Hiding in Plain Sight—The US Navy and Dispersed Operations under EMCON, 1956–1972

18 Pages·2017·0.2 MB·English

Naval War College Review
Volume 64
Article 6
Number 2Spring
2011
Hiding in Plain Sight—The U.S. Navy and
Dispersed Operations under EMCON,
1956–1972
Robert G. Angevine
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Recommended Citation
Angevine, Robert G. (2011) "Hiding in Plain Sight—The U.S. Navy and Dispersed Operations under EMCON, 1956–1972,"Naval
War College Review: Vol. 64 : No. 2 , Article 6.
Available at:https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss2/6
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HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT
The U.S. Navy and Dispersed Operations under EMCON,
1956–1972
Robert G.Angevine
T
heabilitytooperatefreely,unthreatenedbyadversariesseekingtotrackand
targetthemorinterferewiththeircommunications,thattheU.S.Navy’sair-
craftcarriershaveenjoyedforthelasttwodecadesisunlikelytocontinue.China
has been developing an antiaccess/area-denial capability,centered on antiship
ballisticmissiles,thatmaysoonbeabletolocateandattackU.S.carriersatcon-
1
siderabledistances. TheChinesePeople’sLiberationArmyhasalsodeveloped
conceptsforinformationwarfarethatintegratecomputernetworkoperations,
electronicwarfare,andkineticstrikestodegradeanopponent’sabilitytocollect,
2
process,anddisseminateinformation. Ifcombinedeffectively,antishipballistic
missiles and attacks on information networks could endanger the U.S.Navy’s
3
commandofthesea.
Although the specific problems presented by antiship ballistic missiles and
informationwarfarearenew,thebroaderoperationalchallengesarenot.During
the Cold War, the threat posed by Soviet naval aviation and submarines
promptedtheU.S.Navytostageanumberof experimentsexaminingthecon-
Dr.AngevineistheauthorofTheRailroadandthe duct of dispersed operations at sea. Spreading out
State:War,Politics,andTechnologyin19th-Century across a wide area, it was believed, would make U.S.
America(2004)andarticlesonmilitaryapproachesto
naval forces harder to detect, identify, and target. In
technology,navalexperimentation,andAmericanmil-
itary and naval intelligence. He received his PhD in order to lessen the chance of detection further, the
militaryhistoryfromDukeUniversityin1999andcur-
U.S. forces in the experiments strictly limited their
rently works as a defense analyst in the Washington
communications. Dispersed operations under emis-
area.HehastaughtatDuke,American,andGeorge
MasonUniversitiesandnowservesasadjunctassistant sion control (EMCON) represented a significant de-
professor of history at George Washington University.
parture from more active and overt methods of
operation and posed new operational challenges.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2
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80 NAVALWARNCOavLaLlE WGEarR CEVolIlEegWe Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 2, Art. 6
NavyexperimentsliketheHAYSTACKandUPTIDEseriesthereforeoffercollec-
tivelyanexcellentopportunitytostudyorganizationaladaptationandchangein
responsetonewtechnologiesandthreatsandtoconsidertheconductofdistrib-
utedoperationsintheabsenceofanetwork.
THE U.S. NAVY IN THE 1950S
OneoftheprimarychallengesfacingtheU.S.NavyintheearlyyearsoftheCold
Warwashowtoemployitscommandoftheseatoinfluenceeventsashore.The
SovietUnionwasessentiallyalandpower;itdidnotpossessafleetcapableof
challengingAmericanmaritimesupremacy.Instead,AmericanandWesternEu-
ropean policy makers expected a land attack against Western Europe and the
Middle East to constitute the Soviets’principal offensive thrust in any future
4
conflict. As early as 1948, the U.S. Navy began envisaging an offensive strike
5
forcethatwouldseektoslowtheSovietgroundadvanceacrossWesternEurope.
By1956,thecarriersoftheNavy’sMediterranean-basedSixthFleetweretasked
withnotonlyslowinganySovietattackheadedwestandsouthbutalsostriking
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keytargetsinthesouthernEuropeanpartoftheSovietUnion.
Inorderfortheiraircrafttoreachtheirtargets,however,theSixthFleet’scar-
riershadtomoveintotheeasternMediterranean,closetotheSovietUnion,and
survivetherelongenoughtoconductlaunchoperations.Inthemid-1950s,the
carriers’chancesofdoingsoappearedslim.Aseriesofair-defenseexercisesover
theprecedingyearshaddemonstratedthefleet’sinabilitytodefenditselfagainst
7
evenrelativelysmallSovietairraids. In1956,AdmiralJohnH.Cassady,Com-
mander in Chief,U.S.Naval Forces,Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean,con-
ceded in his annual report, “It is widely recognized that a carrier task force
cannotprovideforitsairdefenseunderconditionslikelytoexistincombatin
8
theMediterranean.”
TheHaystackConcept
When Vice Admiral Harry Felt assumed command of Sixth Fleet in 1956,the
fleet’s ability to perform its primary mission was therefore questionable. Per-
haps as a consequence,Sixth Fleet had the reputation of being a social rather
thananoperationalfleet.Feltsoughttochangethatreputationandimprovethe
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effectivenessofhisnewcommandbyinfusingthefleet’sstaffwithnewblood.
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OneoftheyoungofficersFeltbroughtinwasLieutenantJeremiahDenton.
Denton’s background was in lighter-than-air aviation and electronic warfare.
Hehadtestedlargeairborneradarsinblimpsandservedastheprojectofficerfor
theWV-2,oneoftheNavy’sfirstairborne-early-warningradaraircraft.Denton
thuspossessedasolidunderstandingofairdefenseoperations,Sovietaerialat-
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tackcapabilities,andairborneradarsystems.
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Drawingonhisextensiveexperiencelookingatradarscopes,Dentonhadde-
velopedanideaof howtoextendthesurvivaltimeof theSixthFleet’scarriers
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duringageneralwar. HejoinedforceswithRalphBeatty,theOperationsEval-
uationGroupanalystattachedtoSixthFleet,whohadbeenworkingonmathe-
maticaltechniquesforcalculatinghowafleetofaircraftcouldfindacarrierina
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backgroundofsimilartargets.Together,theybegandevelopingthenewconcept.
Denton and Beatty argued that the Soviet bombers’greatest challenge was
findingandidentifyingtheSixthFleet’scarriers.Thefleetshouldthereforedo
everything in its power to “thwart and delay” recognition of the carriers. It
should disperse widely and intermingle with commercial shipping in order to
eliminatetheunmistakableappearanceonairborneradarscopesofthestandard
close,circular(“bull’s-eye”)formation.Allnearbysupportingunits,including
thedestroyersservingasplaneguardsandscreeningthecarriersagainstsubma-
rines, should disperse, and the carriers should operate independently. Strict
controlof allelectronicemissionsandthewidespreaduseof deceptionwould
increasetheeffectivenessoftheconcept,whichDentondubbed“Haystack,”be-
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causeofitsemphasisonmakingthecarriersdifficulttofind.
WhenFeltleftSixthFleetafterjustsixmonthstobecomeViceChiefofNaval
Operations,hemadeapointofpraisingDenton,Beatty,andtheHaystackcon-
ceptinfrontofhissuccessor,ViceAdmiralCharles“Cat”Brown,andtheentire
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SixthFleetstaff. UnderBrown’scommand,SixthFleetbeganconductingex-
perimentstotesttheHaystackconcept.Small-scaletestsbeganinOctober1956.
TheHAYSTACKExercises
The first major exercise testing the Haystack concept,HAYSTACK CHARLIE,was
conducted in January 1957 in the Mediterranean Sea about a hundred miles
westofSardinia.Theprimaryobjectiveofthetwo-dayexercisewas“totestthe
effectivenessoftacticaldeceptionasamethodofstrikingforceairdefense.”The
exercisepittedtwoaircraftcarriers,USSCoralSea(CVA43)andUSSRandolph
(CVA15),theirescorts,andtheirlogisticalsupportshipsagainstaconventional
submarineandland-basedsnooperandattackaircraftflyingoutofNaplesand
Malta.Thecarriers,whichoperatedupto250milesapart,conductedsimulated
nuclear strikes against wartime targets and then retired, while the aggressor
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forcetriedtofindandattackthemassoonaspossible.
Theexerciseresultssuggestedthattacticaldeceptionwaseffective.Thecarri-
erswereabletoavoiddetectionlongenoughtolaunchthirtytothirty-fivesimu-
lated atomic strikes each day before being “attacked” by “aggressor” aircraft.
Smallgroupsofshipswereemployedeffectivelyasdecoys;theyattractedattacks
fromseveralaircraftsearchingforthecarriers.Inparticular,theguided-missile
cruiser USS Boston (CAG 1) and two destroyers acted as an effective “missile
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trap”earlyintheexercise,shootingdownseveralsnooperaircrafttryingtoin-
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vestigatethethreecloselypackedradarblips.
Theresultsindicated,however,thattheHaystackconceptwasstillimperfect.
Destroyerswerefrequentlytooclosetothecarriers.Thethreedestroyersescort-
ingCoralSeawerewithintenmilesof thecarrierwhentheexercisebegan,en-
abling a snooper aircraft to detect the carrier in the first five minutes. The
destroyersaccompanying Randolphremainedmore distant,buttheywere still
close enough to attract attention from snooper aircraft soon after the exercise
started.Aircraftalsotendedtooperate tooclose tothe carriers.Aggressorair-
craftattackedRandolphafterinterceptingtheradarofanantisubmarinepatrol
planecirclingthecarrier.Asnooperaircraftalsodetectedtheradarsignalofan
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airborne-early-warningplaneoperatingnearacarrier.
HAYSTACKDELTA,aseventeen-hourexercise,washeldon2March1957inthe
MediterraneanSeasoutheastofMaltaandSicily.Theexerciseemphasizedpas-
sive air defense using traps and decoy groups. It matched two carriers, USS
Forrestal(CVA59)andUSSLakeChamplain(CVA39),againsttwoconventional
submarines and land-based attack, snooper, and electronic countermeasure
19
(ECM)aircraftoperatingoutofNaplesandMalta.
The exercise results again suggested that tactical deception was successful.
The strike aircraft experienced significant problems identifying targets due to
heavy cloud cover and squalls,careful emission control,and deceptive forma-
tions.Learningfrompastexercises,thedestroyersinHAYSTACKDELTAremained
fartherawayfromthecarriersandoftenpairedwithothershipstosimulatecar-
riers.Theeightaggressorstrikesdetectedthirteenpossiblemilitarytargets,but
only one correctly identified a carrier (Forrestal) and its plane guard. Three
strikesdetectedBostonandtwoaccompanyingdestroyers,whichwerestationed
intheexpecteddirectionofattackinordertodrawstrikesawayfromthecarri-
ers,andclosedtoinvestigateorattack.Twootherstrikesattackedoilers,which
20
werepairedwithdestroyersandbeingusedasdecoysforthefirsttime.
Emissioncontrolalsoprovedeffective.Onlyradarpicketdestroyersandsec-
torair-defenseships,notcarriers,usednavigationaids.TheaggressorECMair-
craft located the task force’s operating area but could not locate or identify
individual units, due to the suppression of electronic signals characteristic of
21
particularships.
Inordertoexperimentwiththeuseofislandstohindertheidentificationof
surfaceunitsbyaggressoraircraft,thevenueforHAYSTACKECHOwasmovedto
the Aegean Sea. The exercise, which was held from 9 to 11 April 1957, pitted
Forrestal, Lake Champlain, and their escorts against two submarines and
land-based snooper, ECM, and attack aircraft operating from Athens. The
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primaryobjective,again,wastopracticetacticalcontrolandairdefenseinadis-
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perseddisposition.
Postexercise analysis was to indicate that it had not realistically tested the
Haystackconcept,becauseoftherequirementfornighttimeairoperationsand
theconsequentneedforthecarrierstoemployplaneguardsandtacticalairnav-
igation systems (TACANs). An aggressor ECM aircraft had intercepted Lake
Champlain’sTACANemissionsshortlyaftertheexercisebeganandvectoredin
snooperaircrafttotrackthecarrierandstrikeaircrafttoattackit.Theinitialtwo
attacks had been successful, as were two later strikes; snooper aircraft had
tracked Lake Champlain almost continuously for the rest of the exercise.
Forrestalhadbeendetectedvisuallyat7:14AMon10Aprilandhadbeentracked
continuously thereafter, although it had not been attacked successfully until
3:01PM.ECMaircrafthadalsodetectedandsuccessfullyattackedthecarrierson
severalotheroccasionsduringtheexercise.Theanalysisconcluded,“Aircontrol
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withouttheuseofTACANbycarriersisessential.”
OtherattemptsatdeceptioninHAYSTACKECHOwereonlymoderatelysuc-
cessful.TheheavycruiserSalem(CA139)andtwodestroyersdecoyedsnooper
aircraftintoshadowingthemforseveralhours,untildaybreakrevealedthatthe
groupwasnotacarrieranditsescorts.Themanyislandsintheoperatingarea,
however,didnotappeartohindertheaggressorforce’sabilitytofindthecarri-
ers. Instead, they complicated the task force’s efforts to defend itself. Land-
locking of radars (the tendency of radar return from landmasses to mask
contactsaroundthem)severelyhandicappedtheabilityofthetaskforcetode-
tectaggressoraircraftandcontrolitsownaircraft.Moreover,oncethecarriers
anddecoygroupswerelocated,theywereunabletorelocatequickly.Theaggres-
24
sorscouldthusignorethedecoysandconcentratetheireffortsonthecarriers.
The purpose of the Haystack concept was to develop tactics that would ex-
tendthesurvivaltimeofU.S.carriersintheMediterraneanduringtheinitialpe-
riod of a nuclear exchange. After the conclusion of HAYSTACK ECHO, Brown
declared the exercises a success. In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO)thatalsowenttoallthemajorcommandsintheNavy,Brownclaimed,
“Haystack tactics have been proved effective in increasing the critical survival
time available for launching counter strikes against aggressor bases under to-
25
day’swarconditionsinthisarea.” Whentheexerciseseriesbegan,theexpected
survival time for carriers in the Mediterranean had been less than two hours.
DuringHAYSTACKCHARLIE,DELTA,andECHO,thecarriers,withoneexception,
survivedforatleasteighthours;half of the participating carrierssurvivedfor
26
over fifteen hours. Extending the survival time of the carriers by even a few
hoursgavethemenoughtimetohitSovietairfieldsandports,therebyreducing
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thethreattheyfacedthereafter.“Aseachhourwithoutattackpasses,”Brownex-
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plained,“thechancesofcontinuedsurvivalincreasesmanyfold.”
THE U.S. NAVY IN THE 1960S
The Sixth Fleet focused most of its attention on the threat posed by Soviet
long-rangeaviationinpartbecausetherewasnosignificantSovietnavalpres-
enceoutsidehomewatersatthetime.Inthemid-1950sSovietsurfacecombat-
ants started to visit foreign ports occasionally, and they began conducting
annual exercises in the North and Norwegian Seas in the late 1950s,but there
werestillrelativelyfewSovietsubmarinesoperatingintheMediterranean.The
commander of the Sixth Fleet from 1958 to 1959, Vice Admiral Clarence E.
28
Ekstrom,feltthesubmarinethreatfacingSixthFleetwas“quitemanageable.”
ThedevelopersoftheHaystackconceptexpectedthatdispersingthedestroy-
ersscreeningthecarrierwouldincreasethecarrier’svulnerabilitytosubmarine
attackbutconsideredtheriskacceptableinareaswherethesubmarineconcen-
29
trationwasloworwhentheairthreatexceededthesubmarinethreat. By1961
they were confident that the combination of dispersion,deception,and emis-
sioncontrolwouldenableU.S.carrierstosurviveagainstenemysubmarineat-
tack long enough to conduct their retaliatory nuclear strikes,even in areas of
relativelyhighconcentrationsofsubmarines,solongasthosesubmarineswere
conventionallypowered.Beattyestimatedthatacarriercouldsurviveforanav-
erage of five days in a ten-thousand-square-mile area containing two conven-
30
tionalsubmarines.
Theintroductionofthenuclear-poweredsubmarineinthemid-1950s,how-
31
ever,revolutionizedunderseawarfare. ThefirstSovietnuclearsubmarinesbe-
ganenteringservicein1958andsoonthreatenedtorendertheHaystacktactics
obsolete.Bytheearly1960sleadingNavyofficialswereincreasinglyfocusedon
howtocounterthepotentialthreatofnuclearsubmarines.Apaper,“TheStrate-
gic Concept for Antisubmarine Warfare,” circulated by the CNO, Admiral
Arleigh Burke,identified hostile submarine activities as “foremost among the
32
threatstoouruseoftheseas.”
Compoundingthechallengewastheequippingof nuclearsubmarineswith
antishipcruisemissiles.Asearlyas1960,RearAdmiralJimmyThach,oneofthe
Navy’sleadingantisubmarinewarfare(ASW)experts,predictedthatsubmarine
forceswouldincreasinglyrelyonmissilesastheirprimaryweapons,evenagainst
33
shipping. The Soviet Echo II class, a nuclear-powered submarine equipped
witheightSS-N-3A(Shaddock)missiles,enteredservicein1962.TheSS-N-3A
missile was,withthe exception of certain aircraft,the longest-rangedantiship
weaponintheworld;itwascapableofstrikingtargetsatseafromadistanceof
250nauticalmiles.SincethetypicaldefensiveperimeterofanAmericancarrier
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battlegroupextendedonlyahundrednauticalmilesfromthecenter,anEchoII
could remain outside the perimeter and potentially launch an attack unde-
tected.AfteranexercisetotestperformanceagainstSovietnuclearsubmarines
firing“standoff”missiles,oneU.S.Navycommanderconcluded,“Itisevident
34
thattheforcewouldhavehadessentiallynocapabilityagainstsuchanattack.”
Althoughthecruisemissile–firingsubmarinepresenteddangers,italsohad
weaknesses.Itschiefproblemwasdetectingandidentifyingitstargetswhilepre-
servingitsownstealth.AsBeattyobserved,“Theabilityofasubmarinetoiden-
tify carriers by sonar alone in large dispersed dispositions is poor. Visual
35
identificationisusuallynecessary.” Herecommendedtestingtheeffectiveness
of dispersed formations against nuclear submarines and placing an increased
emphasisonthedevelopmentofacousticdeceptiontacticsandequipment,par-
36
ticularlyexpendableacousticdecoys.
TheUPTIDEConcept
Bythelate1960s,theNavyincreasinglyemphasizedimprovingitsabilitytode-
fendagainstmissile-firingnuclearsubmarines.InJune1968,thecommanderin
chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral John J. Hyland, initiated Project UPTIDE
(Unified Pacific Fleet Project for Tactical Improvement and Data Extraction).
OneoftheprimaryobjectivesofUPTIDEwastodeviseandevaluatetacticsPa-
cificFleetantisubmarinewarfaregroups(typicallyanASWcarrier,itsairwing,
andadestroyersquadron)couldusetofrustrateanddefendagainstmissileand
torpedoattacksbyenemysubmarineswithinmovingorstaticareasofhightac-
37
ticalinterest.
The driving force behind the UPTIDE series was Vice Admiral E.P.“Pete”
Aurand.Aninnovatorandiconoclast,Aurandsuggestedshiftingthefocusofthe
ASWeffortfromkillingsubmarinestoreducingtheireffectivenessbyprevent-
38
ingencounters. EchoingBeatty,Aurandarguedthatalthoughthenuclearsub-
marine was very fast and could remain submerged indefinitely, it was still
essentially blind. An unassisted submarine relied heavily on passive acoustic
sensorstodetect,classify,track,andlocalizecarriersandotherhigh-valuetar-
gets.Degradingtheinformationthesubmarinereceivedcouldsignificantlyre-
duceitseffectiveness.
TheUPTIDEexperimentsfocusedonreducingtheprobabilitiesthatthesub-
marine would detect, identify, and localize its target. The probability that the
submarinewoulddetectitstargetcouldbereducedbystrictacousticandelec-
tromagnetic emission control. Aurand may have drawn inspiration from his
previousobservationofSovietnavaloperationsintheSeaofJapan.Aurandhad
noticed that Soviet radar antennas neither rotated nor emitted.He speculated
thattheSovietnavy’spolicywastoleaveitsradarsturnedoffunlesstherewasno
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other way to obtain desired information.Although it denied the Soviets early
warning,Aurandbelieved,“suchapolicyhasmerit,especiallywhencompared
to the predominant practice of most U.S. ships to emit constantly.” He con-
cluded, “Finesse in the handling of emitters, electronic, visual, and acoustic
39
shouldbedevelopedbyourships,especiallyinthevicinityofSovietships.”
Theprobabilitythatthesubmarinewouldsuccessfullyidentifyadetectedtar-
getcouldbedecreasedthroughacousticdeception.Theprobabilitythatthesub-
marine would localize it (i.e., close to within range of its weapons) could be
diminished by forcing the submarine to move slowly,by deploying good pas-
siveacousticsystemsinallantisubmarinevehicles,especiallyhelicoptersand
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destroyers.
TheUPTIDEExperiments
Project UPTIDE developed in three phases from January 1969 to November
1972.Ineachphase,anASWgroupexaminedvariousdimensionsof thechal-
41
lengepresentedbynuclearsubmarinesfiringcruisemissiles. Thepurposeof
Phase I was to lay the foundation for Phases II and III by exploring the broad
outlinesoftheproblem,refiningtheexperimentaldesignandmethodology,and
developingproceduresforprocessingandanalyzingdata.Itexaminedthesitua-
tionfromtheperspectiveoftheenemysubmarineandderiveddataonthesub-
marine’scapabilitiestodetect,identify,andfireitsmissilesathigh-valuetargets.
PhaseIalsoestablishedabaselineforcomparisonof conventionalantisubma-
42
rinewarfaretacticswithUPTIDEtactics.
Phase I consisted of three continuous free-play experiments (each a
Hunter-Killer Antisubmarine Warfare Exercise, or HUKASWEX), which took
placefromJanuarytoMarch1969.Ineachexercise,USSKearsarge(CVS33),its
aircraft, and Destroyer Squadron 23, constituting Antisubmarine Warfare
Group1,triedtodefendKearsargeagainsttwoopposingsubmarineswithsimu-
lated cruise-missile capabilities.The submarines participating in Phase I were
USSPomodon(SS486)andMedregal(SS480)forHUKASWEX1-69andUSS
Snook(SSN592)andScamp(SSN588)forHUKASWEX2-69and3-69.There-
sults of Phase I underscored the magnitude of the threat posed by the
cruise-missilesubmarineandestablishedthekeymetricthatwouldbeusedin
PhaseII—thesurvivaltimeofthecarrier.In144exercisehours,thesubmarines
conductedthreetorpedoattacksandnineteenlauncheventssimulatingthefir-
ingofseventy-eightmissilesatthecarrier.Eighty-sevenpercentofthemissiles
werejudgedtohavemetthebearingparametersforacquisitionoftheirtargets.
43
Theaveragesurvivaltimeofthecarrierwasninehours.
PhaseIIwasthemajordata-collectionandtactical-evaluationphaseofProj-
ect UPTIDE.It consisted of four major experiments from September 1969 to
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January1971.Theexperimentsweredevotedtoexaminingtheeffectivenessof
dispersion, acoustic and electromagnetic emission control, simulation of the
high-valuetargetbysurfaceescorts,andactiveacousticdeceptionagainstcruise
missile–firing submarines in a scenario involving a carrier operating within a
44
fixedareaandsimulatingthelaunchingofstrikeaircraft.
The initial Phase II experiment,UPTIDE 2-B,took place in late September
andearlyOctober1969andpittedAntisubmarineWarfareGroup3—consisting
ofUSSHornet(CVS12),itsaircraft,andDestroyerSquadron31—againstUSS
Sculpin(SSN590)andRazorback(SS394).Byemployingadispersedformation,
steamingbelowpropellercavitationspeed(i.e.,thespeedatwhichthecollapse
of bubblesbehindthebladesbecomesdetectablyloud),controllingemissions,
andusingescortsas“wolf trap”unitstolurethesubmarinesaway,Hornetwas
able to avoid identification for the entire seven-day exercise. The submarines
were deceived, lured, or confused for the majority of the exercise and spent
nearlyalltherestofthetimeinunproductivesearches.Towardtheendoftheex-
ercise,infrustration,Sculpinusedstrategicinformationtofireaspreadofeight
missilesatarangeoftwohundredmiles.Significantly,twoofthemcouldhave
metthebearingparameterstoacquireHornet.Nevertheless,thecommanderof
Antisubmarine Warfare Group 3 described the exercise as “an unprecedented
success against the undersea adversary by an ASW group using a totally new
concept in communications, formations, tactics, deception, and electronic/
45
acousticemissioncontrol.”
UPTIDE2-C,heldinJanuaryandFebruary1970,markedtheintroductionof
a new tactical element—the acoustic deception device.The minesweeper USS
Leader(MSO490)wasequippedwithanactiveacousticsimulatorcalled“Ter-
giversator,”developedbytheNavalUnderwaterSoundCenterinNewLondon,
Connecticut.Tergiversatortransmittedintothewatercarrierandescortpropul-
sion noises and active sonar transmissions. Working together, Leader and the
guided-missilecruiserUSSChicago(CG11)wereabletodeceivethesubmarines
USSPlunger(SSN595)andSnook.Afterlisteningtothedeceptiondevice’sout-
putforthreehours,Plungerconcludedthatitwasaheavywarshipandfiredtwo
missilesatit.Meanwhile,Hornetwasabletosurviveundetectedforeighty-seven
hours. Only when the carrier operated independently at high speed were the
46
submarinessuccessfulinmakingacoordinatedmissileattack.
Thenumberandrangeofacousticdeceptiondevicesexpandedsignificantly
inUPTIDE2-D,whichwasheldinOctober1970.Sevendeviceswereemployed,
including an updated version of Tergiversator; two SADSAC (Small Acoustic
Device Simulating a Carrier) buoys, developed by the Naval Underwater Re-
searchandDevelopmentCenter;andfourNYVOs(Nymph’sVoices),developed
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011 9
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