History and repetition

273 Pages·2012·14.8 MB·English

by  Karatani, Kōjin, Lippit, Seiji M

From ancient times, it has been said that history repeats itself. In truth, people study history precisely because it is not a one-time phenom-
enon, but rather possesses something that can recur. For example, historians often say that those who are ignorant of history are doomed to
repeat it. Does that mean, then, that those who have knowledge of history will be able to avoid its recurrence? Does the repetition of history
kojin karatani wrote the essays in History and Repetition during a h actually exist? Such questions have never been properly considered. For even if they intuitively acknowledge the repetition of history, schol-
ars, aspiring to be scientific, refrain from taking on the issue for fear of rendering their work unscientific. I believe in the existence of histor-
time of radical historical change, triggered by the collapse of the Cold War and i ical repetition, as well as in the possibility of engaging such repetition scientifically. Of course, what is repeated is not the event itself, but
S
rather the structure. Within a process of structural repetition, an event may at times also appear to be repeated. Yet one should not be
the death of the Shōwa emperor in 1989. Reading Karl Marx in an original way,
t swayed by the similarity of historical events, for it is only the structure that recurs. I wrote most of the essays contained in this volume
Karatani developed a theory of history based on the repetitive cycle of crises within the environment that existed around 1989. It was a time when an age was coming to an end, as symbolized by the collapse of the
o Soviet Union and the death of the Shōwa Emperor in Japan. Around this time, I became aware of a correspondence between the events of
attending the expansion and transformation of capital. His work led to a rig- the Shōwa period (1926-1989) and the events of the Meiji Period (1868-1912) in Japan. That realization formed the genesis of these essays.
r This type of correspondence does not represent a random coincidence, I thought. For clearly, it conceals within it a geopolitical structure
orous analysis of political, economic, and literary forms of representation that
y distinctive to East Asia as well as the structure of the modern world system. Yet it is actually difficult to engage directly this type of repeti-
recast historical events as a series of repeated forms forged in the transitional tive structure. Historians and sociologists tend to avoid it. On the other hand, the major novelists of contemporary Japan all thematized the
repetitive quality of modern Japan. For this reason, I first wrote these essays in the form of literary criticism. These essays were written
moments of global capitalism. a entirely within the Japanese context, for a Japanese readership. At the same time, I realized that these issues were not limited to Japan. For
this reason, in order to take up the problem within a more universal context, I appended the essay on Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of
History and Repetition cemented Karatani’s reputation as one of Japan’s n Louis Bonaparte to the beginning of the volume. In general, Marx’s view of history is based on stages of development, and for this reason it
premier thinkers, capable of traversing the fields of philosophy, political econ- d appears unrelated to the question of repetition. In fact, however, Marx actually thought deeply about the structure of repetition. The repet-
itive structure that he discerned in Capital was the business cycle, and especially the economic crisis, distinctive to the capitalist economy.
omy, history, and literature in his work. The first complete translation of History On the other hand, in The Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx mainly deals with the repetitive structure unique to the state. In a certain sense, the lat-
r ter is more important than the former. After entering the 1990s, however, I stopped writing about these issues.For one thing, increasing
and Repetition into English, undertaken with the cooperation of Karatani him- numbers of people pointed out the return of the prewar period and the repetition of the 1930s. Yet conversely, I began gradually to think
e thatthisk type of perspective was incorrect. For example, the “economy of grand space” [Grossraumwirtschaft] proclaimed in 1930s Germany
self, this volume opens with his innovative reading of The Eighteenth Brumaire
p or the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere proclaimed in Japan were, in a certain sense, repeated in the 1990s. The obvious example is
of Louis Bonaparte, tracing Marx’s early theoretical formulation of the state. the European oUnion, but in East Asia as well, the plan of an economic and political community has been raised from a variety of perspec-
e tives. To that extent, one can indeed discern a type of repetitiveness. At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that such phenomena
Karatani follows with a study of violent crises as they recur after major transi- t abraes efadr odniff ae 1r9en80t sfr coomn stjchioosues noief stsh. e Y perte Iw saoro pne rrieoadli.z eFdo rth tehrees ew raesa nsoon nse, eI dw taos mdiasskaet iasnfiye dfu wnidtham theen tcaoln ctoernrtesc otifo tnhsi—s bionostke, awdh, wichha wt awsa ess rseeqnutiiarelldy
tions of power, developing his theory of historical repetition and introducing
i was to see the repetitiveness of history in a span not of 60 years, but of 120 years. In truth, the situation following 1990 resembled less the sit-
n
a groundbreaking interpretation of fascism (in both Europe and Japan) as the t uation of 60 years ago, than that of 120 y ears ago. The politics and economics of post-1990 have been referred to as “neo-liberalism,” but they
are, in fact, quite similar to that of post-1870 imperialism. For example, many today are surprised by the emergence of China, India, and Rus-
spectral return of the absolutist monarch in the midst of a crisis of representa- i sia as great powers, but when the situationk is compared to the world of 120 years ago, there is no great reason for surprise. People are con-
o
scious of and try to avoid the repetition of 60 years ago, but when it comes to 120 years, they are not even aware of the repetition. In East
tive democracy. n Asia, for example, there is no doubt that the proablems of the prewar period still cast shadows upon relations among China, Taiwan, South
For Karatani, fascism represents the most violent materialization of the Korea, North Korea, and Japan. Focusing only on thirs, however, we may overlook just how different the present is from the prewar period.
China, which then lay in a fragmented state, exposed to imperialist invasion, has by now become a political and economic giant. The same
a
repetitive mechanism of history. Yet he also seeks out singularities that oper- can be said of Taiwan, South Korea, and North Korea. If anything, it is better to go back to the 1880s in order to understand the present cir-
cumstances. At the time, the Qing dynasty was a world empire otf massive scale. In the peripheral country of Japan, the old system was over-
ate outside the brutal inevitability of historical repetition, whether represented thrown, opening the country to the outside. In response, the Yi dynaasty in Korea suppressed pro-Japanese anti-isolationists, attempting to
maintain its closed-country policy with the Qing dynasty as suzerain state. Ultimately, this led to confrontation between Japan and the
in literature or, more precisely, in the process of literature’s demise. Closely n
Qing dynasty, that is, to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-94. The institutions of tihe modern nation-state and industrial capitalism were estab-
reading the works of Ōe Kenzaburō, Mishima Yukio, Nakagami Kenji, and lished in Japan, which was in the process of a conversion to imperialism. At the same time, by this point, the Qing dynasty was not only mas-
sive, but possessed modern military arms. For this reason, at the time of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese were quite fearful of the Qing
Murakami Haruki, Karatani compares the recurrent and universal with the sin- dynasty. Seen in this light, the current state of affairs much more closely resembles that of the 1880s than the 1930s. The current political ten-
sions in East Asia—including those surrounding Taiwan, which Japan colonized as a result of the Sino-Japanese War—have their origins in
gular and unrepeatable, while advancing a compelling theory of the decline of
the events of this period. A repetitive structure exists in this way in East Asia. It goes without saying that this type of problem is not confined
modern literature. Merging theoretical arguments with a concrete analysis of to East Asia. For example, it applies as well to Russia and to the Middle East. Or rather, one should say that this type of repetitive structure
hexists oni a global scale. In this book, I included a diagram of the “Various Stages of World Capitalism,” which presents a linear development
cultural and intellectual history, Karatani’s essays encapsulate a brilliant, multi- of the stagesS of worltd capitalism, including mercantilism, liberalism, and imperialism. In other words, this represents a view of develop-
ment according to stages, boased on the evolution of productive forces. Seen from this perspective, the 1990s would be characterized by a
disciplinary perspective on world history. transition from durable consumer rgoods yto info rmation industries. Yet, this linear view obscures the repetitive structure. On this point, I
a
learned from Immanuel Wallerstein to think of “liberalinsm” and “imperialism” as cyclical processes rather than as historical stages. Accord-
Aksosojciiantio nkisat rMaovtemaennit ( NisA aM Ja)p. aHniess beo pohkisl oinso Epnhgelris ahn idn cflouudned Oerr igoifn st hoef MNoedw- ka ihghnaaegivgn eeteo mad hc oehinsni yeot.vh uIeignndh k ch iponeonggwt,e rtmeahrsoe tt ,noa iyg nu ei s ntouh frte ph“ laetig bhweee ormoarfll, i da“s imnemdc”po tdenherousiamsc lraiyis b:pm ee st,”rh i toheh deeNg oweefmot shrtoelrdnrudl isgacyng snldetaes ct,m ioGor ninrnte-i sanwttuae hBteiescrs.ih t¶pa atr ihAene ,ci rencaeon atrdhrdt eeti nhnpgeair totUiotocn enWis-tissea todloal eftS erndtssaet tetcheilnasin.t, Wethh,a ebhvrueee nta a cntrhheei weeo v nNneleaydtt tihaohnenrr eoslea vhn enadravwste ihao nsen olhsmt et hiygneeagtt-
r
monic nation was liberalist, the backwards England was mercantilist (protectionist). In addition, politically, the Netherlands was not an
ern Japanese Literature; Architecture as Metaphor: Language, Number, Money; and
a absolute monarchy, but rather a republic. The nation’s capital, Amsterdam, was an exceptional city where Descartes and Locke went into
Transcritique: On Kant and Marx. voluntary exile and where Spinoza was able to live in peace. When the Netherlands lost its hegemony, there was a period of political and
bo t economic strife between England and France, who aimed to be its successor; this is referred to as the age of mercantilism. On the other
ok a hand, although the Netherlands was overtaken by England in the latter half of the 18th century in terms of manufacturing, it continued to
SaTnoedpo icgjuralitpu hrMiee sa .ot f tLJhaeip apUnpensiiev teMr soiidst year sonsifos mcCi aaatlniefd op rerndoifiate,o sLrs ooorfs oThAf nem gEoesldseeesnr. tnHia Jlea A piksa unttehasege a alwuitateh.raotru oref /cover d ni miRianmsuga apsi nwsesittrahaai,aagi nJlteia s ihpimsnea k ng.w neY, homaeintwco,d hninf o ytwaht siheen te shhtrehesee,e g sat eathnmaredgeo ea saSns t oa fiiogcfe f el rnci cbeoaoeetfm ipriomaomnlilip iseitmseri jccri inea(al 1la aia8n sins1md0tda - fi tn1ee8nco M7aoot0n fna )cdos.e embA..c Ielftitiic nnew crgeLao , 1 dsmb8 ei7unipfi0t en t,pb hteEieedtnfi o 1opbg9rnlytea h envia nacd stres uiubnoceetucudgesar sahynsm i otsthroot oann dtrga iEect tcinahollgion ncls ahehen aa acdrssoa abcaucte nehreetrinrseisi uveetleisstcdt. sao Th,abf an ltis ihso sLhe viee serdn rirsa—ienelfl e optsrhufrr euepGsdsec e rltrerioiomab rdaeaisitdnn yt,y,hg b,e e tutso hstt at earab agsUlttiehsa. Shoete.r-f,
esig C ochf acrotn wfleiicthtd— thiteht eande doidntieo cnabanl yrsoayw t hoaf t“ tHheisg setmagoen ciacm naet tioo na.n” eThndis i nca ttheeg olartye i1l9lu30stsr wathese nw thhye tUh.eS .r eepsteatbitliivshe esdtr iutsc thuergee bmeocnoym. Ie sin vcilsuibdlee h weriteh tihne a s a1m20e-
Weatherhead Books on asia n: c yiseha rE, mrapthireer itnh athne 6 109-tyhe acre,n stpuarny.. IYte its igt ewnaesr aplrlyio br etloie 1v9e9d0 tthhaatt i tnh teh Ue .1S9.9 w0ass, tah he eUg.eSm. aocnhiice vneadti oonve; rfrwohme ltmhein 1g9 7h0esg,e ams oilnluys tornat tehde b oyr dtheer oref mthoev Balr iot-f
h the dollar from the gold standard, it had entered into a period of economic decline corresponding to the rise of Germany and Japan. After
a
n 1990, the U.S. remained dominant in the realms of finance and commerce, but this is a common experience for a hegemonic nation in
cncuoepWL.uc MoylBouirmakb uian .eidvue r S i t y preSS g jae le columb dintnhae etcni lpoeinornoe-sl,t iceabocset oirilpoalulenisrs otamrtfae ,lt dabeb duino ti rnor. a pDtthpheeoes crsp iaiintsnege wstt hhoheefa i ttSrh oihesvo Nriseetetfie tlBehr rleaoerndclad atn osrde asav scoa onltuhmdte imEo Cnnooganlrla dyen nWodeu.ma tFrwyo pa rwe rtdrhhi oiialsdpe r, p e(oea1na9sor 3ta0nhn-,e c1o 9edn9,o et0mh )seh.e DsoStuoiuclvrd ifie rnlotog ncB tatlh,to eaact dt ahvtniaemdn A ectm,ih nteehg r depi coovamalnirce isiosettuasigc so e saf o odscfov i“acalniliaibcslee tw drpae acllirfasatpmireiet”s a ,an lfnioasdrtt
printed in the u.s.a. ee ia from presenting a threat to world capitalism, worked to supplement and stabilize it. What came to the fore in the advanced capitalist
nations since the 1980s were the policies of Reaganism and Thatcherism, which reduced the taxation and regulation of capital. This is
referred to as neo-liberalism. Such policies, however, do not contradict imperialism. Hannah Arendt claimed that one of the distinguishing
characteristics of imperialism that became clear in the 1880s was that the state was freed from the boundaries of the nation. In other words,
imperialism describes a condition in which the state and capital rush headlong into global competition, even at the cost of sacrificing the
HISTORY AND RE
P
E
TI
TI
O
N
w
e
a
t
h
e
r
h
e
a
d

b
o
o
k
s
o
n

a
s
i
a
W
e
at
her
he
a
d
E
ast
A
si
a
n I
nstit
ute,
C
ol
u
m
bi
a
U
niversity
columbia university press—New York——
NI
A
T
A
R
A
K
N
JI
O
K
HISTORY AND RE
P
E
TI
TI
O
N
e
di
t
e
d
b
y
S
ei
ji
M
.
L
i
p
p
i
t
This publication has been supported by the Richard W. Weatherhead Publication
Fund of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
ecolumbia university press
Publishers Since 1893
new york chichester, west sussex
cup.columbia.edu
Copyright Rekishi to hanpuku by Kojin Karatani © 2004 Kojin Karatani.
Originally published in Japanese by Iwanami shoten, Publishers, 2004
Introduction and translation copyright © 2012 Columbia University Press
All rights reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Karatani, Kojin, 1941–
[Rekishi to hanpuku. English]
History and repetition / Kojin Karatani ; Edited by Seiji M. Lippit.
p. cm. — (Weatherhead books on Asia)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-231-15728-5 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-231-15729-2
(pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-231-52865-8 (e-book)
1. Historiography. 2. Japan—History—1868—Historiography.
I. Lippit, Seiji M. II. Title.
D13.K2913 2011
952.0072—dc22 2011012631
Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and
durable acid-free paper.
This book is printed on paper with recycled content.
Printed in the United States of America
c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
p 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
S
T
N
E
T
N
O
C
Author’s Preface to the English Edition—vii
Editor’s Introduction: On Repetition, Singularity, and Historicity—xv
1. Introduction:
On Th e Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
1
2. History and Repetition in Japan
29
3. Th e Discursive Space of Modern Japan
47
4. Th e Allegory of Ōe Kenzaburō:
Football in the Year Man’en 1
87
5. Th e Landscape of Murakami Haruki:
Pinball in the Year 1973
Translated by Hisayo Suzuki
117
6. Th e End of the Modern Novel
Translated by Michael K. Bourdaghs
151
7. Buddhism and Fascism
173
Glossary—211
Works Cited—223
Index —235
author’s preface to the english edition
From ancient times, it has been said that history repeats
itself. In truth, people study history precisely because it is not a
onetime phenomenon but rather maintains the possibility of
recurrence. For example, historians oft en say that those who are
ignorant of history are doomed to repeat it. Does that mean,
then, that those who have knowledge of history will be able to
avoid its recurrence? Does the repetition of history actually
exist? Such questions have never been properly considered. For
even if they intuitively acknowledge the repetition of history,
scholars, aspiring to be scientifi c, refrain from taking on the
issue for fear of rendering their work unscientifi c. I believe in
the existence of historical repetition, as well as in the possibility
of engaging such repetition scientifi cally. Of course, what is
repeated is not the event itself but rather the structure. In a pro-
cess of structural repetition, an event may at times also appear
to be repeated. One should not be swayed by the similarity of
historical events, however, for it is only the structure that recurs.
I wrote most of the essays contained in this volume in the
environment that existed around 1989. It was a time when an
age was coming to an end, as symbolized by the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the death of the Shōwa emperor in Japan.
Around this time, I became aware of a correspondence between
the events of the Shōwa period [1926–1989] and the events of
the Meiji period [1868–1912] in Japan. Th at realization formed
the genesis of these essays. Th is type of correspondence does
not represent a random coincidence, I thought. For clearly it
conceals within it a geopolitical structure distinctive to East
Asia as well as to the structure of the modern world system. Yet
it is actually diffi cult to directly engage this type of repetitive
structure. Historians and sociologists tend to avoid it. On the
viii author’s preface to the english edition
other hand, the major novelists of contemporary Japan all the-
matized the repetitive quality of modern Japan. For this reason,
I first wrote these essays in the form of literary criticism.
These essays were written entirely within the Japanese con-
text, for a Japanese readership. At the same time, I realized that
these issues were not limited to Japan. Consequently, in order
to take up the problem in a more universal context, I appended
the essay on Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
to the beginning of the volume. In general, Marx’s view of his-
tory is based on stages of development, and thus it appears
unrelated to the question of repetition. In fact, however, Marx
actually thought deeply about the structure of repetition. The
repetitive structure that he discerned in Capital was the busi-
ness cycle, and especially the economic crisis, distinctive to the
capitalist economy. On the other hand, in The Eighteenth Bru-
maire, Marx deals mainly with the repetitive structure unique to
the state. In a certain sense, the latter is more important than the
former.
After entering the 1990s, however, I stopped writing about
these issues. For one thing, increasing numbers of people
pointed out the return of the prewar period and the repetition
of the 1930s. Yet conversely, I began gradually to think that this
type of perspective was incorrect. For example, the “economy
of grand space” [Grossraumwirtschaft] proclaimed in 1930s Ger-
many or the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere pro-
claimed in Japan were, in a certain sense, repeated in the 1990s.
The obvious example is the European Union, but in East Asia as
well the plan of an economic and political community has been
raised from a variety of perspectives. To that extent, one can
indeed discern a type of repetitiveness. At the same time, how-
ever, it cannot be denied that such phenomena are far different
from those of the prewar period. For these reasons, I was dissat-
isfied with the contents of this book, which was essentially
based on a 1980s consciousness. But I soon realized that there
was no need to make any fundamental corrections; instead,
what was required was to see the repetitiveness of history in a
span not of 60 years but of 120 years.
author’s preface to the english edition ix
In truth, the situation following 1990 resembled less the sit-
uation of 60 years ago than that of 120 years ago. The politics
and economics of post-1990 have been referred to as “neoliber-
alism,” but they are, in fact, quite similar to those of post-1870
imperialism. For example, many today are surprised by the
emergence of China, India, and Russia as great powers, but
when the situation is compared with the world of 120 years ago,
there is no great reason for surprise. People are conscious of and
try to avoid the repetition of 60 years ago, but when it comes to
120 years ago, they are not even aware of the repetition.
In East Asia, for example, there is no doubt that the prob-
lems of the prewar period still cast shadows on relations
between China, Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan.
Focusing only on this, however, we may overlook just how dif-
ferent the present is from the prewar period. China, which then
lay in a fragmented state, exposed to imperialist invasion, has by
now become a political and economic giant. The same can be
said of Taiwan, South Korea, and North Korea. If anything, it is
better to go back to the 1880s in order to understand the present
circumstances. At the time, the Qing dynasty was a world
empire of massive scale. In the peripheral country of Japan, the
old system was overthrown, opening the country to the outside.
In response, the Yi dynasty in Korea suppressed pro-Japanese
anti-isolationists, attempting to maintain its closed-country
policy with the Qing dynasty as suzerain state. Ultimately, this
led to confrontation between Japan and the Qing dynasty—
that is, to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/1895. The institutions
of the modern nation-state and industrial capitalism were estab-
lished in Japan, which was in the process of a conversion to
imperialism. At the same time, by this point the Qing dynasty
not only was massive but possessed modern military arms. As a
result, at the time of the Sino-Japanese War the Japanese were
quite fearful of the Qing dynasty. Seen in this light, the current
state of affairs much more closely resembles that of the 1880s
than the 1930s. The current political tensions in East Asia—
including those surrounding Taiwan, which Japan colonized as
a result of the Sino-Japanese War—have their origins in the