History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Volume II The Test of War 1950-1953

744 Pages·1988·39.552 MB·English

by  Doris M. Condit

THE TEST OF WAR
1950-1953
Tbe Test 0f War. the second volume in the
planned comprehensive History of the Office
ofthe Secretan' ofDefense, follows the evolu
tion ofOSD from the outbreak ofthe Korean
\,'ar in June 1950 to the end of the Truman
presidenC\' in January 1953. Like the first
\'olume in the series (The Formative Years,
194--1950). the present one focuses on the
secretaries of defense, their staffs, and OSD's
administration ofthe Pentagon andexamines,
bn'ond OSD and the Department ofDefense,
the larger framnvork of national security
organization and policy that involved the
White House. Congress, and otheragencies of
the go\'ernment.
:\5 the central n'ent of this period, the
Korean War tested the mettle of officials and
institutions throughout the national security
establishment. butnowhere moreacutely than
in the E,ringofficesofthe Pentagon leadership.
The Korean-era secretaries of defense-Louis
Johnson, George Marshall, and Robert
Lo\'ett-confronted a maze of problems
relating to strategy, budgets, manpower,
",'eapons de\'elopment, and service roles and
missions, Operating under wartime pressures
",'hile anempting to manage a department on
h' recenth' created and still undergoing major
adjustments. they faced a formidable agenda
made e\'en more difficult bydomesticpOlitical
and economic constraints that narrowed the
options a\'ailable to them.
In a narrati\'e rich in both documentary
detail and broad-brush perspective, The Test
of H--ar assesses ho\y well the secretaries met
these challenges, Success or failure depended
not onh' on theireffectiveness in managing the
Pentagon bureaucracy, in particular their in
teraction ""ith theJoint Chiefs ofStaffand the
still parochial-minded militaryservices, butalso
on their relationship with Truman, Secretary
ofState DeanAcheson, and acontentious Con
gress unhappy O\'erthefiring ofMacArthur, the
pace of mobilization, and the progress of the
""ar generallY.
Korea. of course, was the flash point for
a Illuch ""ider struggle unfolding during this
Continued 01'1 back flap
time, theeffort bythe UnitedStatestocontain
the expansionistactivitiesofthe Soviet Union
and communism. As theconflictin the FarEast
dragged on seemingly indefinitely, officials in
Washington turned theirattention increasing
ly to Europe and the strengthening of the
Westernalliance. Muchofthe bookdealswith
the shaping of NATO and the related subject
of military assistance.
In a thoughtful conclusion, The Test of
War observes that the precedents established
ill these seminal years-the beginnings of a
military-industrial complex, the changing
strategicformulations thatallowedfor reliance
on nuclear as well as conventional weapons,
the sharp debate over European vs. Asian
priorities, and, above all, the staunch and ex
pensive commitment to containment-would
influencenationalsecuritypolicy and the U.S.
defenseeffortfor the remainderofthe century.
DORIS ~1. CONDITreceived her A.B. andM.A.
degrees from George Washington University.
She has held various historical and research
positions with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Historical Division, The Johns
Hopkins University, American University, and
the American Institutes for Research. Mrs. Con
dit is the author of or collaborator on
numerous military-political studies relating to
""arand conflict, includingCaseStudyin Guer
rilla \Far: Greece During World War II,
Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict
(3 \·ols.), and Modern Revolutionary
n"arfare-An Analytical Overview.
History ofthe Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense
The Test of War, 1950-1953
HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Alfred Goldberg, General Editor
Volume I: StevenL. Rearden, The Formative Thars, 1947-1950 (1984)
HISTORY OF THE OFFICE
OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Volume II
THE TEST OF WAR
1950-1953
Doris M. Condit
Historical Office
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. • 1988
Library ofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
(Revised for volume 2)
Bibliography: v. 1, p.
Includes indexes.
Contents: v. 1. The formative years, 1947-1950/ Steven L. Rearden-
v. 2. The test ofwar, 1950-1953/ Doris M. Condit.
1. United States. Dept. ofDefense-History. I. Goldberg, Alfred,
1918- .11. Rearden, Steven L., 1946- .111. Condit, Doris M.,
1921- .IV. United States. Dept. ofDefense. Historical Office.
UA23.6.R4 1984 353.6'09 84-601133
For sale by the Superintendent ofDocuments, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword
This volume is the second in the series planned for the History of the
Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense (OSD). This series is intended to present a
scholarly, objective, and critical history of OSD with primary focus on
national security policy and decisions relating thereto.
Volume II presents the Washington background of the Korean War and
other momentous events-international and domestic-from the perspective
of the highest levels of government. It is concerned with what the Truman
administration, andespeciallyOSD,JCS, andthemilitaryservices, weredoing
inresponse to theseevents. Itseekstoweavetogetherstrategicplanning, force
programming, budgetmaking, creation of military forces, direction of the
Korean War, collective security efforts, and military assistance, and to assess
the impact ofall ofthesephenomenaonOSDand theDepartmentofDefense.
Ifthere seems to be much stress on controversy and differences ofopinion in
detailing the process of making policy and strategy decisions, it should be
borne in mind that planners and policymakers are normally concerned with
unsettled questions that inevitably provoke prolonged discussion, argument,
and dispute. Such examination of process may help provide perspective and
historical awareness to those who must make decisions today and in the
future.
The early stages ofwar or periods ofprolonged international tension are
therealtestofdefensepoliciesbecauseofthehigh levelofuncertaintyandthe
limited military resources usually available to implement policy and strategy.
Theemphasisinthisvolume, therefore, isproperlyonthefirst yearofthewar
and the early grappling with collective security and military assistance. For a
better understanding of this early period, adequate attention to the back
ground and setting is indispensable. Much Significant information not previ
ously available is presented in this volume.
Military operations in Korea are treated only to the extent necessary to
understand plans and strategic and political decisions. The space devoted to
ii Foreword
military operations in Korea and Indochina varies with their significance in
the larger context of events. But because detail is necessary to establish the
essential discipline of the subject, the author has sought as far as possible to
letthefacts telltheirownstory, tosayhow andwhy things happened. But she
has not shirked the historian's duty of indicating conclusions to which the
evidence seems to point.
The author, Doris M. Condit, holds A.B. and A.M. degrees from the
George Washington University and served as a historian with the Historical
Division ofthe U.S. Army Engineer Corps, the Operations Research Office of
The)ohnsHopkins University, and theAmericanInstitutesfor Research. Sheis
the author ofa number ofpolitical-military studies, including Case Study in
Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II and Modern Revolutionary
Warfare-An Analytical Overview.
This publication has been reviewed and its contents declassified and
cleared for release by concerned government agencies. Although the manu
script itself has been declassified, some of the official sources cited in the
volume may remain classified. This is an official publication ofthe Office of
the Secretary ofDefense, but the views expressed are those ofthe author and
do not necessarily represent those of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
ALFRED GOLDBERG
Historian, OSD
Preface
This second volume of the History of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) covers the period from June 1950 to January 1953. It treats
mainly the problems confronting the secretary ofdefense and his department
as a result of the North Korean invasion of South Korea and President
Truman's decision that the United States should go to the aid of the South
Koreans. The Korean War raised strategic questions that had to be addressed
immediately. Thesecretary ofdefense and other u.s. officialsgroped to create
a coordinated policy that would meet a range of possible perils. President
Truman stated the broad outlines of policy in July 1950: The United States
would fight in Korea, build up overall U.S. strength, and create a worldwide
collective security network.
The United States adhered to this basic policythroughout the Korean War
years in the face of other fateful changes in the international scene. The
Chinese Communist intervention in Korea in November 1950 multiplied
strategic and tactical difficulties and created a dilemma over the possible
escalationofthe war. Although armistice talksbeganin]uly 1951, the Chinese
Communists and North Koreans refused to complete a mutually acceptable
agreement, thus confronting the administration with the question of how to
win militarily without escalating the conflict. Meanwhile, limited military
operations in Korea continued for two more years, causing many casualties
and further complicating already formidable U.S. domestic and international
problems. If nothing seemed certain at the beginning of the war, little could
be taken for granted during its later stages. In the end, the death ofStalin and
internal Soviet affairs may have had more to do with ending the war than any
U.S. actions.
The beginning ofwar inJune 1950 confronted the three-year-old Depart
ment ofDefense withanimmediatechallengeto fight and topreparefor other
anticipatedcontingencies. The UnitedStatesundertook to revitalizeand rearm
NATO and to find away to bring still-occupied West Germany into the service