and Events in the Last Weeks of the German Reich 350

Appendix III

Annexe Written by Hauptsturmfuehrer Göring to Schellen-
berg’s Report on His Transactions with Count Bernadotte
and Events in the Last Weeks of the German Reich. Part II 357

Abbreviations, Acronyms, Cover Names 363

Glossary. German Intelligence Services 367

Bibliography 374

Index 381

Introduction

by

Gerhard L. Weinberg

T he leadership of National Socialist Germany included a large number of
individuals who might well be called peculiar. The term applies not only to
a lack of moral sense. It also can be applied to someone who does not quite fit
in because of considerable intelligence on the one hand and a special personal
relationship to one of the most important and highest leaders on the other.
Walter Schellenberg certainly fits this characterization.
Decades ago the scholar Robert Koehl called attention to what he called
the feudal aspects of National Socialism. Personal allegiances and alignments,
rivalries and jurisdictional disputes were so endemic to the system that they
effectively displaced what formal structures of state and Party there were. It
was in the context of such a personal relationship with the head of the whole
German police apparatus, Heinrich Himmler, that Walter Schellenberg rose to
prominence. And he was able to do so and retain his position to the end of the
regime in spite of having a clearer and earlier perception of the likelihood of
German defeat than such allegedly smart men like Albert Speer who did not
come to this recognition until the end of January 1945. What tied Himmler and
Schellenberg together cannot be explained precisely; but there cannot be any
doubt that a special personal tie existed and that Himmler allowed Schellenberg
a degree of latitude that was unique in the higher reaches of Nazi Germany.
It is in the context of a man of considerable ability and vast ambition rising
to prominence in an evil regime that this study of Schellenberg sheds light on
the regime he served. Participating in its horrors, engaging in endless
organizational rivalries, inheriting growing responsibilities in the field of
intelligence, Schellenberg is seen here as a person who enjoyed a degree of
x Hitler’s Intelligence Chief
what the Germans call “Narrenfreiheit,” the loose reins of the mentally
incompetent.

The problem of sources is especially complicated in this case, and
Professor Reinhard Doerries has tackled it in a systematic way like no one else.
The interrogations by the British after the war—which Doerries has himself
carefully edited for publication—the recently declassified records of British and
American intelligence agencies, the very confused status of Schellenberg’s
memoirs, and a host of other materials have all been carefully searched and
evaluated. Whether it is Schellenberg’s ascent in the hierarchy of the Third
Reich, his efforts to sound Allies and neutrals for a way out of Germany’s
losing war, his hopes of a future for himself by saving Jews destined for death
in the final days of fighting—all these and related issues are recounted here in a
manner unmatched in the existing literature.
The inclusion in this book of Schellenberg’s original autobiography written
in Sweden in 1945 and a report by Schellenberg’s adjutant, Franz Göring,
offers the reader a sense of how these two men saw themselves acting in the
last hectic days of Nazi Germany. That as participants in a regime that had
engaged in murder on a colossal scale they would emphasize their own efforts
at rescuing Jews and others from the death planned for them is hardly
surprising. It is, however, not entirely false because it is self-exculpatory. Those
saved are unlikely to have been troubled at the time by the prior activities of
those who kept them from being slaughtered. This portion of the story is also
of interest for understanding the activities of Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte
and Jewish organizations trying to rescue victims of the Nazis.
There is in this a further important insight into the extraordinary society
that was Nazi Germany. The careers and actions of the regime’s leading figures
can more easily be seen as to a large extent self-determined. As long as loyalty
to Hitler, or to whoever one’s immediate superior might be, could safely be
assumed, there was a very great degree of latitude. Individual initiative was
allowed far greater leeway than one might have expected from a state that
prided itself on the “Führerprinzip,” the leadership principle. This principle
was frequently interpreted to mean unquestioning adherence to whatever was
prescribed from above. In practice, however, as long as there was no doubt
about personal loyalty, one could voice views and suggest courses of action
that at first sight might appear to contradict official policy.
This has important implications for an understanding of the whole system
because it sheds important light on those who never thought to take advantage
of this opportunity. The point is that whatever the endless jurisdictional
disputes, there was far more consensus among those in positions of authority
Introduction xi
than the postwar memoirs and protestations might lead one to expect. The
disputes have left behind masses of records; tacit agreement on policies and
objectives did not. It is this combination of a broad consensus with a
considerable degree of latitude for any in the system who actually wanted to
take advantage of it that contributed to the system’s coherence and strength as
well as to its ability to maintain itself operating relatively effectively until the
bitter end. In this way, the account offered here of one figure of real
significance in the political and military system that was Nazi Germany can
provide insight into the vanished world of Hitler’s government as a whole even
as it concentrates on the life and activities of a single individual.

Gerhard L. Weinberg
Efland, North Carolina
April 2009